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Introduction 
 
The Research Problem 
 
Being a ―middle size state‖1 and a ―regional power‖2 with global ambitions occupying a 
highly strategic peculiar position,
3
 Republic of Turkey is a member of North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the sole candidate of the European Union (EU) with a predominant 
Muslim population passionate for the full membership. The unique feature of Turkey lays on 
the fact that it is a democratic, secular state, at the same time among the best allies of the 
West in the region that situates at the very heart of trouble zones encompassed with Balkans, 
the Middle East and Caucasus.
4
 Due to its geographic location between the ―East and West‖,5 
it gives an easy access to strategically important regions and major energy resources. Besides, 
thanks to its character as a modern country, culturally, Turkey stands as a bridge between the 
West and Islam.
6
 Henceforth, Turkey as a geopolitical and geostrategic center has constantly 
occupied a prior level agenda in region politics. 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AK Parti, AKP, eng. JDP 
hereinafter: AK Party)
7
 entered to Turkish political scene at the year of 2001 under the 
leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.8 Shortly after its establishment, the Party swept the 
victory at the general elections held in 2002 while major center parties that ruled the country 
for decades failed to pass ten percentage thresholds.
9
 AK Party formed the government and 
                                                 
1
 Baskın Oran, „TDP’nin Kuramsal Çerçevesi‖ („Theoretical Framework of Turkish Foreign Policyv‖) 
Baskın Oran (ed.) Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy) İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2001, p. 30. 
2
 Gökhan Bacık, Bülent Aras, ―Turkey‘s Inescapable Dilemma: America or Europe?‖, Alternatives: 
Turkish Journal of  International Relations, 2004, Vol. III, No. 1,  p. 56. 
3
 ―The New Ottomans?‖, Aljazeera English, 16 June 2011. 
4
 Graham Fuller, ―Turkey‘s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities‖, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 
2004, pp. 51-54. 
5
 Maciej Herbut, ―Turcja między wschodem a zachodem‖, (―Turkey between the East and the West‖), 
in Teresa Łoś-Nowak Teresa (ed.), Polityka zagraniczna: aktorzy – potencjały – strategie (Foreign Policy: 
Actors – Potencials – Strategies), Poltext, Warsaw 2011, pp. 312-330. 
6
 Hasan Bağcı, Şaban Kardaş, ―Post September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey 
Revisited‖, CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels 2003, p. 20. 
7
 The acronym of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) since its 
establishment in 2001 has been a theme of discussion in Turkish domestic politics. In accordance with the 
official party records given by the Ministry of Interior, the acronym of the party is ―AK Parti.‖ In Turkish the 
word ―Ak‖ means white and clean; that refers a clear reference to the party image of uncorrupted character. 
Instead of AK Parti, however, many scholars (and most political opponents) insist on using AKP, which is a 
misnomer. In the course of the dissertation all acronyms are going to be applied to avoid engaging into similar 
debates and to secure neutrality of the dissertation. 
8
 ―History of the Justice and Development Party‖, (source:www.akparti.com.tr,  
http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/index.html>, October 2011). 
9
 Soner Çağatay, ―The November 2002 Elections and Turkey's New Political Era‖, Middle East Review 
of International Affairs Journal, Vol. VI, No. 4, December 2002, p. 46. 
 4 
hitherto ruled Turkey gaining all legislative and local elections held since 2002 with an 
increasing vote percentage.
10
 
In the course of Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011, 
foreign policy outlook of the Party formed by Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu who is appreciated 
as the architect and mastermind of AKP‘s foreign policy concept.11 Ankara, in accordance 
with foreign policy doctrines of Davutoğlu, proposing a ―Zero Problem‖ principle with 
Turkish vicinity, matured immensely close affiliations and solidarity in terms of politic, 
economy, commerce, trade and diplomatic sphere with the Middle East, Eurasia, Balkans and 
South Caucasus contrariwise to secluded structure of Turkey‘s established foriegn policy 
tendency towards the regions.
12
 Additionally, under the framework of Professor Davutoğlu‘s 
vision,
13
 AK Party advanced a proactive rhythmic diplomacy with Turkey‘s neighborhood, 
while putting forward the geopolitical and geostrategic role of Turkey trough the rehearsal of 
―Strategic Depth‖ theory. 14         
 Since Justice and Development Party came to power, Ankara has acquired the general 
secretary position of Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), assumed an observer 
status at the Arab League, joined the G-20 group of the largest world economies, held a non-
permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, appointed an Assistant 
Secretary General of NATO, as well as a Secretary General of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) while sought seats on the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) along with World Bank executive boards.
15
 Accordingly, the new multifaceted 
foreign policy involvement of the Republic of Turkey under the AKP rule toward the 
Ottoman periphery and Muslim world, had magnetized the concerns that gave rise to 
tempestuous controversies both domestically and abroad. Notwithstanding to the fact Justice 
and Development Party high rank charter members repeatedly notified that they have changed 
their political views as refer to their Islamist past publicly, preferring to use ―Conservative 
                                                 
10
 Soner Çağatay, ―The AKP‘s Overwhelming Victory‖, Foriegn Affairs, June 2011. 
11
 Gürkan Zengin, Hoca: Türk Dış Politikası'nda Davutoğlu Etkisi (Teacher: Impact of Davutoğlu on 
Turkey’s Foreign Policy), İnkilap Yayınları, İstanbul 2010, pp.1-10. 
12
 Bülent Aras, ―Davutoğlu Era Period in Turkish Foreign Policy‖, Insight Turkey, Vol: 11, No.3, pp. 
127-142. 
13
 Justyna Głowska, ―Koncepcja strategicznej głębi (Stratejik Derinlik) jako nowa doktryna polityki 
zagranicznej Turcji‖ (―The Concept of Strategic Depth (Stratejik Derinlik) as a New Foreign Policy Doctrine of 
Turkey‖), Stosunki Międzynarodowe, (source: www.stosunki.pl,  
<http://www.stosunki.pl/?q=content/koncepcja-strategicznej-g%C5%82%C4%99bi-stratejik-derinlik-jako-nowa-
doktryna-polityki-zagranicznej-tu>, December 2011). 
14
 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik; Türkiyenin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: 
International Location of Turkey), Küre Yayınları, İstanbul 2001, pp. 1-23. 
15
 Caroll Migdalovitz, ―Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S.View‘s‖, Congressional 
Research Service, November 2010, p. 6. 
 5 
Democracy‖16 as the identity of new political formation. Yet, a number of foreign policy 
analysts, experts, observers and critics have judged the very new foreign policy engagement 
of the party as an ―axis shift‖17 of traditional line of Turkey‘s foreign policy.18 It was also 
argued that it is a split from traditional Western oriented foreign policy of Turkey to East, 
whilst the ideological identity of Justice and Development Party is regarded. Therefore, one 
of the most controversial issues as regard to Justice and Development Party throughout its 
government periods subsisting is its new foreign policy concept due to the Islamist pedigree 
of the Party and its charter members. Justice and Development Party was occasionally 
suspected of applying an ―Islamist‖19 and ―Neo-Ottomanist―20 foreign policy  understanding 
instead of Turkey's Western orientated foreign policy orientation holding a hidden agenda in 
terms of foreign policy that has its roots in National Vision Movement.
21
  
 
Scope and Objective 
 
The main goal of the dissertation is to contribute to the academic debate with an objective 
scientific research as regard to Turkey‘s foreign policy under AKP rule in 2002-2011. 
Thence, the main objective of the dissertation is to examine main directions of Turkey‘s 
foreign policy during Justice and Development governments in 2002-2011. Within this scope, 
it analyzes two government periods of AKP from 4
th
 of November 2002 since 12
th
 June 
2012.
22
 Within the content of the study, political,
23
 economic, trade, commerce, military, 
diplomatic and security related foreign policy issues between Turkey and its neighbors, allies 
as well as with other international actors is deeply elaborated. Turkey‘s foreign relations with 
the Middle East states, the United States of America, the European Union, Balkans, Greece, 
Cyprus, Central Asian Sates, Southern Caucasus and Russian Federation along with the 
                                                 
16
 Yalçın Akdoğan, Ak Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi (AK Party and Conservative Democracy), Alfa 
Yayınları, İstanbul 2004, pp. 5-13. 
17
 İdris Bal, ―Axis Shift or Boom of Self Confidence?‖, USAK Yearbook of International Politics and 
Law,  No.4, 2011, p. 304.  
18
 Ziya Öniş, ―Multiple Faces of the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a 
Critique‖, GLODEM Working Papers, No. 04, 2010, p. 1.  
19
 Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2009, pp.2-20. 
20
 Soner Çağatay, ―Is Turkey Leaving the West?‖, Foreign Affairs, October 2009. 
21
 Buğra K Kantat, ―AK Party‘s Foriegn Policy: Is Turkey Turning a way from the West?‖, Insight 
Turkey, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2010, p. 207. 
22
 ―Turcy ponownie wybrali Partię Sprawiedliwości i Rozwoju‖ (―Turks Re-elected Justice and 
Development Party‖), Wprost, 12 June 2011. 
23
 Aleksandra D Szuszczykiewicz, ―Polityka zagraniczna Turcji w kontekście czerwcowych wyborów 
parlamentarnych i ―Arabskiej Wiosny‖ (―Turkey‘s Foreign Policy in the Context of June Parliamentary 
Elections and Arab Spring‖), National Security Bureau, 29 July 2011, p. 2.  
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emerging global powers like China, India and Brazil compose the main scope of the 
dissertation.  
Aside from analyzing Turkey‘s foreign policy practices with a deep focus on internal 
and external determinants influencing the decision making processes under the AKP rule, the 
dissertation also examines Turkey‘s foreign policy practices chronologically in this time 
frame from a comparative perspective to traditional context of Turkey‘s foreign policy line 
under the light of historical background of relation prospects. Alternately, the dissertation 
purpose to comprehend and elucidate the key characteristic features of Turkey‘s foreign 
policy under Justice and Development Party rule period and in what way and wherefore 
Turkey‘s foreign policy changed. In turn, it aims to apprehend if Ankara‘s new initiatives in 
the Middle East, Balkans, North Africa, South Caucasus and Russia signify a divergence from 
Turkey‘s formerly recognized Western connected policy and may be appreciated as a 
departure from the West. In addition to that, the dissertation tries to find answers whether 
Turkey‘s foreign policy in the course of Justice and Development Party government periods 
experienced an ―axis shift‖ or a radical transformation from its orthodox path in comparison 
to traditional line of Turkey‘s foreign policy or Turkey continued to keep its traditional 
foreign policy concept. Eventually, the dissertation aims to study whether foreign policy 
initiatives of Justice and Development Party bears an Islamist agenda and it promote an 
imperialist expansion instinct under the Neo-Ottomanism rhetoric or AK Party applies a 
sovereign foreign policy practice due to the newly emerged conjecture in international politics 
emerged following the post 9/11 terror attacks. 
 
Theory 
 
States, as the members of international community, have definite aims and standing points 
regarding their external relations toward the other states and international organizations. 
There exist diverse ―methods and means‖24 that are applied either to achive their goals or to 
protect their interests in the course of formulation and realization process of their foreign 
policies.
25
 According to Ryszard Zięba,26 a doyen of international relations discipline who is a 
                                                 
24
 Ryszard Zięba, „Cele polityki zagranicznej państwa‖ („Foreign Policy Goals of States‖), in Ryszard 
Zięba (ed.), Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państw (Theory of State Foreign Policy: An Introduction), 
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004, p. 48. 
25
 In the Polish literature see: Teresa Łoś-Nowak, Polityka zagraniczna: aktorzy - potencjały - strategie, 
(red.) (Foreign Policy: States - Actors - Potentials), Poltext, Warszawa 2011, pp. 42-61. 
26
 Ryszard Zięba, Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa (ed.) (Introduction to Theory of 
Foriegn Policy), Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Torun 2004, pp. 17-55. 
 7 
recognized scholar both domestically and abroad, the main goal of a state‘s foreign policy is 
to secure its entity, protect it, to increase its power, provide and develop prestige of the state 
in international relations. Professor Zięba reckons that the conditions determining the 
fundamentals of foreign policy are divided into two main categories: objective conditions and 
subjective conditions; these very conditions also have their domestic and international 
dimensions that are highly influential on foreign policy making process of a state. The 
objective conditions of foreign policy are generally similar for all states and they maybe 
understood as the protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and realization of national 
interest, its protection and development. As for the subjective conditions of foreign policy, 
they differ for each state; and constitute the national and specific feature of the foreign policy 
of a given state. In retaliation, status quo principle may constitute the objective fundamental 
of a state while expansionism may constitute the subjective fundamental of another state‘s 
foreign policy aim.
27
 Hence, while performing foreign policy and evaluating world and 
regional politics the first and utmost standing point of states is to secure its sovereignty as 
well as territorial integrity, to protect its national interest and to develop it that may be 
appreciated as the fundamental objective of a state‘s foreign policy. As for the subjective 
factors, they may diverse per state and shaped by historical, geographical and national 
ideology of a state. In addition to that, in order to achieve their goals or to protect their 
national interests, throughout foreign policy making process, states may apply hard power 
usage like military means or soft power applications like diplomacy, negotiation, foreign aid 
or other economic tools.
28
  
Notwithstanding to the fact that since the emerge of foreign policy as an independent 
sub-category of study within political science,
29
 change or reconstructing  phenomena in 
terms of foreign policy analysis occupies a vital issue in the realm of international relations 
discipline. Nonetheless, there exist a quite intermittent foreign policy analysis literature 
concerning the change and reconstructing issue in foreign policy. ―The Study of Political 
Adaptation‖30 put down on paper by James Roseau is appreciated among the early works as 
regard to foreign policy change and reconstructing literature. The main thesis of the book, in 
basic, defends the arguments that, the change in foreign policy takes place upon emerge of 
                                                 
27
 Ibidem, pp. 18-54. 
28
 Justyna Zając, „Środki i metody polityki zagranicznej państwa‖ („Means and Methods of Foriegn 
Policy‖) in Ryszard Zięba (ed.), Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa (Theory of State Foreign Policy: 
An Introduction), Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Torun 2004, pp. 79-97). 
29
 Ayşe Keşler, Dimensions of Foriegn Policy in Turkey: A Comparative Analysis of AKP Government 
and DSP - MHP - ANAP Coalition, Unpublished MA Thesis at Sabancı University, İstanbul 2005, p. 14. 
30
 James N Rosenau, The Study of Political Adaptation: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics, 
Nichols Publishing, New York 1981, pp. 1-10. 
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need and demand both in domestic and external level.
31
 Kalevi Jaakko Holsti‘s ―Why Nations 
Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World‖32 is a remarkable landmark for 
the literature of foreign policy change where he explicates foreign policy restructuring 
patterns and occurs, while proposing many definition regarding the change. Jerel Rosati‘s 
―The Frustrating Study of Foreign Policy Analyze‖,33 along with his collective book with Joe 
Hagan and Mart Sampson ―Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to 
Global Change‖,34 are accepted among the magnum opus books at the field of change in 
foreign policy. Besides, David Welch‘s masterpiece ―Painful Choice: A Theory of Foreign 
Policy Change‖35 suggests an organizational theory along with cognitive and motivational 
psychological approaches constituting a prospect theory as regard to foreign policy change 
attitudes.  
All the above mentioned literature stresses the fact that the change phenomenon in 
terms of foreign policy bears different meanings and contexts. However, it may be proposed 
that in today‘s world, states in very rare cases tend to change their foreign policies. In fact, 
change in foreign policy may take place due to wars, economic reasons, or due to conjectural 
changes in international system. Apart from these, there may appear changes that arise due to 
the regime changes of a state or as a consequence of state transformations. New foreign policy 
orientations of Central and Eastern Europe countries, in the course of post-Cold War 
constitute a good example to this category. In addition to that, as it has been underlined by 
Holsti, domestic politics of a country may as well influence the foreign policy direction of a 
state, thus internal politics has the potential to cause a foreign policy change. Kalevi Jaakko 
Holsti, after analyzing foreign policy change patterns in different countries, comes to 
conclusion that many foreign policy change cases mostly stem from leader oriented, alias 
personal perceptions of the elites or leader led orientations that affect foreign policy decision 
making process which are highly determinant at the change of foreign policy process.
36
  
Charles Hermann in his article ―Changing Course: When Governments Choose to 
Redirect Foreign Policy‖, accordingly, points out that a foreign policy change tendency which 
                                                 
31
 Ayşe Keşler, op.cit., p. 15. 
32
 Kalevi J Holsti, Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World, Allen and 
Unwin, London 1982, pp. 1-10. 
33
 Jerel Rosati, ―The Frustrating Study of Foreign Policy Analyze‖, International Studies Review, Vol. 
VI, No.1, March 2004, p. 110. 
34
 Jerel Rosati, Joe Hagan,  Mart Sampson, Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond 
to Global Change, University of South Carolina Press, South Carolina 1994, pp. 3-22. 
35
 Dawid A Welch, Painful Choice: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change, Princeton University Press, 
New Jersey 2005, pp. 10-30. 
36
 Kalevi J Holsti, op. cit., pp. 1-10. 
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occurs when a government opts to create different policy orientations in comparison to 
traditional foreign policy directions
37
 of a country has different connotations, he categories 
foreign policy changes pattern of a country as follows: 
 
1- Adjustment Change: Changes occur in the level of effort (greater or lesser) and/or in the 
scope of recipients (such as refinement in the class of targets) what is done, how it is done, 
and the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged. 
 
2- Program Change: Changes are made in the methods or means by which the goal or problem 
is addressed. In contrast to adjustment changes, which tend to be quantitative program 
changes are qualitative and involve new instruments of statecraft. What is done and how it 
done changes, but the purpose for which it is done remain unchanged. 
 
3- Problem/Goal Changes: The initial problem or goal that the policy addresses is replaced or 
simply fortified. In this foreign policy change, the purposes themselves are replaced. 
 
4- International Orientation Change: The most extreme form of foreign policy change 
involves the redirection of the actor‘s entire orientation toward world affairs. In contrast to 
lesser forms of change that concern the actor‘s approach to a single issue or specific set of 
other actors, orientation change involves a basic shift in the actor‘s international role and 
activities. Not one policy but many are more or less simultaneously changed.
38
 
In this context, the ―change within continuity‖39 theory formulated by Mesut Özcan 
and Ali Resul Usul constitutes the theoretical background of the dissertation. As proposed by 
Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul, under the frames of change within continuity theory, taking 
into consideration the foreign policy practices of Justice and Development Party government 
in 2002-2011, the new concept of Turkey‘s foreign policy has not influenced traditional 
orientation of Turkey‘s foreign policy per se. The fact that, there exist some changes in 
Turkey‘s foreign policy is not ignored by the scholars though it has been classified as 
―adjustment changes‖40 as refer to classification of Charles Hermann.  
                                                 
37
 Charles Hermann, ―Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy‖, 
International Studies Quarterly, 1990, pp. 3-21. 
38
 Ibidem, pp. 5-20. 
39
 Mustafa Özcan, Resul Usul, ―Understanding the ―New‖ Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within 
Continuity Is Turkey Departing From The West?‖, Uluslararası  Hukuk  ve Politika, Vol. VI, No. 1, 2010, p. 
110. 
40
 Ibidem, p. 110. 
 10 
 The ―change within continuity‖ theory simply advocates the idea that, the new 
understanding introduced to foreign policy of Turkey by Ahmet Davutoğlu proposes 
multidimensionality in terms of external relations that cannot be interpreted as a radical 
departure of Turkey from the West. Besides, as considered the claims blaming AK Party to 
follow a Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy with a hidden Islamist agenda, Özcan & Usul hold 
the point that the Neo-Ottomanism is not a monolithic concept, moreover the Neo-
Ottomanism understanding does not constitute an alternative policy for the Justice and 
Development Party decision makers just because owing to the fact that Ottoman Empire was a 
Balkan / European state in practice rather than an Asian as well as modernity movement of 
Turkey has its roots in late Ottoman period. 
As it has been theorized by Özcan & Usul,41 Turkey‘s foreign policy ruled by Justice 
and Development Party in 2002-2011 coincides to the ―adjustment change‖ category taking 
into consideration that Justice and Development Party‘s endeavored to develop Turkey‘s 
affiliations with the European Union, particularly in the course of first government period of 
AKP. In comparison to previous Republic of Turkey governments, Turkish - EU relations 
have not dramatically transformed, contrarily JDP government improved relations with EU as 
Turkey acquired a candidate status during AKP government in 2005 which may be 
appreciated Turkey‘s ―level of efforts‖ as regard to strengthen relations with the European 
Union.
42
 
Accordingly as regard to Hermann‘s classification, Özcan & Usul highlights that 
Turkey‘s foreign policy experienced a qualitative but not a quantitative transformation 
referring to Justice and Development Party‘s foreign policy practices toward Middle East 
states. Albeit it is a theme of controversy and on contrary to mainstream literature accusing 
AKP to shift Turkey‘s traditional Western axis that was established by Mustafa Kemal, AK 
Party did not challenge Turkey‘s Western connection quantitatively. Although, the extent and 
scale of change as regard to program may constitute a theme of discussion, when taken into 
consideration worsening relations with Israel, nonetheless it still should be accepted as a type 
of  ―program change‖ whilst notified by Turkish FM Davutoğlu ―the axis of our foreign 
policy is toward NATO, the EU and the transatlantic process‖.43 
                                                 
41
 Ibidem, p. 110. 
42
 Murat N Arman, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Hükümetleri Döneminde Türkiye - Avrupa Birliği 
İlişkileri (Turkish - European Union Relations during Justice and Development Party Governments), Kitap 
Atelyesi, Ankara 2010, p. 47.  
43
 Ahmet Davutoğlu, ―Rules out Shift from Transatlantic Axis‖, Todays Zaman, 23 March 2009. 
 11 
 As it is argued by Özcan & Usul,44 the new rhetoric of Turkey‘s foreign policy 
promoting maximum collaboration prospects in terms of political, economical and diplomacy 
sphere, with a multidimensional character as regard to ―strategic depth‖ of Turkey, may not 
be merged for Turkey‘s foreign policy‘s fundamental principle that symbolized as the desire 
to be full membership of the European Union for decades. Justice and Development Party so 
as to increase its negotiation deal with the EU, tried to consolidate its influence in Turkish 
periphery hinting the EU that Turkey‘s strategic significance would be hard tenet for Brussels 
to refuse in the course of negotiation process. 
 
 Hypothesis 
 
Regardless of the fact that in terms of foreign politics Turkey challenged some controversies 
when it rejected the U.S. demands to deploy its army in the course of the occupation of Iraq 
due to 1 March permit crisis in 2003,  or due to Gaza Flotilla attacks of Israel in 31 May, 
2010, where its diplomatic relations experienced the worst period since the establishment of 
reciprocal relations, Turkey continued to be the strategic, military ally of the European Union, 
the United States of America as well as Israel under the rule period of AKP in 2001-2011 
period. 
After ten years of AK Party governments, Turkey highly improved its relations with 
the European Union where it achieved to obtain an official candidate status in 2005. Apart 
from that, Ankara continued to posses good relations with Greece while experienced 
unorthodox affiliations with Armenia. It also supported negotiations in Cyprus Island as 
regard to unification of the Island under the frames of Annan Plan. On the other hand, due to 
the rhythmic diplomacy attempts, Ankara initialized a tie-up process with Middle East, 
Caucasus and Balkan states, that Republic of Turkey has ethnic, cultural, religious and 
historical associations because of its Ottoman past. Still, the main motivation of a similar 
policy orientation was not aim to create new paradigm instead of traditional foreign policy 
concept of Turkey. Quite the contrary, the main objective of similar foreign policy initiative 
was to gain new alternatives dimension for Republic of Turkey to enforce its relations with 
Western allies in the course of EU full membership negotiations.  
Furthermore, the changing dynamics of the region and global politics following the 
collapse of the Cold War paradigm, and post 9/11 September era, blooming Turkish economy 
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as well as the newly emerged conjecture highly influenced the development of a similar 
foreign policy assignment. Therebeyond, Turkey's strict engagement with Ottoman periphery 
is not an ideological preference peculiar to AKP whilst similar policy engagements initialized 
due to changing regional and international dynamics following the end of the Cold War. 
Opposite to all close connections with Middle East states principally, Ankara both 
institutionally and psychologically is far a way of having a strategic partnership as a substitute 
for its West direction. 
Henceforward, the main hypothesis of the dissertation lays on the argument that 
conversely to claims of mainstream literature,
45
 blaming AKP to shift Turkey‘s traditional 
Western oriented foreign policy to Eastward with an Islamist agenda that resulted in an ―axis 
shift‖,46 the dissertation supports the argument that, though Turkey experienced some 
quantitive changes in terms of foreign policy in AKP rule, a similar quantity change may not 
be interpreted as an axis shift that caused a radical convert or a transformation of Turkey‘s 
traditional foreign policy orientation. What is more, as an outcome of drastic changing 
regional and international dynamics following the 9/11 terror attacks that resulted in 
occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, similar to previous Turkish governments AKP continued 
Turkey‘s foreign policy orientation that tuned within 90s mostly as a consequence of the end 
of the Cold War. Therefore, the dissertation argues that in the course of AK Party rule periods 
in 2002-2011, the essential character of Turkey‘s foreign policy preserved its fundamental 
feature that aims to be a part of the West. 
 
Methodology  
 
According to David Collier, comparison is an essential method of analysis to describe 
similarities and contrast among the cases. In political science and related disciplines not 
excluding international relations, comparison is widely used to test proposed hypothesis, also 
it is highly fruitful in theory building process. In the field of political science discipline, form 
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of comparative method in general contains a wide diversity including analysis based on 
statistics and historical studies. In this sense, comparative method has a broad scope of usage 
meaning where it refers to ―methodological issues that arise in the systematic analysis of a 
small number of cases‖.47 Late 1960s and initial of 70s evidenced a boom in literature 
studying comparative method analysis. The notorious article of Arend Lijphart ―Comparative 
Politics and Comparative Analysis‖,48 Richard Merrit and Stein Rokkan‘s ―Comparing 
Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross National Research‖49 along with Arthur 
Kalleberg‘s ―The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study on 
Political System‖50 are appreciated among the classics of comparative method literature with 
its application in political science. 
Owing to the fact that the main purpose of the dissertation is to analyze the directions 
of foreign policy of Turkey in Justice and Development Party governments, to conceptualize 
whether the principal foreign policy character of Turkey shifted or not, the comparative 
method constitutes the spine methodological approach of the dissertation. So as to respond the 
interrogation if Justice and Development Party under its rule introduced an unorthodox policy 
in terms of foreign politics that resulted in an axis shift or not, it is imperative to compare 
foreign policy practices of AK Party to previous governments of Republic of Turkey, 
therefore the comparative method is used to a great extent to respond given question properly. 
It is a widely agreed fact that both in terms of domestic and international politics, language 
plays a crucial role. The discourse of political speaking, namely the speeches of Presidents, 
Prime Ministers, Foreign Affairs Minister and other foreign policy decision makers constitute 
a domestic and international significance. Thus, to decipher policy orientations of foreign 
policy decision makers, Critical Discourse Analysis is a unique method. 
Regardless of the fact that, the phenomena of discourse is a broadly used concept 
ranging from sociology, philosophy to political science, within the scope of methodological 
approach in terms of foreign policy analysis, it will be handled as the ―data that is liable for 
empiric analysis‖.51 As it was argued by Van Dijk Teun, ―Critical Discourse Analysis‖ is 
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obviously not a homogeneous model, nor a school or a paradigm, but at most a shared 
perspective on doing linguistics, semiotic or discourse analysis‖.52 The main objective of the 
critical discourse analysis is to perceive language use in social and political practice. It should 
be noted that in terms of language use in politics -both in domestic and abroad sense- 
utilization of language may not function in isolation but under the frameworks of social, 
psychological and political context. Hence, critical discourse analysis appreciates the socio - 
political context of language and it studies the correlation between text structures and it takes 
the very context to explore its function in terms of politics. 
 Correspondingly, the critical discourse analysis is also used within the scope of the 
dissertation owning to the fact that official statements of Presidents, Prime Ministers, and 
Foreign Ministers generate a crucial argument so as to understand policy orientation of states. 
Thus, official statements, press conferences, informative releases of Foreign Affairs 
Ministries and official responds as regard to questions during press conferences regarding 
Turkey‘s foreign policy in this period examined via critical discourse. Ultimately, direct 
sources like party program, election manifestos, government programs as well bilateral 
agreements, not excluding memorandum of understanding along with other types of official 
documents signed during the rule period of JDP also constitute a remarkable source to 
examine foreign policy concept and practice of the Party.  
In addition to that, the literature resources, policy analysis, and academic publications 
including articles are also examined critically via text analysis method so as to study AK 
Party‘s foreign policy concept and practices during its rule period in 2002-2011. Henceforth 
critical text analysis is also applied in the scope of the dissertation to a wide extent. Apart 
from that the critical analysis of documents in terms of internaitonal relations and critical 
analysis of literature that focusing Turkey‘s foreign policy of the AKP governments in 2002-
2011 periods also used under the frame of the dissertation as a part of political science 
research method approach. 
In a nutshell, the comparative analysis, critical rhetoric analysis, and critical text 
analysis form the main methodological approaches that are applied in the course of the 
dissertation to thoroughly analyze the main directions of Turkey‘s foreign policy in Justice 
and Development Party government periods from 2002 to 2011. 
 
 
                                                 
52
 Van Dijk Teun, „Discourse, Power and Access‖ in Caldas-Coulthard, and M. Coulthard (eds.) Texts 
and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis, Routledge, London 1996, p.131. 
 15 
Literature Overview 
 
The dissertation ―Turkey‘s Foreign Policy of the Justice and Development Party Governments 
(2002-2011)‖ covers a range of bounds from political diplomatic, economic, commerce issues 
to trade, military, culture and religious liaisons. The list may be extended regarding to the fact 
that the scope of bilateral relation prospects of Republic of Turkey with its Eastern, Western, 
and Northern along with the newly emerged global actors occupy a broad field to analyze at a 
whole.  
Subsequently, in consistency with the primary objectives of the dissertation, essential 
resources in related fields are deeply examined. As an indispensable part of the research and 
data collection throughout the preparation process of the dissertation, library resources, 
including first and second literature sources, books, academic journals, monographs, 
periodicals, newspapers releases, articles are utilized to a great extent. Over and above, 
internet resources not omitting on-line books, periodicals, newspapers, articles are explored 
along with the official websites of political parties, Foreign Affairs Ministries, embassies; 
state departments research and think thank centers. Hereafter, the direct sources like party and 
government programs, election manifestos, and bilateral agreements, memorandum of 
understandings, press briefs and releases constitute primary source of the dissertation in terms 
of literature. 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 
The dissertation is organized in seven chapters. The first chapter bears an introductory 
character focusing on theoretical framework of Turkey‘s foreign policy along with its 
historical background. The second chapter provides profound information with respect to 
Justice and Development Party and its foreign policy concept. It explores the history of 
political Islam in Turkish context, including critical analysis of National Vision Movement. 
The chapter also examines the birth and development period of AK Party along with the 
dynamics determine its foreign policy concept. 
The Eastern direction of Turkey in terms of foreign policy relations under the rule of 
Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011 is examined in the third 
chapter. The chapter is organized under six subtitles. Firstly, the chapter introduces the 
historical background of Turkey‘s relation prospects with Middle East region. Following that, 
Turkish - Iraqi, Turkish - Syrian, Turkish - Iranian, Turkish - Israeli relations including 
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Palestinian issue, along with AK Party‘s position toward the process commonly named as 
Arab Spring is elaborated. Within the context of the chapter, foreign policy interactions of 
AKP rule is examined from a comparative manner taking into consideration the historical 
perspective of bilateral relations with mentioned states. The fourth chapter of the dissertation 
focuses on the Western direction of Turkey‘s foreign policy in Justice and Development Party 
governments. The chapter contains four subtitles. It initially introduces historical background 
of Turkish - Western relations. Following that it examines Republic of Turkey‘s relations with 
the United States of America, the European Union, Balkans and Greece. Republic of Turkey‘s 
foreign policy direction in the course of AKP‘s office period from 2002 to 2011 with Russian 
Federation, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia is focused at the fifth chapter. The Northern 
direction of Turkey‘s foreign policy in this chapter is examined under the subtitles of relations 
with Russia, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Chapter six elaborates relation perspectives 
of Ankara‘s with emerging global actors in the course of government period of JDP in 2002-
2011. Within the scope of the chapter bilateral relations between Turkey and Chine, India and 
Brazil are studied under three subtitles.  
The seventh and final chapter of the dissertation bears an evaluative character. Under 
four subtitles it evaluates foreign policy performance of Justice and Development Party in 
2002-2011 period from a comparative perspective so as to find answer whether foreign policy 
orientation of the Republic evidenced a radical change that caused an axis shift in this period. 
The Eastern, Western and Northern connections of Turkey‘s foreign policy along with the 
relation prospects with emerging global actors is examined in this chapter to find proper 
responds to for the above mentioned question. 
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Chapter I 
Turkey’s Foreign Policy from Historical Perspective 
 
The chapter analyzes the general framework of Turkey‘s foreign policy from a theoretical 
perspective, along with the main determinants shaping it and the characteristic features of 
Turkey‘s external policy concept. The main objective of the chapter is to conceptualize 
fundamental components of Turkey‘s external policy that influence decision making 
processes. It assesses historical aspect of Turkey‘s foreign relations policy along with the 
geostrategic dimension of Turkey thoroughly. It also considers internal dynamics in order to 
sketch out the basic principles and theoretical framework of Republic of Turkey‘s foreign 
affairs. 
 
1. Geostrategic Position of Turkey 
 
It is a general assumtion that the geographical position of a given country plays a vital role in 
the determinacy of its security and foreign policy perception priorities. Plus, as it has been 
repeatedly highlighted in the literature of international relations, the geostrategic position may 
introduce many opportunities for a country on one hand, while on the other hand it may as 
well poses serious threats against. And same is the case for Turkey. 
 Territory of Republic of Turkey situates at a highly geostrategic post as it cohabits 
with Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East, at the same time it constitutes a natural bridge 
between Western industries and Caspian energy basin. From this aspect, Turkey has a highly 
significant geopolitical and geostrategic position that introduce many precious and unique 
advantageous. Thanks to its geopolitical location, Turkey plays an uppermost function in 
world politic, nonetheless
53
 from the historical perspective; this very bridge role turned its 
territories to a transit route from East to the West which seriously threaten its security 
perceptions.
54
 Yasemin Çelik highlights the prominence of Turkey laying on the fact that its 
territories rest on Asia and Europe, while it borders with the Middle East, post-Soviet states as 
well as with the European Union. Moreover, Turkey is also surrounded on three sides by the 
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Black Sea, Aegean Sea and Mediterranean Sea, that makes it a natural passage between 
Europe and Asia.
55
  
Referring to the classical masterpiece of Lewis F.Richardson‘s, ―Statistics of Deadly 
Quarrels‖,56 there exist a strict correlation between the external wars and custom quantity of a 
given state. On that account, Republic of Turkey neighboring with seven states, and eight due 
to aftermath of division of Soviet Union nearby to Turkish border, obliged to remove its 
security concerns. Similarly, as the complex and unstable structure of Middle East, Caucuses 
and Balkans aggravated threat perception that pushed Turkey‘s foreign policy decision 
makers to seek allies to balance this very negative geopolitical disadvantage. Mustafa Aydın 
denotes that Turkey is located at the crossroads of land connections between Europe, Asia and 
Africa and it has many neighbors with different characteristics, regimes ideologies and aims. 
According to his point of view a country‘s border maybe a source of strength and weakness 
depending on their length, number and intentions of neighbors and the relative power. 
Another geostrategic importance of the Republic of Turkey is Turkish Straits.
57
 Thanks to the 
Straits, the strategic significance of Turkey gains a global dimension. Geographical location 
of Turkey has played an influential role in terms of shaping its foreign policy.
58
 Mustafa 
Aydın also notifies that the possession of the Straits conveys political and military 
advantages, and raises Turkey from the position of a purely local power to one having crucial 
international influence.
59
 Yet, Turkish Straits constitute a highly vulnerable place in terms of 
defense as regard to air and sea attacks.
60
 Taking into account all mentioned parameters, the 
geopolitical and geostrategic location of Turkey are both advantageous and disadvantageous, 
according to which Turkey‘s foreign policy decision makers determine foreign policy 
orientation in accordance with national security perceptions. 
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2. Turkey’s Foreign Policy under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Rules 
 
The foreign policy followed by Mustafa Kemal
61
 during this time line can be categorized in 
three periods. The first period includes Turkey‘s foreign policy during the National 
Independence war when the battle and international diplomacy were undertaken concurrently. 
The second period includes the Turkey‘s foreign policy during Lausanne treaty when Turkey 
gave a diplomatic test and the third period from Lausanne till the death of Mustafa Kemal.
62
 
 
Independence War (1919-1922) 
The National Movement initialized against the occupation of Anatolia due to the 
conditions arose after the First World War. It commenced its struggle against England, 
Greece, France Italy and Armenia on 19
th
 May 1919 when Mustafa Kemal arrived in Samsun 
from İstanbul. The leaders of National Movement organized an irregular army, besides they 
established a de facto government and started diplomatic relations with foreign states. After 
series of conferences held in different places of Eastern Anatolia with delegations coming 
from different points of the country, the National Movement under the leadership of Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk opened the Turkish Grand National Assembly (1923). It initially accepted and 
enacted the National Oath in order to formulate both internal and external political principles 
of Turkish National Movement. Thus, National Oath became the cornerstone of Turkey‘s 
foreign policy aftermaths. 
While the National Movement was in warfare status with England, Greece, France, 
Italy and Armenia it developed positive relations with United States and Soviet Socialist 
Republican Union in order to compensate diplomatic circumstances against it and to earn a 
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wide maneuver capacity.
63
 Besides, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk skillfully took advantage of the 
dissidence among occupying forces and their interest clashes as well.
64
 To find resolution 
patterns in this period, some leading members of National Movement used to support the idea 
that Turkey had to go under an American mandate in order to gain its independence. Owing to 
the fact that, under the frame of Wilson Principles, the United States of America advocated 
the idea of self-determination, rights of nations. Because of its distance to Turkey, American 
mandate seemed to be a good solution against the occupation under the present circumstances 
of that time for the supporters.
65
 Nevertheless, The United States of America did not indicate 
any sort of inclination to regional politics of Middle East and selected the isolation policy to 
external politics. The American mandate proposal was discussed during the conferences and 
under the roof of Turkish Grand National Assembly broadly, however it was not accepted. 
On the other hand, the leader of Independence Movement, Atatürk, developed highly 
positive relations with Soviet Union to support Turkey,
66
 which may be recognized as a 
perfect example of bright foreign policy and diplomacy practice.
67
 USSR was experiencing 
hard times after Bolshevik revolution; conjointly Vladimir Ilyich Lenin denounced the secret 
treaties against Ottoman Empire that was signed during the Tsarist period. Thus, Ankara was 
persuaded that Russia was not in search of any territorial claims against it anymore. Lenin, 
realizing a civil war after the Bolshevik revolution shared a strategic affiliation with Ankara.   
Instead of leaving Turkey to imperialist the West, he favored to build relations with 
Turkey as it was in advantage of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to guarantee its borders 
and widen its periphery including Turkey to socialist bloc.
68
 As for Ankara, it was mainly 
occupied with its Independence War seeking financial and weapon support, therefore Ankara 
sent a delegation to Moscow in order to sign a treaty with Soviet Russia. However, Moscow 
due to Armenia changed its point and asked Turkey for some additional conditions, which 
were against Turkish National Oath. Mustafa Kemal being highly jealous on Turkish 
sovereignty, due to Soviet Russia‘s demands initialized a huge military operation, because of 
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which Moscow was forced to sign an initial agreement with Ankara.
69
 Even tough it took 
more time than planned due to Soviet intention of getting Turkey to Soviet influence, the 
Moscow agreement was signed at 1921.
70
 Henceforth, Turkey left Batumi to Russia although 
it was declared as a part of Turkey on the National Oath, while it signed with Armenia Kars 
agreement.
71
  
When it comes to relations with the occupying forces, while the diplomatic relations in 
different levels were carried out by National Movement,
72
 there was still the struggle 
undertaken by irregular armies using guerrilla war tactics in different fronts. The relations 
with France experienced a fluctuating period.
73
 Firstly, France occupied south part of Anatolia 
with the aim of securing Syrian mandate.
74
 However, because of severe Turkish resistance 
and due to economic relations initialized a relatively mild relation with Ankara government.
75
  
Occupying the south - west of Turkey, Italy followed a soft oriented policy from the 
beginning of occupation. Rome, so as to protect its stakes and not to endanger its 
advantageous position in Anatolia mostly undertook charity, building, education etc. activities 
in order to keep the sympathy of local Turks. The motivation of Italy‘s Turkish friendly 
policy was mainly due to the status of Twelve Islands that caused deep dissidences with 
England. At the year of 1921, Italian forces left Turkey, although Rome asked some economic 
priorities and capitulations that Ankara government did not accept.
76
 The toughest relations of 
the period were experienced with England and Greece. England undertook all sort of 
persecution in order to suppress National Movement. London, perceiving Ottoman Empire as 
the greatest obscure preventing it from reaching its ideas, was highly motivated to punish 
Turkey severely in order to avoid similar obstacles in future.
77
 The fear that Turkish national 
liberation movement would create a positive wave for Indian Muslims pushed England to 
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follow a fierce policy. It is substantial to underline that in addition to Soviet aids Turkey 
found pretty much help in previous English colonies like Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.
78
 
The tense relations between England and Turkey continued even after Lausanne Conference 
due to the status of Mosul.
79
  
As a consequence of diplomatic and military strategies of National Movement, Turkey 
obtained a very determinant victory against Entente powers, which urged them to arrange a 
peace talk and in Lausanne, Switzerland. As a result of successful military operations 
undertaken through Turkish armies, the Entente powers declared to sign armistice and asked 
Turkish independence movement to organize peace talks in Lausanne, Switzerland.
80
 
Although, the leaders of Turkish liberation movement insisted on the idea to collect the 
conference in Turkey, the Entente powers did not accept the proposal. Furthermore, in order 
to urge their future plans the Entente powers invited the İstanbul government to participate in 
the conference. But the suggestion was vehemently rejected by Turkish parliamentary 
assuming itself as the sole representative of Turkey. 
 
Lausanne Conference 
 After the Independence War, Ankara government was highly occupied by Lausanne 
peace treaty, which determined the general outlines of Turkey‘s contemporary foreign 
policy.
81
 Ankara mostly obtained its demands proposed in Lausanne Conference and signed a 
peace treaty with Entente powers.
82
 In addition to this, Lausanne Conference may be 
appreciated as the explicit evident of Turkey‘s acceptance as a sovereign state by international 
community. Turkey achieved rights to regulate Ottoman debts preventing capitulation claims 
of Western states and liberalized its economy completely.
83
    
 Withal, the themes like the status of Mosul, Hatay and Turkish Straits were still in 
ambiguity,
84
 moreover Turkey had to make concessions in the themes like religious and 
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ethnic minorities, Cyprus and lose of Twelve Islands.
85
 The turn out of Soviet - Turkish 
relations, which would crystallize later, commenced with the Lausanne conference. 
Additionally, the Lausanne may be appreciated as the touchstone of the Republic‘s entrance 
to the West as well as the formation of Turkey‘s foreign policy orientation compatible with 
Western norms and values. It is crucial to underline that Mustafa Kemal‘s abolishment of 
Monarchy shortly before the initiation of Lausanne Conference also may be accepted as a 
clear evidence of this idea. Atatürk‘s primary policy was to convince Western world that 
modern Turkey would have a new political orientation along with the desire to integrate with 
Western political system. Yet, Mustafa Kemal‘s delay about the abolishment of Caliphate 
needs to be understood as a diplomatic tactic in order to suppress the potential internal 
reactions. 
The participants of the conference consisted of Turkey, England, France, Italy, Japan 
Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia, nevertheless Turkey insisted on participation of Russia, 
Ukraine, and Georgia in order to follow sessions where the Straits theme was going to be 
discussed.
86
 Lausanne peace conference lasted eight months and witnessed vehement 
discussions between Turkey and Entente powers. Turkish delegation was headed by ―İsmet 
İnönü‖87 who was appointed by Mustafa Kemal as a victorious general of Western front88 and 
held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs,
89
 although he was an ―amateur diplomat‖90 
having no previous experience in terms of diplomacy. One additional point to highlight is, 
Turkey‘s foreign affairs of the period were not that perfectly organized but above all Mustafa 
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Kemal did not want to send any former Ottoman diplomats under the fear that the Ottoman 
legacies could negatively influence the talks. Nevertheless, the decision of the founder of 
modern Turkey has been critiqued by scholars and historians for being a factor causing power 
dissipation of Turkey against the Entente powers.
91
 In general, the peace talks may be 
summarized under three topics; the Turkish Straits, financial matters and immigration issues. 
First cycle of the talks witnessed harsh debates between Turkish and English delegations due 
to the fact that English armies were situated around Turkish Straits at that time. The financial 
matters were mostly discussed with French delegation as France did not want to lose its 
capitulation privileges seized from Ottoman Empire.
92
  
When it comes to immigration issues, it was among the hottest topic of the Lausanne 
agenda that took place with Greece. Similar issues mainly consisted of border debates, 
exchange of population, minorities and war hostages.
93
 The Iraqi border including Mosul and 
the status of Turkish Straits with England,
94
 the rights of Christian minorities residing in 
Turkey with Greece, finally French insistence on keeping the economic privileges seized 
during Ottoman times blocked the negotiations among the parts. With the effect of similar 
dissidences between the parts the talks came to a halt. Turkish delegation turned back to 
Ankara in order to discuss further strategy with President Mustafa Kemal in detail. 
Meanwhile,  in order to balance the negative atmosphere against Turkey Atatürk acquired a 
more dominant pro Western rhetoric, while he accelerated Turkey‘s Westernization process 
leaving Soviet friendly and Islamist discourses that he utilized in the course of Independence 
War.  
To signalize modern Turkey‘s Western inclination,  Kemalist regime put a heavy 
pressure on Russian and socialist supporters, moreover Mustafa Kemal‘s marriage with Latifa 
-as a  modern Turkish woman prototype symbolizing Western values- coincided with the 
same period. Furthermore, the reforms undertaken in civil code regulating women rights, the 
laws protecting foreign investments as well as religious - ethnic minority issues and the 
augmentation of secularization process via laws created a highly positive image of Turkey in 
                                                 
91
 Ibidem, p. 363. 
92
 Roderic H Davison, ―Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After‖, Middle East Journal, 
Vol. VII (3), Summer 1953, pp. 324-348. 
93
 Nimet Beriker, Negotiating Styles of the Minor Parties in Multilateral Peace Negotiations: Greece 
and Turkey at the Lausanne Peace Conference, 1922-23, unpublised Ph.D dissertation at George Mason 
University, Washington DC 1993, pp.1-5. 
94
 Norman J Padelford, ―Solutions to the Problems of Turkish Straits: A Brief Appraisal‖, Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 2 (2), April 1948, pp. 175-190.  
 25 
Western media and public view.
95
 Under the roof of Turkish Grand National Assembly, all 
aspects of the Lausanne were discussed vehemently along with the heavy critics of 
opposition.
96
 Subsequently, Turkish delegation settled back to Switzerland in order to 
continue negotiations. The second cycle of talks went rather smoothly in comparison to first 
one; consequently the parts arrived at the agreement, in defiance of severe opposition, 
Lausanne treaty was ratified at the Turkish Grand National Assembly.  
It may be claimed that in comparison to Sèvres, the Lausanne treaty may be accepted 
as a diplomatic victory of Turkey‘s foreign policy. Turkey mostly obtained its demands 
defined in the National Oath. Ultimately, Ankara solved many of its border problems with its 
neighborhood and ended a long term war with Greece.
97
 Turkey determined its place in the 
West and found acceptance as a sovereign state not only economically but also politically. On 
the other hand, it did not resolve the Mosul and Hatay issues, which were included in the 
borders of National Oath. In addition to that, though Turkey freed the Straits, it could not 
have complete authority on them. Finally, Turkey lost the Twelve Island conceding some 
rights in Aegean Sea and lost major advantages in Cyprus. Up to the present time, the 
Lausanne peace treaty has been a controversial issue in Turkish public view. There exist a 
constant public debates as regard to the consequences of treaty in terms of current security 
dilemmas of foreign policy as an inheritance that restricts Turkish national security.
98
 
After the signature of Lausanne peace treaty, Turkey‘s foreign policy followed an 
affiliation period to the Western direction in accordance with Atatürk‘s foreign policy 
principles. Notwithstanding to the fact that in the world, notably in Europe, the steps of the 
Second World War were heard gradually, Turkey as a consequence of well programmed 
foreign policy decision making process realized its main goals and followed a peaceful 
foreign policy principle that based on status quo principle. Turkey‘s foreign policy agenda of 
the time period was mainly occupied with Mosul question,
99
 which could not be resolved in 
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the course of Lausanne talks.
100
 Along with the population exchange theme with Greece and 
the Greek Patriarch question, the issues like the movement of capital from İstanbul to Ankara 
and Turkey‘s entrance to the League of Nations occupied Turkey‘s foreign policy agenda. 
The Mosul question constituted the toughest agenda for young Turkey as it remained 
as a question that was not clarified after the Lausanne Conference. Turkish government 
declared Mosul as a part of Turkey in National Oath and asked Britain to leave the region; all 
the same, Britain rejected the proposal.
101
 In order to discuss the issue, Turkish and British 
sites gathered in İstanbul. Ankara held on to the point that geographically Mosul is a natural 
part of Turkey, owing to the fact that majority is inhabitants of region were Turks and 
Kurds.
102
 Thus, Britain had to leave Mosul to Turkey. However, Britain insisted on the idea of 
leaving Mosul within British mandate Iraqi borders paying a special attention to Christian 
minorities.
103
 The relations between both countries due to Mosul gradually tensed to reach 
harassing fires at the borders. The sites could not reach a consensus, thus brought the issue to 
the League of Nations in order to come to a decision and passed the deal to international 
enquiry commission. After series of discussions, the commission decided the leave of Mosul 
within Iraqi borders, which caused a huge reaction of Ankara.
104
 The Mosul issue even today 
constitutes a huge volume of discussion in Turkish public view, beyond that the relations with 
Iraq in terms of border security aggravate the mutual relations due to terrorist leakage that 
seriously threat Turkey‘s national security.105 
As regard to the relations with Greece, the majority of population exchange issues 
were settled during the Lausanne and initially some part of population were exchanged. Due 
to the social and economic aspects of the population exchange issue, Greece and Turkey 
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experienced serious conflicts that later on caused deep breaks in diplomatic relations. The 
main focus of disagreements cumulated due to Greece‘s reluctance to remove Greek 
population of İstanbul and unwillingness to pay for immovable estates. Another issue that 
caused controversy between the parts was the situation of Greek Patriarchy and its ecumenism 
claims that situated in İstanbul. Turkish part developed all possible tactics in order to stop 
activities of Patriarchy in Turkish territories due to negative approaches of Patriarchy as an 
institution that acted against Turkish War of Independence and supported occupying forces.  
After series of negotiations, the previous Patriarch‘s mission ended while changed 
with a fresh one that was not politicized, besides the political mission of Patriarchy was 
entirely limited and remained as a religious body. The reflections of the Greek Patriarch and 
ecumenism question still may be found as a theme causing fierce debate between Turkey and 
Greco it also constitutes a huge obstacle before Turkey‘s EU membership. Additionally, the 
minority schools, and their real estates status are among the top agendas related to the issue 
now. Turkey‘s entrance to League of Nations may be accepted among the important 
occurrences of the after Lausanne period in terms of foreign policy. As it has been mentioned 
previously, Turkey‘s shift to the West after the Lausanne was flattened thanks to its entrance 
to League of Nations. Turkey indicated some inclinations to Soviet Union as a negative result 
of Mosul conflict experienced with Britain in order to balance situation.
106
 Apart from that, 
Republic of Turkey became neighbor with Italy through Twelve Islands and France through 
Syrian mandate; hence, it paid attention to keep friendly and peaceful relations with Paris and 
Rome. Nevertheless, the relations with Italy started to worsen after Mussolini‘s rise to power 
when Italy threatened Turkey through Twelve Islands. As for the France, there were some 
controversies on the payment of Ottoman debts and the continuation of capitulations. 
Additionally, Ankara initialized positive relations with Middle East and Balkan states 
aiming to secure its eastern borders. Therefore, it signed a non-aggression treaty called 
Sadabat Oath in Tehran in 1937 with Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.
107
 Turkey also gained a 
more advantageous position by converging an entire sovereignty at Straits with signed 
Montreux agreement (1936).
108
 Thus, it partially compensated some negative conditions that 
emerged in Lausanne treaty. In addition to that, it also developed highly constructive relations 
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with Afghanistan while Afghan King visited Turkey to observe it as a model country to be 
followed during modernity and nation building process of Afghanistan.
109
 
 
3. Turkey’s Foreign Policy during the Second World War 
 
The representatives of Turkey‘s foreign policy decision makers witnessing deadly results of 
the First World War, keenly evaded to follow adventurous policies applying an ―active 
neutral‖110 foreign policy practice in the course of the Second World War.111 Ankara preferred 
to follow a realist, non adventurist outlook as well applied all possible diplomatic methods in 
order to protect itself from the destructive affects of the War. However, principally toward the 
end of the War, because of pressures by Alliance powers and not to have a disadvantageous 
position at the post War era cut its relations with Germany and Japan declaring war against 
Berlin and Tokyo. In addition to that, the emergence of Soviet threat also played an essential 
role in the decision making process of Republic of Turkey.
112
  
On contrary to peace treaties signed after the First World War, Turkey did not accept 
to accord with Sèvres treaty proposed by the winners, enforcing to sign Lausanne treaty 
instead, consequently it mostly reached majority of territorial claims determined by the 
National Oath. İsmet İnönü, the second President of Turkey, as the closest friend, companion 
of Mustafa Kemal and as a follower of Kemalist doctrines in terms of foreign policy, 
absolutely dominated Turkey‘s foreign policy decision making procedures in this period. 
İnönü played a crucial role in Turkey‘s foreign policy priorities, albeit, he was highly 
criticized for applying oppressive and anti-democratic methods in the course of his rule 
period. Due to his skillfully managed diplomatic methods, Turkey evaded influencing from 
the Second World War.
113
 From diplomatic point of view, it may be asserted that Turkey‘s 
foreign policy decision makers in the course of Second World War gave a good example of 
successful, well managed, versatile diplomacy.
114
 Ankara in spite of the slippery atmosphere 
                                                 
109
 Annette Destree, ―Reformisme "Laicisant" en Iran, Turquie et Afghanistan 1920-1930‖, 
Civilisations, Vol. XXXII (1), 1982, pp. 167-186. 
110
 Selim Derengil, Turkish Foriegn Policy during the Second World War: An “Active” Neutrality, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989, p. 133.  
111
 Selim Derengil, Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’nin Dış Politiakası (Balance Game: 
Turkey’s Foriegn Policy during the Second World War), Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul 1994, pp. 2-10. 
112
 Ataöv Türkkaya, ―The Policy of the Great Powers Towards Turkey on the Eve of the Second World 
War‖, Turkologischer Anzeiger, Vol. III, 1972, pp. 321-328. 
113 Selim Deringil, ―Turkey‘s Diplomatic Position at the Outbreak of the Second World War‖, Boğaziçi 
Üniversitesi Dergisi, Vol. VIII-IX, 1980-81, pp. 63-88. 
114
 Annette B Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1959, p. 50.  
 29 
of international arena achieved to continue its positive relations with Germany, Soviet Union, 
England along with France together in as much as possible.
 115
  
Shortly after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Ankara felt the steps of forthcoming 
war. Accordingly, it signed aid and non-aggression treaties. Signing analogous treaties, 
Turkey estimated that it would keep a balanced policy among European states, all the same 
when Russia signed a friendship treaty with Germany,
116
 for example, it felt insecure and 
turned the current treaties to alliance cooperation. Turkey‘s tactical movements in terms of 
diplomacy in this period, may be interpreted as the break point of Turkish - Soviet relations 
that bloomed since the Independence War, while it may be understood as Turkey‘s certain 
shift to Western alliance in terms of strategic, military, political and economical sense 
following an affiliation process that initialized after the Lausanne Conference.
117
 
Additionally, Ankara‘s timing of signing a friendship agreement with Berlin turned the 
situation to a more complex character as Germany declared war again Soviet Union. Since 
then, Turkey was persistently explored deep pressure from both Russia and England to 
declare war against Germany and Japan. In order to persuade Turkey to wage war, then 
Winston Churchill of Great Britain visited Turkey where he had secret meetings with senior 
Turkish officials, yet Turkey under the pretext of weapon and supply shortage rejected all 
similar insistences.
118
 The main motivation of similar behests to plunge Turkey into the war 
was the fear that Turkey, as a geopolitically and geostrategically significant country, could 
take place within the rows of Axis Powers that would change the destiny of entire war against 
Alliance Powers. Nevertheless, toward the end of the Second World War, Turkey‘s foreign 
policy decision makers, upon the approaching post war conjecture as well as the emanating 
Soviet ménage abreast, froze diplomatic relations with Berlin and Tokyo, declared war 
against these countries.
119
  
 As it has been featured in the chef d‘oeuvre of Edward Weisband ―Turkey‘s Foreign 
Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics‖,120 Republic of Turkey 
from the very initial to the end of the Second World War endeavored to refrain from the War 
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trying to reconcile confronting developments emerged in the course of the World War 
Second. Ankara merely preferred to sign nonaggression treaties in this period to guarantee its 
borders avoiding any engagement that would result in participation to the world war. Turkish 
diplomacy deeply shaped by the leadership of İsmet İnönü launched resolute relations with 
the West at the dawn of the prospective the Cold War. 
 
4. Turkey’s Foreign Policy during the Cold War  
 
The end of the Second World War proposed to the international system a conjecture that 
shared the world between the ―West and the East‖121 clustered around the United States of 
America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The newly emerged bipolar structure of the 
world obliged many states to develop alternative foreign policy paradigms convenient to the 
recent conditions of the Cold War. Ankara too was constrained to conform this.
122
 Mehmet 
Gönlübol, for instance, denotes that due to the oncoming realities of the Cold War, Turkey‘s 
foreign policy decision makers were obliged to abandon Turkey‘s neutrality policy, which 
was applied successfully during the Second World War, de facto and enforced to search for 
close allies with the West and in particular with the United States of America.
123
 
Baskın Oran, in order to underline the chaotic ambiance of the Cold War eve period 
prefers to utilize ―psychological warfare‖124 expression. With regard to Oran‘s opinion, Soviet 
Union‘s separation from the war as a political, economical, and military giant immediately 
beside to Turkey highly augmented Ankara‘s national security concerns. What is more, the 
image of emerging ―Soviet threat image‖125 in Western mass media also influenced Turkish 
public view and foreign policy decision makers.
126 
Oral Sander in his article ―The Reasons of 
Continuity in Turkey‘s Foreign Policy―127 defends the following arguments to interpret 
Turkey‘s choice of Western bloc during the Cold War. Apart from the Soviet exerted pressure 
and claims, domestic political system transiting to multiparty democracy along with the free 
market economy system of modern Turkey played a crucial role on its shift to the West. 
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Ultimately, benefits of Turkish elites were also highly determinant at Turkey‘s opt. 
Nonetheless, Sander maintains the idea that the above-mentioned factors played a substantial 
role in decision-making process. Ankara‘s inclination to Western bloc, Oral Sander asserts, 
was the continuation of westernization movement that initialized with late Ottoman periods 
harmonious to Mustafa Kemal‘s Westernization principles.128 
In 1945, Turkey along with the fifty countries signed the founding treaty of United 
Nations charter.
129
 Aftermaths, Turkey applied for the full membership upon the 
establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, just the same Ankara did not find 
positive acceptance. Washington highly appreciating the role of Ankara in the course of 
Korea War lobbied in favor of Turkey, as a result of which Turkey became North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization member in 1952.
130
 Upon Its entrance to NATO, Republic of Turkey 
played an utmost important role in terms of maintaining security in the Euro-Atlantic area, 
and became a crucial military alliance in the history of North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
131
   
Following the NATO membership, Turkey was accepted in European Council, and 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, thus it became strict and natural 
alliance of the West mostly adjusting its foreign policy priorities in accordance with the 
demands of Western allies. Additionally, in accordance with the Truman doctrine,
132
 Turkey 
played an essential role in the course of surrounding policy against USSR, while modernized 
it army soundly as brought it to NATO standards, plus Republic of Turkey upgraded its 
industry infrastructure under the frame of Marshall plan, whereas became highly dependent 
on the United States of America both in economical and political sense.
133
 Ankara in the 
period of the Cold War, mostly launched its foreign policy to Western dynamics, it orientated 
external policy perspectives in accordance with the demands of bipolar world conditions. 
Soviet policies in Turkish vicinity were appreciated as attempts of invasion by the Soviet 
Union; vice versa Moscow constantly feared that Turkey would constitute a basement for a 
Western attack. Therefore, Turkey, along with the encouragements of its allies, initialized 
pact policies in order to secure its eastern borders where it participated to Baghdad Pact 
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(Central Treaty Organization)
134
 with eastern neighbor countries against Soviet expansion. 
Another aspect of Turkey - Middle East relations in this period was Ankara‘s official 
recognition of Israel state.
135
   
After the death of Joseph Stalin, the Cold War entered to détente period and Moscow 
declared that it had denounced the Stalin‘s claims on Turkey aiming to warm bilateral 
relations;
136
 all the same Turkey‘s foreign policy approached similar attempts still very 
cautiously. Turkey‘s foreign policy in this period continued to be highly dependent on the 
West particularly to the United States of America appreciating Soviet Russia still the biggest 
threat against its sovereignty.
137
 Turkey, since its establishment, could not undertake 
fundamental economic reforms. It was still in need of subsidies that would be provided 
through International Monetary Fund and World Bank in order to continue its economic 
development.   
Another remarkable incident of the period was the military coup undertaken by 
Turkish Armed Forces, that highly negative affected Turkish democracy. The military coup 
was severely criticized by Western democracies, nevertheless in order not to harm delicate 
relations with Turkey under the Cold War conditions, Western allies of Turkey on purpose 
hesitated to undertake any sort of persecutions against Ankara. Apart from the military coup, 
Cyprus issue became an important theme for Turkey in this period. As an outcome of the 
Cyprus problem, Turkey‘s decision makers commenced to question Turkey‘s unilateral  
foreign policy structure that highly depend to the West, ergo Ankara initialized a multifaceted 
external policy dynamic as regard to negative conjecture due to Cyprus issue. Parallel to the 
new concept that emerged as a reaction to feeling of isolation owning to Cyprus, Republic of 
Turkey developed constructive relations with Soviet Union aiming to engage USSR to the 
issue to create a balance regardless of the Cold War conditions. 
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5. Foreign Policy of Turkey in the post-Cold War Era 
 
Due to the collapse of  Berlin wall in the year of 1989 and as a consequence of dissolution of 
Soviet Union, the political system of the world encountered fundamental changes which led 
structural shifts in international system. The bare peculiarity of the post Cold War era laid on 
the fact that the international politics sphere was highly dominated by instability and conflicts 
that obliged states to create new foreign policy paradigms. Furthermore, the political order of 
the world shifted from a bipolar constitution to a predominant American hegemony.  
In this vague atmosphere, not only Turkey but also many other ―flank states‖ 138 would 
not determine their foreign policy orientations without considering the hegemony of United 
States of America.
139
 İdris Bal appreciates the new conjecture as ―Turkey as a neighbor of 
former USSR, a member of NATO and located at the center of a sensitive region covered by 
Caucasus, Balkans and Middle East, has been affected by the end of Cold War fundamentally. 
Turkey has lost some of its bargaining cards in the new era and therefore has needed new 
arguments. This need encouraged Turkey to take active steps in post Cold War era‖.140 
Whereas, Sabri Sayari views the new dynamic policy engagement of Turkey in the post Cold 
War era conjecture as ―new activism‖ with the signs of ―daring and cautiousness‖.141  
 The end of the Cold War introduced both new opportunities and challenges for 
Turkey‘s foreign policy.142 At first glance, the end of the Cold War seemed to be a deep relief 
for Turkey‘s foreign policy decision makers since the immediate Soviet threat diminished.143 
Nasuh Uslu reckons that apart from the termination of Turkey‘s major security threat, the end 
of the Cold War also weakened regional enemies of the Republic such as Syria, Iran and 
Iraq.
144
  With the end of the Cold War, Turkey found itself with an opportunity to take part in 
cross border activities on the contrary to highly dependent structure of the Cold War 
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period.
145
 Turkey enjoyed a wide maneuver area where it became a more centralized 
region.
146
 Henceforward, it utilized this new conjecture to the maximum. Just the same, the 
newly emerged unipolar structure of the international system introduced some challenges for 
Ankara as the strategic position of Turkey became a matter of question.
147
 
Above all, Turgut Özal‘s liberal understanding also positively contributed to the 
acceleration of Turkey in terms of foreign policy perspectives in the post Cold War era 
period.
148
 The most considerable change took place in Ankara‘s foreign policy in this period 
in the Middle East due to occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Turgut Özal closely allied with the 
United States of America as Turkey actively participated in United Nations coalition against 
Iraq.
149
 Republic of Turkey leading a pioneer role in the Gulf War, intended to indicate its 
position in the rows of Western alliance stressing Turkey‘s geostrategic location and unique 
position as a pro Western, Muslim populated democratic secular state in the Middle East.
150
 In 
addition to that, Ankara developed highly strict ties with the newly independent republics of 
Central Asia.
151
 The newly independent Central Asian republics expected Turkey to play a 
―model role‖ for their development and integration with the world.152 A similar role model 
policy of Turkey was supported by United States too in order to balance the fundamental 
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religious policies of Iran toward the Central Asia region. Turkey provided long term credits, 
supported military reconstructions and renovations, as well as proposed scholarship 
opportunities for the students and invested in many other spheres in order to enforce its 
existence in the region and brought alternative dimensions to its foreign policy outlook.
153
 
On the other hand, Turkey faced serious conflicts with its close neighborhood because 
of increasing ―Kurdistan Workers‘ Party‖154 (PKK) terror acts.155  The Kurdish problem 
gained an international character, and along with human rights violations which caused harsh 
criticism against Turkey in the course of the European Union candidacy talks.
156
 Moreover, 
Turkish cross border attacks against Kurdistan Workers Party camps caused tense debates 
among Syria, Iraq and Iran.
157
 Mustafa Aydın holds the point that ―Republic of Turkish had 
experienced dramatic shifts and transformations in its political structure, economic system, 
social strata, cultural patterns, religious expressionism, and foreign policy‖.158 Following the 
ten years, after the end of the Cold War, in parallel with radical systemic changes took place 
in the world, Aydın emphasis that ―Turkey moved suddenly from a staunchly pro Western 
isolationist existence in its immediate neighborhood into a central posture with an intention to 
have an effect across a vast region extending 'from eastern Europe to western China'. This 
change in Turkey's stance and mentality was due to wider changes experienced within and 
around Turkey during the 1980s‖.159 
 
6. Legacies in Turkey’s Foreign Policy 
 
The section aims to describe main structural determinants of Turkey‘s traditional foreign 
policy that shape its foreign policy concept 
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6.1. Legacies of Ottoman Empire  
The first structural determinant shaping the traditional foreign policy concept of 
Turkey is legacies of Ottoman Empire that are highly influential on conceptualization of 
Republic of Turkey‘s foreign policy.160 Being one of the greatest empires before its downfall, 
the Ottoman Empire
161
 even in its worst periods -when referred as the ―sick man of Europe‖-
162
 was a determinant authority not only in European, but also in world politics. The outbreak 
of the First World War set the end of Ottoman Empire, along with the other Empires leading 
them to disappear from the history scene and giving birth to the various nation states along 
with an entire new international political conjecture. Thus, the First World War introduced an 
epoch entirely new to the international political system. 
Since the establishment of Turkey, there has been a continuous theme of discussion 
among historians, politicians and scholars whether modern Turkey is a continuation of 
Ottoman Empire or not as well as to what extent Ottoman legacies are deterministic at 
Turkey‘s foreign policy decision making processes.163 According to some distinguished 
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historians like Prof. İlber Ortaylı, the modern Turkey is a continuation of ―modernity‖164 
movement that started in 19
th
 century in Ottoman Empire and it is a consequence of 
―autocratic modernity‖.165 Ortaylı considers that this very movement does not bring Turkey 
from middle century darkness to 21
st
 century, but it is a sort of continuation which started in 
the last decade of Empire. Professor Halil İnalcik, being a tenet on Ottoman Empire history, 
advocates the thesis proposing the idea that the roots of Turkish modernity needs to be 
searched in its Ottoman past. In order to clarify his thoughts professor continues as follows: 
                
                  The ruling élite played a key role in promoting Westernization, and an alliance and 
identification with the West as the best policy for ‗the state‘. For the integrity of the 
empire or for the preservation of the imperial political and social system, the central 
bureaucracy decided that Westernization and western alliance was the only way out. The 
immediate danger posed by the military imperialism of the rival empires of the Habsburgs 
and Romanovs always served as the incentive and excuse for the intensification of the 
westernization process introduced by the reformer bureaucrats. On the other hand, it has 
rightly been observed that the civilian and military bureaucrats emerged at the moment of 
the collapse of the imperial system as the champions of the independence of the Turkish 
nation and culture. In the footsteps of the nineteenth century reformer bureaucrats, they 
espoused again, in a most radical fashion, the western ideals-this time ideals of 
nationalism and democracy, the preliminary forms of which were introduced already in 
the Tanzimat period. Westernism was a tradition rooted in the élite during the Young Turk 
revolution of 1908 and the Independence War. If Turkey emerged as an independent state, 
developing its own identity and national culture in the modern world, that only became 
possible as a result of the ideological zeal and elevation of the great leaders who emerged 
from the ranks of the Ottoman bureaucrats. In other words, the independent national state 
of Turkey owes its existence and development primarily to this group who tried in the 
decades after the national victory to bring about a complete westernization of the state and 
society.
166
 
 
 
Notwithstanding to the fact that the founder elites of modern Turkey endeavored to 
disassociate, the Republic of Turkey from its Ottoman Past, newly established modern Turkey 
inherited many tendencies including foreign policy and diplomacy. Baskın Oran defends the 
point that Turkey thanks to its attentive foreign policy perception, as an inheritance through 
Ottoman Empire, played a more important state role. He pledges that Turkish diplomacy is a 
natural extension of Ottoman diplomacy, as Republic of Turkey did not experience any 
ineptitude in terms of diplomacy even during the Lausanne peace talks.
167
 Furthermore, 
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George Harris, for instance, points, ―two thirds of Ottoman foreign service made the transition 
into the Republic‘s Foreign Ministry‖.168  
It goes without saying that Ottoman Empire, being among the most powerful and long- 
lasting empires ever seen, imposed an influential political system on a vast territory. The 
imperial legacies of Ottoman Empire as an outcome of intercourse with diverse ethnic groups, 
nations or members of religious groups introduced Republic of Turkey both advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of political, economical, religious, cultural and linguistic spheres.
169
 In 
order to comprehend the influences of Ottoman past on Turkey‘s foreign policy substantially, 
it is essential to refer Mustafa Aydın who is accepted among the doyennes on Turkey‘s 
foreign policy. In terms of legacies of Ottoman Empire, Professor Aydın notes that the present 
skeptical structure of Turkish diplomacy is a natural consequence of continuous external 
attacks and aggression against Ottoman Empire especially during its last century. As a result, 
up to now not only Ministry of Foreign Affairs workers but also majorities of Turks perceive 
external relations highly cautious. Aydın explains Ottoman legacies on Turkey‘s foreign 
policy as follows:  
Religious groups, by appealing to European care, continued participation of the 
Europe in Ottoman internal affairs. Consequently, as the Ottoman authorization undermined, 
the national system, that used to be a perfect method of governing, accelerated the demolition 
of the Empire. Primarily, Greek Orthodox and Armenians were used as an instrument to 
interfere with Ottoman authority during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Consequently, Turkish sensitiveness about Greece‘s attempts on internationalizing the 
Orthodox Patriarchy in Istanbul, or any chance of recognizing so-called Armenian genocide 
claims, perceived against similar previous experiences. Obviously, Europeans' intervention in 
Ottoman internal affairs, on behalf of Christian minorities, gave rise to a feeling among 
Turks, that this dissimilarity in religious origin, albeit seldom hinged, is highly relevant to 
their international relations. This is especially authentic for those who as a rule look up to the 
European Union as a ―Christian Club‖ as well as voice their concerns about if these non 
Muslims would welcome an Islamic country.
170
 
Second sour inheritance from the Ottoman Empire, as per Mustafa Aydın, is the 
remembrance of the financial control on Turkish lands, practiced by the Europeans through 
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the Public Debt Service (Duyun-u Umumiye), since the Ottoman Empire proceeded 
bankrupt. Mustafa Kemal, parallel to this sensibility, in the course of Independence War 
declared that by complete independence, Turkish people mean complete economic, financial 
juridical, military, cultural independence and freedom in all matters.
 
Being deprived of 
independence in any of these factors for a nation is equivalent to being deprived of all its 
independence.
171
 Ottoman Empire, throughout its demise period, had lost its freedom, due to 
the foreign interferences, privileges granted to foreigners, as well as the economic 
capitulations. Therefore, young Republic was highly sensitive about contraventions upon its 
sovereignty and economy. In terms of economic activities, for example, Ankara's skepticism 
reflected itself by tense distrust over international companies activating in Turkey.
172
 
On the other hand, in its last days, Ottoman administration in the areas where it had 
ruled left a sort of ill will against the Turks; hence Republic of Turkey was obliged to 
befriend neighbors that have resentful remembrances of the Ottomans. Of course, for 
instance, Ottoman past to some degree has some influence in the unpleasantness between 
Turkey and Greece or Armenia. As the last century of Ottomans countersigned ascension of 
Greek nationalism, Greeks became the first nation in the Balkan Peninsula to come into 
existence as a result of conflicts between nationalism and the Ottoman Empire.
173
 
Conclusively, in terms of Turkish national security perceptions, northern neighbor of 
Turkey symbolizes the principal menace to against Turkey‘s safety measures, along with its 
deep historical roots. Ever since the Seventeenth century, Russian expansion became the 
―arch enemy‖ of the Ottoman Empire. A sequence of major failures against Russians 
encountered the Ottomans with the facts of its diminishing authorization. Furthermore, it was 
Tsar Nicholas I, who characterized the Ottoman Empire as the ―sick man of Europe‖. The 
Russo - Turkish wars had evidently created a sense of hostility as well as suspicion among 
Turks and Russians. Even during the period of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality,
174
 
when competent amicable terms were enjoyed by both sides, the chronicled Turkish mistrust 
for the Russians was highly apparent. 
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Like to all other states, Turkey established its foreign policy concept as regard to its 
identity and ideology that inherited trough internal dynamics and legacies of the history. On 
contrary to general opinion, the West orientation, as the main feature of Turkey‘s foreign 
policy concept in terms international system is a bequest of Ottoman Empire that started in 
19
th
 century. Though the main purpose of Ottoman Westernization was to prevent Empire‘s 
dissolution, foreign policy decision makers of Turkey too adopted a pro Western policy 
orientation in order to complete new Republic‘s nation building process trough Western 
norms. 
The status quo principle of Turkey‘s foreign policy concept, aiming to protect the 
present as well, has its roots in Ottoman heritage. As a consequence of losing its momentum 
due to changing power balances in Europe, to a large extent in 19
th
 century, Ottoman Empire 
nullified participation in wars, and opted to protect its present situation (status quo). 
Following this path, Republic of Turkey mostly focused to protect its national borders, abided 
by natural borders to survive instead of global passions and evaded to follow an expansionist 
foreign policy perception.  
It may be suggested that when taken into consideration, institutions, demography, and 
international relations perspectives of modern Turkey maybe appreciated as the continuation 
of Ottoman Empire. Although, Republic of Turkey was established due to collapse of 
Ottoman Empire, it should be evaluated not as a break but as a reconstruction, owing to the 
fact that there exist no sudden breaks and sudden starts in the dynamic course of history. 
Henceforth, albeit Ottoman Empire seemingly collapsed, an Empire that ruled for centuries 
certainly leaves deep impressions on the geography it dominated for ages, thus it is as well 
impossible for Turkey to isolate itself from Ottoman periphery at all. From this perspective, it 
may be concluded that modern Turkey has reconstructed Ottoman heritage with Western 
style, thus legacies of Ottoman Empire are highly deterministic in terms of constructing 
theoretical framework of Turkey‘s foreign policy paradigm. 
 
6.2 Legacies of Kemalism 
 The second and latest structural determinant shaping traditional Turkey‘s foreign 
policy is Kemalism. Legacies of Kemalism are highly influential on foreign policy concept of 
Turkey.
175
 The ideological framework and principles dominating contemporary Turkey‘s 
foreign policy have been mostly identified by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the founding father 
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of Republic of Turkey.
176
 Turkey‘s external policy has been initiated, formulated and directed 
by Atatürk and till now the traces of Kemalist doctrines are the principle shaping factors of 
Turkey‘s foreign policy. Mustafa Aydın remarks as regard to influence of Mustafa Kemal on 
Turkey‘s foreign policy as bellow: 
 
            Although experiences and memories of the Ottoman past, together with its geostrategic location 
served as a foundation  for and influenced  the subsequent foreign  relations of Turkey, it is 
Atatürk‘s theory and  practice of foreign policy  which has been the  most important factor in  
shaping Turkey‘s foreign policy. He not only completely controlled Turkey‘s foreign policy 
in his lifetime, but he also put forward an ideological framework by which the pursuit of 
Turkey‘s foreign policy could be achieved.177 
 
Mustafa Kemal as a person, who had been highly influenced by the Western positivist 
philosophy approaches, struggled for the establishment of his ideas and founded the modern 
Turkey as a European style nation state
178
 with deep stress on Turkish nationalism.
179
 Unlike 
to heterogeneous structure of Ottoman Empire and its huge territories, Kemal supported the 
idea of a defendable territory with a homogeneous population enforcing nationalization 
process within its borders. Respectively, instead of following a foreign policy concept similar 
to Ottoman Empire, Kemalism deeply focused on protection of Turkey‘s natural borders.180 In 
a speech on Turkish Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal notifies as follow while 
Turkey continues its Independence Movement: 
 
Sirs, we are not among those who are running for big ideas. As a consequence of running for big 
ideas we attracted animosity of whole word to our nation. We do not follow Pan-Islamist policies, 
we seem to tell we follow or we will follow pan-Islamism, thus our enemies not to let us follow 
Pan-Islamist policies tried to kill us. We neither do follow Pan-Turanist
181
 policies; we seem to tell 
we follow or we will follow Pan-Turanism, thus our enemies not to let us follow Pan-Turanist 
policies one more time tried to kill us. Owing to the fact that, we do not follow similar policies, we 
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do not augmented our enemies because we are a nation who desire to live and independence and 
we will spend our lives solely for similar reasons.
182
 
 
 
Another principle of Kemalism is the promotion of Turkey to the level of contemporary 
civilizations that pose a development pattern for modern Turkey modeling Western Europe 
which is identified as the ultimate level of civilization.  Adaptation of many Western style 
laws and reforms barely indicates this feature of Kemalist outlook as regard to foreign policy. 
Mustafa Kemal‘s aim to promote Turkish society to the level of contemporary civilization 
highly contributed an affiliation between European states and Turkey.  
In spite of the fact that Turkey undertook its Independence War as a struggle against the 
Western powers, the chief of the Turkish National Liberation war‘s notification: ―Turkish 
War of Independence is not against the West but imperialism‖183 is crucial to comprehend 
modern Turkey‘s approach to the West. Likewise, the realist, non-adventurous principles of 
Kemalist paradigm as regard to foreign policy concept constitutes the general red lines of 
Turkey‘s foreign policy concept. Kemalist foreign policy doctrine poses a diplomacy 
oriented foreign policy prioritizing peaceful solutions of problems under the frame of 
international law instead of audacious policies of Young Turks.
184
 During his lifetime, 
Mustafa Kemal achieved the control over Turkey‘s foreign policy entirely and he clearly 
underlined the ideological structure that Turkey‘s foreign policy should follow. Mustafa 
Aydın summaries the issue in a detailed way illustrating the impacts of Kemalist ideology on 
Turkey‘s foreign policy outlines: 
 
Though the original Kemalist goals of national foreign policy underwent various mutations, 
practically all Turkish governments, regardless of their standpoints, put his ―indisputable dogma‖ 
into their programs and have not, and could not implement policies that ran counter to Kemalist 
principles. His influence over the Turkish people, in general, and through Turkey‘s foreign policy 
in particular, has been so deep and so fundamental that there are at times intimations, and often 
open warnings, that anything other than strict adherence to his principles would be disloyal to him 
and to the country. Atatürk‘s foreign policy views, like his political views, represented a break 
with the past. He aimed at a renunciation of three strains which had been important during 
Ottoman times: the imperial Ottomanism, Pan Islamism, and Pan-Turanism. Incidentally, policies 
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which could break these strains coincided with three of his political principles: Republicanism, 
Secularism and Nationalism respectively.
185
 
 
 
7. Main Principles of Turkey’s Foreign Policy 
 
The main purpose of this section is to describe main principles of traditional peculiarities of 
Turkey‘s traditional foreign policy as well as the determinants shaping these very principles. 
 
7.1. Status Quo Principle  
The first principle determines main axiom of traditional Turkey‘s foreign policy is its 
status quo principle. As it has been mentioned beforehand, the status quo principle might be 
understood as the preservation of present situation as an inheritance of Ottoman Empire to 
Turkey. Principally, after the 17
th
 century due to the recession of Ottoman Empire as a rule 
Empire did not prefer to be engaged in wars to prevent direct danger menacing its entity and 
unity.
186
 Accordingly, Baskın Oran remarks that, the main perception of status quo for Turkey 
is the conservation of present Turkish borders; as a consequence of this understanding 
Turkey‘s foreign policy makers conscientiously abstain from applying irredentist policies.187 
The founder of the Republic explicitly underlined modern Turkey‘s new approach as regard to 
Turkey‘s status quo principle notifying Peace at home, Peace at Word.188 The resolution of 
―Hatay question―189 in favor of Turkey may be accepted as an exceptional case for Turkey‘s 
status quo oriented policies, yet since annex of Hatay to mainland Republic of Turkey has not 
followed any irredentist policy application. The internal turmoil of Turkish domestic policies 
in the course of transition period and the emergence of Soviet Union adjacent to Turkey 
became boosting factors for Turkey to stick to status quo principle. As a result of revisionist 
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attitude of Mustafa Kemal and founder cadres of modern Turkey,
190
 Ankara mostly achieved 
territories that were defined at ―National Oath― (Misak-i Milli).191 
 
7.2. Westernization Principle 
The second principle determines the traditional foreign policy concept of Turkey is its 
Western orientation. From history point of view, as it has been repeatedly mentioned, the roots 
of Turkey‘s Westernization date back to late Ottoman Empire period.192 According to Baskın 
Oran, there are historical, geographical, ideological, and sociocultural factors that push Turks 
to follow a pro Western foreign policy orientation.
193
 
The geographical structure of Anatolian peninsula highly contributed to Turkey‘s 
Westernist orientation, while Turks continuous interaction with the West as well highly 
contributed this very process.
194
 From cultural point of view, Turks prefer to call them as 
Europeans instead of Asians. Scholars who study Turkey‘s foreign policy‘s Western 
orientation have two views; First view advocates the thesis that the ―West‖ itself constitutes a 
role model for the Republic. The word of Mustafa Kemal ―Which nation that wanted to be 
civilized had not turned toward the West‖195 supports this idea. As for the second idea, the 
West has been interpreted as the model to improve Republic of Turkey. Relations with the 
West perceived as an obligatory prerequisite for Turkey‘s economic and political development. 
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On the other hand, Turkey‘s gradual independence to the West, especially after the emergence 
of the Cold War following the Second World War became a theme of criticism. 
After the establishment of the Republic, Turkey‘s foreign policy decision makers 
persistently put a special mark on relations with the West in political, diplomatic, cultural, 
military, strategic and economic meaning. Oral Sander notifies that, it is an obvious fact that 
the factors, like the emergence of Soviet threat, or the interest of Turkish elites coincided with 
the favor of continuation relations with the West, and this very fact constituted an additional 
motivation for Ankara to take part in Western Alliance. Nevertheless, the continuous threat 
perception or the choice of elites itself still is not an enough explanation in order to 
conceptualize Turkish foreign policy‘s Western dimension and preference priorities 
properly.
196 
The Westernization process, at this respect in Oral Sander‘s opinion, should be 
appreciated as the strict engagement to Western norms and value system, the root of which 
should be searched in foundation philosophy of the Republic. Therefore, Western orientation 
and status quo constituted the general framework of Turkey‘s Foreign policy since her 
foundation 1923. Parallel to above mentioned transformation period, the Westernist 
interpretation of civilization profoundly influenced Turkey‘s foreign policy. According to this 
idea, foreign policy makers of the Republic conceived that the modernization/civilization idea 
can best be accomplished through the harmonizing measures domestically with a Westernist 
foreign policy to reach Western standards as the ideal sample of civilization. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
A ―medium power state‖,197 situates in an extremely crucial position which makes it a 
geopolitical and geostrategic asset, Republic of Turkey plays a determinant role in regional 
politics. Yet, referring to ―Aron paradigm‖,198 the medium power states do not have an elastic 
opportunity to move regardless of blocs in terms of international politics. In this sense, 
Turkey not excluded from the very reality, continuously has been acting in line with bloc 
power balances in order to survive since its establishment. 
According to Ramazan Gözen, the main characteristic feature and the basic 
understanding of Turkey‘s foreign policy could be summarized under the following 
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dimensions: In terms of its main orientation and stance in international system, Turkey is 
directed to the West. The Westernization principle that accelerated with the establishment of 
the Republic may be divided to two sub periods; the period when young Republic attempted to 
approach and the period since the Cold War. During the period that commenced with the 
emerge of the Cold War, Turkey highly integrated in terms of institutions with the West -the 
United States of America, the European Union and NATO- as determined its internal and 
external compatible to Western standards. Besides, Gözen stresses that Turkey‘s foreign policy 
has shaped due to Western norms and principles under the frames of modernity, nation state 
and sovereignty. In terms of foreign policy tools and methods internationalist realist 
skepticism, that has its roots in late Ottoman period, and use of hard power tool highly 
dominated Turkey‘s foreign policy. The political, military, strategic, both economic and social 
as well as diplomatic relation perspectives of Turkey have been also determined through its 
Westernization objectives. Eventually, from historical perspective foreign policy orientation of 
Republic of Turkey since the emerge of the Cold War has not experienced a fundamental shift 
or transformation, main foreign policy orientation, ideology and tools of Republic continued to 
be the U.S,, NATO and the  EU centered.
199
 
As for the practice, Philip Robins summarizes the history of Turkey‘s foreign policy as 
follows: Republic of Turkey, hitherto, has met four major foreign policy challenges. Firstly, in 
the early and mid 1920s, it saw the challenge of consolidating the emerging state of Turkey, 
principally through external recognition. The second appeared with the Second World War as 
the need to remain outside of a conflict that raged all around spinning most of Europe and the 
Middle East. the third came with the territorial and security challenge from the Soviet Union, 
in particular at the early period of the Cold War; and the fourth coincided with the end of the 
Cold War due to the collapse of bipolarity, as the need to navigate carefully through the 
transitional period in the international system.
200
 
Turkey, in accordance with the Westernization principle established its political, 
economic and legal system compatible to Europe and set up a Western style democratic, 
secular, nation state that became the principle component of Turkey‘s foreign policy concept 
and opted to be a part of Western bloc system. Tough in many cases as regard to foreign policy 
it inherited both positive and negative legacies of Ottoman Empire it strictly followed the 
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foreign policy doctrines of the founder and the first President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
Kemalist paradigm has become the official doctrine of Turkey‘s foreign policy that shaping its 
theoretical outline along with its practical implementations since its establishment. 
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Chapter II 
Justice and Development Party and Its Foreign Policy Concept 
 
The chapter analyzes Justice and Development Party through a historical perspective focusing 
on ideological transition from political Islam to conservative democracy with a strong stress 
on the main factors shaping its foreign policy concept. The main objective of the chapter is to 
properly conceptualize main determinants constructing foreign policy concept of AK Party so 
as to understand foreign policy decision making process of the Party during its government 
periods in 2002-2011. 
 The first section of the chapter analyzes the historical background of Justice and 
Development focusing on the period from late Ottoman times to National Vision Movement 
including construction and development period of Justice and Development Party. The second 
section examines ideological transformation of administration staff of AKP and the process of 
taking them from a political Islamic background engaging them in conservative democracy 
with a focus on the theoretical and practical aspects of its political ideology. As for the third 
and final section, it explores foreign policy concept and principles of AK Party with an accent 
on Strategic Depth Doctrine and Zero Problem Principle along with election manifestos and 
Party program. 
 
1. Historical Background of Justice and Development Party (AK Party) 
 
In order to delve deep into the historical background of AKP, it is necessary to go over the 
history of political Islam and National View Movement in Turkey. 
 
1.1. Political Islam in Turkey 
The adventure of political Islam in Turkey cannot be understood properly without 
considering Pan Islamist ideology. Pan Islamism emerged as a reactive doctrine proposing 
alternative solution models to the demise of the Ottoman Empire. It was a political view or a 
sort of ―revivalist movement‖201 against the collapse of Ottoman Empire; it bore an anti-
imperialistic rhetoric, which aimed the ―union of all Muslims‖.202 In his book ―The Politics of 
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Pan Islam: Ideology and Organization‖,203 Jacob Landau accentuates that in order to provide 
unity of Muslim world Pan Islamic ideology suggests two methods: To create a single Muslim 
state or to build a Muslim union harmonious with Muslim states. Pan Islamism introduced 
alternative resolution prescriptions against imperialism, underdevelopment and enthrallment 
in Islam world. As a political view, it suggested rational, modernist and eclectic ideological 
proposals against above mentioned problems that Muslims encountered between 19
th
 and 20
th
 
century.
204
 Oxford Dictionary of Islamic Studies describes Pan Islamism as follows: 
 
Ideology calling for sociopolitical solidarity among all Muslims has existed as a 
religious concept since the early days of Islam. It emerged as a modern political 
ideology in the 1860s and 1870s at the height of European colonialism, when 
Turkish intellectuals began discussing and writing about it as a way to save the 
Ottoman Empire from fragmentation. Became the favored state policy during the 
reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (r.1876 -1909) and was adopted and promoted by 
members of the ruling bureaucratic and intellectual elites of the empire. With the rise 
of colonialism, became a defensive ideology, directed against European political, 
military, economic, and missionary penetration. Posed the sultan as a universal 
caliph to whom Muslims everywhere owed allegiance and obedience. It sought to 
offset military and economic weakness in the Muslim world by favoring central 
government over the periphery and Muslims over non-Muslims in education, office, 
and economic opportunities. Ultimately failed and collapsed after the defeat and 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Resurrected during the 
resurgence of Islam after World War II. It was expressed via organizations such as 
the Muslim World League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which 
seek to coordinate Islamic solidarity through political and economic cooperation 
internationally. It has also served as an important political tool in recruiting all-
Muslim support against foreign aggressions.
205
 
 
The emergence of Pan Islamism in the Ottoman Empire coincides with the rule period of 
Abdulhamid II
206
 (Ottoman Sultan)
207
 who ―tried to mobilize the opinion all over the Muslim 
world in support of the flattering Ottoman state, as well to provide it with much needed help 
against its numerous and powerful enemies‖.208 Pan Islamism idea in Ottoman intelligentsia 
indispensably advocated the proposal that the Ottoman Empire should keep its positive 
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relations and solidarity with other Muslims as well as with the ―Ummah‖209 living all around 
the world. Similarly, Pan Islamist model aimed to gather all world Muslims around the 
―Shari‘a‖210 under the authority of Caliph. In spite of the fact that Pan Islamism did not reach 
its main goal to evade the collapse of Ottoman Empire to collect all Muslim nations under the 
same roof, thanks to tight relations developed with other Muslim societies -particularly with 
Indian Muslims (today‘s Pakistan, India and Bangladesh)- young Turkey gained a substantial 
material support during its Independence War.
211
 
After the break down of the Empire, Pan Islamism ideology gradually transformed to 
―Islamism‖ in modern Turkey. According to Şerif Mardin, ―Islamism is an ideological 
behavior that consolidated in Ottoman periphery and India, then got strength at the center of 
state and thereafter turned out to be a political view‖.212 Instead of gathering all world 
Muslims together, Pan Islamism became part of the Turkish internal politics and mostly 
engaged in the independence of Anatolia in a different outpost, which was namely Islamism. 
Islamism developed under different fractions reacting against the occupation of Anatolia. In 
the meantime, Islamist ideologists established several organizations like Association for the 
Exaltation of Islam (Teal-i Islam Cemiyeti) in order to raise awareness among the Turkish 
society against the invasion.
213
 Mustafa Kemal, as the leader of Turkish War of Independence 
in the course of his struggle also used a pro-Islamist rhetoric,
214
 while addressing religious 
emotions of the people around him. Islamism mostly defended religious and spiritual 
solidarity against the occupation, but it also supported the protection of Caliphate institution. 
Subsidiarily, the supporters of Islamist ideology actively participated in the Independence 
War initialized by Atatürk. Yet, the abolition of Caliphate constituted a new problem to be 
discussed, besides the conversion to Latin alphabet, Westernization with an immerse stress on 
secularization along with tough interpretation of laicism principle erasing the official religion 
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expression in Turkish constitution accelerated the transformation process of critical approach 
to an opposition against Kemalist paradigm. The gradual replacement of Islamic institutions 
to secular ones, the establishment of Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı) in order to augment state control on religious issues boiled the tension. Some 
members or supporters of the Islamist association (both in administrative and member level) 
were highly marginalized and they actively attended social revolutions against the Kemalist 
regime.  
On the other hand, the moderate Islamists who preferred pacifist methods continued 
their struggle via political activities under the roof of opponent parties like conservative 
Progressive Republican Party (Terakki Perver Fırkası).215 Nevertheless, due to the enact of 
―Tranquility Statement Laws‖216 so as to repress the Sheikh Said217 revolt supported by 
Kurdish tribes in the south eastern part of Anatolia, the pressure on the Islamists along with 
other opposition groups increasingly augmented, therefore the activities of all other political 
parties except for Republican People‘s Party were banned. Henceforward, under the shade of 
―shock therapy‖218 which was applied to Turkish society through newly emerged Kemalist 
bureaucracy and military elites, Pan Islamism ideology that formerly proposed a Muslim 
union gradually converted to Islamism, thus it commenced to advocate an Islam based state 
model in Turkey. Nonetheless, since the international and domestic conjecture rose after the 
First World War, Islamism was obliged to abandon its public discourse and eventually 
initialized to be politicized mostly focusing on the conservation of religious and traditional 
norms in Turkish society.  
Thanks to transition to multi party system in Turkey, the pressure on Islamists 
decreased relatively.
219
 Islamists at this period commenced to participate in policy making 
process of the country at the rows of Democrat Party. The Islam friendly policy approaches of 
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Adnan Menderes
220
 -like the conversion of Azan (call for prayer) from Turkish to Arabic-.
221
 
And it highly contributed to this very affiliation process. However, as a consequence of 27 
May 1960, coup d‘état Democrat Party was closed by Military regime and the activities of 
Islamist were abolished. 
 
1.2. Political Islam and National Vision 
The main organization of Political Islam was realized, thanks to the initiatives of Prof. 
Mehmet Zahit Kotku.
222
 Zahit Kotku as a reaction to never ending struggles and political 
intrigues at right wing parties and in order to express the ideas of Islamists more explicitly 
decided to establish a political party ―that can stand itself‖ 223 with an Islamic orientation. 
Kotku favored the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan as a promising and outstanding 
personality of first Islamist political party in Turkey. Thus, Necmettin Erbakan thereafter 
undertook the indisputable charismatic, traditional Islamist leadership that made him as the 
most notable figure of political Islam in Turkey.  
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establish closer ties with Muslim states. Recognizing the deep-seated religious fervor of the populace, Menderes 
relaxed much of the official antipathy of Atatürk and the RPP towards some of the more conservative 
manifestations of Islamic religious feeling. 
The DP encouraged private enterprise as opposed to a planned economy, but it eventually brought the 
country to insolvency by a policy of heedless importation of foreign goods and technology. While the lot of the 
average villager did improve, it was done at the sacrifice of national economic integrity.In spite of Turkey‘s 
crushing economic problems, Menderes maintained his popularity with the peasantry, and in the 1954 elections 
the DP again won by a substantial majority, returning Menderes to office. Always intolerant of criticism, 
Menderes then set out to silence his opposition. Press censorship was instituted, journalists were jailed at whim, 
and local elections were rigged. These policies not only angered the intellectuals but alienated the military, a 
group that saw itself as the guardians of Kemalist ideals and felt that the Atatürk reforms were being directly 
challenged.Although the national economy continued to decline, Menderes still had popular support and won the 
1957 elections. But the opposition to him was intensifying, and on May 27, 1960, a military coup overthrew his 
government. Menderes and hundreds of Democrat Party leaders were arrested. During a trial lasting 11 months, 
Menderes was accused of embezzling state funds, extravagance, and corruption, among other charges. He was 
sentenced to death and, following a suicide attempt, was hanged. 
―Adnan Menderes‖ in Encyclopedia Britannica,  (source: www.britannica.com,  
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/374821/Adnan-Menderes>, May 2011). 
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Necmettin Erbakan was born in 1926 in Northern Turkey.
224
 His father, who came from 
a long-standing family, was a civil servant worked in different places of Turkey while his 
mother was a member of a reputable family. Being a bright student during his initial learning 
life, he studied mechanical engineering at Istanbul Technical University which is the most 
prestigious and oldest university of Turkey in the field of Technology and earned his PhD 
degree from Aachen University. During his stay in Germany, he was highly influenced by 
German discipline and technology that would reflect his political discourse in the course of 
his future career. His achievements and bright intelligence were noticed by German scholars 
and was invited to undertake projects for German army.
225
 Erbakan got acquaintance with 
religious ideas in İstanbul after his father‘s retirement.226 He gradually became a popular 
figure among Islamic and conservative circles. After his return to Turkey, Erbakan worked on 
the project of producing Turkish cars, which increased his popularity and constituted a 
national, conservative, reference for his political activities. 
Inspired by Kotku along with the support of many religious groups and communities 
Necmettin initialized ―National Vision Movement‖227 (Milli Görüş Hareketi) which was also 
published as a manifesto aftermaths.
228
 In their corporate book ―Religion and Politics in 
Turkey‖, Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry M. Rubin make the inference that ―the term National Vision 
constitutes the key concept in the ideology of Islamic parties in Turkey‖229 So as to describe 
ideological axiom of the National Vision Movement and Islamist parties established by the 
movement Çarkoğlu and Rubin notifies as follows: 
 
The political vision of Islamist parties in Turkey is based on a certain way of interpreting Muslim 
history and Western influence in the world. They argue that Muslim World has experienced a 
decline for several centuries, although it used to be advance than the West. They explain their 
greatness with the moral and spiritual strength that comes with the nation‘s faith. As Turkey has 
imitated the Western values and utilized inappropriate Western technology by a Western-oriented it 
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has fallen behind. They point a better future when Turkey properly blends and synthesis moral 
spiritual and material development.
230
     
  
 
To boot, Mehmet Ali Soydan summarize the social and political doctrines of the 
Movement in five points:  
 
1- Reject Western imitation 
2- Reject Western Capitalism 
3- Develop  moral  and material well-being of citizen 
4- Reject Western dependency and adopt Islamic unity 
5- Realize Islamic Justice.
231
 
 
Thereafter, the movement established National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) in 1970 as 
the first Islamist political party in Turkey. The first Party of National Vision Movement had 
an Islamic - Conservative discourse highlighting the spiritual and national upgrading of 
Turkish nation. Apart from stress on social justice, a natural culture and education,
232
 the 
Party program openly objected to market economy and interest system,
233
 while it advocated a 
state oriented economy based on ―Fair Order‖.234 The idea of ―Fair Order‖ (Adil Düzen) soon 
became a slogan of Erbakan oriented political Islam in Turkey with a socialist accent 
remarkably against American imperialism.
235
 Erbakan‘s strong opposition against Western 
imperialism, his interpretation of the European Union as a Christian Club along with 
vehement critics of Turkish secularism and Kemalist paradigm, turned him out to be a 
controversial figure in Turkish politics. National Order Party under the leadership of 
Necmettin Erbakan harshly opposed Turkey‘s close association with Europe and NATO 
membership as he proposed an Islam union. Eventually, he critically approached toward Israel 
- Turkish alliance with an anti-Zionist stress (he was criticized for being anti-Semitist) as well 
as searched close ties with other Islamists around the world.
236
 Yet, the National Vision 
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Movement proposed resolution models that turned out to be chronological problem for 
Turkey. Hence, these actions were highly welcomed by masses thanks to rhetoric used by his 
charismatic leader. The identity and anti-corruption policies along with its address to 
conservative and religious sentiments of Turkish people made the party rise gradually. 
National Order Party was represented under the roof of Turkish Grand Assembly, but 
it also experienced the same end as Democrat Party did. The leader of the Party, Necmettin 
Erbakan, was obliged to leave Turkey for Switzerland. Aftermaths, Necmettin Erbakan 
established the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) as a successor of National 
Order Party at 1972. National Salvation Party took 11% of total votes and entered to Turkish 
Grand National Assembly with 48 deputies, while the Justice Party lost its votes from 46.5 to 
28.9. Consequently, National Salvation Party set up a coalition government with Republican 
People‘s Party. 
As an outcome of the 1980 military coup d‘état, Turkish civic politics repeatedly 
entered under the influence of military regime. National Salvation Party along with all other 
political parties in Turkey was dissolved, as the high rank members and executives of the 
Party were banned from political activities. At the year of 1983, military government 
permitted to reestablishment and activity of all political parties back in Turkey, thus 
Necmettin Erbakan established Welfare Party (Refah Partisi),
237
 as the following political 
organization, tough he could not participate in it due to the continuation of his political 
prohibition. After referendum held at national level, it removed political bans related to coup 
and Erbakan became the leader of the party and continued his political life under the roof of 
Welfare Party.  
The real rise of political Islam in Turkey took place with Welfare Party when the Party 
won İstanbul and Ankara metropolitan municipalities during the local elections held in 
1994.
238
  ―This burst in support for Erbakan‘s party set the stage for its landmark victory (with 
21 percent of the vote) in the December 1995 elections that marked the first time an Islamist 
political party had ever won a plurality in a Turkish national elections‖.239 Aftermaths, 
Welfare Party formed a coalition government with True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi), in 
which Necmettin Erbakan performed the Prime Minister task. The boom of political Islam in 
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Turkish political scene caused panic among bureaucratic and military elites of Turkey.
240
 The 
pro Islamists activities of Welfare Party along with its public discourse of administration staff 
agitated the tension. Prime Minister ―Erbakan embarked on some bold symbolic changes in 
domestic and foreign politics. For instance he paid his first state visit to a number of Muslim 
countries, allowed female bureaucrats to wear headscarves in the office and agreed on 
adjustment of working-hours during Ramadan, the holy month of fasting‖.241 Ultimately, the 
controversial reception program for Sheikhs at Prime Minister residency increased the 
concern of General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silalhlı Kuvvetleri) appreciating 
itself as the protector of secular regime in Turkey absolutely. Therefore, agitated also by the 
provocative rhetoric of mass media The Chief of General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces 
issued a memorandum at 28 February 1998, which obliged the resignation of Welfare - True 
Path Party coalition government. The indirect intervention of military forces to civil politics 
registered to Turkish political history as a ―Post - modern coup d‘état‖242 introducing harsh 
pressures not only against political Islam but also toward all Islamic movements.
243
 
Following the 28 February coup, the Welfare Party was closed by the decision of 
constitutional court under the accusation of undertaking political activities against the 
secularity principle of constitution, henceforward, high rank officials were banned from 
politics including Necmettin Erbakan. As an outcome of the verdict, the movement 
established the next political party of National View Movement, this time it was called as 
Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi). However, this period was also pregnant upcoming political 
turmoil for National Vision Movement itself. The new generation National Vision Movement 
politicians started to question and criticize aggressive and non-conformists attitude of hawk 
wing of National Vision Movement politicians with the dominant powers of republic. 
The inner party critics of milder wing of National Vision Movement as well as their 
opposition against tough attitude versus the settled secular system in Turkey reached to its 
peak level particularly when a woman deputy, Merve Kavakçı, entered to National Assembly 
with veil and was enforced to leave the session under the protests of opposition deputies. The 
incident caused tough discussions as regard to interpretation of laicism and religious symbols 
almost at all level of Turkey, harsh criticism directed to political Islamist under the pretext to 
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be provocative, while Turkish public view clasped to the incident for weeks. The destiny of 
Virtue Party that established instead of Welfare Party became similar to its predecessor and 
Turkish Constitutional Court dissolved it too under the allegation of being the successor of 
Welfare Party.
244
 One more time, the following political party of National Vision Movement 
was closed by Turkish justice system under the blame of their anti-secular activities. As the 
political struggle between conservatives and innovators continued, the Turkish Constitutional 
Court closed the party that replaced with Felicity Party. (Saadet Partisi). 
 
1.3. The Birth and Development of Justice and Development Party 
The 28 February postmodern coup process and continuous antagonist structure of 
political Islam versus secular elites gradually augmented disappointments among the 
members of National Vision Movement.
245
 Among the NVM members, it was ―concluded 
that the only way the Islamists could succeed was by avoiding a direct confrontation with the 
secularists and deemphasizing the religious agenda‖.246 Additionally, the following closure 
case disclosed deep discussions, which gained a public character. Thereby, the inner-party 
dissidence gave birth to ―intense internal debate and rethinking within the Islamic movement 
about the movement‘s future political strategy and agenda, and a growing philosophical and 
political rift emerged within the movement between two different groups‖.247 
The fraction called as Traditionalist (Gelenekçiler) wing of Virtue Party consisted of 
old generation political Islamists who used to be tightly connected to ideas of Erbakan, 
advocating the orthodox struggle tools of National Vision Movement. Oppositely, the 
reformist Innovators (Yenilikçiler) upheld a mild manner instead of igniting tension with 
secular elites led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan248 and Abdullah Gül.249 The struggle between the 
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Traditionalists and Innovators displayed publicly during the ordinary congress of Virtue Party 
that was held to select a new chairman following Erbakan‘s political ban. The Innovators 
intended to take the control of the party putting Abdullah Gül against the Conservatives‘ 
candidate supported by Necmettin Erbakan. In the end the candidate of Innovators was almost 
reaching the victory. The success that the innovators gained during the above mentioned 
Congress paved the way for the emergence of them as a new party in Turkish political arena 
on 14
th
 August 2001.
250
 This new party was called the Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi) under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan. Soon after completing its 
organizational process, Justice and Development Party took part in general elections held on 
3
rd
 November 2002. Despite being a comparatively young party, it achieved to collect 34 % of 
                                                                                                                                                        
oriented politics instead of engaging ideological structures. Erdoğan as well developed highly positive relations 
with mass media representatives in order to introduce his performance ably on public view, yet was criticized 
trough suspicious seculars due to ban of alcohol in some districts of İstanbul open to public. On the other hand, 
the policies developed during his administration in İstanbul was not perceived as Islamist but implicated as Neo 
Ottomanist as he allocated huge amounts of  municipality budget to restore Ottoman monuments and  ― change 
of some street names ‖During a public meeting at the year of 1997, He read a poem published by the permission 
of Ministry of Education and sentenced to a ten year prison punishment, banned from politics and ended his 
mayor post of İstanbul municipality.        
 ―RecepTayyip Erdoğan‖ in Britannica Encyclopdia Online,  
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general polls and became the ruling party after the first elections that it participated. With this 
result, the party gained the absolute majority of seats in Turkish National Grand Assembly.
251
 
First government of Justice and Development Party and the 58
th
 of Republic of Turkey 
were formed under the leadership of Abdullah Gül as Erdoğan was legally banned from 
political activities due to the conviction he was sentenced to in 1998. The political ban of 
Tayyip Erdoğan was removed thanks to a constitutional amendment that was supported by the 
opposition parties as well in 2002. And he was elected as a deputy after the interim elections 
held in Siirt. On the first ordinary general assembly of JDP, party members elected Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan as the chairman unanimously. The 58th government established under the 
leadership of Abdullah Gül held the power from November 18, 2002 since March 14, 2003 
resigned and the 59
th
 government of the Republic was established under the leadership of 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, thence he became the new Prime Minister of Turkey. 
 In local elections held in 2004, Justice and Development Party increased its vote 
proportion to 42 % of prevailing at the majority of metropolitan, provincial, country and 
district municipalities.
252
 AK Party increased its vote percentage during the general elections, 
which was held at July 22, 2007. AK Party recorded 46.6 % percentage allocating 341 seats at 
Turkish Grand Assembly.
253
 Following that, during the local elections held at 29 of March 
2009 the vote rates of Justice and Development Party fell to 38.78 percentages of total votes 
tough became the first party, however it lost some important cities at the Eastern and Southern 
part of Turkey. Ultimately, in the national elections held in 12 June 2011, Justice and 
Development Party achieved to collect almost 50 % of total votes in Turkey. AK Party signed 
a historical record not only in Turkish democracy but also in Europe as a political party being 
elected three times in row with an increasing vote percentage.
254
 It was a historical success at 
Turkish political history as a rare case for a ruling party increasing its vote percentage, which 
has not been met since 1950 general election. 
In spite of the fact that, Justice and Development Party entered to general elections 
shortly after its establishment, it succeed an unexpected increase among other political parties 
the origins, which date back almost to the establishment of Republic. The unforeseen 
achievement of a new party with an Islamist background caused deep dissents among 
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scholars, academicians and intellectuals specialized in political sciences and sociology. All 
the same, the success of AK Party may be shortly summarized as bellow: First of all, Turkish 
political scene from the death of Turgut Özal till the Justice and Development Party period 
was full of political deadlocks. Because of continuous coalition-governments corroded 
political ethics and caused a great despair of Turkish people toward politics as an institution 
(interpreting as an institution serving solely for the stakes of privileged group of people). The 
perception of politics was seriously injured by continuous fluctuations due to shallow, causal 
interest struggles of coalition governments, henceforward Justice, and Development Party as a 
new political formation turned out to be hope for Turkish society. 
  Secondly, the degreasing economy of country made Turkish people search new 
alternatives in order to stop critical situation. The devaluation of foreign currency against 
Turkish Lira during True Path Party and Social Democrat Party coalition caused almost half 
million people jobless, furthermore as a reflection of Russian financial crisis, at the year of 
1999 Turkey experienced the worst economic crisis in the history that caused a deep shake for 
Turkish people. Besides, the corruption, continuous inflation, and increasing Kurdish 
separatist terror became deterministic at the political behavior of Turks. As a result, Turkish 
voters estimated that the coalition governments couldn‘t manage the crisis. Another reason, 
parallel to above mentioned factors, Turkish policy tired with old images and old political 
actors activating at political scene almost since the establishment of Republic and a newly 
born party who proved its success through its members  during previous post caused an 
affiliation of voters. Notwithstanding to the fact that, it is not the main concern of this 
dissertation to examine internal and external dynamics made the AKP first party shortly after 
its establishment and increase its vote proportion stably in the course of three period at the 
office consecutively, there are many other factors deterministic at this very phenomena. 
Owing to the transformation under the roof of National Vision Movement, the new discourse 
of Justice and Development Party embraced wider parts of Turkish society; furthermore the 
negative effects of 28 February military coup and favor to democracy as well highly 
contributed Justice and Development Party‘s achievement. 
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2. AK Party and Its Political Identity   
 
Conservatism as an ideological phenomenon and political doctrine firstly emerged with the 
motto to preserve the existing in France as a reaction to social and economical transformation 
rose aftermath the French Revolution.
255
  Scholars from continental Europe like Edmund 
Burke, Hugh Cecil, Lord Hailsham and Roger Scruton had constructed the philosophical 
fundamentals of Conservative Democracy doctrine.
256
 The ―Reflections on the Revolution in 
France‖ of Burke and the masterpieces of Russell Kirk ―The Conservative Mind‖ as well as 
―The Politics of Prudence‖ are the reference books of Conservative Democracy in political 
philosophy literature.
257
 
As a reference to Conservative Democracy experience in the West, AK Party put a 
distance between political Islam attempting to create a political philosophy within a 
theoretical frame that is understandable at all levels of the society adopting the Conservative 
Democrat political party identity.
258
 Seeking legitimacy in front of Kemalist elites of the 
Republic, Justice and Development Party developed a new political discourse conversely to 
its staff members‘ former political Islamist identity. Therefore, the ―Conservative 
Democracy‖259 had become the new political identity of former Islamist to explain political 
orientation of the newly established Party. AKP undertook an academic work headed by 
Yalçın Akdoğan, who is an academician and political adviser of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, to manifest its ideological position called as ―Conservative Democracy‖.260  
Justice and Development Party decision makers, undergoing a considerable change in 
the course of its establishment process publicly announced that the Party has cut all its 
National Outlook past. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the chairman of the AK Party adopted the 
popular discourse of ―we have took out our National Outlook shirt‖261 to indicate the 
conservative democrat orientation of AK Party. The party program of JDP as well barely 
reflected its transition and break from National Vision Movement tradition. The expression 
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―loyalty to the fundamental values and constitution of the Republic‖262 was barely exposed in 
the program.
263
 The respect for fundamental principles toward democracy, the right of 
freedom and acceptance of religion as a unifying element of society were explicitly stressed. 
In addition to that, secularity as a principle guarantying religious independence of individual 
and regulating state individual relation in term of religion was as well highlighted in the party 
program, while protection of representatives of other religions and nonbelievers also added to 
the party program of the JDP.
264
 Besides, by contrast to anti-Western attitude of National 
Vision Movement ideology that appreciate the West an enemy of Islam and Turkey, Justice 
and Development Party ―has increasingly emphasized Western political values such as 
democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law  in its public discourse‖.265 
İhsan Yılmaz so as to express the ideological shift of JDP decision makers stresses ―the 
AK Party is a successful example showing that political participation and the opportunities 
available for the Islamist parties can generate political change, resulting in the transformation 
of Islamism to non-Islamism in the Turkish context‖.266 Bilal Sambur highlights unique case 
of AK Party and its dissimilarity to orthodox political Islam and Islamist movements‘ as 
bellow: 
         This movement formed itself as a political party. Its members are politicians, not militants. It 
constantly and explicitly rejects radical and militant types of Islamism, stays away from religious 
literalism, tries to produce a kind of conservatism with a liberal tone. AKP does not approve 
violence and militancy in the name of religion. The exclusion of militancy, literalism and violence 
gives opportunity to AKP to accommodate religiosity, plurality, democracy, secularity and 
modernity together. The case of AKP should not be analyzed the way Taliban or Al-Qaida has 
been presented in the world press. Instead of a militancy presentation, AKP should be understood 
in terms of its political, social and cultural dimensions.
267
 
 
Yasin Aktay, as regard to ideological transition of AKP‘s decision makers, points out that 
―after AK Party‘s break from National Outlook political line they entered to a purification 
process of Islamic symbols tough they did not isolated trough Islamic ontology at all‖.268 
Professor Aktay adds that, Justice and Development Party created a new rhetoric in order to 
continue its connection and communication with its natural grassroots thanks to this new 
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conservative political party identity that adopted compatible with the realpolitik and 
conjecture.
269
 Yalçın Akdoğan, in order to classify political party identification of definition 
among Justice and Development Party grassroots stands out as follows: 
                
                  In a political profile query Justice and Development Party members identifies themselves 
as ―democrats, nationalist, conservatism, social democrat, and Islamist‖ in sequence. 
Those who identify themselves in all surveys occupy a 5 % to 10 %. It is vital to remind 
that this proportion is 85 % in Islamic oriented parties.
270
 
 
The radical change from heavy political Islamist ideological engagement as well as Islamist 
discourse accented with religious symbols to a central axis political orientation carried the 
party to a more central position under conservatism rhetoric. Thus, political elites of JDP 
aimed to evidence that AK Party does not have a secret Islamist agenda as refer to a universal 
political party identity with a complete legitimacy. Thanks to conservative democracy party 
identity, AKP instead of staying under the ideology patterns highly stocked to Islamic rhetoric 
and depend on a limited vote percentage became a central party embracing wider masses. JDP 
as refer to European style Christian Democrats consolidates its legitimacy signaling to 
dominant elites that the party has cut all its affiliations with political Islam.
 
 AKP charter members consciously avoided to identify party as a ―Muslim 
Democrat‖271, while preferred to refer political identity of party as conservative democrat in 
order to prevent future association with Islamism or Political Islam. Notwithstanding to the 
fact that the Party authority publicly declared that Justice and Development Party does not 
refer to Islam anymore, the Party administration staff preferred to call themselves as 
observing Muslims in their private lives. Justice and Development Party adopted the idea that, 
true interpretation of secularity is the sole warranty of religious freedom in Turkey, however 
dissimilar to traditional French style laicism interpretation; AK Party argued that it is not 
possible to be a laic at individual level,
272
 while state should be laic in order to protect its 
neutral position toward all its citizens. Apart from Muslim Democrat reference, AKP 
administration staff as well approached cautiously toward the Moderate Islam or Moderate 
Islamist political party identity. In his book ―AK Party and Conservative Democracy, 
Akdoğan prefers to use neo Islamism concept instead of Moderate Islam as regard to Party‘s 
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stance,
273
 as for Tayyip Erdoğan he fervently rejects  the Moderate Islam concept notifying as 
follows: 
 
               Turkey is not a country, where dominates Moderate Islam. First of all the notion of 
Moderate Islam is wrong as regard to Islam. Islam itself is Islam, when you call as 
moderate there may appear alternative views are not moderate. Islam rejects all sort of 
extremism. I am not an extremist Muslim; we are Muslims who find moderate way.
274
 
 
 
As the leader of ruling party and Prime Minister Erdoğan many times repeated that Turkish 
army is the sole defender of Turkey to balance fragile momentum between civic politics and 
armed forces in Turkey. Yet, particularly in the course of second term in the office, Justice 
and Development Party, Erdoğan government supported the juridical actions against junta 
settlements in Turkish army who used to organize coup attempt against his government. 
Subordinately, owing to the previous experiences – where Turkish military regarding itself as 
the sole guarantor of Kemalist secular state structure where always interfered to civil 
governments- Justice and Development Party increased the authority civil governments on 
Turkish military while signed radical reforms related to civil control on army in the course of 
EU accession talks.   
Eventually, apart from declaring the new political identity of Justice and Development 
Party as Conservative Democrat, in order to spread party grassroots to a central axis often, 
AK Party decision makers referred to favor an Özalist - Menderesist rhetoric. Besides, AK 
Party repeatedly declared itself as inherit, follower, eventually the contemporary 
representative of Özal and Menderes school where it aimed to stress its centralist position in 
Turkey‘s political system. Justice and Development Party frequently referred to Turgut Özal 
and Adnan Menderes as the heroes of democracy aiming to refer its democracy struggle 
against the settled secular elites. Concisely, tough majority of the high rank party members 
used to be political Islamists; newly formed AKP preferred to define its political orientation 
as conservative democracy. The founder cadres of JDP repeatedly underlined the Party‘s 
distinction from National Outlook line and political Islam. The conservative democracy 
notion in Turkish example still keeps its ambitious feature and there exist hot debates as 
regard to new concept proposed by Justice and Development Party. On the other hand, AKP 
thanks to its new rhetoric achieved to legitimize itself both in domestic and international 
meaning and accelerated its vote percentage regularly from 2002 to 2011. Apart from that, 
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Justice and Development Party calling the new establishment as the inheritor and predecessor 
of Mother Land Party (Anavatan Partisi) and Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) located itself in 
center right of political scale in Turkey.   
 
3. Analysis of AK Party’s Foreign Policy Concept 
 
The aim of the section is to analyze on foreign policy concept of AKP. The main principles 
determining AK Party‘s foreign policy outlook like Özalism and the party and government 
program of JDP as well as the election manifestos of the Party are examined. The concept of 
―Strategic Depth‖ and ―Zero Problem Principle‖ with Turkish neighborhood theorized by 
Ahmet Davutoğlu that constituted the spine of Justice and Development Party‘s foreign policy 
approach is worked out. 
 
3.1. The Change  
In general terms, National Vision Movement and the parties established parallel to 
NVM ideology bear conspicuous differences to a large scale in comparison to Justice and 
Development Party‘s foreign policy concept. Yasemin Çelik describes foreign policy 
orientation of National Vision Movement and Erbakan both in terms of theory and practice as 
bellow: 
 
           Erbakan had campaigned for and end to interest rates, called for jihad (holy war) against 
Jerusalem, and he had acclaimed that he would withdraw Turkey from NATO to form an 
Islamic NATO if he were elected. [……] On his first official visit in August 1996, for 
example, Erbakan traveled to Iran openly defying Washington‘s wishes to isolate Iran. A 
few months later, he visited Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya and declared that Libya 
rather than being a terrorist state was actually victim of terrorism.
275
  
 
Çelik also underscores that, in the time period when Welfare Party was in office with True 
Path Party under the Prime Ministry of Necmettin Erbakan Turkey‘s commitment to the 
United States of America was highly jeopardized.
276
 Euro skeptic attitude of National Vision 
Movement appreciated the European Union as a ―Christian Club‖277 and enemy of Turkey 
that aims to divide Turkey. Additionally, in the course of its rule period in the office Welfare 
Party under the leadership Necmettin Erbakan initialized an economic union project among 
Muslim nations like Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
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Nigeria that is known as Developing Eight (D-8).
278
 Ismail Duman in his article ―Turkey's 
Erbakan and his ―National View Movement‖ summarize foreign policy understanding and 
foreign policy goals of National View Movement following: 
 
1- Establishment of the Organization of Muslim United Nations to the end the Zionist 
conspiracy against the Muslims; 
2- Establishment of the Muslim Defense Organization; 
3- Formation of a Muslim common market 
4- Common currency among Muslim nations 
5- Establishment of Muslim countries‘ Organization of Cultural Cooperation.279 
 
Opposite to Necmettin Erbakan, who turned his face toward East, Tayyip Erdoğan paid his 
first visit to White House while he was banned quasi chairman of AKP. After being elected as 
Prime Minister, Erdoğan paid his first official visits to EU capitals in 2002.280 Actually, 
owning to the fact that being a Party the founding members of which composed of former 
political Islamist, and the legitimacy of which is highly questioned, the extern policy was an 
important agenda for AKP. Consequently, Justice and Development Party strained pretty 
much to proof that the Party adopted a central path in terms of foreign policy concept as well 
to consolidate its legitimacy.
281
 In stark contrast to National Vision Movement doctrines, AK 
Party advocated the continuation of Turkey‘s institutional strategic relation prospects with the 
West.
282
 Yet instead of engaging Turkey‘s foreign policy orientation to a one-side orientation, 
AK Party acquired a new attitude stressing the necessity of constituting a multi dimensional 
foreign policy concept. Additionally, AK Party foreign policy decision makers supported 
alternative paradigms as regard to foreign policy issues.
283
 
Justice and Development Party, in both party and government programs, focused on 
the necessity of building constructive relations with the Middle East, Russia, Caucasus and 
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Central Asia, Balkans and with the emerging global powers of the world.
284
 On the other 
hand, it was deliberately highlighted in the ―government programs‖285 that alternative 
paradigm quests in terms of foreign policy do not constitute an alternative for Turkey‘s 
established relations with the West.
 286
 Founding members of Justice and Development Party 
on purpose did not pay special attention not to utilize a rhetoric that might sound anti-Semitist 
or anti-Zionist both in government and party programs.
287
 It adopted a realist approach in 
terms of foreign policy issues adherent to balance principles of traditional Turkey‘s foreign 
policy pattern. AK Party preferred to embrace a more central, realist, pragmatic position in 
terms of foreign policy concepts. As it was mentioned in the party program ―against changing 
regional and global realities, our Party believes that Turkey must redefine its foreign policy 
priorities. And create a balance between these realities and its national interests‖,288 on 
contrarily to abiding Islamist ideology like National Vision Movement.
289
 
 
3.2. Party Program and Election Manifestos 
Party program and election manifestos of Justice and Development Party constitute its 
outlook as regard to foreign policy understanding of the Party. The party program of Justice 
and Development Party and the election manifesto as well as the government programs of 
AKP in 2002 and 2003 bear the identical style owning to the fact that the same expressions 
took place almost in the same manner at official documents.
290
 At the party program, Justice 
and Development Party manifest its theoretical framework in terms of Foreign policy as 
follows: 
The geopolitical location of Republic of Turkey has the prospective to create a 
magnetism zone for many collaboration opportunities. The ability to alter this potential into a 
regional and global creativeness depends on the logical use of the geopolitics in international 
political, economic and security relations. The dynamic environment that emerged due to the 
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post Cold War epoch produced an opportunity for growing an international policy with 
various options. The meticulousness of Oaths and blocks to turn out to be the causal factor 
essentials of international relations had extremely decreased, and collaboration assignments 
have become a collective tool of relations between the Nations. In these new 
circumstances, Turkey as well obliged to reorganize and formulate her relations with hubs of 
power with choices, flexibly and with various axes.
291
 
 Justice and Development Party will chase a pragmatic foreign policy harmonious with 
the past and geographic location of Turkey, liberated from biases and preoccupations, 
stationed on mutual of benefits. Turkey, which is respectful of the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of other states, considers it her right for other states and international institutions 
to esteem her territorial integrity and sovereignty. In contrast to changing dynamics of 
regional and global facts, AK Party maintains that Turkey must redefine its foreign policy 
superiorities and compose equilibrium between these realities and her national interests.
292
 
AK Party is of the point of view that the regional security condition arranges a 
prominent input to economic progress. Therefore, Turkey shall perform more attempts for 
providing security and steadiness in her near neighborhood, she will boost her endeavors to 
assert good willed relationship with her vicinity stationed on mutual communication. Hence, 
it will donate more to the advancement of regional collaboration. Turkey has been in close 
connection with Europe both geographically and historically. For this reason, relations with 
Europe will carried to be at the uppermost of the list in Turkey's foreign policy itinerary. 
Turkey shall expeditiously accomplish its promises in its relations with the European 
Union, which the EU requests of other candidate states as well. Therefore, it will avoid the 
occupation of foreign policy agenda with artificial problems. Analogous to the contributions 
made by Turkey inside North Atlantic Trade Organization till the present day efforts will be 
affirmed for Turkey to take the place it merits within the new European Security and Defense 
Concept formulated within the structure of the new European security strategy. The political 
and economic liaison that proceeds to survive since a long time between Turkey and ally 
states and will be maintained and this partnership will be boosted in diverse spheres.
293
  
The cooperation with the USA which had been security oriented will be maintained and 
this association shall be enlarged to extents of the economy, commerce, as well. Friendly 
relationships with the Russian federation shall be continued established on collaboration 
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rather than rivalry in Middle - Asia and the Caucuses. Relationship with Greece based on 
mutual economic interests shall be maintained increasingly and thanks to the environment of 
security provided by these relations. The ground will be prepared for the resolution of more 
difficult political problems. As for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, the presence of the 
Turkish residents on the isle, its identity, and its right for self-determination cannot be 
disregarded. AK Party maintains the idea that the resolution in Cyprus must be based on 
consent between the two States present on the island and that entrance of the Greek Cypriot 
parts into the European Union before the solution of this question will cause this problem gain 
a complex character.
294
 In spite of its historical, cultural and kinship to Turkey's of Middle 
Asia, it is a fact that Turkey could not live up to anticipations of the Central Asian newly 
emerged countries. Justice and Development Party will carry relationship with the newly 
independent republics of Central Asia to the strongest level and undertake attempts to realize 
maximum cooperation.
295
 When it comes to Justice and Development Party‘s relations 
perspectives with Islamic countries, it is underlined below: 
 
           Our Party attributes a special importance to Turkey's relation with Islamic countries. Thus, it shall 
make efforts for the increase of our bilateral cooperation with these nations on the one hand, while 
continuing attempts on the other for the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to have a more 
respectable place in the international arena and to have a dynamic structure able to take initiatives. 
Again in this conjunction, it shall try to impart more substance to the work of the standing 
committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of OIC which is chaired by the President 
of the Republic of Turkey.
296
  
 
After its tenure in office from 2002 to 2007, Justice and Development Party revised its 
election manifesto section as regard to foreign policy following 2007 general elections.
297
 
Foreign policy section of the third AKP and 60
th
 Turkish government program as well may 
be considered as an epitome of the 2007 election manifesto. In fact, the influence of Ahmet 
Davutoğlu‘s Strategic Depth theory may be observed in the party program, election 
manifestos and government program as regard to foreign policy issues profoundly. After the 
first government period, due to gained experiences in the office and exceedance of legitimacy 
problem relatively, the foreign policy principles of the party commenced to be presented in a 
clearer manner.  
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3.3. The Influence of Özalism 
Turgut Özal as a dominant leader established a wide vision for AKP founders. In spite 
of the fact that it has been more than a decade since his death, his vision and mission on 
Turkish internal and external politics is still influential and directive. Özalism as an ideology 
aimed to turn Turkey to a regional and global power in foreign politics while in domestic 
aspect shift Turkey to civic, democrat, and liberal state reconciled with all diversities present 
in Turkey. His principles and political philosophy has been adopted by Justice and 
Development Party as a new formation shifting from National Vision Movement to a more 
centralized- conservative position embracing all layers of society. Erdoğan and his 
administration staff adopted many parallel political orientations introduced by Turgut Özal 
like; The European Union, realist and positive relation perspectives with the United States of 
America as well as non military approaches toward Kurdish question and finally in the field 
of economy. Foreign policy concept of Justice and Development Party bears heavy traces of 
Turgut Özal‘s liberal foreign policy approaches that called as ―Özalism‖.298 Similar to his 
liberal oriented policy openings in domestic sphere, Turgut Özal also introduced a positive 
dynamic to Turkey‘s foreign policy.299 His controversial statements with respect to foreign 
relation perspectives of Turkey, for instance, are highly illustrative to comprehend his 
alternative paradigm. It conversely established Kemalist paradigm like; ―The next century 
will be a Turkish century or Turkey cannot be a prisoner of Misak-i Milli (National Oath) 
border‖,300 he also proposed the idea that ―peace at home, peace at world‖301 principle highly 
limits Turkey‘s foreign policy concept.302 
İhsan Uzgel remarks the point that AKP seems to have taken the Özal period as a sample 
in terms of foreign policy practices. Uzgel holds the point that AK Party government in a 
reminiscent way the foreign policy practices realized in Özal period pragmatically bypasses the 
bureaucratic mechanism engaging to foreign policy decision making process consultants with 
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businessman background.
303
 Özlem Terzi concludes the idea that ―The foreign policy practice 
of AKP can mostly be seen as a continuation of the Özal era in Turkey‘s foreign policy‖.304 
She views the influence of Özalism on foreign policy concept of AKP in the following way: 
 
         It was Özal‘s aim that Turkey should become a country, which can solve regional problems trough 
political negotiations and not trough military means. This idea is similar to the ―soft power‖ 
conception of AKP today. Özal describes the existing link with Western countries and the 
promotion of close relations with the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries as complementary to 
each other as in the view point of AKP. He stated that despite its denial, Turkey was the remainder 
and the heir of Ottoman Empire and that the former Ottoman lands from geographical areas in 
which Turkey‘s interests and security should be preserved, which is the prevailing agenda of 
AKP‘s strategic depth doctrine developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu.
305
 
 
 
Thereby, foreign policy attitude of Turgut Özal, as a liberal diplomat gained Turkey wider 
perspectives, which influenced Justice and Development Party deeply as well. The main idea 
of Özalist ideology laid on the idea that, Islamic and Ottoman identity of Turkey was not an 
outpacing reason for Turkey, the Muslim majority of Turkey does not constitute an obscure 
for Turkish integration to Europe, as he accepted Turks as European Muslims. While Özal 
supported the possible tight relation with the West, he barely underlined that the European 
civilization was not the ultimate model for Turkey stressing the alternative cultural interaction 
with other cultural basins implying Islamic and Turkic origins of the Republic. Likewise, to 
Özalism, Justice and Developments foreign policy also based on the fact Turkey‘s 
establishment to new paradigms for its foreign policy concept referring to cultural richness of 
geographic situation of Turkey. Foreign Policy decision makers of Justice and Development 
Party, likewise Özal‘s political doctrines did not appreciated Turkey‘s North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization membership or access to full European Union membership as a danger against 
Turkey‘s security concept. AK Party estimated that many security issues threading Turkey 
would heal thanks to Turkey‘s participation to traditional European security.  
To boot, similar Özal‘s views on foreign policy, AKP foreign policy decision makers 
hold the idea that Turkey might increase its model role for the other Middle East countries 
governed by authoritarian regimes due to its integration with Europe. Justice and 
Development Party administrators, as did former President, accepted Turkey as the 
continuation of Ottoman Empire. Although, Kemalists constantly stressed the negative 
inheritance of Ottoman past, both Özal and AK Party authorities argued that Ottoman Empire 
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past, if solved the problematic issues, would gain a lot for Turkey and Turkey will turn a 
regional and global power with deep influence both at  her periphery and global politics.
306
   
 
3.4. Ahmet Davutoğlu Factor 
Being a distinguished scholar in Turkish academia and a doyenne on Turkey‘s foreign 
policy,
307
 Ahmet Davutoğlu was appointed as the chief foreign policy advisor to Prime 
Minister and ambassador following the national elections in 2002 November.
308
 ―On 1st of 
May 2009, he was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 60
th
 Government of the 
Republic of Turkey‖.309 Professor Davutoğlu ―having an academic background, can be argued 
to provide the theoretical basis for the foreign policy understanding of the AKP with its 
seminal work ―Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye‘nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: 
Turkey‘s International Position)‖310 which was published in 2001‖.311 Soli Özel, supporting 
the above mentioned ideas, points out that ―In Ahmet Davutoğlu, the AKP has had a very 
articulate theoretician who conceptualized Turkey‘s foreign policy in creative ways using 
concepts as ―zero problems with neighbors‖, ―strategic depth‖ and ―Turkey as a centre 
country‖ that gained currency both domestically and abroad‖.312 Ultimately, Caleb Lauer 
accentuates that ―for eight years he has had the enviable position of being a politically 
unaccountable politician with the job of turning his personal theory into his country's 
policy‖.313 
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On that account, owning to the fact that ―Turkey‘s foreign policy under the AKP 
administration has been associated with the name of Davutoğlu‖314 it is imperative to focus 
his strategic vision to apprehend sophisticatedly general framework of Justice and 
Development Party‘s foreign policy concept. 
 
3.4.1. The Strategic Depth Doctrine 
The main argument of ―Strategic Depth‖ 315 doctrine presented by Davutoğlu 
structured on the axiom that ―a nation‘s value in world politics is predicated on its 
geostrategic location and historical depth‖.316 Correspondingly, Davutoğlu emphasizes 
―Turkey is uniquely endowed both because of its location in geopolitical areas of influence, 
particularly its control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, and its historical legacy as heir to the 
Ottoman Empire‖317 highlighting the powerful potential capability of Turkey which might 
return to a real power. Nevertheless, the theory proposes realistic approaches stressing the 
stable dates of Turkey, which is impossible to change at the present time like history, 
geography and culture which carry series risks notwithstanding to their advantageous.
318
 
Joshua W. Walker describes the policy implications of Strategic Depth doctrine as: 
 
1) Refocusing Turkey’s Historic Alliances 
a. Traditional allies like the United States and Europe are important, but new emphasis needs 
to be paid to former estranged neighbors such as Russia and Iran. 
b. New alliances with emerging powers like the Chinese and India help to ―balance‖ Turkey‘s 
dependency on the West 
2) Greater Identification with Turkey’s former Ottoman Space 
c. Renewed interest in engaging Muslim former colonies that might welcome Turkey‘s 
―return‖ to the Middle East with particular focus on Syria and Iraq. 
d. Taking on greater responsibility for regional stability in the Balkans through working with 
new allies such as Serbia and Russia in addition to its NATO obligations. 
e.Resolving of historic differences with Armenia to enhance greater cooperation throughout 
the Caucus given Turkey‘s ―central‖ role.        
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3) Reaching Beyond the Ottomans 
f. Emphasizing Turkey‘s role in the Muslim world and historic relations with Afghanistan and 
Pakistan while building stronger connections with places as far away as Malaysia (Davutoğlu 
has a personal affinity given his tenure as a visiting professor here) and Indonesia. 
g. Engaging Central Asia and offering an economic model of development through Turkish 
businesses, construction, education, and NGOs.
319
 
 
Strategic Depth doctrine defends the thesis that,
 320
 the geographical depth of Turkey situates 
at the very heart of the world politics. Turkey as a country situated at a highly geostrategic 
location has close land connections with Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East,  as well as sea 
connections with Aegean, Mediterranean, Black Sea, Turkish Straits, Black Sea, Basra, 
Caspian and Red Sea eventually continental connections with Europe, North Africa, Central 
and west Asia.  Similar data of Republic of Turkey may be interpreted as it is situated at the 
center of the world. Additionally, she constitutes the heart of world. Consequently, taking into 
consideration all above-mentioned facts, not a single international phenomenon of Turkey 
will meet or intervene at this geography may not be understood from a one site dimensional 
depiction. Thereby, Professor Davutoğlu owing to all similar parameters suggests that 
Turkey‘s foreign policy outlook may not be constituted toward an international system having 
dimension upon a one site - one axis. On the contrary, it is obligatory for Turkey‘s foreign 
policy decision making process to estimate each separate basin both specifically taking into 
consideration multi dimensional analyze and interaction among the other basins. These very 
interaction spheres must be followed systematically in order to establish a stable foreign 
policy concept in accordance with Turkey‘s foreign policy interests.321 
The main foreign policy implication of Strategic Depth doctrine is the idea that, 
Turkey owing to its deep potential in terms of upcoming new conjecture of global politics 
may not be confined to a bridge or bulwark role by her Western allies. (USA & EU) As a 
country, Turkey bears many dialectical peculiarities as being a Muslim majority, secular and 
democratic, nation state that is capable of playing crucial role in Europe, Middle East, 
Caucasus, Balkans and Central Asia applying a versatile, multiregional foreign policy line 
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which may turn Turkey to be regional and gradually to be a global power.
322
 While the 
Strategic Depth Doctrine suggests an active engagement with all regional systems in Turkish 
neighborhood, Justice and Development Party foreign policy architect also suggests being 
sensitive to American and European interests in the given regions. He as well argues that, 
Turkey needs to rediscover its historic and geographic identity and reassess its own position 
vis-à-vis for regional and global issues, while distancing it from solely being labeled a 
Western power. As a foreign policy doyenne, Davutoğlu has promoted Turkey's re-
engagement with the Middle Eastern region, particularly with Iran and Syria, an effort that, 
has been facilitated by the American misadventure in Iraq and its subsequent aftermath. In 
view of the transatlantic rift evident in the wake of the American-led second Gulf War, the 
architect of Erdoğan's government foreign policy advises developing a balanced approach 
towards all global and regional actors, which has led to noticeably improved relations with 
Russia and Central Asia. Ahmet Davutoğlu has also emphasizes the importance of economic 
interdependency in the globalizing world and the need to build strong economic linkages with 
all regional states for Turkey regardless of former Cold War mentalities or hostile American 
policies towards these neighbors. In the final analysis, ―Strategic Depth‖ envisions a Turkey 
that would transform itself into a global actor rather than a regional or junior partner to the 
United States.
323
 
According to Professor Davutoğlu, it is mandatory for Turkey to use its historical and 
geographical parameters with a maximum efficiency merging them with cultural and 
population datum in maximizing its economic, political and military power in order to have a 
strategic understanding applying it as a tool at foreign policy making process. It is impossible 
for Turkey to follow an autistic foreign policy as a country strategically situates at the very 
heart of strategic zone of the world, moreover Turkey as a state inheriting Ottoman bequest -
along with other countries with an imperial past- cannot isolate itself from the outside world 
surrounding its periphery. Turkey as a follower of Ottoman past may not adopt an ordinary 
nation state foreign policy neglecting its historical background. Furthermore, it cannot restrict 
itself solely to its borderlines. Ottoman Empire being among eight empires collapsed with the 
First World inherited many crises influencing Turkey in regional and local politics. On 
contrary to other empires like Great Britain for instance Turkey felt the disaster of the 
collapse closely, however according to Professor if Turkey may successfully achieve to settle 
                                                 
322
 Ibidem, pp. 501-557. 
323
 Ibidem, pp. 501-557.   
 76 
this challenge she may turn this negative position to her advantage.
324
 Following the end of 
the Cold War, Republic of Turkey has been besieged with many frozen conflict areas like 
Karabagh, Bosnia, Kosovo and North Iraq which threatens Turkish security severely, besides 
although Turkey took part at the NATO site during the Cold War period it may not be argued 
that Ankara gained a lot of in terms of its support toward the West.
325
  
Finally and more importantly, in order to summarize his general outlook on Turkey‘s 
foreign policy, he gives the ancient Turkish states examples. Ottomans and Seljuk Turks 
continuously realized their development thanks to their foreign balance between the West and 
East. Turkish Kissinger,
326
 at this moment use adroitly arch allegory;
327
 he explains that the 
more drawn back an arrow, the more go forward. Therefore, if Turkey would successfully 
apply constructive foreign policies with its Eastern neighbors (Arabic, Iran, Russian, 
Caucuses and Turkic world) its relations with the West would launch to a more positive 
direction meeting the benefits of all sides. Consequently, a country like Turkey situates at the 
very strategic point of international relations may not have a one sided and one dimensional 
foreign policy concept. He notifies that, it is a pity to reduce Turkey‘s foreign policy‘s final 
aim to enter the European Union. Turkey referring to its historical heritage and geographical 
position must produce multi dimensional and multi faceted foreign policy supporting its 
economical, political and military factors. It is an indispensable obligation for the foreign 
policy makers of Turkey to acquire a strategic depth mentality in order to create alternative 
paradigms in external politics instead of directing all potential power to a one-sited 
perspective.  
A similar policy understanding would enforce Turkey during its stakes with the West, 
while Turkey would meet its natural periphery, as Turkey‘s isolation of regional politics 
would on the contrary cause deeper problems. As it has been mentioned above, the post Cold 
War period brought many serious challenges and security treats for Turkey‘s foreign policy. 
During the Cold War Turkey was a wing country under North Atlantic Treaty Organization; 
however Republic of Turkey during the post Cold War period re-described its position and 
became a more centralized power for its allies. Turkey plays an essential role at regional 
politics and plays a balance role between its strategic alliance and regional states. As a central 
country, it bears many dialectic features specific to itself. For instance, in Turkey now there 
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live more Bosnians than in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Albanians than in Kosovo, as natural 
consequent Turkish domestic and international politics turning Republic of Turkey a more 
centralized state with an obligation to product diverse and multi faceted policies toward 
region. Professor Davutoğlu describes the perspective of new Turkey‘s foreign policy outlook 
as follows:  
 
           Turkey's foreign policy objectives and its vision of how to achieve them are very 
clear. Turkey has multiple goals over the next decade: First, it aims to achieve all 
EU membership conditions and become an influential EU member state by 2023. 
Second, it will continue to strive for regional integration, in the form of security 
and economic cooperation. Third, it will seek to play an influential role in 
regional conflict resolution. Fourth, it will vigorously participate in all global 
arenas. Fifth, it will play a determining role in international organizations and 
become one of the top 10 largest economies in the world.
328
 
 
3.4.2. Zero Problem Principle       
 Apart from the Strategic Depth doctrine, the ―Zero Problem Principle‖329 of Ahmet 
Davutoğlu constitutes the other trivet and theoretical backbone of Justice and Development 
Party‘s foreign policy outlook. The Zero Problem Principles with Turkish vicinity, basically, 
proposes a peaceful relationship perspective with its neighborhood intending to develop 
possible maximum economic relations with Turkish periphery as well as Turkey‘s 
involvement at region politics with entirely new perspectives instead of security-oriented 
paradigms of the Cold War era. As a continuation of his Zero Problem Principle, Davutoğlu 
separates the principle into three methodological and five operational principles directing 
Turkey's foreign policy today. He describes his Zero Problem Principle as following in an 
article written at Foreign Policy magazine as follows:      
 The First methodological principle is based on a ―visionary‖ approach to the issues 
instead of the ―crisis-oriented‖ attitudes that occupied foreign policy attitudes in the course of 
Cold War period. It is a wide vision that encompasses the whole Middle East region: Turkey‘s 
Middle East oriented policies cannot be reduced solely to the fight against Kurdistan Workers' 
Party. Turkey may use her unique understanding of the Middle East, and her assets, to operate 
more efficiently on the ground. Its good will attempts to mediate between Syria and Israel, 
plus achievements at Palestinian reconciliation, as well as  her attempts to facilitate the 
participation of Iraqi Sunni groups in the 2005 parliamentary elections, finally her 
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constructive engagement in the Iranian nuclear crisis are integral parts of Turkey's foreign 
policy wide vision for the Middle East region.
330
       
 The second methodological principle is to base Turkey‘s foreign policy on a 
―consistent and systematic‖ framework around the world. Ankara's attitude and vision for the 
Middle East is not in opposition to its approach in Central Asia or in the Balkans; its approach 
to Africa is no different from its approach to Asia. Turkey is also actively trying to improve 
relations with nearby countries like Iraq, Greece and Russian Federation.
331
 The third 
methodological principle is the adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style, which has 
resulted in the spread of Turkish soft power in the region. In spite of the fact that Turkey 
obtains a powerful military due to its insecure nature of the region, Turkish diplomats and 
foreign policy decision makers have adopted a new language in regional and international 
politics that prioritizes Turkey's soft power.       
 In addition to these above mentioned three principles, five operational principles guide 
Turkey's foreign policy making process. Firstly, it is the equilibrium between security and 
democracy. The legitimacy of any political regime comes from its ability to provide security 
and freedom together to its citizens; this security should not be at the expense of freedoms and 
human rights in the country. Since 2002, Turkey has attempted to promote civil liberties 
without undermining security. This is an ambitious yet worthy aim -particularly in the post-
September 11 environment, under the threat of terrorism, in which the general tendency has 
been to restrict liberties for the sake of security.
332
 The second principle is zero problems 
towards neighbors, which has been practiced for the past seven years. Turkey's mutual 
relation perspectives with her neighborhood now follow a path mostly based on cooperation. 
The gradual increasing economic interdependence between Turkey and her neighborhood 
countries have favored the bilateral relations positively.
333
     
 The third operative principle is proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy, that goals 
to take measures before crises emerge. Ankara's regional policy is mostly established on 
security for all, high-level political dialogue, economic integration and interdependence, and 
multicultural coexistence. Consider Turkey's mediation between Israel and Syria, a role that 
was not assigned to Turkey by any outside actor. Other examples of pre-emptive diplomacy 
include Turkey's efforts to achieve Sunni-Shiite reconciliation in Iraq, reconciliation efforts in 
Lebanon and Palestine, the Serbia - Bosnia reconciliation in the Balkans, dialogue between 
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Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the reconstruction of Darfur and Somalia.
334
   
 The fourth principle is adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Turkey's 
relations with other global actors aim to be complementary. Similar policy orientation views 
Turkey's strategic relationship with the United States of America through the two countries' 
bilateral strategic ties and through North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This principle takes in 
to account its European Union membership process, her good neighborhood policy orientation 
with Moscow, as well as her synchronization policy in Eurasia. Similar approaches means 
that constructive relations with Russian Federation are not an alternative to relations with EU. 
Nor Turkey model partnership with the United States of America a rival partnership against 
Russia.
335
 The Fifth principle in this framework is rhythmic diplomacy, which aspires to 
provide Turkey with a more active role in international relations arena.   
 This final principle implies active engagement in all international organizations and on 
all issues of global and international importance. Turkey became a non-permanent member of 
the U.N. Security Council. It is also chairing three critical commissions concerning 
Afghanistan, North Korea, and the fight against terror. Turkey undertook the chairmanship-in-
office of the South-East European Cooperation Process, a forum for dialogue among Balkan 
states and their immediate neighbors, for 2009 and 2010. Turkey is also a member of G-20, 
maintains observer status in the African Union, has a strategic dialogue mechanism with the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, and actively participates in the Arab League. Turkey has also 
launched new diplomatic initiatives by opening 15 new embassies in Africa and two in Latin 
America, and is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol. These developments show a new 
perspective of Turkey, one that is based on vision, soft power, a universal language, and 
implementation of consistent foreign policies in different parts of the world.
336
   
4. Conclusions 
Justice and Development Party emerged as a reaction against the ideology of political Islamist 
National Vision Movement redefining its new political party identity as conservative 
democracy referring to Christian Democracy tradition in Western Europe. Shortly after its 
establishment, Justice and Development Party won a landslide victory and has become the 
ruling party in office for three terms successively.  Dissimilar to political Islamist past of its 
founding members, the Party adopted a paradigmatic and rational foreign policy concept 
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reconciled with orthodox foreign policy patterns of Turkey. Declaring itself as the inherit 
Özal and Menderes, AK Party barely indicated its eagerness to be the successor of central 
wing politics with liberal tendencies as a respond to its legitimacy problem. On contrary to the 
fact that, many high level administrative of AK Party are previous National Vision Movement 
members, their foreign policy preferences in terms of relations with the European Union, the 
U.S. and relations with Israel as well bear serious dissimilarities to other  Islamist oriented 
National Vision Movement political parties.       
 Özalism, as a foreign policy understanding idealized a Western oriented direction that 
aimed possible maximum relations with the European Union and the United States of 
America, meantime it did not put the Westernization as the sole direction of Turkey‘s foreign 
policy. Hence, Özalism, as a foreign concept profoundly influenced the construction of 
AKP‘s foreign policy orientation. Foreign policy vision of Justice and Development Party 
influenced by Özalist doctrines also defend a versatile foreign policy orientation, stressing the 
Islamic and Turkic origins of Republic of Turkey. Similar to Özal, who preferred to call 
Turkey as a European Muslim country, JDP foreign policy decision makers also appreciate 
that the integration with Europe is inevitable for Turkey, while it is vital to keep tight 
relations with the United States of America in terms of strategic and military relations as 
regard to insecure nature of Turkish neighborhood. Apart from that, the doctrines of Professor 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, gathered in Strategic Depth and Zero Problem Principle mostly shaped and 
directed the foreign policy concept of Justice and Development Party during its rule period in 
2002-2011.
337
 Strategic Depth theory briefly highlights the historical and geographical 
background of Turkey and propose the idea that Turkey‘s foreign policy may not engage a 
one-side dimension (EU membership or Turkey‘s cut role as the watchman of Europe), on the 
contrary Turkey as a central state needs to create multi-dimensional and multidirectional 
proactive foreign policy initials in order to strengthen its position so as to be a regional power 
momentum and gradually turn to a global power.
338
 Turkey, as a country situating at the very 
center of world politics should develop maximum positive relations at Turkish periphery to 
create a stable and secure region that would contribute regional and international stability. 
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Chapter III 
The Eastern Direction 
 
The chapter analyzes the Eastern direction of Turkey‘s foreign policy under Justice and 
Development Party governments in 2002–2011. The main objective of the chapter is to 
examine bilateral relations between Turkey and its Eastern neighbors from political, 
economic, military and diplomatic relations in a chronological order to study foreign policy 
practice of Turkey under the rule of Justice and Development Party governments during this 
period.  
The chapter also vies to answer the questions like whether Turkey‘s foreign policy 
experienced a radical shift from its orthodox policy approach toward the Middle East in this 
period applying a comparative perspective taking into account relations with the West. The 
chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section of the chapter examines historical 
relation perspectives of Turkey toward the Middle East region. The second section focuses on 
Turkish - Iraqi relations, the third section explicates Turkish - Syrian relations and the fourth 
section analyzes Turkish - Israeli relations along with the Palestinian issue in the course of 
Justice and Development Party government periods under the light of historical perspective. 
The fifth section of the chapter focuses on Turkish - Iranian relations while the sixth section 
analyzes foreign policy approaches of Turkey towards the period called as Arab Spring that 
emerged in Tunisia in 17 December 2010 and gradually spread all around the Middle East- 
along with AK Party foreign policy decision makers‘ attitude and practices toward the 
developments. The final section of the chapter is conclusions. 
 
1. The Middle East and Turkey 
 
From international relations point of view, it is a widely shared assumption that, owing to its 
political structure and rich natural resources, the Middle East is acknowledged among the 
most problematic regions in the world.
339
 After the collapse of Ottoman Empire, the Middle 
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East region turned out to be a field of struggle for global powers;
340
 moreover continues 
clashes among region states aggravated the stability in the region at all.
341
 
In order to conceptualize elaborately the very complex structure of the Middle East, it 
is crucial to analyze the historical background of the regional politics in deep and its relation 
to external power centers seeking influence on the region. After the end of the World War I, 
the Middle East was divided among the winners of the War according to strategic importance 
and priorities of triumphant countries.
342
 In this sense, the majority of contemporary problems 
like ―Arab – Israel War‖343 that turned out to be a chronic problem for decades related to 
region have emerged from the ignorance of self-determination of people habiting in the region 
and artificial borders dividing people regardless of their religious, sectarian, ethnic and 
historical identities prioritizing the imperial instincts of occupying powers. Besides, heavy 
traces of post-colonial legacies agitated the situation. In addition to above mentioned factors, 
the rich natural resources of the region continuously attracted the attention of imperialism, 
while historical, cultural and socio - political background of the geography as well negatively 
contributed to destabilization of the Middle East. ―The effects of modernization, lack of 
political participation, poor economic growth, foreign indebtedness to the West, the 
competition for arms and increasing urbanization‖344 are the other factors that negatively 
influenced to the development of the Middle East. 
On the other hand, the internal dynamics of Middle East also challenged the regional 
stability and balance of regional parameters. El-Nasir,
345
 for instance, taking administration 
with a coup in Egypt, burned the Arab nationalism and turned it to a political tool with an 
anti-imperialist motto thanks to Soviet support. Throughout his rule period, Nasir reached 
huge masses with the idea gathering all Arab nations under a single Arab state.
346
 The other 
step of El-Nasir was to demolish Israel state, which caused to initial of Six day Wars. Because 
of humiliating results, the Arab nationalism wind had subsided while the Western Alliance in 
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order to balance Soviet treat at the Middle East initialized different blocks like Bagdad Pact or 
Central Treaty Organization.  
However, with the unexpected Islamic revolution in Iran undertaken by Imam 
Humeyni, the dynamics of the Middle East one more time dramatically changed, the Shiite 
influence of Iran highly developed in the region, while Tehran started good relations‘ with 
Soviet Russia. The raise of Iran has toughly challenged region politics, as the Sunni - Shiite 
separation gained a more distinct feature in Middle East. Palestine question, nuclear weapons 
threat, increasing oil prices, water problems, democracy and human rights issues in the 21
st
 
century constitute the main topics of current international debates in the region.
347
 What is 
more, due to the initial of mass protests that commenced in Tunisia called as ―Arab Spring‖, 
the Middle East entered to a new period where despotic regimes have been started to be 
overthrown by oppressed people.   
Speaking of Republic of Turkey‘s relation to Middle East region; The Ottoman 
Empire‘s four century of sovereignty had ended with the First World War and many 
psychological barriers, stereotypes, and prejudgments emerged between Turks and people of 
the region. The fact that, the majority of Arab nations had realized their independence war 
against Turks and the nation building process established on an anti-Ottoman, anti-Turkish 
history writing which indicated the Turks as the sole reason of the underdevelopment of their 
lands.
 348
 Henceforth, the antagonistic sentiments settled heavy subconscious barriers between 
Arabs and Turks in both social and administrative level. The Turks called Arabs as the 
―traitors‖ and ―untrustworthy‖ helping ―profane non-believers‖ during the First World War. 
Whereas, particularly in Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the newly emerged elites in order to 
create the fundamentals of nation state building blamed Ottomans to be an imperial state 
exploiting natural resources of Arab nations.
349
 The similar hostile approaches that were 
present between Turkey and neighbor Arab countries negatively influenced the structural 
factors of foreign policy decision making processes.
350
 With the establishment of Turkey, and 
the abolishment of Caliphate,
351
 Ankara entirely minimized its relations with Middle East 
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countries as it launched its foreign policy to Western axis. Yet, it initialized security pacts in 
order to secure Turkey‘s eastern borders. 
In the course of inter war period, Turkey‘s relations with Middle East countries took 
place through mandate state level. Turkey lost Mosul against mandate Iraq, while gained 
Hatay through mandate Syria. Nevertheless, Mosul and Hatay issues caused to continue 
conflicts between Iraq and Syria particularly after the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, 
similar conflicts blocked the development of regional collaboration and reciprocal relations 
between the neighbors. Another breaking point of Turkey with Middle East region countries 
took place with the birth of Israeli state when at 28 March 1949 Turkey recognized Israel 
officially as the first country with the majority Muslim Population.
352
 
In general, Turkey preferred to follow a sober foreign policy attitude toward the 
Middle East specially avoiding regional conflicts. In the course of the Cold War period, 
Ankara continued a similar policy understanding overlapping it with Western alliance against 
Soviet threat. Turkey participated at CENTO organization against Soviet economic 
dominance as continued to move together with its Western alliance during the Suez Channel 
crisis in spite of the reaction of the Middle East countries. After the emerge of Organization 
of Islam Conference in 1970, Turkey also attended the organization in order to follow 
developments in Middle East, while accented its distance toward region politics participating 
to the conference at Foreign Affairs Ministry level. Under the rule of Turgut Özal, Turkey 
initialized proactive policy toward Middle East initializing economic and political 
engagement,
353
 especially within the period following Saddam Hussein‘s occupation of 
Kuwait, by opening its land and air spaces to construct positive relations with USA. 
Particularly after the end of the Cold War, Turkey‘s foreign policy orientation toward the 
region has mostly engaged to Kurdish separatist terror. As a result, it has degraded the 
complete regional politics to national security dimension missing bilateral cooperation and 
economic relation perspectives with region countries. Simultaneously with Kurdistan 
Workers‘ Party (PKK) terror,354 Ankara experienced serious conflicts with Iraq, Iran and 
Syria during the post Cold War Period. 
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Republic of Turkey configured its relation perspective to the Middle East without 
ignoring the fundamental principles of foreign policy concept of Turkey. In other words, the 
status quo principle of Turkey‘s foreign policy tried to be preserved in the application of 
region politics while it was developing joint policies with the West parallel to Westernization 
principle of foreign policy concept. On the other hand, the conjectural changes, characteristic 
features of leaders and foreign policy decision makers as well as their viewpoints also played 
a crucial role in the shape of Turkey‘s foreign policy outlook toward the Middle East region. 
 
2. Iraq 
 
Turkish - Iraqi relations date back to the conquest of Anatolian peninsula by Turks.
355
 With 
Seljuqs Empires,
356
 the current Iraqi region was ruled by Turks until Mongol occupation. 
Afterwards, the rule of Iraq was respectively undertaken through Aq Qoyunlu (White Sheep 
Turkmen),
357
 Safavid dynasty
358
 and finally Ottoman Empire until the end of the First World 
War. Following the First World War, Iraq became a mandate state under British rule. 
Following the birth of modern Turkey, mutual relations between two countries developed 
positively, as Sadabat pact signed in 1937 between the parts regulating border disputes, 
establishing mutual friendship. The signed pact created a common ground for struggle against 
Kurdish separatism.
359
 From this aspect, the initial of reciprocal relations between Turkey and 
Iraq from their early emerge level has developed under the frame of good neighborhood 
relations. 
360
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Withal, the positive relation perspectives commenced to alter toward the end of the 
Second World War as Baghdad gradually indicated tendencies to shift towards Soviet 
influence. All the same, thanks to signed Baghdad Pact Organization,
361
 which then turned to 
Central Treaty Organization Turkish - Iraqi relations relatively healed. During the second half 
of 1950s, the mutual relations entered a new period with the coup d‘états took place both in 
Iraq and Turkey.
362
 In 1960, Ankara initialized GAP (South Eastern Project) project in order 
to utilize its water resources on Euphrates and Tigris rivers efficiently,
363
 the project was 
reactively met through Iraqi government blaming Turkey to cut Iraq‘s water resources and 
violating international water agreements.
364
 The petroleum crisis experienced in 1973 made 
Turkey search for alternative policies to secure its natural resource demand. With the support 
of  Europe, U.S.A, Iraq and Turkish governments agreed to build Kirkuk - Ceyhan oil 
pipeline that meets 3/2 Turkey‘s petroleum demand, while constitutes an important pipeline 
assuring energy transit toward Europe, besides Kirkuk - Ceyhan oil pipeline constitutes Iraq‘s 
biggest crude oil export pipeline.
365
 Throughout Iran - Iraq war, Ankara followed a neutral 
policy continuing its economic and political relations between Tehran and Baghdad, while it 
played a peacemaker role in order to stop the war, which as well depreciated Turkish 
economy.  
Saddam Hussein‘s occupation of Kuwait resulted in a drastic shift in terms of Turkey - 
Iraq relations. Ankara, during the period that coincided to the presidency of Özal, openly 
opposed the occupation of Kuwait and collaborated with Western alliance opening both its air 
and land bases for the use of American forces against Saddam.
366 
Because of authority gap in 
Baghdad, Kurds in Northern Iraq started a riot against Saddam Hussein and occupied Kirkuk, 
which resulted with the bloody suppression by Iraqi National Forces even using biological 
and chemical weapons against civilians that caused severe causalities. In order to escape mass 
massacre, Kurdish civilians immigrated to Turkey. A similar mass of Kurdish immigrating 
caused serious security weaknesses for Turkey, which caused a radical augmentation of 
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Kurdistan Workers‘ Party (PKK) attacks. The marital situation of Iraq made Turkey‘s foreign 
policy administrators find no addressee in Baghdad and communicate with Northern Iraq 
local representatives and leaders in order to take required persecutions to stop PKK terror 
directed against Turkey. Turkish - Iraqi relations of post Gulf war period mostly engaged to 
PKK terror and Turkey‘s endeavor to stop birth of an independent Kurdish state. 
To sum up, after gaining their independence, mutual relations between Iraq and 
Turkey mostly followed a fluctuating line. While examining bilateral relations of both 
countries, it is vital to take into account the stakes and influence of imperial powers seeking 
their interest at region rich of natural resources. It would be a great visional shortcoming not 
to evaluate liaison of third countries influencing regional politics. Turkey mostly focused its 
attention on security issues and Kurdish problem. At the same time, Iraq blamed Turkey for 
interfering with its sovereignty, and for treating it as economic embargo and water cards.  
The former agendas of Turkey‘s foreign policy like; PKK terror, a potential 
independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, Iraqi Turkmens, the status of Kirkuk, integrity of 
Iraq, security of oil lines occupied the top level of foreign policy agenda as regard to Iraq 
during the Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011. Turkey - Iraq 
relations particularly in the course of post ―Gulf War period‖367 mostly engaged to separatist 
PKK terrorism issue and the situation did not evidence a radical change as well in the course 
of Justice and Development Party government periods. Nonetheless, with 2002, AK Party 
foreign policy decision makers dexterously achieved to hand issues related to terror and Iraq 
separately; For instance, foreign policy making process toward North Iraq and PKK problem 
tried to be approach as different matters, which resulted in a more effective policy 
implementation process toward Iraq. Furthermore, traditional foreign policy orientation of 
Turkey towards Iraq at this period was rescued from Northern Iraq obsession that handled 
with national security concerns. Henceforth, Ankara initialized to develop policies 
overlapping all ethnic and religious diversities of Iraq people. A similar policy approach as 
well was highly appreciated by the United States of America along with other region states. 
Professor Efegil describes this very new situation as follows: 
 
         The policy of the Turkish governments on the northern Iraq focused on the PKK issue until 2002 
when AK Party won the elections and formed the government. From that perspective, the Turkish 
policymakers viewed the PKK terrorism, the Kurdish issue and the developments in the Northern 
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Iraq as completely independent and unconnected matters. In this respect, they did not need to 
formulate a comprehensive policy, covering all these issues into one basket. However, AK Party 
put aside this approach and attempted establishing a comprehensive policy on the issue.
368
 
 
Justice and Development Party after the convincing victory in 2002 gave its first serious 
foreign policy examination with Iraq as Saddam Hussein commenced to be charged under the 
pretext supporting Al-Qaida militants and hiding chemical weapons potentially threatening 
regional and global security. Stressing the reality that Republic of Turkey had been among the 
states that were most affected through the First Gulf War and parallel to the new rhetoric of 
Justice and Development Party at foreign policy proposing minimum problem with Turkish 
neighborhood, AKP foreign policy decision makers barely indicated their position addressing 
UN framework as a resolution formula. What is more, in order to prevent upcoming war, AK 
Party commenced tense shuttle diplomacy traffic not only in regional countries but also in 
Europe as well as in the U.S. applying all possible diplomatic methods to persuade Saddam 
Hussein to open his country for international monitoring.  
To persuade Saddam Hussein, former Foreign Trade Minister Kürsat Tüzmen 
undertook an official visit to Iraq with a huge delegation constituted of businesspersons eager 
to invest in Iraq hinting to international public view Turkey‘s intention to invest in Iraq even 
before the upcoming war.
369
 Additionally, former Foreign Affairs Minister of Turkey, 
Abdullah Gül meantime undertook an official visit tour to Egypt, Syria and Jordan aiming to 
create a pressure to Iraqi President to permit international monitoring. Besides, Turkish 
officials repeatedly announced the dangers of a prospective occupation, which would cause an 
authority gap in Iraq similar to Gulf War that would jeopardize regional stability and security. 
While it underlined the fact that a future occupation would give birth to tense sectarian 
clashes that hard to avoid after the occupation aiming to warn American Neo Conservatives 
who fiercely supported the declaring war against Iraq under the pretext war against global 
terrorism.  
Since trying all possible diplomatic channels, Turkish diplomats soon realized that 
they have almost nothing to do with the occupation and Turkey‘s foreign policy makers 
commenced to develop alternative policies in accordance with the upcoming conjecture. On 
the pre - war period Ankara mostly focused on territorial integrity of Iraq, Iraqi Turkmens and 
future PKK infiltration to Turkey through Iraqi border, which is very hard to protect 
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regardless of huge capacity, human resources and technologic background of Turkish army, 
as well as the security of oil pipelines. After the expire of deadline introduced by United 
States to President Saddam Hussein in order to permit international observes to undertake 
required monitoring, the United States of America started air attack against Iraq.  
However, to finish military operation quickly, efficiently and with the minimum 
casualty, USA required take advantage of strategic position of Turkey. U.S. military 
strategists had to open an additional front from the Eastern of Turkey to Northern Iraq 
deploying the U.S. forces to Turkey to make military operation short and with maximum 
efficiency. Moreover, the U.S. forces wanted to use Turkish air, sea and land area in order to 
undertake logistic back up for the troops that situating in Iraq. What is more, United States 
officials also asked Turkey to participate military operation in North of Iraq, which did not 
met positively; especially by Iraqi Kurds fearing Turkish military presence in Northern 
Iraq.
370
 According to Turkish constitution, all similar military permits needs to be voted by 
Turkish Parliament, thus Justice and Development Party Government asked Parliament to 
grant the U.S. military permission to use Turkish air and land spaces to open northern front 
against Iraq, nonetheless the permit failed in spite of all efforts of the government. As a result, 
Justice and Development Party experienced a bad assay on a serious foreign affairs issue, 
which may be commented as a badly managed process, thus it was written negatively to 
foreign affairs performance section of the government as regard to relations with Iraq.
 
 
Following that, 11 Turkish Special Forces members had been detained by American 
soldiers under the ground of misunderstanding upon an alleged assassination plot against 
governor of Kirkuk, furthermore Turkish soldiers were mocked for sacking their heads at 
Sulaymaniyah (Iraq) that tensed mutual relations completely. The reaction of America was 
widely criticized by not only Foreign Affairs Ministry but also all levels of government along 
with other platforms both political and civic. JDP government exposed a harsh wave of 
criticism particularly by opponent parties being incapable of managing foreign affairs of 
Turkey, loosing Turkey‘s advantageous position in Northern Iraq. In addition to that, the anti-
Americanism on Turkish public view at this period experienced its highest level outpacing 
most Middle East countries.  
  On the other hand, the decision of  Turkish Grand National Assembly parliament was 
highly appreciated by Iraqi Kurds while Northern Iraqi local administration provided all 
required positive strategic and logistic help during USA occupation, which then made them 
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the best ally of the United States in Iraq against Shiite‘s and Sunni Arab resistance against the 
occupation. The new conjecture making Iraqi Kurds best ally of USA in Iraq highly disturbed 
Ankara and pushed to develop more alternative policies in order to provide a power balance 
in Iraq. The period after the rejection of motion, Turkey lost its strategic position and control 
over Northern Iraq, thus Kurdistan Worker‘s Party militants augmented attacks against 
Turkey for taking advantageous of the authority gap in the region leaking into Turkish 
territories. Meanwhile, the government faced harsh criticism of nationalist and right wing 
opponent platforms blaming Justice and Development Party asking permit of USA and Iraqi 
Kurds in order to provide Turkey‘s internal security and undertake actions guaranteed by 
international law. As a consequence of heavy causalities of similar attacks, the JDP was 
toughly pressed in order to undertake cross border military operations against PKK camps 
situated at Northern Iraq. However, both United States and Northern Iraqi regional Kurdish 
authorities severely opposed the idea of undertaking military attacks, under the pretext that it 
would damage the tactful situation in Iraq and America‘s struggle against the terrorism.  
In the summer of 2006, Ankara, in order to defend itself against attacks directed from 
Northern Iraq, mobilized its army at Iraqi border to signal its determinant attitude which then 
was prevented by Washington. In 2007, the continuation of terror acts pushed Turkish Army 
to stack its troops at Iraqi border once again. But this time President Bush invited Turkish 
Prime Minister to White House and Turkey was urged not to release mass military operations 
against Northern Iraq while it was consolidated with wide usage of hot pursuit right as well as 
instant intelligence support from the United States of America.
371
   
During the reconstruction period of new Iraq after Saddam Hussein, Justice and 
Development Party government continued the Turkey‘s traditional policy of supporting Iraqi 
Turkmens. Ankara in all platforms supported the idea that Turkmens are situated among the 
constructive element of Iraq and should be mentioned as among the constructive elements and 
founding nation of Iraq in the new constitution. Turkey‘s foreign policy ruled by JDP as well 
holds the Turkish traditional paradigm of opposing the emergence of a potential Kurdish 
state‘s establishment. When it comes to destiny of Kirkuk, Ankara many times repeated its 
concerns about the demographic structure of Kirkuk and stressed its interest in undertaking a 
fair referendum in Kirkuk. Finally, Turkey -as it used to be previous government policies- 
insisted on the idea that all natural resources of Iraq should be monitored by the Iraqi central 
government as Ankara continuously feared Iraqi Kurds would capture priorities that might 
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gain capitulations of Iraqi petrol‘s and gas particularly situating in Northern Iraq and abuse 
this advantage against Turkey. 
When Justice and Development Party government increased its vote percentage and 
reached 47 percentages in 2007 general elections, it applied a more efficient policy toward Iraq 
applying diplomatic, economic and military methods in order to expose Turkey‘s policies 
particularly in terms of security issues. Ankara, at this period openly indicated tendencies that 
it would use its self-protection and hot pursuit right in accordance with international law in 
order to protect itself against terror attacks stem from North Iraq. While, simultaneously sent 
Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Babacan to neighbor countries and the European Union in order to 
inform about upcoming security policies of Turkey connected with Northern Iraq. Justice and 
Development Party also apply all diplomatic measures to constrain activities of Kurdistan 
Worker Party‘s in Iraq and other countries as well. AK Party initialized a reform package 
enforcing democratic rights of Kurds living in Turkey opening a state based channel 
broadcasting in Kurdish, which has happened first time at Turkish history aiming to reduce 
social support for PKK terror. Moreover, taking in to consideration geopolitical location of 
Turkey as the sole gate of Northern Iraqi Kurdish administration outside world, Turkey 
properly used its embargo card against Northern Iraqi Kurdish administration‘s support for 
PKK. 
Ankara enforced this very policy implication with bilateral trade relations gaining 
auctions for Turkish enterprisers, particularly at the field of building during Northern Iraq‘s 
construction.  Justice and Development Party launched positive relations after the permit crisis 
with the United States of America implementing security policies as well that gave fruitful 
outcomes due to the failure of USA in Iraq. Additionally, Turkey‘s compatible relations with 
Iran and Syria against a potential Kurdish state and the chaotic feature of Iraq made neighbor 
countries to follow a common policy in the region with Turkey. Ankara strengthen its hand at 
the region with the conference of Iraqi Neighborhood Countries held at 2007 explaining 
Turkish thesis while gained more active initiatives in Iraq. Prime Minister Erdoğan‘s visit to 
Washington had gained a new perspective for Turkey - Iraq relations connected with the 
United States of America, which came to a breaking point with 1 March permission crisis at 
2003. Thanks to Erdoğan - Bush meeting the cooperation rhetoric‘s previously mentioned 
between USA and Turkey mostly turned to be an abstract project, additionally by virtue of the 
meeting Turkey guaranteed instant inelegancy assistance from the U.S. satellites against PKK 
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attacks, where George Walker Bush called PKK as the ―common enemy‖372 of both states. It is 
imperative to accentuate that this ice-melting period on the other hand closely related with 
United State‘s withdrawal plans from Iraq. Washington‘s interest of using Turkey‘s logistic 
position during this period as well its need for Ankara after withdrawal period as an alliance of 
USA in the region as the sole democratic country majority of population is Muslim.   
On the other hand, though many times Turkey and the United States of America 
developed compatible politics in terms of Iraq, in some cases Ankara and Baghdad experienced 
serious conflicts with both Northern Iraq Kurdish Federation Administration and Iraqi Central 
Government. Turkey blamed Iraq for not to undertaking required cooperation against terror as 
Iraq accused Turkey to have imperialistic instincts planning to occupy Mosul and Kirkuk under 
the pretext of a cross border military operation. Here, one more essential footnote is that after 
Saddam Hussein‘s collapse Kurdistan Democratic Party leader and Kurdish Regional 
Government leader Masoud Barzani, Iraqi President Djalal Talabani and former Iraqi Prime 
Minister Hosver Zebari were all Kurdish politicians who held the upmost critical posts in post 
Saddam Iraq. In addition, this fact directed deadlock Turkish - Iraqi relations in terms of 
Kurdish problem and emerge of an independent Kurdish state which may provoke Kurds in 
Turkey.  
To illustrate the fact mentioned above, for instance, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Maliki 
paid an official visit to Ankara on third of August 2007, where both sites signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding against terrorism. Just the same, Prime Minister Maliki 
underlined that the signed Memorandum of Understanding needed the approval of Iraqi 
parliament to be valid. Otherwise, he could not implement it, as Barzani did not recognize 
PKK as a terrorist organization.
373
 2008-2009 became the golden year of for frozen relations 
between Iraq and Turkey. In the March of 2008, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani visited Turkey 
due to the invitation of his counterpart Abdullah Gül. Following that, and after 18 years of 
break, Prime Minister and head of AKP Recep Tayyip Erdoğan undertook a high-level official 
visit to Iraq in 10 July 2008 bringing a broad vision to mutual relations locked to solely terror 
problems. During his official visit, Prime Minister met with high rank Iraqi officials, thus both 
states signed strategic cooperation agreement including points from security, economy, 
infrastructure, water, border security and trade issues. Under the frames of the signed 
agreements, Iraq and Turkey created strategic cooperation council planning to meet in Prime 
                                                 
372
 Ibidem, pp. 6-10. 
373
 Ibidem, pp. 6-10. 
  
 93 
Ministers level once a year, while three times at Ministry level. Turkish Prime Minister at the 
press conference   highlighted the necessity of regional cooperation particularly against PKK 
terror defining it as the mutual enemy of Iraq and Turkey, he as well stressed the necessity of 
unity of Iraq, and one specific feature of the meeting was Turkish Prime Minister did not meet 
with the representatives of Iraqi Kurds.
374
  
Shortly after the visit of Turkish Prime Minister, the President of Turkey paid a 
historical visit to Baghdad in the March of 2009, as he became the first Turkish President to 
visit Iraq in 33 years. During his visit, President Gül met with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, 
Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and that was a serious 
step for Turkey‘s foreign policy attitude toward Northern Iraqi Kurds. Turkish parts high level 
visits to Iraq continued with the visit of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu after which both 
states got ahead pretty much in terms of fight against terrorism.
 375
   
Ensuing, in the year of 2009, the head of Mahdi‘s armies, Muktade Al Sadr paid a visit 
to Ankara calling Turkey as an old friend of Iraq. During Islam Conference President Gül‘s 
met with Hosber Zebari and many other  high level important Iraqi leaders who have recently 
visited Turkey due to Turkey‘s invitation. The top level Iraqi political figures including Prime 
Minister Maliki, President Jalal Talabani, Vice President Tariq Hashimi and Adeel Mahdi, 
Leader of the Iraqiyya List, Ayad Allawi, Moktada al-Sadr, Ammar al-Hakim, Mosul 
Governor Atheel Nujayfi, the National Security Chief, Shirwan al-Waili, and the Minister of 
Defense, Abdulkadir Muhammad Qasim were among the high level Iraqi politicians who 
visited Turkey at this period.
376
 Most of the mentioned leaders were invited to Turkey, not 
only as representatives of their own parties or the Iraqi Republic, but also as a representative 
of the different sects and ethnical groups along with the representatives of Turkmens both 
form Sunni and Shiite groups barely indicates the Justice and Development Party‘s new 
approach to Iraq embracing whole groups, ethnicities and religious minorities of Iraq under 
the Iraq‘s unity. 377  
Aftermaths, both countries accessed a compromise on the water issues, transfer of 
Iraqi petrol to the West via Turkey, license validation for Turkish companies in order to 
search oil in Northern Iraq, Turkish contractor‘s achievements in building, as well as 
Turkey‘s initiatives of establishing private universities at Northern Iraq. Finally, Ankara‘s 
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peacemaking role at the conflict between Iraq and Syria in terms of Iraq‘s accusation of Syria 
supporting terrorist groups realizing suicide bomb attacks in Iraq accelerated Turkey‘s active 
role in Iraq gained  Turkey  new perspectives. In the period immediately following the 
constructive relation perspectives, at 2010, Iraqi Kurdish Regional Administration Leader and 
Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Massoud Barzani -a highly controversial leader in Turkish 
public view- paid an official visit to Turkey after long terms of tense years and mutual fierce 
explanations between Turkey and Northern Iraqi administration.
 378
 Even the realize of a 
similar visit the level of relations as Barkey states was ―Unimaginable only a few years ago, 
showed how dramatically Turkey‘s policy toward Iraqi Kurds and Turkish strategy on Iraq 
had changed‖.379 During his official visit, Massoud Barzani undertook official meetings with 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. Kurdish Democrat Party leader and the President 
of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Massoud Barzani had not been in Turkey for six 
years. The six years since this visit evidenced many tensions between Barzani and Turkey 
inciting provocative statements. Yet, this period also includes a positive turn in relations; this 
new track in reciprocal relations was the natural outcome of strengthening economic ties and 
the lack of a rooted hostility or rivalry between the parties.  
Thence, along with the economic relations, other progressive steps were harbingers of 
a closer relationship. The opening of a Turkish consulate in Erbil especially is a landmark of 
the changing nature of relations.
380
 It is requisite to accent that, before Barzani‘s official visit, 
Turkey under the administration of Justice and Development of government sent a delegation 
of watchdogs in order to observe 2009 local and presidential elections in Northern Iraq. It was 
elucidated as the official recognition of Turkey‘s Iraqi Kurds autonomous structure and was 
criticized by opposition in Turkey; on the other hand, the watchdog delegation from Turkish 
site was invited by Iraqi central electoral commission and attributed highly positively to the 
development of mutual relations with Iraqi Kurds. 
Turkey‘s foreign policy under Justice and Development Party administration 
continued its close relation and interest to Iraq during the general elections in Iraq which held 
in 7
th
 of March 2010. Foreign Affairs Ministry declared the position of Turkey supporting the 
democratic elections in Iraq underlining that it would highly contribute to stability and 
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security of Iraq. In order to contribute to government organization process and to follow the 
improvements closely, Turkish FM Ahmet Davutoğlu invited Ilyad Allawi the leader of Al- 
Arabia party and the winner of Iraq general elections to Ankara in April 2010. Under the 
frames of the visit, Davutoğlu met with Ilyad Allawi, Turkish Minister evaluated the meeting 
highly positive during the press conference after the meeting. He said, he congratulated 
Allawi as the winner of the election and stated that now the most important task for Iraq to 
construct an inclusive government representing the whole of Iraq with a high legitimacy. On 
his term, Allawi underlined Turkey‘s attitude toward Iraq and expressed his appreciation in 
terms of Turkey‘s contribution to stability and democracy process in Iraq without interfering 
Iraq‘s internal affairs appraised Turkey‘s regional and global power.   
But then, the political deadlock emerged after the elections period highly concerned 
Ankara as the central government could not be organized for a long period. This time Turkish 
Foreign Affairs Minister Davutoğlu realized a visit to Iraqi capital aiming to follow latest 
developments and government organization process as two weeks before the meeting a 
delegation from Iraq met with Turkish Foreign Ministry without attracting attention of mass 
media. Davutoğlu firstly went to Northern Iraq and met with local Kurdish leader Massoud 
Barzani then flied to Baghdad where he realized high rank meetings with Prime Minister Nuri 
al Maliki and Allawi along with the representatives of other political groups. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu‘s active participation and endeavors among Iraqi groups in order to accelerate 
government-building organization was highly appreciated by both United States and Iraq. 
Turkish Foreign Affairs head repeated Ankara‘s position one more time underlining the 
necessity of a government representing all of Iraqi and stressed the functionality of the 
government as Bosnia and Herzegovina experience a similar problem. He also indicated that 
the developments in Iraq are very important for Turkey as it influences Turkey directly. That 
is why Turkey may not restrain apathy toward Iraq, it is crucial to stress that Turkish FM 
became the first foreign affairs representative visiting Iraq during the time course of political 
instabilities aggravated with terror attacks, which may indicate Ankara‘s new attitude toward 
its neighbor at this period. 
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3.Syria 
 
Turkish - Syrian relations lean back to the times when Turks were brought to Damascus 
trough Umayyad
381
 caliphate as slaves at the beginning of 8
th
 century.
382
 After their 
achievements in the field of military, Turks gradually took higher ranks in Umayyad state as 
well as in the society. Subsequently, Turks initialized to settle at the region as masses on the 
territories today called ―Syria‖.383 During the Seljuk Dynasty period, Turks captured Syria;384 
aftermaths Turkish sovereignty in Syria replaced another Turkic originated state 
―Mamluks‖385 because of destructive influence of Mongolian occupations. The Ottomans 
regained sovereignty at Syrian territories at 16
th
 century and continued their rule till the end of 
the First World War.
 386
    
With the end of the First World War, Turkey - Syrian relations developed as mandate. 
Syrian - Turkish relations were mostly shaped by Paris as it was in search of protecting trade 
and economic benefits of France.
387
 On the other hand, the Hatay (Alexandretta) issue as a 
conflict affecting Turkey - Syria relations until present day mostly started at this very 
period.
388
 Hatay district, which was a part of Turkey according to National Pact left in 
mandate Syria in accordance to Ankara agreement, nonetheless when France recognized the 
independence of Syria at the year of 1936, henceforth Turkey commenced to undertake talks 
with Paris demanding Hatay‘s independence, yet France did not accept Turkey‘s demands 
stating it would jeopardize Syria‘s unity. After series of diplomatic note deliveries, Turkey 
brought the Hatay problem to Nation‘s League. Nation‘s League counsel accepted limited 
independence of Hatay county on condition that it should be completely sovereign in internal 
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affairs while depend to Syria in foreign issues, which may be called a status of entité 
distinct.
389
 Nation‘s League committed observer task trough the aid of France in order to 
prevent potential conflicts between the parts.
390
 
In 1939, on the eve of the Second World War, France started to lose its dominant 
position in the region. Therefore, Hatay County was declared independent, besides it 
undertook a consensus where Hatay ceded to Turkey. The decision was as well recognized by 
France under the condition that Turkey would respect Syria‘s independence and territorial 
unity. Since Hatay‘s incorporation into Turkey, Hatay became an issue of debate between 
Republic of Turkey and Syria. Turkey blamed Syria for not recognizing its territorial unity -as 
Syrian state continuously indicated Hatay district as a part of Syrian even on official maps- 
and for not recognizing international law along with self-determination right of Hatay people 
and Syria accused Turkey for seizing Syrian territories through political tactics.
391
 Apart from 
the Hatay problem, the water issue has another theme of debate between Turkey and Syria 
until today.
392
 Republic of Turkey and Syria signed an agreement on water issue in the year of 
1921 regulating water share between two states. Until the beginnings of 1950, there may not 
be mentioning of any tension between Syria and Turkey in terms of water, however when 
Syria and Turkey initialized to build water dams on Orontes, Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the 
neighbors this time opposed on water issue. When Turkish state initialized the GAP project 
(South - Eastern Anatolian Project) aiming to use its water resources efficiently concentrating 
the development of eastern Turkey -where Kurdish people live densely in order to stop social 
support for separatist Kurdish movements-. Yet, Damascus appreciated it as a treat against 
itself blaming Turkey to abuse its water card against Syria. Under the presidency of Turgut 
Özal, Turkey realized official meetings with Syria and signed protocols regulating water share 
between both countries, moreover water conflict between Turkey and Syria has been 
discussed in many international conference in search of engaging international water laws in 
order to find a mutual understanding between the parts.
393
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When it comes to security issues between Turkey and Syria, both countries situated at 
opposite sites during the Cold War, hence security concepts of both countries mostly shaped 
in accordance with the Cold War conjecture. The security concept of Syria to a degree was 
understandable as it was surrounded by enemy Israel, Iraq and Turkey, besides Syria is not an 
oil rich country and after the collapse of Soviet Union, it was without of any external support. 
Syria in order to balance negative situation degrading with water crisis against Turkey 
selected to use terror card. Firstly, Damascus gave asylum to Abdullah Öcalan -the founder 
and leader of PKK- and opened its territories many radical left terrorist groups along with 
Armenian nationalist terrorist group ASALA,
394
 which realized many fatal suicides against 
Turkish diplomats, then Damascus opened its territories to PKK militants providing them 
with all logistic and military support. Turkish official in different meetings warned Syria not 
to support PKK terror and urgently close PKK camps activating casual operations against 
Turkish military and civil target but Syria repeated the answer that it does not support any 
terrorist activities against neighbor countries.
395
 
Increasing terrorism inflicted a deep pressure on Turkish government in 1998 and 
terror bargains between Turkey and Syria encountered a total new period bringing both states 
to a war level.
396
 Ankara asked Damascus to hand Abdullah Öcalan or to deport him on the 
grounds of accumulating a huge military power in Syrian border. The high tension between 
Syria and Turkey was calmed down, thanks to diplomatic attempts of Iran and Egypt. Both 
sides undertook a secret meeting in Adana -a southern Turkish city- which was then referred 
as Adana Protocol or ―Adana Accord‖.397 Thanks to it, ―Damascus agreed to recognize PKK 
as a terrorist organization, pledged to cease all logistical and financial aid to  terrorists and 
shut down all PKK camps in the country‖398 as deported head of Kurdistan Workers‘ Party,399 
Abdullah Öcalan from Syria. 
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After
400
 JDP‘s landslide victory at general elections, the biggest change in terms of 
foreign policy attitude toward the Middle East was evidenced in Syrian - Turkish relations. A 
decade ago, before Justice and Development Party came to power; two states came to edge of 
war due to Syria‘s open support for separatist PKK terror that managed Turkish national 
security serious.
401
 However, the changing of status quo and world conjecture, the instability 
increasing in the region post Iraqi occupation period, potential Kurdish state risk treating both 
country,
402
 besides isolation policy exposed against Syria labeled by the United States of 
America situating at devil axis made Damascus under the Presidency of  Assad seek more 
positive and constructive policies with Turkey. On the other hand, Syria‘s affiliation to 
Turkey coincided Justice and Development Party‘s new foreign policy concept aiming 
relatively active policy engagement in Middle East region under the frame of  zero problem 
principle with Turkish periphery.
403
        
 Most notably Ahmet Necdet Sezer‘s official attendance to funeral of Hafiz Assad 
melted mutual relations starting to develop after Adana Accord. Though Ankara was highly 
criticized by its allies like the United States of America that were urging it not to attend 
funeral of former President, the historic visit highly contributed to the initialization of 
constructive relations.
404
 The visit was highly slated ahead above all by the U.S. 
administration. The United States of America‘s ambassador, Eric Edelman said in reply to a 
query regarding to  President Sezer's visit to Syria uttered that ―the U.S., the EU countries and 
Egypt were in a consensus with putting restrictions on Syria and that they were anticipating 
Turkey to support the verdicts of the international community‖.405 He noted that, in case 
Turkey Sezer settled to Damascus, Turkey would be marginalized by the international 
community. Edelman added that ―Of course it depends on Turkey whether to act in line with 
the international community or not ―.406  Ahmet Necdet Sezer's visit was explicitly significant 
for the reciprocal relations, chiefly for the Syria since the visit coincided with a stretch as 
Syria was growingly being dominated over the occurrences in Lebanon.
407
 It is noteworthy to 
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stress that following Turkish Presidents visit, Syria gradually, tough not officially, eliminated 
the controversial themes between Turkey like Hatay and water issues from the political 
agenda.
408
  
Ankara dispatched confident messages to Damascus and came to be a leading state that 
advocated the Damascus against the growing international pressure after the homicide of the 
Rafik Hariri as regard to the outlook of Syrian culpability in the act.
409
 President Sezer's visit 
was encountered highly favorably at the political rank and by the Syrian society, conveying 
the two nations further together. Owing to the fact that the conjecture had emerged recently 
and Syria had strategic position as a gate opening toward Middle East, there was an eagerness 
at both sides to bloom relations. Moreover, the post 9/11 developments created a favorable 
environment that drew the countries closer and the Iraq War deepened the relations between 
Turkey and Syria by creating common security perceptions. The common sensibilities upon 
the future Kurdish state that would emerge at the Northern of Iraq along with its implications 
on regional balance of the Middle East as well highly contributed to profounding of the 
mutual relations between Ankara and Damascus.
410
 Damascus was indicating a positive 
tendency towards Turkey both in social and economic meaning as the most outstanding 
parameter was the increasing trade volume between Turkey and Syria. Although Ottoman 
past of mutual relations was a huge barrier in both Syrian elite and nation level, the current 
conjecture was an impetus to put history a way. When it came to Turkey, it was as well highly 
interested in developing constructive relations with its neighbor.     
 Nonetheless, the Hatay issue was a huge obstacle for the improvement of mutual 
relations. Turkish army in that time was highly dominant both in domestic and external 
politics, while at times of adopting a pragmatic approach to Syrian - Turkish relations, was 
stressing mutual  cooperation on security issues and leaving water and border disagreements 
without an object of pressure on Hatay issue in 2001. Turkish Foreign Affairs as well shared a 
similar view parallel to Turkish Army. The Ministry underscored the vitality of resolving the 
current disputes between the states firstly and suggested to prepare a declaration of principles 
that would not exlude respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each state as a 
precondition for the advancement of mutual relations. Yet, Damascus was extremely 
unenthusiastic to approve the Turkish side‘s declaration of principles, as a consequence of this 
very reluctance; Bashar Assad‘s schedueled official visit to Republic of Turkey was 
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delayed.
411
 Ultimately, Dmascus assured Ankara that it is willing to solve border and water 
problems quickly, but it was uttered that it would require some additional time to express it to 
the public view, henceforward Damascus held on to a discreet policy orientation to about take  
the border issue to the higher agenda. The request of Turkey‘s Eastern neighbor was approved 
by AKP‘s foreign policy decision makers.      
 Bashar Assad‘s visit to Turkey in 2004 was a milestone for the prospect of Turkish 
Syrian relations.
412
 Syrian President's visit was highly crucial not only as it was the first time 
official visit to Turkey ever realized by a Syrian President for 57 years but also as it was 
under the frame of this visit that ―Syrian President put his signature on documents explicitly 
recognizing Turkey‘s current borders‖.413 Henceforth, Syria officially affirmed Hatay region 
as an integral part of the Turkey as well as recognized Turkey‘s territorial integrity. The 
countries also ―agreed to open a consulate in Gaziantep (Turkey) and border centers in several 
Turkish cities to facilitate trade opportunities in the border regions‖.414 The mine cleaning of 
areas in Turkey - Syria border territories in order to open this area for organic agriculture was 
also among the issues that both sides agreed at this meeting.
415
 Özlem Tür notifies as follows 
regarding historical visit of Syrian President:  
    
During Bashar's visit, important regional security issues were brought to the agenda, one of 
which was the Kurdish question and how to deal with the effects of Kurdish autonomy in 
Northern Iraq. During his visit, Bashar underlined the existence of common views and threat 
perceptions within Syria and Turkey as related issue.
416
 In reference to Turkey's previous 
announcements notifying that the establishment of a Kurdish state would be unacceptable, thus, 
it constituted a red line for Turkey, Bashar Assad stated, ―a Kurdish state would violate our red 
line too‖.417 In addition to Iran - Syria - Turkey trilateral meetings, Syria became part of the 
Iraq's Neighbors Initiative started by Turkey.
418
 As it was mentioned above, Turkey - Syrian 
relations were intensifying pursuant to similar safety apprehensions in the region. While worries 
over Iraqi War was partaken as well, the solicitude over Israeli activities.
419
 
 
 
The relations procured to further degree with Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan's official visit 
to Damascus in December 2004.
420
 ―It was a significant as it inaugurated consultations over 
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the water problem and lead to the signing of a Free Trade Agreement between Syria and 
Turkey. Since the visit came just after the decision to begin Turkey‘s European 
Union accession negotiations, one of the affairs on the program turned out to be Turkey's EU 
integration and membership‖.421 ―As regard to the water issue what was appealing to perceive 
that the inconvenience of sharing the waters of the rivers was left behind and commenced to 
be viewed as a technical detail between the parts‖.422 Turkish Prime Minister aforementioned 
that Syria could utilize more water from the Tigris River for it had augmented requirement. 
Syrian Prime Minister Otri stated as regard to Turkish PM‘s statement good news for the 
citizens and to the query, ―whether Turkey and Syria were leaving the traditional water 
problem back‖423 during the press conference, Erdoğan responded, ―from now on we have 
agreed. We are aiming development and cooperation. Other issues are forgotten‖.424 Turkey's 
engagement as a mediator in Israel - Syria conflict attained to the calendar of foreign affairs in 
2004. According to Israeli authorities, it was Israel that awaited and that it took Israel three 
years to accept the offer.
425
 Even so, by 2007, the public opinion matured and the ground for 
circuitous conversations was set.   
During this period, the decreasing significance of the reciprocal relations was obvious. 
―There was a tension in the political scene of Tel Aviv‖426 due to Erdoğan's remarks of ―state 
terror‖ and the primacy of the Palestinian issue on the Turkey‘s foreign policy program.427 
Nonetheless, Ankara was still seen as an intermediary in peace talks. Regardless of the crisis, 
the proposal that unlike 90‘s, Turkey of the 21 century, under the Justice and Development 
Party having close relations with both Israel and Syria could play such a mediation function 
was accented. Negotiations began and prolonged under Turkish mediation; however, they 
were halted after Israel‘s attack to Gaza district. Turkey's attempt is notably important in 
exhibiting the degree of custody between Damascus and Ankara. There has been 
the reluctance on the Syrian side to reconvene the dialogues, but the Israeli side has been 
unwilling to jerk the talks since the Turkey‘s harsh opposition against Gaza attacks of Israel. 
What is foremost at this point is that Syria has given messages of full support to Turkey's 
mediation role. Whether negotiations are to resume, Syria comprehends Turkey as a trusty 
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accomplice in the process. Turkey also displayed her willingness for such a role despite no 
progression in the issue.
428
        
 Turkey also engaged to an intermediary role in Syria's dismayed relations with Iraq 
afterwards a serial of bombs were blasted in the Green Zone of Baghdad in August 2009. 
The Iraqi government had charged the Syrian government for the attacks and held Damascus 
responsible for backing terrorist pursuits and intending at sabotaging the stability of Iraq. In 
addition to that, Baghdad called back its ambassador in Damascus as a result. At the same 
time as the tension rose, Turkish FM Davutoğlu journeyed to Baghdad and Damascus to 
discover the perceptions of two sides over the advancements and to pass along Ankara's 
posture within this contextual relationship. Turkish Minister suggested to Maliki government, 
―Tell us every message you like to be transferred to Syria and give us all the verification and 
information, and we will transport it to the Syrian side‖.429 In the period that followed, 
Turkey brought the Foreign Ministers of Iraq and Syria in İstanbul. In the meeting, Turkey 
not only arbitrated the crisis but also suggested both states to found a three-party border 
safekeeping appliance. This mechanism will aim at combating PKK and Al Qaida in Iraq. The 
tension was eased in the following period pursuant to these attempts.   
 The commercial and business aspects of the relationship have been consequential 
since the very commencement of the normalization of relations after the endorsing of the 
accords. As touched above, the economy advanced under the shadow of the political 
progressions. For Syria, Turkey's economic sovereignty has notably been influential. The 
deepening of the relations with Turkey reached at such a vital timing for the Syrian regime, 
like in other aspects of the relationship, when it was feeling economically stuck. Because of 
its obligation to perform selective reform suitable with the expanding of the ruling coalition in 
the country plus the relapse of the peace speeches in the Arab - Israeli conflict, turkey's 
accession negotiation process with the European Union augmented the economic merit of the 
closeness further. Turkey is regarded by Syria both as an important market and as a model in 
terms of economic progress. Turkey as well depicts itself as an example for Syria in this 
aspect. Regarding the blooming economic relations between Syria and Turkey Özlem Tür 
accentues that: 
 
              Tayyip Erdoğan, during a visit to Syria in April 2007 attended the Syrian - Turkish Business 
Council gathering after the entering into force of the Free Trade Agreement in 1 January 2007. 
In the meeting, Erdoğan called the Syrians to pursue the Turkish reform process. Turkish Prime 
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Minister said, ―Our exports were at $36 billion and then reached $114 billion over a period of 
five years. This can easily be done in Syria. All you need is will power and then you will be able 
to extract milk even from a male goat! We are willing to put our hand in yours‖. In 2000, trade 
volume between the two countries was $ 724 million; it reached $1.8 billion in 2008 and the 
target is set for $5 billion for 2012. Erdoğan said that he was not satisfied with the current 
volume and aiming to bring the figure to $5 billion in three-four years. ―We talked about this 
with my brother Otri‖ Erdoğan said, ―There is a political will for this. We will succeed in this, 
willing‖.430 
       
In this period, additionally, Ankara and Damascus agreed to create a ―Turkish - Syrian 
Regional Cooperation Program that became operational in 2006, intending to develop 
technical, economic, cultural and scientific cooperation‖.431 The main motivation of th 
program was to faciliate ―a regional development by promoting projects that will create 
employment as a priority. The program encourages integration of the two countries' 
economies and aims at a joint development of the region at large‖.432 Following ―the 
enactment of the Free Trade Agreement, not only the level of trade have bounded between the 
neighbors, but also there has been evidenced a substantial investment from Turkish 
companies -particularly in Aleppo- and numerous joint infrastructural projects have been 
initialized. Bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria turned to an entire new phase with 
the removal of the visa requirements between the countries‖.433 Özlem Tür eveluates the 
removal of visa requirement as follow: 
 
 
             The decision to lift the visa requirements were taken during the meeting in September 2009. This 
meeting became very significant for the relations as it carried the cooperation between the two 
countries to a level of economic integration. It was also during this very gathering that the 
decision to form a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was taken. As regard to the lifting 
of visa, Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said, ―I would like to address to Syrian 
people. Turkey is your second country and Turkish people are waiting for you with open arms 
without a visa‖.434  In addition to that, Davutoğlu notified, ―We are lifting the borders which 
were artificially put and becoming the people of one hinterland. We are turning the economic 
cooperation to an economic unity. We are hoping that this will be a model for all our 
neighbors.‖435 Erdoğan in a speech he made to the Turkish - Syrian Business Council in Syria 
underlined some important points on the issue as well. He said that the separation of nation with 
a border was artificial and abnormal and that they were ―building the communication and 
cooperation that should exist between brothers and relatives‖.436 Parallel to that, a unified visa 
idea, and to ―create a free trade zone‖437 similar to Shengen visa called as ―Shamgen‖438 among 
Iran, Turkey, Syria and Iraq initialized to be discussed at the highest level of states.
439
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Regarding the economic integraration Tür notes as follow: 
  
          Steps for economic integration were being materialized, so were initiatives for closer political and 
military relations. During the same meeting that decision on the lifting of the visa was taken, the 
decision to form High Level Strategic Council between the two countries was also put into effect. 
Within the context of this mechanism, at least once in a year the Prime Ministers will host together 
a meeting composed of important ministers of each state.
440
 Accordingly, the ministers responsible 
for Foreign Affairs, Energy, Trade, Public Works, Defense, Interior Affairs and Transportation will 
meet at least twice every year to build a common action plan. This action plan will then be 
discussed in details in the Ministerial Council and then will be executed under the joint leadership 
of the two Prime Ministers. This Council is indicative of the extent and depth of the relationship.
441
  
 
When it comes to military affiliations in this period, Özlem Tür states that there were notable 
improvements at this period. Turkish and Syrian armies hold a military exercise in the April 
2009, she continues as follow referring the military relations of Turkey and Syria:  
 
The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to 
enhance joint training and enhance operability and are expected to be followed by similar 
exercises in the future. On the same day, the two countries signed a technical military cooperation 
agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries. On the other hand, the 
military exercise attracted concerns from Israel primarily due to the possibility of technology 
transfer that Turkey received from Israel into Syria while there was no such sign of leakage, but 
anyway Israeli concern endured on the issue.
442
     
  
However, all the positive affiliations in terms of Turkey - Syria relations in term were 
seriously challenged with the social unrests and mass protest against the Baas regime upon the 
emergence of so-called Arab Spring.
443
 Both countries recently turned out to be close allies 
gave a tough examine although the representatives tried not to voice their concerns publicly 
initially. Ankara from the very early phase of events commenced in Tunisia warned Ashad to 
undertake required democratic reforms to prevent similar incidents in Syria.
444
 Justice and 
Development Party government as regard to incidents in Syria notified that they appreciate 
the incidents as if it is internal affair of Turkey and followed the developments cautiously. 
Turkey‘s foreign policy decision makers realized high level talks with Damascus to stop 
violence, but allowed Syrian opposition leaders held a meeting in Antalya aiming to Turkey‘s 
position toward the incidents, the result of which de facto finished of all positive relations 
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built. Ankara initially caring to use a soft language toward its ally increased the tone of 
criticism publicly when Syrian people residing in Turkish border cities started to immigrate to 
Turkey as masses in fear of Syrian armies operations. Within a week, the amounts of refugees 
hit the figure of 10.000 as the matter turned out to be an international and humanitarian issue. 
The government on one hand tried to hospitalize refugees directing as masses to Turkey and 
on the other hand put a heavy pressure to Damascus in order to stop violence against civilians.  
The incidents that took place in Syria affected Turkey - Syria relations very negatively. 
Moreover, it made the situation harder for Justice and Development Party as it was the eve of 
general elections and party administration did not want to get any initiatives prior to elections. 
However, circles close to AK Party it was rumored that after the elections AK Party would 
increase its voice and get more actively engaged in Syrian incidents. 
 
4. Iran 
 
In spite of the fact that the initial contacts between Turks and Persians grasped previously 
both nations' conversion to Islam,
445
 the tense junctions commenced after their acceptance of 
Islamic faith.
446
 Turks performed crucial roles in state construction period and military 
organization in Iran,
447
 whereas Turkish language and culture was deeply influenced by 
Persian language and traditions. Although, both Persians and Turks have converted to 
Islam,
448
 as an outcome of sectarian distinctions,
449
 throughout the history a close affinity did 
not take place between Iran and Turkey in terms of politics.
450
 
The lands currently is noted as Iran became a province of Seljuk Turks while Persians 
continued to live in their culture and sects with a broad freedom,
451
 nevertheless the relations 
entered a more complex period with the rise Ottoman Empires in the region. Notwithstanding 
to the fact that Safeties and Ottoman empires were established by Turkish origin tribes,
452
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Shiite orientation of Safeties brought Ottomans versus Safeties at odds.
453
 Yavuz Sultan Selim 
and Shah Ishmael encountered in Chaldiran plate,
454
 which ended with Ottoman victory.
455
 
Two states had met many times in order to capture Baghdad, Tabriz, and Karbala.
456
 Toward 
the declining period of Ottomans, clashes over Iraq continued between the states, but as it has 
been underlined, a clear result for both sides did not achieved. Ottomans and Safeties signed 
at 1639 the agreement of ―Kasr-i Shirin‖457 which has not changed since today.458 The 
agreement barely indicates Sunni and Shiite separation of population and natural borders 
between Turkey and Iran, while it is highly significant owning to the fact that it displays the 
peaceful relation between Iran and Turkey since 17
th
 century. 
After the collapse of Ottoman Empire, Turkish - Iranian relations started to develop 
not on religious or sectarian axis but as two secular neighbors. Although Iran used to be a 
monarch country and Turkey was a republic, the secularity emphasize of both states pulled 
Mustafa Kemal and ―Reza Shah Pahlavi‖459 together.460 Additionally, the Kurdish population 
settling both in Iran and Turkey too caused both countries adopts similar policies toward 
Kurdish question.
461
 In addition to that, the Soviet imperialism treating both states pushed 
Turkey and Iran develop co-operative security policies. Henceforth, Iran and Turkey signed 
Turkish - Iranian Friendship and Security Treaty emphasizing neighbor states good will and 
respect recognizing mutual borders along with sovereignty.
462
 Following that, in parallel to 
Mustafa Kemal‘s foreign policy principles,463 Turkey and Iran along with participation of 
Afghanistan and Iraq signed Sadabat Pact to create a non-aggression pact among states.
464
 
During the Cold War period, Turkey and Iran became the United States of America‘s 
most trusted allies in the Middle East along with Israel. Turkish - Iranian relations have 
advanced both economically and strategically as both states became members of CENTO 
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(Central Treaty Organization) against increasing Soviet threat and Soviet centered alliance 
blocs irritating both Turkey and Iran regimes.
465
  
Mutual relations between Iran and Turkey entered a complete new phase upon Islamic 
revolution headed by Imam Khomeini.
466
 Republic of Turkey approached to Islamic 
revolution highly cautious suspecting Iranian endeavors of regime exportation intention to 
Turkish Islamist, however on contrary to international disposition isolating new Iran regime, 
Ankara approached Iran closely in order not to cause Tehran entirely slide to Soviet Axis.
467
 
Ankara performed a neutral policy during Iran - Iraq war trying to foster its mediator role in 
Middle East focusing attention to economic and natural resource aspect of the war.  Turkish - 
Iranian relations followed a fluctuating line in the course of history. Particularly, because of 
the newly emerged regional and global conjecture following the end of the Cold War, Tehran 
and Ankara became opponents searching for influence in Central Asia and South Caucasus as 
well as in Muslim world. Turkish governments from the highest level continuously stated its 
anxiety on PKK settlements on Iranian borders as well as connections between Turkish 
radical Islamist and Iran. As for Iran, there appeared distrust towards Turkey due to 
suspicions on support Iranian opposition with a stress on Azeri population. Tehran 
approached to Turkey highly cautiously in terms security perceptions, 
468due to Ankara‘s tight 
relations with Israel, NATO membership and the West. Henceforth, the nature reciprocal 
relations between Iran and Turkey may be ―characterized by both conflict and 
collaboration‖469 called as ―essential friends and natural enemies‖.470 
Justice and Development Party governments basing its foreign policy concept on ―zero 
problem‖471 principle vis -á- vis with Turkish neighborhood, embarked a cooperation 
orientated assertive foreign policy to obtain maximum regional collaboration in terms of 
economics, trade, energy, security and struggle against terror,
472 
toward Islamic Republic of 
Iran.
473
 Over and above, ―the U.S. invasion of Iraq and a mutual concern about possible 
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instability in their region accelerated the rapprochement‖,474 besides Kurdish question, 
Ankara‘s relatively independent policies from the United States of America against Iraq‘s 
occupation, common concerns on Syria‘s isolation as well highly contributed to the affiliation 
process between Ankara and Tehran.
475
 Ultimately, Turkey‘s support for Iran along with 
Brazil in nuclear enrichment issue along with Turkey‘s insistence of utilizing diplomatic 
methods instead of applying heavy embargos isolating Iran from international community 
brought two neighbors closer. Justice and Development Party foreign policy decision makers, 
on contrary to previous experiences followed a cautious policy toward avoiding putting a 
special priority on Iran.
476
 It may be argued that during the government periods of Justice and 
Development Party from 2002 to 2011, Turkey - Iran relations experienced a stable direction.
 Following AK Party‘s formation of the government, the first time high-level visit took 
place between neighbors at 17-18 June 2002.
477
 Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer paid a 
visit to Islamic Republic of Iran.
478
 Before his departure, Sezer underlined the importance and 
goal of the visit saying ―after 9/11 incidents, international environment pressed region 
countries to develop more strict co-operations, thus I will envoy my ideas to my counterparts 
in Iran‖.479 Turkish part was intending to indicate its solidarity and support to Khatemi as 
regard to its political reforms, to persuade realize coordinated operations against Kurdistan 
Workers Party Camps and to obtain trade balance with Iran. The visit was also significant for 
Tehran, to highlight its constructive approach toward its Western neighbor, thus Sezer was 
met by his counterpart Khatemi.
480
 The place of ceremony was also highly significant as it 
realized in Sadabat Palace where Turkey and Iran signed historical Sadabat Pact.
481
  
Taking into consideration that Ahmet Necdet Sezer had refused his counterpart‘s 
invitation to attend Economic Co-operation Organization meeting took place 10
th
 of June 
2000.
482, as a consequence of ―the revelations by Turkish media‖483 as regard to Iran‘s 
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involvements in assassination of secularist journalists in Turkey. Turkish President‘s visit to 
Iran was highly crucial as it barely indicates Ankara‘s intention toward Iran upon the current 
developments took place in Middle East. Besides, during his visit, Turkish President settled to 
Tabriz -a province majority of which densely populated with Azeri Turks- that symbolically 
indicates level of intention in current bilateral relations.
484
 
Henceforth, under the frame of the visit, Ankara and Tehran signed important 
protocols in order to strengthen regional cooperation between the countries. In the course of 
visit topics like; the rebuilding of Afghanistan, Iraqi occupation and future policies develop 
toward the problems would arise, eventually war against PKK and Kurdish question brought 
to the agenda. Furthermore, trade and commerce issues between two countries came to 
agenda as 120 businessperson and 20 delegations accompanied to the Presidents delegation.
485
 
Economic and financial relations between Turkey and Iran at this period also accelerated 
gradually. Oil, gas and energy sectors constitute a huge portion of this mutual trade relation. 
While Iran was seeking a way out from the United States of America and United Nations 
sanctions,
486
 Turkey was seeking alternative energy resources and enforcing its role of being a 
hub between East and the West.
487
 The economic affiliation between Turkey and Iran in terms 
of energy even planning a future pipeline project as well supported by the European Union as 
in future terms it would be possible to export Iranian oil and gas to the West thanks to which 
the European Union would discard of Russian energy monopoly. On the other hand, during 
this period AK Party government tried to develop trade relations with Iran at non-energy 
sector although it was highly narrowed due to sanctions.
488
 After President Ahmet Necdet 
Sezer‘s visit to Tehran, Turkish - Iranian trade capacity highly increased and at the year of 
2007 trade between both countries hit Seven and Half billion.
489
 
Ankara and Tehran agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding to transfer Iran gas 
to Europe via Turkey up to 35 billion cubic meters,
490
 while Iran and Turkey compromised to 
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create a venture in order to build a natural gas pipeline between Turkey and Iran.
491
 
Furthermore, when gas crisis appeared between Russia and Europe, Russia decreased the gas 
amount to Turkey; Iran suggested supplying Turkey with more gas in order to compensate 
Turkey‘s gas demand. As a natural consequence of positive relations developed with Iran in 
terms of energy, Islamic Republic of Iran became the second largest gas supplier of Turkey 
after Russian Federation.
492
 In the spring of 2009, Turkey, Iran and Syria signed a 
memorandum of understanding in order to raise regional trade among countries, because of 
which Turkey became Iran‘s most close trade partners.493 Moreover, Turkish investments at 
this period directed to Tabriz region where the population mostly constitutes of Azerbaijan 
Turks.
494
  
Parallel to economic and trade relations, Turkish - Iranian relations also experienced 
an improvement period in terms of politics in the course of AKP governments. The historical 
visit of Turkish President became a landmark for many political and security issues between 
two neighbors.
495
 As respond to Turkish side‘s visit, Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmedinejad paid a ―working visit‖496 to İstanbul in 2008 where he met with Turkish 
President and Prime Minister. Iran and Turkey under the frames of this meeting signed mutual 
understanding agreements in the fields of economy, security, and education. As regard to 
Iranian President‘s official visit to Turkey, his reluctance to visit Ankara (Due to Presidents 
antipathy against secularism principle, he deliberately did not visit the mausoleum of Mustafa 
Kemal) attracted heavy critics over Justice and Development Party through the Turkish 
seculars.
497
  
Following that, at the year of 2009, Iranian Parliamentary speaker paid an official visit 
to Turkish President Abdullah Gül,498 while in March of the same year Abdullah Gül attended 
the Economic Cooperation Organization summit which held in Iran capital Tehran.
499
 Under 
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the frame of his visit,
500
 Turkish President met his counterpart Ahmedinejad as well as the 
religious leader Khamane.
501
 Correspondingly all similar constructive development 
experienced between the neighbors at this period, both countries declared the 2009 as the 
―Iran - Turkey Culture Year‖ stressing the advancement of cultural aspect of bilateral 
agreement. As a reflection of similar positive developments, Iran declared its full support for 
Turkey‘s membership to the European Union,502 while Turkey supported Iranian arguments in 
international arena to soften economic sanctions applied against Tehran. On the other hand, 
Iran and Turkey co-operated many regional issues like Iraqi neighborhood countries 
conference and the meeting of Friends of Democratic Pakistan focusing the methods of 
reaching stability in Pakistan. Iran and Turkey hold similar positions in many regional issues 
like Iraq, as both countries advocated the unity of Iraq while the instability at Afghanistan and 
Pakistan were the common concerns of both states against jeopardizing regional stability.
503
 During the controversial Presidential elections hold in Iran in 2009, Turkey continued 
its pragmatist - realist approach toward Tehran. On contrary to its Western allies, Ankara did 
not direct a harsh criticism against Iran related to election fault claims that resulted in heavy 
protests in Iran. Turkish President and Prime Minister were among the world leaders who 
congratulated Mahmoud Ahmedinejad for his re-election.
504
 Turkish Foreign Minister 
referred the event as ‘the domestic issue of Iran‘505 while Prime Minister Erdoğan called Iran 
as a ―friend‖ of Turkey and underlined that Turkey will act in accordance to this principle.506 
 In the autumn of 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan settled to Tehran to 
discuss various regional issues with Iranian officials.
507
 Owing to the fact that the timing of 
the visit coincided with a period of Turkey‘s turmoil relations with Israel,508 high rank 
officials of Islamic Republic like Parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani expressed his full support 
toward Turkey calling for close cooperation in Islamic world.
509
 In November 2009, 
Ahmadinejad visited Turkey to take part in the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
Economic Summit in İstanbul. Besides, the military forces of both countries reached a 
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consensus to fight against separatists PKK militants at Turkish border Iran and Iraq border in 
2009.
510
 
The political affiliation between Iran and Turkey highly consolidated as the 
international pressure against Iran augmented in terms of Iran‘s nuclear enrichment program. 
Republic of Turkey stated that it officially recognizes the right of Iran, a member of the 
Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to develop nuclear technology, if it 
remains on a peaceful track and allows for the application of full-scope safeguard inspections 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
511
 In addition to that, ―Turkish officials state that 
Iran has the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and has called on Iran to 
cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency to demonstrate that its nuclear 
program has peaceful intentions‖.512 As regard to Iran‘s nuclear issues, Turkish PM reckoned 
in an interview ―States have the right to possess nuclear energy to utilize for peaceful 
purposes‖. He also emphasized that Turkey has good neighborly relations with Iran and that 
the two countries have developed mechanisms for the purpose of cooperation on security 
issues‖.513  
After Turkey‘s initials of being a mediator between Israel and Syria, this time Turkey 
was determined to be a peace builder between Iran and the United States of America in terms 
of nuclear enrichment program.
514
 Turkey tried to push Iran into cooperate with International 
Atomic Energy Agency [to agree on an incentive package offered by the five permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany (P5+1)]
515
 to freeze Iran‘s enrichment 
program in the course of Iran President‘s visit to Turkey. But Ahmedinejad rejected Turkey‘s 
initiatives under the pretext that the enrichment program was bearing peaceful purposes. 
Justice and Development Party government foreign policy decision makers applied all 
possible diplomatic ways not to isolate Iran from international community. However, 
Ankara‘s endeavors highly disturbed Washington and Brussels that searched  methods to urge 
Turkey to stop its open support for Tehran (e.g. at this period, the U.S. officials hold the 
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position that the planned pipeline between Turkey and Iran would violate United Nation 
sanctions applied versus Iran).
 516
 
While United Nation member countries were discussing sanction plans against Iran, 
Turkey and Brazil took an unexpected initiative to Iran‘s uranium enrichment program.517 In 
accordance with the achieved agreement among parts that called as ―Nuclear Fuel-Swap 
Deal‖,518 Iran would inform the uranium barter suggestion to International Atomic Energy 
Commission.
519
 If Iran‘s suggestion would be approved by Wien group -which is constitutes 
of countries like: the United States of America, Russia, France- Iran will transfer 1.200 kg 
low degree enriched uranium to Turkey. During this period, this item would be accepted at 
Iranian property and both Tehran and International Atomic Energy Commission would have 
right to send a delegation to Turkey to examine security of uranium.
520
 Over against, the Wien 
group would provide Iran with 120 kg enriched Uranium, but Iran would not have any 
opportunity to produce a nuclear weapon with it.
521
 Turkey and Brazil‘s last minute 
diplomatic attack caused a sober reaction in global scale. United Nations and Russia found the 
agreement positive with strong reservations while the European Union declared that there are 
still questions to answer adding that the agreement will not be a complete satisfaction.
522
 
Along with Brazil, Turkey refused to accept United Nations Security Council sanctions 
against Iran,
523
 which was accepted unanimously. Turkey‘s behavior at United Nations caused 
tough criticism of United States
524
 and the European Union while Turkey‘s foreign policy 
decision makers advocated applying all diplomatic methods in nuclear program issue.
525
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5. Israel and Palestinian Issue 
 
First time contacts between Turks and Jews took place upon the conquest of Anatolia and 
Constantinople.
526
 Relation prospects between Turks and Jews gained acceleration within 
1491,
527
 when Jews were starting to be expelled with inquisitions in Iberia peninsula.
528
 
Ottoman Sultan introduced asylum to Jews sending Ottoman navels whose number were 
approximately hitting 200.000.
529
 The ―Sephardim‖530 Jews were allowed to settle in 
―Constantinople‖531 and Thessaloniki.532 Afterwards, The Jews of Ottoman found a vast 
independence under the multi cultural ambience of the Empire exercising their religious belief 
in a complete freedom. Moreover, they were also provided with high rank position both in 
state and military levels as well as they gained priorities arts and trade market of Ottoman 
Empire.
533
  
Following the establishment of Israel State, first time diplomatic relations between 
Turkey and Israel commenced when Turkey became the first country as a state the population 
of which was constituted of majority Muslims recognized the Israel shortly after its 
establishment.
534
 The mutual relations between Israel and Turkey gained acceleration during 
the government periods of Adnan Menderes and Ben Gurion,
535
 as both states initialized close 
affiliations in the fields of military,
536
 intelligence and industry cooperation.
537
 The Cold War 
played a determinative role of the convergence of both states.
538
 As it has been observed by 
Dunkar Rustow: 
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It is Turkey‘s firm alliance with the West that make possible Moscow‘s recurrent setbacks in 
Cairo, Baghdad, and other Arab Capitals…Only behind that same barrier can Israel maintain its 
status as a regional power and cope with continuing Arab hostilities without risking facing in 
Golan heights not just Soviet arms supplied to Syria, but the full force of the Red Army.
539
 
 
When Israel and Arab nations confronted at Six-Day War, Turkey abstained to sign a 
declaration condemning Israel as an aggressor state, furthermore Turkey refused the proposal 
of Islamic Conference conclusion declaration to call Muslim nations to break diplomatic 
relations with Israel state.
540
 Diplomatic relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv entered a 
recession period when Turkey downgraded its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv to a symbolic 
level, as a reaction to Israeli aggressive politics closing peace-building process in Middle East 
conflict. Meanwhile, Turkey announced that it recognizes the existence of a Palestinian 
state,
541
 thus became the first nation holding diplomatic relations with Israel recognizing the 
existence of Palestine state, however, it did not grant a full diplomatic status to representatives 
of Palestine. Nonetheless, ―In the 1990s, relations between Israel and Turkey greatly 
expanded and reached an unprecedented degree of closeness. Thence, Israel - Turkey entente 
has become an important element in the politics of the Middle East and Eastern 
Mediterranean areas‖.542 Turkey‘s struggle with Kurdish separatist terror pushed Ankara to 
develop new coalitions and cooperation perspectives with Israel. Furthermore, problems with 
Greece, Iraq, Syria and Iran in terms of Kurdish questions along with spoiling relations with 
the European Union highly contributed this affiliation process.
543
  
Turkey and Israel in this period signed many strategic and military agreements.
544
 
Turkish army undertook a complete renovation and modernization thanks to technology 
bought from Israel that was used in Turkish tanks and planes.
545
 Israel shared intelligence 
with Turkey, which Republic of Turkey used against PKK.
546
 Both states signed many trade, 
tourism and cultural agreements that caused an affiliation between Ankara and Tel Aviv, 
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while at this period Turkish and Israel high level officials -both civil and military- visited 
each other as the armies undertook common military exercises.
547
 Moreover, Jewish lobby in 
the United States of America assisted Turkey to stop Armenian genocide claims in Unites 
States House of Representatives.
548
 
Yet, the mutual relations entered a degradation process with Ariel Sharon government 
when Tel Aviv initialized rigorous policies towards Palestinians. As a reaction to unbalanced 
power usage of Israel giving birth to heavy civilian causality, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent 
Ecevit fiercely criticized Israel blaming it for committing genocides against Palestinians.
549
 
Nevertheless, a  similar severe criticism did not harm reciprocal relation as Turkey signed a 
668 million United State Dollar protocol with Israel to upgrade Turkish tanks following that, 
what is more both states signed an agreement at value of 800 million U.S. Dollars importing 
fresh water from Turkish Manavgat to Israel.
550
 
The complex nature of Turkish - Israeli relations was characterized by former Prime 
Minister of Israel, Ben Gurion, in a complaining manner as follows: ―The Turks have always 
treated us as one treats mistress, and not as a partner in an openly avowed marriage‖.551 
Besides, Ofra Bengio observes ―Turkish - Israeli relations have intrigued observers and 
scholars. To some they looked special, to others they appeared abnormal‖.552 Henceforth, the 
characteristic feature of reciprocal relations between Ankara and Israel based on pragmatic 
factors that shaped trough the interdependency along with mutual interests of states. Ankara 
favored close relations with Israel to gain intelligence, technology and military support of 
Israel, while Tel Aviv enjoyed Turkish cooperation as a balance in Muslim world and many 
strategic issues including water issues. Besides, the cooperation prospect between the parts 
was supported by the United States of America as well to keep its balance in the Middle 
East.
553
  
It may be argued that since the establishment of reciprocal relations with Israel, 
Republic of Turkey experienced the worst period with Tel Aviv during the government 
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periods of Justice and Development Party. Yet, one may observe that, during the beginning of 
new millennium Turkish - Israeli relations were not following a similar trend as it used to be 
in 90‘s. Previous to establishment of AK Party government, the aggressive attitude of Sharon 
government was exploited a harsh criticism by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, which is highly 
important to trace clues in order to comprehend level of reciprocal relations. 
Justice and Development Party‘s landslide victory in general elections initially did not 
disturb the nature of bilateral agreements;
554
 the mutual relations at the first stage did not 
experience a sudden change. On the other hand, notably on Israel‘s side concerns on Justice 
and Development Party‘s Islamic roots and alleged secret Islamic agenda caused deep 
concerns in dread that might seriously harm strategic relations.
555
 Nevertheless, the tension 
accelerated with changing regional politics and power balances. First disputes between Israel 
and Turkey rose when Turkish media claimed Israeli intelligence activities in Northern 
Iraq.
556
 As regard to news appearing at Turkish media, Turkish officials conveyed their 
concerns
557
 over the claims proposing Israeli professional forces and training
558
 ―Mossad‖559 
in Northern Iraq. As Kibaroğlu stresses ―Turkey has always been uneasy about the aspirations 
of Iraqi Kurds; any prospect of Iraq coming apart and the emergence of an independent 
Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq produces wariness among Turkish statesmen and the military 
alike‖.560 
The claims were immediately refused by Israeli authorities urging Turkey that Israel 
informs all its activities as regard to Northern Iraq as a condition of being good ally and 
strategic partner.
561
 While the tension between the parts was gradually calming, the 
controversial article of Jewish origin New Yorker columnist Seymour Hersh ignited the 
discussion again. According to column, Israel state was undertaking certain activities not 
excluding military trainee of Iraqi Kurds to guarantee itself and constitute a balance against a 
potential Shiite danger or Shiite state that might come to existence between Iraq and Iran. The 
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mutual relations was soften previously became worse one more time due to the publication of 
the article.
562
 
   In 2004, when Israeli army assassinated Sheikh Ahmed Yassin,
563
 Ankara under the 
Justice and Development Party government took a highly critical position against Tel Aviv. 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called Israel‘s action as a ―terrorist act‖.564 
Additionally, Turkish PM compared Israel‘s attitude toward Palestinian like the way Jews 
exposed by Spanish Inquisition and he commented, ―Latest Israeli aggressive actions give rise 
to anti-Semitism in the world‖.565  
Yet, Prime Minister Erdoğan sent his top foreign policy decision makers to Tel Aviv 
in order to express Ankara‘s position properly upon rising tension between the parts. A 
delegation headed by Justice and Development Party Foreign Affairs Council director Şaban 
Dişli and Prime Minister Erdoğan‘s former foreign policy advisor Egemen Bağış settled to 
Israel.
566
 After the commission‘s visit, Abdullah Gül as the Foreign Minister of Republic of 
Turkey paid the following visit to Israel to calm the tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
567
  
Eventually, Turkish Prime Minister undertook an official visit to Israel at 2005.
568
 During his 
two days visit Primer Erdoğan met Israeli high rank officials along with Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon, President Moshe Katsav and opposition leaders. He also met with Turkish origin 
Jews living in Israel. Erdoğan, during his trip, as well visited Palestinian territories. Turkish 
Prime Minister‘s visit was highly crucial for mutual relations for the initial perspectives of 
Justice and Development Party‘s Middle East politics and Israeli relations.569 Following the 
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PM‘s visit, an Israeli council paid a visit to Turkey in order to materialize the agreement made 
during Erdoğan‘s visit to Israel.570   
Turkish - Israeli relations encountered a new challenge as the peace process became 
more complicated after the legislative elections held in Palestine National Authority when 
Hamas
571
 announced its victory at Gaza strip in 2006.
572
 Due to aggressive activities of 
military wing of Hamas (Izzeddin al Qassam Brigades) the European Union, the United States 
of America and Israel classify Hamas as a terrorist organization,
573
 while Russia, Turkey and 
United Nation do not, hence due to status of Hamas as an organization and outcome of 
elections reciprocal relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv tensed repeatedly.  
Upon the Hamas victory, Turkish Prime Minister mentioned that international 
community should respect free will of Palestinian, underlying ―The choice of the people must 
be respected, whether one likes it or not‖,574 moreover Justice and Democrat Party invited a 
delegation of Hamas headed by
575
 ―Khaleed Meashal‖576 to Ankara.577 It was firstly 
announced that Hamas politburo head would be hosted by Prime Minister Erdoğan but due to 
severe criticism,
578
 Turkish Prime Minister announced that he would not meet with Khaleed 
Meashal while Hamas leader undertook a meeting with former Turkish FM Abdullah Gül.579 
In order not to increase criticism they did not conduct public meeting in government buildings 
and hosted Hamas delegation in the AKP headquarters.
580
 High rank Israeli officials 
expressed their deep concerns underlining that it might harm historical Turkish - Israeli 
relations that might cause uncorrectable consequences in future respective. What is more, 
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some Israeli authorities like spokesperson Ranaan Gissin notified that ―I wonder what the 
Turkish authorities would think if we were to invite [PKK leader] Abdullah Öcalan for talks 
in Israel?‖581 While Turkish side declared that a similar comparison would be ―groundless and 
wrong‖,582 according to PKK - Hamas comparison that would occupy top agenda in Turkish - 
Israeli relation at this period.
583
 
The U.S. officials also stated their anxiety on Hamas visit,
584
 and underlined that it is a 
futile effort of Ankara to make talks with Hamas politburo head, as they firstly should stop 
the violence against Israeli state.
585
 On the other hand, Turkish seculars directed their 
criticism towards JDP government accusing it to turn Turkey‘s foreign policy toward Middle 
East and Justice and Development Party to advance tight relations with other Islamic oriented 
Middle East regimes and parties as Hasan Koni evaluated the meeting as ―a premature and ill-
calculated move‖.586 As for the AK Party, foreign policy decision makers stand on the point 
that it required a meeting emphasizing on Turkey‘s new initiatives on the Middle East. It was 
also underlined that Khaleed Mashaal‘s visit was highly fruitful in terms of peace process 
between Israel and Palestinian. Foreign Ministry of Turkey issued a statement after the Hamas 
visit underlining ―The Hamas delegation was reminded of the expectations of the international 
community and of the importance of adopting a judicious, pragmatic and conciliatory 
approach.‖587 Besides, Turkish Foreign Minister supported Turkey‘s policy and acceptance of 
Hamas leader advocating Turkey‘s role as a mediator in Middle East and as an agent who 
may urge to stick to democracy in order to provide a peace prospect between Israelis and 
Palestinians underling the democratic victory of Hamas during elections. 
 As it is mentioned above Turkish - Israeli relations experienced a fluctuating line in 
this time period. The economic and strategic relations particularly during the first period of 
JDP government did not harm as ―Israel and Turkey have agreed an extraordinary ―water for 
arms‖ deal which will sees millions of gallons of fresh water being shipped in giant tankers 
across the eastern Mediterranean and into Israeli ports‖.588  Following that, AKP government 
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increased its peacemaking role in Israel - Palestine conflict and to boost Turkey‘s engagement 
in the Middle gathered Israel and Palestine Presidents together in Ankara.
589
 After the 
meetings took place between Simon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas both leaders addressed in 
Turkish National Assembly with optimism upon upcoming peace conference that would take 
place in New York,
590
 and hoped for the peace.
591
 With his address in Turkish Parliament, 
Israeli leader became the first President of Israel speak before the legislature of a Muslim 
predominant country,
592
 where he notified ―We may be saying different prayers, but our eyes 
are turned toward the same sky and toward the same vision for the Middle East‖.593  
 In the December of 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert paid a high level visit to 
Ankara,
594
 in order to discuss themes like Israel - Syrian conflict, Palestine problem, Hamas, 
along with economic and strategic relation prospects between the countries. During his visit, 
the Prime Ministers of both countries talked for five hours, and then Olmert met with Turkish 
President. The main agenda of the meeting was peace talks between Israel and Syria, as 
Israeli Prime Minister said before his visit to Turkey that ―a peace with Syria is 
achievable‖.595 Ankara prior to Olmert‘s visit achieved to settle another indirect talk between 
Israel and Syria, which was an essential step for the initials of direct talks; furthermore due to 
Turkey‘s contributions the sides almost finish a common text to settle talks.596 
Nevertheless, shortly after Israeli Prime Ministers return to home, Israel initiated a 
huge military operation called ―Operation Cast Lead‖,597 which soured the relations with a 
tone of harsh criticism wave by Justice and Development Government headed by Turkish PM 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkish PM, increasing the dosage of criticism, accused Israel for 
being an ―aggressive state‖598 while international community as well reacted Israeli  attacks 
calling Gaza strict as  ―a sort of open air prison‖.599 On the other hand, Turkish FM Babacan 
expressed his frustration with Israel‘s attack saying ―it is not possible to battle in Israel - 
Palestine front while there is a negotiate peace in Israel - Syrian front‖.600 
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  According to Carol Migdalovitz, the main reason for Justice and Development Party 
government‘s reactive attitude toward Israel was commented as a betrayal by Israel. Turkey‘s 
foreign policy was trying to gather active participation of other countries against Israeli 
attacks in the Middle East. It felt disrespected during peace building process between Israel 
and Syria.
601
 Additionally, AKP government also lost its trust to Israel government as Gaza 
attack took place five days after Olmert‘s visit to Turkey believing in that Prime Minister of 
Israel had the information about the upcoming attacks and he did not share it with AK Party 
during the visit. On the other hand, Israel reacted against Turkish PM‘s ―inflammatory 
condemnations of Israel became unrelenting and he did not mention Hamas‘s indiscriminate 
rocket attacks against southern Israel, which Israel cited as the reason for its campaign‖.602  
Turkey not only criticized Israel but also motioned action in international arena calling 
United Nations to dismiss Israel for its brutal attacks in Gaza strict. Turkey‘s open challenge 
against to Israel increased Turkey‘s and in person Prime minister‘s popularity in Arab world 
as other Arab states contented with denouncing Israeli attacks. When it comes to Israel‘s side, 
as a reply to Turkey‘s severe criticism and tough attitude toward Israel, Tel Aviv defended 
itself underling its right to protect itself. Turkish policies against Israel were adamantly 
criticized as PKK - Hamas comparison one time came into agenda.
603
 Besides, the alleged 
claims proposing Turkey‘s ―axis shift‖604 from Western orbit to Islamic line under the Justice 
and Development Party government coincides at this period. In a period when reciprocal 
relations between Tel Aviv and Ankara were still tense, Turkish Prime Minister and Israel 
President attended together a panel discussion in Davos / Switzerland at World Economic 
Forum. The theme of the session was ―Gaza: A New Peace Model in Middle East‖.605 Along 
with Turkish PM and Israel President, United Nation general secretary Ban Ki Moon and 
General Secretary of Arab League Amr Mousa attended to panel while the moderator of the 
discussion was Washington Post columnist David Ignatius. The panel, which initially started 
highly calm, turned to be tense debate as on his row Turkish Prime Minister criticized Israel 
to use measureless power against Hamas and to turn Gaza into ―an open prison‖.606 Israeli 
President Shimon Peres during his speech accused Hamas to be the real reason for the war; he 
increased his voice nodding his finger and asked Erdoğan ―what would Turkey do if every 
                                                 
601
 Carol Migdalovitz, ―Turkey: Selected Foriegn...........‖,  op.cit., p.11. 
602
 Ibidem, p.12. 
603
 İdris Bal, ―Is PKK Turkey's Hamas?‖, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 6 May 2010. 
604
 Mensur Akgün, ―Turkey: What Axis Shift?‖, Le Monde Diplomatique Engish, July 2010.  
605
 Atilla Sandıklı, ―Turkey - Israeli Relations Have Hit Rock Bottom‖, Wise Man Center for Strategic 
Studies,(source:www.bilgesam.org,<www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3
81:turkey-israel-relations-have-hit-rock-bottom&catid=77:ortadogu-analizler&Itemid=147>, February 2012). 
606
 Zeyno Baran, op.cit., p.173. 
 124 
night İstanbul would be targeted by missiles‖?607      
 Turkish Prime Minister tried to respond Peres‘s question, however, the moderator of 
the panel discussion tried to cut him to reply, as a reaction Prime Minister Erdoğan outburst 
the behavior of the moderator ―One minute... one minute… one minute… Don‘t interrupt me. 
You are not allowing me to speak‖.608 To take voice he stormed out ―Mr. Peres, you are older 
than me‖609 Turkish Prime Minister said. ―Your voice comes out in a very loud tone. And the 
loudness of your voice has to do with a guilty conscience. My voice, however, will not come 
out in the same tone‖.610 Accusing Israeli government killing innocent civilians, Turkish 
Prime Minister added, ―When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill‖.611 Ultimately, 
he gathered up his papers and departed the panel with a burst of anger saying, ―And so Davos 
is over for me from now on‖.612 
Upon Turkish Prime Minister‘s arrival to İstanbul, he ―was greeted to a hero's 
welcome back in Istanbul a few hours later as thousands of supporters, angry not only at 
Israel's 22-day Gaza offensive against fellow Muslims but also at years of being snubbed by 
Europeans‖613 along with Palestinian and Turkish flags, as well as posters calling him the 
―Conqueror of Davos‖.614 During the press conference after his arrival, Prime Minister of 
Turkey particularly underlined that his reaction was against to Israeli government not against 
Israeli people. Turkish Prime Minister also stressed that as punishment for its war crimes, the 
Israeli government should be denounced and it should be ousted from United Nations.
615
 
Turkish media repeatedly broadcasted the outburst of Erdoğan, while many analysis and 
articles were written on Turkish press examining Turkish Israeli relation for future prospects. 
Justice and Development Party strictly supported the output of Tayyip Erdoğan and blamed 
the moderator of the forum for being incapable of managing forum while being impartial.  
The diplomatic crisis in Davos also attracted the attention of many foreign press 
agencies. The incident was analyzed broadly from all respects establishing a consensus that 
the Turkish - Israeli relations damaged severely after Davos forum, while the severe criticism 
directed to Erdoğan from Israeli Jerusalem Post newspaper accused Turkish PM for 
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deliberately undertaking actions in order to win support for Turkish domestic politics. On the 
other hand, when Israel Commander of Land Forces, Avi Mizrahi stated ―Erdoğan should 
look at mirror‖616 referring to Kurdish resurgence in Turkey, Ankara issued a diplomatic note 
which aggravated the tense relations. The American Jewish Committee, that for a long time 
lobbied Turkey, particularly against so-called Armenian genocide claims as well declared its 
reaction against Erdoğan, although they had awarded him with a courage medal in 2004. The 
director of committee revealed his disappointment through an open letter address to the 
Turkish Prime Minister that published in Jerusalem Post.
617
    
The soured Turkish - Israeli relations experienced another crisis during Justice and 
Development Party in the field of diplomacy. Due to a T.V. serial, broadcasted on Turkish 
state channel about Israel - Palestinian conflict, Israel government delivered its concern under 
the pretext that it emits anti-Israeli feelings. Additionally, when Turkey‘s most popular T.V. 
serial ―Valley of Wolves‖ (Kurtlar Vadisi) ―portrayed Israeli intelligence agents holding a 
woman and her baby hostage‖,618 Israel‘s Vice Foreign Affairs Minister Danny Ayalon 
invited Turkish ambassador Oğuz Çelikol to Foreign Ministry. All of sudden, he changed the 
date and place of meeting and invited Turkish embassy to Knesset in order to express Israel‘s 
position and precision as regard to the issue trough diplomatic methods.
619
 However, when 
Turkish ambassador came to meeting, he was waiting at the door, while he was being 
recorded by Israeli press who were invited to Ministry by Vice Minister Ayalon. After this 
sort of undiplomatic fine-tuning, Turkish ambassador was invited to a room and was not 
welcomed on contrary to insistence of press members. During the meeting, Vice Minister 
voiced the Israeli anxiety about the serial. On response, the Ambassador said he had no idea 
about the serial while he is not able to realize any persecution as it was shown on a private 
channel. The most attracting part of the meeting was Turkish ambassador was seated on a 
smaller chair in comparison to Ayalon, additionally Israeli vice Minister in Hebrew said to 
press members that ―we wanted him to be seen seating lower than us‖620  while there was only 
an Israel flag on the table where meeting took place.
621
  
After the meeting, when the violation of diplomatic manner case found a wide 
reflection on Turkish media, the diplomatic outburst arose one more time between Turkey and 
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Israel. Ankara called Israel ambassador to Foreign Minister, the Minister stressed that if Israel 
will not issue and excuse it will call back its embassy back, and stated that it will continue 
diplomatic relation through the lowest level.
622
 The ―lower armchair crisis‖ shared Israeli 
public view and politicians, the hawk wing Israeli politicians made the harshest explanation 
stating that Turks are the last people who would teach them how to behave reminding Turkish 
Prime Minister‘s former statements adding Israel‘s intention of continuation positive relations 
with Turkey. As for the opposition, they put the blame on Foreign Affairs Minister Liberman 
under the pretext to spoil strategic relations between Turkey trough methods far from being 
diplomatic politeness and humiliating Israeli image.  
In order to repair relations between Ankara, Israel Prime Minister and President Peres 
got engaged into crisis and the ―hero‖ of ―lower armchair crisis‖ sent an apology letter to his 
counterpart stating that ―humiliation of Turkish envoy does not reflect Israel‘s diplomacy‖.623 
Ankara shortly after receiving the apology letter officially stated that it has accepted the 
apology. Following the diplomatic crisis, Israel Defense Minister Ehud Barack paid an 
official visit to Ankara to repair spoiled relations where he met Turkish FM and National 
Defense Minister as Turkish Prime Minister and President were out of Ankara.
624
  
Among all diplomatic crisis and tensions experienced between Turkey and Israel  not 
only during Justice and Development Party government periods but also since the 
establishment of reciprocal relations,
625
 not a single incident had not caused a deep affect as 
similar to ―Israel Gaza Flotilla‖626 raid.627 Along with the participation of many other pro 
Palestine international civil society foundations, a huge coalition group consisting six ships 
with 650 passenger initialized  ―Free Gaza Movement‖628 to break Israel‘s blockade that 
started in 2009 after the Cast Lead Operation. Many popular activist including Desmond Tutu 
(South African Archbishop) and Nobel Prize laureate ―Corrigan Maguire‖629 along with many 
volunteer activists all around the world supported the campaign and collected tones of 
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humanitarian and medical aid to Gaza. Humanitarian Relief Foundation of Turkey (IHH),
630
 
which is aftermath the incident was put the list of terrorist organizations both in EU and 
USA,
631
 also arranged a huge campaign to be delivered to Gaza via Mavi Marmara (Blue 
Marmara) ship that led the ―Free Gaza Movement‖ which was bought through the 
organization.
632
 
In Turkey, the debate on the Mavi Marmara vessel, which was planned to carry 
humanitarian aid to Gaza, started since the campaign and was still on preparation level. Israeli 
government organs warned Ankara that they would not let the ships to enter Israeli waters, 
suggesting instead of conveying help materials to Hamas proposed to hand them Israeli 
authorization as Israel was applying embargo to supplies which may be used during terror acts 
against itself. Besides, Israeli Mossad released its intelligence connecting actions with radical 
terrorist groups as Israel Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon dubbed ―The organizers are 
well known for their ties with Global Jihad, Al-Qaeda and Hamas. They have a history of 
arms smuggling and deadly terror‖.633 On response to Israeli statements, Turkish government 
remarked that they have nothing to do with the case, as it was the initiative of a non-
governmental civic organization.
634
 Turkish FM, aftermaths the incidents, dubbed that ―the 
government had tried to convince the non-governmental organizations in charge of the flotilla 
to take the aid to Israeli ports, but it was not successful‖.635 
When the Free Gaza Movement ships set off from Turkish shores, Foreign Affairs 
Minister of Israel stated ―If you ignore this order and enter the blockaded area, the Israeli 
navy will be forced to take all the necessary measures in order to enforce this blockade‖,636 
calling the initiative as a propaganda of violence.
637
 As the fleet was approaching toward 
Israel territorial waters, Israeli military ships cut the route of humanitarian aid fleet enforcing 
them to change their direction. However, the captains of ships did not accept commands as 
they were on international water. Israeli naval special trained commandos in order not to 
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permit ships enter Israel waters intercepted the convoy realizing a military operation via 
helicopters to Mavi Marmara.
638
 When the activists resisted to commandos, they fired to 
activist causing 9 deaths while injuring 20 passengers and 10 commandos.
639
 After the raid, 
along with Mavi Marmara, Israel detained all ships carrying help materials to Gaza and 
imprisoned all activists.
640
 
Henceforth, the bloody raid of Israel special troops, caused harsh outburst of Turkish 
government that called back Turkish embassy to Ankara issuing a denounce note blaming 
Israel to attack civilians on international waters, while Turkish Foreign Affairs stated that 
Israel will pay for its behaviors heavily. Ankara called its Israel Embassy to Foreign Affairs in 
order to convey Turkish concerns of Israel acts. Turkish Prime Minister and many other 
ministers of JDP government called Israel as ―terrorist state‖ and ―pirate‖ stressing Tel Aviv 
Turkish - Israeli relations never will be same again.
641
 Additionally, Turkey called Israel to 
release activist and ships back as soon as possible as there was no legal reason to detain them. 
Carol Migdalovitz summarizes Turkey‘s view as regard to issue as follows: 
 
The Turkish government, all political parties, and people were outraged by the Israeli attack. After 
the raid, mass demonstrations occurred in Ankara and Istanbul, and officials made repeated, 
dramatic, if not hyperbolic, statements about Israel‘s actions. The Turkish Foreign Ministry first 
protested Israel‘s use of force ―in the strongest terms,‖ charging that ―Israel has once again clearly 
demonstrated that it does not value human lives and peaceful initiatives through targeting innocent 
civilians‖.642 
 
Justice and Development Party government faced severe critics not to get necessary initiative 
to prevent the incident. For instance, the United States of America ―caught between two long-
time allies‖643 expressed its sorrow while reminding that they are examining under which 
conditions it took place hinting that Israel‘s right of self-protection. Besides, opposition 
parties accused AKP government for not being able to foresee upcoming results of the 
humanitarian aid project and for not applying proper measures to stop fleet before sailing to 
Gaza strict. Furthermore, AKP parliamentarians who initially publicly expressed that they are 
also going to join humanitarian aid campaign than changed their ideas and did not entered to 
ship, which made the attacks much more controversial that turned JDP administrative staff to 
ignore the potential risks for civilian and to use the case for political benefits. As for the Israel 
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side, though there appeared diverse views upon the raid and Gaza blockade, it was believed 
that the main purpose of the convoy was to break blockade instead of bringing goods.
644
 
Prime Minister Netanyahu, for instance, stated, ―Had the blockade been breached, this flotilla 
would have been followed by dozens, by hundreds of ships. The amount of weapons that can 
be transported aboard a ship is very different from what we saw get through the tunnels 
(beneath the Gaza - Egypt border). Hundreds of missiles and rockets, and an innumerable 
number of weapons can be smuggled aboard a ship‖.645 
Turkey after the attacks brought the case to United Nations, Arab League and Islamic 
Conference as well applied a shuttle diplomacy in order to take condemnatory decision 
against Israel, and it applied all diplomatic methods against the raid. Turkish diplomats also 
pressed United Nations to open an international investigation in order to examine the case, 
while Israel only accepted to charge a local commission in order to investigate the Mavi Mara 
raid. Moreover, Ankara proposed the prerequisite of abolishing Gaza blockade, paying 
compensation for the families of death and injuries, while ask Israel to excuse activities that 
have not been accepted by Israel government. To some extent, strategic cooperation with 
Israeli and Turkish army continued as Ankara bought Heron planes of Israel, on the other 
hand when Justice and Development Party government canceled Turkish - Israeli joint air 
military exercise and called Syria instead to ―hold defense drills‖,646 openly indicating its new 
attitude toward Israel after the attacks. 
The following diplomatic reaction took place against Israel after the Gaza Flotilla 
attacks took place when during Ramadan (the holy month of Muslims) JDP did not invite 
Israel Embassy to participate at dinner that was organized by the Party where all diplomatic 
mission representatives met.
647
 Ankara‘s critical attitude towards Turkey continued as it 
officially protest to attend OECD‘s tourism conference which held in Jerusalem. Besides, 
AKP government also denounced Israel‘s decision to open settlements in Eastern Jerusalem 
blaming Israel for provoking peace talks.  After the Flotilla attacks the first detente between 
Israel - Turkish frozen relations came when Turkey sent its fire exhausting planes to the help 
Israel during the wood fire in which many Israel citizen died.
648
 Israel replied Turkish gesture 
trough the highest level as Netanyahu publicly thanked Turkish pilots. Thanks to closure 
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initiated due to fire between Ankara and Tel Aviv the high rank diplomats of both sites came 
together for the first time since the attacks thanks to so-called ―Disaster Diplomacy‖ in order 
to talk about the future of relations.
649
 On contrary to fact that, the details of the meeting were 
not transmitted to public the theme of excuse and compensation issues discussed between the 
diplomats although Turkish FM Ahmet Davutoğlu denied the similar claims. Turkey at this 
period supported the negotiation perspectives with Israel while Prime Minister Erdoğan once 
more repeated that the condition of normalization with Israel is Turkey‘s request for an 
excuse and payment of compensation for the deaths and injured activist. The period 
coinciding these debates Israel government declared that they eased Gaza embargo and 
blockage. While both Israel and Turkish public view were discussing the method of excuse 
and amount of the money to be paid for activists, Israel Prime Minister announced that Israel 
would not excuse for the events in Flotilla raid, hence in spite of the closure between Israel 
and Turkey the required steps could not moved in order to normalize mutual relations. On the 
other hand, Israel after freezing of relations with Turkey initiated tight strategic cooperation 
with Greece and Cyprus. Israel and Greek part of Cyprus signed a border determination 
agreement at Eastern Mediterranean where it found rich natural gas resources yet Ankara 
strictly opposed the signed agreement on the pretext that similar initiatives might negatively 
influence stabilization of the Cyprus problem and stressing his rights in the area.
 650 
 
6. The Arab Spring and AK Party Government 
 
Likewise to many other states,
651
 Ankara under the rule of JDP government was highly 
unprepared for the events that commenced to emerge in Tunisia which is called as the ―Arab 
Spring‖.652  In general, it may be observed that Turkey‘s foreign policy decision makers under 
the AKP rule indicated a rational-behavior toward the uprisings as regard to Turkey‘s 
economic, strategic, business and population interest with the given state. When Turkey was 
mentioned as regard to the Arab Spring, there appeared two views: ―1. Turkey is a great 
model for Arab countries as a secular democracy with a majority Muslim population. 2. 
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Turkey is not a good model since it has its own problems with minority rights, freedom of 
speech/press and human rights, and recently Turkey has become more conservative moving 
away from Western values‖.653 As regard to AKP government, it put forward AKP model as a 
―Muslim Democrat‖,654 ―pro-free market, and fully obedient to the secular constitution‖655 
party to the opposition parties after the despotic regimes. Foreign Policy decision makers of 
Turkey under the AKP rule in some cases like Tunisia applied a wait and see policy and 
hesitated to be engaged in incidents,
656
 while in Egypt case they followed a more decisive 
foreign policy orientation. Turkish Prime Minister called Hosni Mubarek to ―to bow his 
nation‘s will‖,657 likewise in Libya insurgence Turkish PM asked Kaddafi to leave country.658  
Ankara preferred to keep quite on the protests commenced in Tunisia initially, though 
Turkey closely observed all developments. When President of Tunisia, as a result of street 
protest, was forced to leave the country, Foreign Ministry stated that Turkey is ready to 
support Tunisia as regard to its transition to democracy. After Zin al-Abidin, the former 
President of Tunisia left the country, the foremost exile opponent of the regime Rashid 
Ghannusi returned to home. Upon his arrival to country, as regard to his future political 
orientation he stressed that the best model coinciding to Tunisia is Turkey and Justice and 
Development Party as a sample coinciding democracy within an Islam majority population.
659
   
 In comparison to insurgences in Tunisia, Justice and Development Party followed a 
more determined foreign policy towards Egypt.  Turkish Prime Minister was among the first 
world leader who called Hosni Mubarak to take steps in order to meet demands of Egyptian 
people. ―Mubarak should act immediately and prevent ―exploiters, groups with dirty aims, 
[and] those sections that have dark designs over Egypt to take the initiative‖660 said Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan as regard to protests spread all around the Egypt. In spite of the fact that, 
there exist tight economic and trade relations between Ankara and Cairo, AK Party risked to 
take part along with the rows of opponents due to historical rivalry
661
 between Egypt and 
Turkey in Middle East as well as Sunni Islam world politics the roots of which date back to 
Ottoman Empire.  
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As for the Libya, the incidents were bearing completely different peculiarities in 
comparison to Tunisia and Egypt for Turkey‘s foreign policy decision makers. At the initial 
levels of insurgency, Ankara applied an attentive posture toward the issue preferring to stay 
neutral toward Kaddafi and Rebels. When, the international community started to discuss a 
common NATO operation against Kaddafi, Turkish PM stressed that a NATO military 
intervention to Libya would be futile,
662
 noting ―what would NATO do in Libya‖?663 
However, due to the developments arose in Libya, Turkey on one hand supported United 
Nations decision to employ sanctions against Kaddafi regime, while on the other hand 
opposed to apply a no fly zone against Kaddafi forces to prevent air attacks against 
rebellions.
664
 Ankara as a reaction to France‘s attempts to taking a leading role in Libya 
operations entirely changed its previous position and strictly emphasized the necessity of 
NATO‘s role in the coordination of the military operations against Kaddafi forces. Besides, 
Turkey engaged its naval forces in order to observe arm embargo against Kaddafi thanks to a 
bill approved by Turkish parliamentary.
665
 Turkish FM Davutoğlu stressed that Turkey stance 
as regard to NATO operation was supported by his government. 
Due to Turkey‘s close economic affiliation with Libya, the contracts of Turkish 
building sector hit 15 Billion USD
666
. At the very early stages of events Ankara, vehemently 
oppose an international intervention against Kaddafi regime and applied a decisive policy. In 
addition to that, the presence of Turkish population in Libya as well their safety was highly 
influential at the policy prospects of Justice and Development Party. Finally, the general 
election schedule in Turkey made Erdoğan government to follow a conservative policy 
orientation with a Muslim base.  
7. Conclusions  
 
In comparison to traditional foreign policy concept of Turkey that preferred not to intervene 
complex balance power and intrigue structure of Middle East, Justice and Development Party 
government seemed took tight initiatives in regional politics and attempted to increase 
Turkey‘s role in the Middle East region. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that upon the 
newly emerged demands of regional and international conjecture that emerged with the end of 
the Cold War, following 90s Ankara indicated a close tendency toward the region. Thus, it 
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may be argued that AKP continued this very policy towards the Middle East region. During 
its office period, JDP governments engaged itself in both bilateral relations between the 
countries and developed unorthodox initiatives in Turkey‘s engagement to the Middle East. 
Nevertheless, Ankara, at this period, in some exceptional cases like 1 March permits cases, 
moved highly attentive not to come at odds with its Western allies.  
In this period, as reference to relations with Iraq, Ankara under the rule of AKP 
diversified its traditional policy prospects toward Baghdad that used to be solely engaged 
security issues, whereas it developed policies embracing all ethnic, sectarian and religious 
groups in Iraq not excluding the Kurds. Besides, AKP foreign policy decision makers 
enriched relation prospects with Iraq diverting its economic and trade based relations.  
Turkey‘s foreign policy, during the office period of AK Party initialized a close affiliation 
with Syria. Ankara instead of applying an isolation policy against Assad regime and preferred 
to develop an economic, diplomatic and even a military association in order to prevent 
marginalization of Damascus. On the other hand, conversely to Ankara‘s attempts, Assad 
regime‘s unbalanced violence against protesters inspired by Arab Spring. It brought highly 
tensed Turkish - Syrian relations to a deadlock.  
Turkish - Iranian relations did not experience a radical shift since Iran nuclear crisis 
appeared. In this period since Turkey along with Brazil engaged to process and urged Tehran 
to realize barter in Turkish territory. Parallel to these initiatives of Ankara, Erdoğan 
government was blamed to shift Turkey‘s Western axis, however the Shiite - Sunni rivalry 
continued to be a determinant factor shaping bilateral relations in the Middle East. On the 
other hand, Ankara developed constructive relations against PKK terror with Tehran though 
following that due to ballistic missile system that planned to be launched in Turkey. 
The most radical shift in comparison to orthodox Turkey‘s foreign policy, as regard to 
Middle East took places in terms of relations with Israel. In spite of the fact that, at first 
government period of AK Party bilateral relations did not indicate a shift, after Israel‘s 
military operations in Gaza, mutual relations highly worsen. In addition to that, when Israel 
army attacked Gaza Flotilla in international waters bilateral agreements between Ankara and 
Tel Aviv almost come to a breaking point. 
When it comes to Ankara‘s attitude toward the so-called Arab spring revolutions, it 
may be argued that Justice and Development Party government applied a pragmatist-realist 
foreign policy far from being ideological. AK Party government promoted its unique case in 
Islam world with the support of the United States of America and the European Union as a 
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model coinciding Islam and democracy for the future regimes of Tunisia, Libya, Syria and 
Egypt to prevent radical Islamist movements.  
As it was mentioned, during its government periods, Justice and Development Party 
developed more decisive  foreign policy orientation toward Turkey‘s eastern direction in 
comparison to past. In spite of the fact that, similar policy orientation of AK Party was 
commented as Ankara‘s break from its Western orientation, the nature of Turkey‘s foreign 
policy toward its Eastern dimension may not be interpreted as a radical change or as an axis 
shift. Besides, like in Iran and Syria cases Turkey‘s foreign policy decision makers 
successfully achieved to express their points to Western allies and played a bridge role 
between the West and East prioritizing dialogue and diplomacy.  
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Chapter IV 
 The Western Direction 
 
The chapter analyzes Turkey‘s foreign policy during Justice and Development Party 
government periods in 2002-2011 towards the West. The main objective of the chapter is to 
examine bilateral relations between Turkey and its Western allies and neighbors from 
political, economic, military and diplomatic perspectives in order to study foreign policy of 
Turkey during the tenure of Justice and Development Party government periods. The chapter 
seeks answers whether Turkey‘s foreign policy in AKP rule experienced a ―breaking away 
from its traditional role as a reliable ally in the Western defense system and a modern country 
in search of membership in the European Union as part of its broader policy of constituting an 
integral part of the West‖? 667 Or the West still constitutes the utmost agenda for Turkey‘s 
foreign policy decision makers? 
The first section of the chapter analyzes Turkey - USA relations, while the second 
section focuses on Turkey - EU relations. The third section will dwell on Turkey‘s relation 
with Balkan region states along with Turkey - Greece relationship with a specific stress on 
Cyprus issue in Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011. 
 
1. The West and Turkey 
 
As it has been repedeatly mentioned previously,
668
 since the establishment of the Republic, 
the West had been uniform and fundamental dynamic part of Turkey‘s foreign policy, the 
roots of which date back to late 19
th
 century Ottoman Empire.
669
 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as 
the founder and mastermind of Republic of Turkey identified the modern civilization ideal 
with the West, thus integration with the West became the top agenda of Turkey‘s foreign 
policy since the establishment of modern Turkey. After the end of the Second World War, 
Turkey‘s place became mostly definite within the West. During the Cold War, Turkey 
reinforced its position among the rows of democratic and liberal regimes of the West. From 
this perspective, Turkey affiliated with the United States of America in terms of strategic, 
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military as well as economic relations becoming a North Atlantic Treaty Organization. While 
Turkey at this period either participated or willed to participate European institution to 
reinforce its economic and cultural association with European norms and values applying for 
the European Union membership (its former version). 
 In spite of the fact that, in some strategic cases jeopardizing Turkish lebensraum, 
Turkey experienced some road accidents with the West, nonetheless, Turkey arranged its 
security, economy, military and foreign policies in accordance with the West. Henceforth, not 
taking the Western connection of Turkey‘s foreign policy into consideration it would be 
highly misleading to examine foreign policy decision making process of Turkey. 
 
2. The United States of America 
 
Diplomatic interaction with the U.S. ―dates back to the days when Turkey was known as the 
Ottoman Empire‖.670 The relations ―first developed during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries on the basis of activities of merchants and missionaries in Northern 
Africa‖.671 In accordance with trade agreement signed between the states at 1830, United 
Stated navels obtained wide trade priorities, (capitulations)
672
 enabling them to move freely in 
Mediterranean without the treats of pirates as well as opening an access to Black Sea.
673
 
Another dimension of the relations was religious activities of ―Protestant‖674 American 
missionaries in Ottoman territories.
675
 The United States of America implemented first 
diplomatic mission in 1831 while Ottoman Empire opened its embassy in Washington at 
1867.
676
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Turkey - USA relations experienced a term of recession in the course of WWI
677
 until 
the birth of the Republic in 1927 because of the isolation policy of Washington and economic 
crisis in North America.
678
 Nevertheless, following the Second World War, Turkish -
American relations went through a revolutionary transformation and the current structure of 
mutual relations mostly shaped after this period.
679
 Ankara‘s main motivation for the alliance 
was its security concerns against Soviet Union and economic interest in order to regulate 
depreciated Turkish economy after the World War II, besides American military aid was an 
important factor for the modernization of Turkish army. As for USA, Turkey‘s geopolitical 
and strategic position was crucial for Middle East, Mediterranean, Bosporus and Black Sea 
interests.
680
 
The Cold War period became a bloom for bilateral relations between both states; 
because of threat from Moscow, Ankara developed close relations with the United States of 
America, while Washington in accordance with Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan 
supported Turkey due to its strategic and geopolitical position
681
 in the course of struggle 
against Soviet expansion.
682
 Relationship between the United States of America and Turkey 
experienced a problematic period between 1960 and 1980 period. First serious breaking point 
took place due to President Johnson‘s letter683 addressed to his counterpart putted down on 
paper with an undiplomatic style so as to prevent Turkey‘s military intervention toward 
Cyprus.
684
 The letter deeply insulted Turkey and threatened strictly not to start a military 
operation in Cyprus. Turkey‘s foreign policy from the Second World War since Johnson letter 
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that developed through an American sided monotonous line gained a multi dimensional 
character.  
In this period, Turkey - USA relations experienced a fluctuation because of so-called 
Opium Crisis,
685
 in which USA tired to limit Turkey‘s opium production686 that hit Turkish 
economy heavily.
687
 On the other hand, the United States of America opened ―İncirlik‖688 air 
base, which is a strategic military base for USA military, enabling to operate direct flights to 
many Middle East countries. Finally, when the United States applied a weapon embargo 
against Turkey due to the military operation Turkey released in Cyprus,
689
 Turkey responded 
to cancel Common Defense Agreement and closed of the U.S. bases in its territory except for 
NATO, hence mutual relations between both countries experienced a serious challenge.
690
 
Additionally, United State‘s attitude toward so-called Armenian genocide claims, economic 
aid policies to Turkey and eventually USA tariffs applied against Turkish products 
deteriorated mutual relations. However, due to invasion of Afghanistan through USSR in 
1979 and Iran revolution endangering USA interests in Middle East pushed America to 
consider Turkey sensibly.
691
 Relations between Turkey and the U.S. entered to a new period 
after the Cold War. The Post Cold War world, leaded by USA in order to secure its military, 
economic and ‗energy interests‘ developed a milder way, win - win oriented relations with 
Turkey as Ankara tried not to lose its strategic point after the collapse of iron curtain. 
Republic of Turkey indicated its readiness to help the U.S. at Gulf War opening air bases 
during operations,
692
 while the United States of America supported Turkey‘s European Union 
membership and provided technical support during Turkey‘s war against PKK. 693 
Notwithstanding to the fact that in general terms there exist tight relations between 
USA and Turkey on security level, the trade volume between the states constituted the weak 
ring of  the mutual relations and a paradoxical situation in comparison to retrospective that 
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first contacts between USA and Ottoman Empire initialized through trade.
694
 On the other 
hand, between 1993 and 2000, the United States signed agreements to sell Turkey arms worth 
$5.17 billion, making Turkey the top two ranked European purchaser  each year in that 
period‖.695 Relations with the United States of America have unique place for Turkey‘s 
foreign policy decision makers. Since the end of the Second World War, USA became the 
most crucial strategic alliance and partner for Turkey. Thanks to its pivotal position, Turkey 
has been an essential friend for USA to have access to Israel in Middle East, Caucasus, 
Central Asia, Black Sea, Balkans and North Africa geographies. In spite of the disputes and 
contemporary crisis over Cyprus, so-called Armenian genocide, PKK and future of Iraq, it 
may be suggested that the USA is among the most important countries for Turkey‘s foreign 
policy. 
It has been claimed commonly that along with the AKP rule in Turkey, a paradigm 
shift took place in terms of Turkey‘s foreign policy concept, particularly regarding the 
relations toward the United States of America and the European Union. Nevertheless, the 
interpretation of the shift and the role of Justice and Development Party in this very process is 
an essential matter of debate in both the academic literature and Turkish public opinion.
696
 
USA foreign policy mostly focused on fight against terrorism after the 9/11 terror attacks 
under Bush administration to construct a new foreign policy outlook mostly based on the 
rhetoric of struggle against terrorism. President Bush during his popular speech to American 
nation barely gave the signals of this new period warning not only enemies but also allies of 
the United States of America urging them to select either to pose along with USA or with 
terrorists.
697
 From this perspective in the post 9/11 period, Turkey - America relations re-
formed in the line with struggle against terror issue.
698
 
Ankara openly supported the U.S. fight against terror after the 9/11 attacks. It 
explicitly declared that Turkey would support its alliance in accordance with the N.A.T.O. 
decree.
699
 Thus, it allowed USA forces to use air and land spaces during Washington‘s 
military operation in Afghanistan. In addition to that, Ankara sent 90 high rank military anti-
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terror specialists to Afghanistan in order to aid USA. Eventually, Turkey took over 
commandership of International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, while the United 
States of America highly appreciated Ankara‘s support particularly due to Turkey‘s 
exceptional position being the sole Moslem country taking part at Afghanistan operation.
700
 
However, when the scope of the U.S. fight against terrorism expanded to Iraq the relation 
took a hit. The United States of America upon  George Bush‘s identification of Iran, North 
Korea and Iraq as ―evil axis‖701 followed by public discussion on military operation due to the 
allegedly claimed Al-Qaida connection of Saddam Hussein and his hidden chemical weapons, 
the nature of Turkey - USA relations commenced to follow an entire dissimilar line in 
comparison to Afghanistan cooperation.
702
 Washington to finish operation against Saddam 
Hussein effectively and to reduce causalities to minimum level developed strategy to open a 
front from Northern Iraq thus asked Ankara to permit usage of its bases and Turkish 
territory.
703
 Additionally, the U.S. demanded military staff from Turkey to support the U.S. 
forces during the operations.
704
 
As it has been mentioned in terms of relations with Iraq, Justice and Development 
Party government gave its first serious foreign policy exam against Turkey‘s most important 
alliance in the course of occupation of Iraq by United States. AK Party, on one hand, tried to 
realize the necessities of a strategic partnership
705
 and on the other hand vied to secure 
stability in the region as well as to avoid emergence of a potential Kurdish state in Northern 
Iraq.
706
 Ankara from the very beginning of USA‘s demand, explicitly hinted that it would 
support the U.S. if Washington act in accordance with United Nation‘s decision. In this 
respect, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to discuss Turkey‘s reservations and explain the position of 
AK Party settled to White House.
707
 The meeting was highly remarkable as Washington 
invited Erdoğan as the leader of governing party, owing to the fact that Erdoğan could not 
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perform Prime Ministry assignment due to his political ban. During the meeting with 
President Bush, Erdoğan publicly announced Turkish position and conditional support to 
Washington on condition that America should act in accordance with United Nation‘s 
decision while warning Saddam Hussein to collaborate with international organs in order to 
open Iraq for monitoring.  
The meeting was perceived by Bush administration as a partial support for the 
demands and the negotiations continued further. Besides, FM Abdullah Gül‘s telephone 
diplomacy calling regional leaders and the regional visit containing Egypt, Iran, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan in order to push neighborhood states press Saddam Hussein to corporate 
with International Atomic Energy Agency appreciated by the media organs close to Bush 
administration perceiving it as an endeavor of postponing Iraq war.
708
 In addition to that, the 
U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz visited Turkey to urge AKP with an 
economic aid packet.
709
 The upcoming Iraqi war and Washington‘s demand of the U.S. troops 
to use Turkish territories against Saddam Hussein caused deep dissidence not only in Justice 
and Development Party parliamentarians but also among opposition parties, militaries, civil 
bureaucrats, intellectuals, academicians and media members.
710
 Those opposing the bill 
propose the idea that Turkey‘s acceptance of the bill would seriously harm Turkish image in 
Arab world and cause troubles for Turkey in future prospective, the occupation plan of USA 
would be the second Vietnam for Washington, thus Turkey should not take part in a similar 
action. Distrust against USA and media debates introducing Turkish soldiers as mercenaries 
of America constituted the negative arguments of opposition rows, besides it was proposed 
that the U.S. could not attack against Iraq without the opening of Northern front. As for pros, 
favoring Turkey‘s close alliance with America stressed repeatedly the risk of a potential 
Kurdish state, Iraqi Turkmen‘s situation, post-war conjecture that might cause Turkey to lose 
all gains in Iraq and economic dimension in sense of International Monetary Fund supportive 
credits, USA help and oil-construction tenders would arise after war period.
711
  
After long discussions that took place in Turkey, Justice and Development Party 
government applied to Turkish Grand General Assembly in accordance with Turkish 
constitution Article 92 in order to receive authorization for the motion opening Northern front 
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trough Turkish territories in 01.03.2003. Justice and Development Party administration 
neither got a binding group decision nor a directing method nor pressed AK Party 
parliamentarians in order pass the bill. 
712
 The bill brought by Justice and Development Party 
to the assembly to be voted according to ninety second closure of Turkish constitution was 
briefly as follows: To permit Turkish Armed Forces to be sent foreign countries and the use of 
forces in accordance with determined necessary guidance.
713
 Within the framework of 
international laws, to deploy temporary, no more than six months, foreign soldiers, no more 
than 62.000, along with 255 aircrafts and 65 helicopters in the places where would be 
determined by Turkish government. To undertake all necessary regulations in order to provide 
foreign air and land forces to release an action and to perform all required tasks during the 
preparation period along with determination of status that upcoming forces would subject 
during their stay in Turkey.
714
 
  During the closed session held in Turkish Grand National Assembly, the bill one more 
time discussed in all details between ruling and opposition parties. Justice and Development 
Party‘s bill putted to vote that was attended by 553 deputies. After the secret ballot voting 261 
deputy voted  in favor of  USA troops deployment in  Turkish territories, while  250 deputies 
opposed the demand and 19 deputies abstained noncommittal, thus the majority in order to 
pass the bill did not obtained and the permit authority demand of AK Party did not pass 
through Turkish Grand General Assembly. Nevertheless, Turkish Grand National Assembly 
ratified a decision permitting the U.S. troops to use Turkish airspace in order to provide 
logistic assistance to American forces situated in Iraq.
715
 
The rejection of the bill at Turkish Grand Assembly caused the United States - Turkey 
relations to experience the second break after the ‗Johnson Letter‘ case.716 It obliged 
Washington completely change its plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein and directed a reaction 
wave mixed with disappointment and anger against Justice and Development Party 
government.
717
 The United States of America evaluated the consequences of the rejection 
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while some high rank USA officials like Wolfowitz accused Turkish military members for not 
undertaking required activities in order to pass the bill as some others blamed Turkey for not 
fulfilling the requirements of strategic partnership.
718
 As for Justice and Development Party 
administration staff, they responded the criticism calling Pentagon and Washington officials 
to respect democracy process and convey the Ankara‘s inconvenience not to approach case 
with indulgency in Turkey. The experts, academicians, specialist or media members realizing 
the evaluation of bill crisis took place among Turkey and USA criticized American foreign 
policy decision makers and high rank army members not to approach case seriously. Idris Bal, 
for instance, criticizing the U.S. officials not to undertake lobby activities to express USA 
views at public and official level in order to remove Turkish anxieties and blame Pentagon to 
look the case almost certain and not to seriously approach the deal.
 719
 Aftermaths the 
rejection of the bill, ―the Turkish Parliament agreed later in March to give the United States 
access to their airspace, and the United States provided Turkey with a $1 billion package in 
exchange‖720 tough the tensed relation between the parts did not calm down.721 
 
The Hood Event  
The Turkey - U.S. relations that tensed due to the rejection of motion experienced the 
second breaking at this period in the case, which is called as Hood Event. After the Gulf War, 
due to authority gap arose in Northern Iraq, Turkey, in accordance with the agreement 
provided among Iraq central government, the United States of America and Kurdish local 
administrative, and deployed its special forces at the strategic points situated in Northern Iraq 
in order to prevent P.K.K. leaks against Turkey.
722
 In the course of time, Turkish special units 
continued their anti-terror and intelligence activities at this frame against terror acts directed 
to Turkey from Northern Iraq. 
In 4 July 2003, Turkish headquarters office situated in Northern Iraq city 
Sulaymaniyah was raided by the U.S. troops and Kurdish local forces. Along with Turkmen 
and Kurdish civilians,
723
 11 high level (These were trained elite soldiers constituting of 3 
officials and 8 junior officials who were subjected to anti-terror trainee) officials were 
detained by the U.S. troops incumbent in the discreet. After the raid, Turkish soldiers and 
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civilians were detained for 60 hours in American airbase situated in Northern Iraq. This made 
the situation more insulting as they were forced to wear hood on their heads, which portrayed 
them as terrorist trough allies with whom they allied for years.
724
 According to Turkish 
sources, it was a completely sudden, unexpected attack, which was not foreseen through the 
Turkish forces both in Northern Iraq as well in Ankara, as Turkish forces since the Gulf War 
were cooperating with the United States of America. Some media organs in Turkey even 
claimed that, the commander heading the detainment operation visited Turkish headquarter 
previously in order to drink coffee and that is why Turkish units did not realize that it was an 
attack against them.
725
 After the attack, Ankara both via diplomatic and military channels 
tried to reach USA officials, however due to the public holiday of 4
th
 July Independence Day 
celebrations Turkish officials could not contact with American counterparts, which prolonged 
the period of arrest period.
726
 
After the incident Ankara at all levels contacted to Pentagon and Washington, former 
Foreign Affairs Minister Gül made a telephone call with his counterpart Collin Powell 
warning him that the incident might affect Turkey - U.S. relations very negatively. During the 
press conference held after the hood event, former Minister Abdullah Gül on a respond to a 
question directed by a journalist stressed that the strategic cooperation between the U.S. and 
Turkey continue and commented the case as a local event, which took place without the 
previous information of Pentagon high rank soldiers.
727
 High rank Turkish civil and military 
official came together in Prime Minister‘s office so as to evaluate latest developments related 
to the case. The most adamant statement related to detainments came from Turkish Prime 
Minister who interpreted the case as a nasty case, which must not take place in alliance 
relations and harshly criticized the responsible
728
. In addition to that, as a quick reaction to the 
detainments Ankara closed her border to Iraq while some high rank Turkish generals canceled 
their programs in the U.S.
729
 As for the United States, after the first minutes of the case it 
claimed that they were informed that Turkish forces were in the course of an assassination 
against a Kurdish local administrator.  
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Then, Pentagon evaluated the incident as a misunderstanding rooted to the fact that 
Turkish special units were not wearing uniforms and were not carrying identification cards, 
which gave way to such mistake. Thanks to initiatives of Ankara, Turkish soldiers were 
released, however due to the incident Turkish - USA relations experienced the worst period 
both in official and public level. The anti-Americanism in Turkish public view hit its record at 
this period. Scholars, columnists and critics approached the case United States‘ and Kurdish 
administrative attempt to liquidation from the Northern Iraq. The coincidence to event to 
Fourth of the July commented as a hidden message conveyed to Ankara hinting that the new 
sheriff is at work. As an argument supporting this hypothesis there appeared news in Turkish 
media claiming
730
 that Iraqi Kurdish administration pushed heavy press on the U.S. in order to 
withdraw Turkish special unites from Northern Iraq in return for their support against USA 
fight against terror in Iraq. The future of relation with Washington and Iraqi Kurds along with 
the future of Iraq and P.K.K. threat against Turkey was discussed with all its aspects after the 
incident.
731
 
The most reliving part of the hood event was Turkish soldiers did not resisted the raid 
which could resulted in heavy causalities, henceforth it could cause wound in Turkey - USA 
and Turkey - Northern Iraq local Kurdish administration relation both in diplomatic, military 
and economic sense. Till now the real motivation and backstage of the incident is not clear, 
even after 7 years,  but there appeared some news
732
 in Turkish media claiming that the real 
reason of the incident was the land registrations and demographic structure of the Northern 
Iraq. Kurdish ―Peshmergas‖,733 who were trying to loot the land offices in order to change 
demographic structure against Turkmen‘s as well as Arabs, however Turkish special units 
situated in Sulaymaniyah learned the plan beforehand thanks to inelegancy, thus they copied 
all the original land registration to micro film and at digital context and sent it to Ankara. 
According to claims, Kurds manipulated and provoked the U.S. troops against Turkish units, 
which caused the raid. It is also remarkable that during the raid the U.S. forces cluttered 
Turkish headquarter which gave the impression that they were searching something on 
purpose.
734
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Turkish - United States Relations, which got highly tensed, due to the rejection of 
motion and hood event, entered a more positive direction thanks to the meeting took place 
between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President George W. Bush.735 The main 
topic of the meeting was ―global war on terrorism‖736 and was related to the future of Iraq and 
PKK terror.
737
 The high-level meeting of Turkish delegation headed by Prime Minister 
Erdoğan indicated the importance of Turkey in the eye of the U.S. regardless of crisis that 
took place shortly before the meeting.
738
 In addition to that, in the course of the visit,
 739
 many 
influential U.S. newspapers touched on the critical visit stressing crucial strategic position of 
Turkey for Washington‘s Middle East interests evaluating Turkish P.M. as a successful 
partner.
740
  
The topics of the meeting was mostly focused Cyprus issue, trade and economic 
relations related to create more investment prospects and naturally to Iraq. Turkish P.M., 
during the meeting, expressed security anxieties of Turkey directed through Northern Iraq 
along with the status of Kirkuk and risks of potential Kurdish state and territorial integrity of 
Iraq. Washington meeting Turkey‘s concerns perspicuously declared that they added new 
version of PKK as a terrorist organization stressing that they would prohibit all activities of 
the organization in Northern Iraq.
741
 The U.S. officials as related to the meeting underlined 
the unique status of Turkey in the Muslim world as a democratic-secular state that has a 
predominant Muslim population. Apart from that, Washington from the highest level repeated 
its open support for Turkey‘s membership to the European Union while as well encouraged 
Turkish thesis in terms of Cyprus during the negotiations with Greek part. Turkish Prime 
Minister, at this context realized visits to the United States of America in order to strengthen 
Turkey - U.S. relations that made a road accident during Iraq war at the period of Bush 
administration.
742
 
After the high level meeting, American President paid his first visit to Turkey due to 
NATO summit which held in Istanbul at 28
th 
- 29
th
 June 2004.
743
 In spite of the fact that there 
had been blasts in Istanbul killing civilians and around the hotel where would American 
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President stayed, White House did not cancel Bush‘s historic visit to Turkey calling them as 
actions aiming to shade NATO meeting.
744
 Before his departure for Turkey for the summit, 
American President appraised Turkey role in the region calling Turkish Prime Minister as his 
friend, gave positive messages to Turkish public view.
745
 George W. Bush repeated 
Washington‘s support against the separatist Kurdish terrorism and support Turkish thesis and 
economic aid to Cyprus.
746
 Before the Summit, President Bush paid an official visit to Ankara 
where he met with President Erdoğan and Foreign Affairs Minister Gül along with his high 
rank officials Condoleezza Rice and Collin Powell. The main issues discussed during the 
meeting -as it has been in previous meeting held in Washington- Iraq and Afghanistan 
question, PKK existence and terror threat against Turkey directed from Northern Iraq, 
Turkmens in Iraq, Middle East questions and relations between Turkey and the United States 
of America. Turkish Prime Minister, participating on a T.V. program shortly after the meeting 
with Bush, voiced his appreciation and content with the visit, and stated Turkey‘s open 
support for the United States of America during their fight against Al-Qaida while in turn 
expected understanding Turkey‘s fight against Kurdish separatist terror. 
Following the fruitful meeting between Bush and Erdoğan due to NATO summit, the 
mutual relations gained a deeper aspect after the G-8 summit that took place in Sea Island, the 
United States of America. The main topic of the G-8 summit was the United State‘s attempts 
to gain support of other global and regional actors related to its Middle East policies, thus the 
United States of America commenced to promote democratization, economic and social 
development of region under the frames of Great Middle East. But, due to reservation of 
France it was noted to the official documents as Broader Middle East and North Africa -
including North Africa and Central Asia region states- while Washington endeavored to 
engage the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to Group of Eight.  
Turkey was invited to the summit first time and was accepted as the co-leader of the 
Democracy Assistance Dialogue. Turkey‘s invitation to the meeting was highly important for 
putting Ankara as protagonist due to its geostrategic and geopolitical position in the region, as 
an ally of the West and as a unique country merging Western and Islamic values under the 
roof of democratic and secular frame. Thus, the foreign policy decision makers of AK Party 
highly appreciated the invitation and supported the Great Middle East Project. During the 
summit, Turkey was represented at the highest level by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
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Erdoğan. His words ―As a society predominantly consist of Muslims, Turkey will continue to 
make contributions towards disseminating and developing universal values in this region. 
Turkey feels this responsibility as a result of its democratic structure rich historical legacy and 
identity, economic potential, and its membership in Western institutions‖ clearly indicates 
Turkey‘s full support regarding the project.747 However, in the summit Turkish PM declared 
Turkey‘s reservations against top to bottom decision making mechanism and the necessity of 
including the demands of region states, considering particularities of every region country. 
Prime Minister Erdoğan added that the other member states of G8 and NATO as well should 
be engaged in the decision making process of the project in order to prevent it from seeming 
as an United State project.
748
  
High-level contacts at this period continued at the Foreign Affairs Ministries level; 
within the framework of her state visit to Europe including main European capitals along with 
Tel Aviv, the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Ankara. During the visit, the 
talks continued in the context of Iraq, terrorism, strategic relations between Turkey and 
USA.
749
 In reply to his counterparts visit, former Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Gül paid 
official visits to the U.S. in 2006 and 2007. In contrast to initial period of Iraq war, the United 
States of America at this period commenced to follow a consultative policy toward Iraq in 
accordance with Turkey. Thus, Ankara and Washington decided to share their visions and 
continue consultations in a regular line. The high level meeting of leaders and Foreign Affairs 
Ministries, diplomatic contacts as well highly contributed to this project, while developments 
(terror attacks and political instabilities) affected the U.S. decisions. Hence, in Fifth of July 
2006, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Gül and USA Secretary Condoleezza Rice 
agreed on signature ―Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advanced the Strategic 
Partnership‖. The original text of the mutual understanding in general terms is as bellow: 
 
         The relationship between Turkey and the United States is characterized by strong bonds of 
friendship, alliance, mutual trust, and a unity of vision. We share the same set of values and ideals 
in our regional and global objectives: the promotion of peace, democracy, freedom and prosperity. 
Thus, Turkey and the United States face common challenges and opportunities that demand our 
concerted efforts. These challenges and opportunities form the specific items of our common 
agenda for consultation and cooperation. We agree to translate our shared vision into common 
efforts through effective cooperation and structured dialogue. Turkey and the United States pledge 
themselves to work together on all issues of common concern, including promoting peace and 
stability in the broader Middle East through democracy; supporting international efforts towards a 
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permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli  conflict, including international efforts to resolve the  
Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of a two-state solution; fostering stability, democracy and 
prosperity in a unified Iraq; supporting diplomatic efforts regarding Iran‘s nuclear program 
including the recent P5+1 initiative; contributing to stability, democracy and prosperity in the 
Black Sea region, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan; supporting the achievement of a 
just and lasting, comprehensive and mutually acceptable settlement of the Cyprus question under 
the auspices of the UN and in this context ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots; enhancing 
energy security, through diversification of routes and sources including from the Caspian basin;  
strengthening transatlantic relations and the transformation of NATO; countering terrorism, 
including the fight against the PKK and its affiliates; preventing WMD proliferation; combating  
illegal trafficking of persons, drugs and weapons; increasing understanding, respect and tolerance 
between and among religions and cultures; and promoting together effective multilateral action to 
find solutions to international challenges and crises of  common concern. The United States 
strongly supports Turkey‘s accession to the European Union and the accession process now 
underway. Our consultation and cooperation will also include enhanced bilateral relations with 
particular emphasis on economic and commercial relations and investments; defense/military 
cooperation; science and technology and public diplomacy efforts and exchanges.
750
 
 
The memorandum of understanding was highly crucial for the future perspectives of 
mutual relations as in the course of history it was the first time that bilateral relations was 
clearly defined by a road map while it was proposed that both parties should gather regularly. 
As required by the scopes of the Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advanced the 
Strategic Partnership, an action plan was agreed defining the development line of mutual 
relations in the issues like economy, trade, technology and science. The agreed plan was 
bearing essential peculiarities as it was including specific points related to energy, economy, 
trade and commerce issues particularly referring to transit of Caspian resources to the West. 
 On the eve of Prime Minister Erdoğan‘s long waited visit to Washington, so-called 
Armenian Genocide claims one more time shook Turkey - USA relations. United States 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs headed by Nancy Pelosi passed a genocide resolution 
with a measure 27-21.
751
 In respond, Minister for the European Union Affairs and Chief 
Negotiator Eğemen Bağış -also a well known, influential figure in USA politics and media 
circles- warned Washington to withdraw resolution giving French example as Turkey 
prohibited France to use Turkish airspace. Since the acceptance of so-called genocide, as like 
did Turkish Prime Minister hinting that it might jeopardize strategic relations existing 
between the parts, while President Abdullah Gül stated his disturbance there might be serious 
problems in relation prospects, besides, as a reaction to the resolution Ankara recalled its 
ambassador back, in order to prevent resolution to the U.S. congress. Bush administration 
Defense Secretary Robert Gater, taking the situation seriously publicly declared that the 
resolution might endanger USA policies in Iraq as 70 percent air cargo realizes trough flights 
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on Turkey,
752
 while State Secretary Rice conveyed her regret to her counterpart Ali Babacan. 
In spite of speaker Pelosi‘s attempts to bring the issue to full vote, pressures from Ankara and 
Bush administrations concerns on Iraq and Afghanistan postponed the resolution come to 
agenda for a while at this period.  
With the increasing terror attacks, Justice and Development Party exploded a heavy 
pressure in order to realize a cross border operation against P.K.K. camps situated in 
Northern Iraq; however Kurdish local administration and United States harshly opposed the 
intended operation under the pretext that it may harm sensitive balances and stability in Iraq. 
Besides, Turkish Grand National Assembly with a unanimous form accepted a ‗cross border 
operation‘ motion in spite of heavy U.S. opposition and critics. So under the shadow of terror 
-the ambiance of Turkish publish view was so tense that in the media it was even discussed 
the possible clash with the U.S. troops during cross border operation to Northern Iraq-.  
At the November of 2007, Turkish Prime Minister paid a Four day official visit to the 
United States of America. At the fifth of November, the following high-level meeting took 
place between Erdoğan and Bush. Thus, the main topic of the meeting, as it used to be, was 
Iraq and terror threat directed to Turkey, moreover the Turkish delegation accompanying to 
PM was consisting of Ministry of Defense and Second Chief of General Staff barely 
indicated the military and defense dimension of the talks. Turkish Prime Minister declared 
that Turkey has the right to protect itself against the terror directed from the Northern Iraq 
camp; he added that the Turkish army is ready to realize similar operations. Turkish 
government from the top level asked the United States of America to close terrorist camps in 
Northern Iraq, cut logistic support to camps, and arrest of leader staff of Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK). While USA President opposed the idea of cross border operation trying Turkey 
to persuade collaborate in terms of intelligence cooperation aid, which means that instead of 
realizing any sort of attacks to Iraq, USA was offering to give information of terrorist groups 
leaking to Turkey, thence Turkey could counteract it with local attacks instead of mass 
operations. President Bush‘s offer in terms of intelligence was highly important in order to 
conceptualize Washington‘s position toward Ankara as USA was providing a similar 
strategic intelligence solely to Israel in the world and the permission of the congress was 
required.  
Both Presidents evaluated the current situation of the relations during the press 
conference. President Bush underlined the necessity of collaboration. In addition, when he 
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was asked about Turkey‘s possible Northern Iraq operation he hinted Washington‘s dislike 
but he defined Kurdistan Workers Party as the common enemy of Turkey and Iraq.
753
 On the 
other hand, Prime Minister revealing that he is repeating his previous statements during the 
closed meeting underlying that Ankara is ready for an air operation against terror camps 
situated in Northern Iraq, plus he tried to remove concerns on civilian causalities.
754
 High 
level visits at this context during the Presidency of George W. Bush continued at a regular 
line. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and new President Abdullah Gül in 7th - 11th January 
of 2008 met with his counterpart Bush along with State Secretary Rice and Defense Minister. 
In return, The Vice President of the United States of America visited Turkey in March 4, 
2008 in order to exchange views on strategic, military and economic issues gathering with 
President, Prime Minister and previous Chief of Turkish General Staff. 
The election of Barack Hussein Obama as the 44
th
 President of the United States of 
America like all around the world created a positive ambiance in Turkey as well, both in 
public and official level.
755
 His father‘s Muslim roots, lexicon of change created a hope in 
Turkey in terms of Turkish - USA relations exercising a though period during two terms of 
Bush administration.
756
 After the Obama‘s announcement as the new President, in Turkey it 
was appreciated as a fresh breathe not only bilateral Turkish - U.S. relations but also in 
Middle East, Afghanistan and the world.
757
 On the other hand, Obama‘s approach to so-
called Armenian genocide claims and open support along with the election promise to 
recognize 1915 events as genocide,
758
 gravely irritated Turkish administration although 
diplomatic circles and Justice and Development Party foreign policy decision makers 
evaluated it as an election propaganda in order to gain Armenian support referring to 
strategic relationship between the United States of America and Turkey.
759
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The first high-level contact after Obama‘s settlement to White House took place in 
Presidents level when he paid his first visit to a Muslim nation during a two day official visit 
to Ankara.
760
 Under the frame of his visit,
761
 American President met with President 
Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan and with the general secretaries of opposition parties, 
and Turkish religious leaders.
762
 He also voiced to Turkish National Grand Assembly being 
the second U.S. President making a speech at Turkish Parliamentary after President Clinton, 
during his visit, Obama was accompanied as well by State Secretary Hilary Clinton.
763
  
Starting his 25 minute speech, Obama noted that ―Turkey is not where East and the 
West divide, it is where they come together‖,764 to hint Washington‘s open support to Turkey 
for its entrance to the European Union. He mentioned about historical ties between the U.S. 
and Turkey, in his speech at the Parliamentary.
765
 President Obama underlined the future 
partnership prospects between Turkey and the United States of America calling it as ―Model 
Partnership‖ thanks to which Turkish – U.S. relations gained a deeper level in terms of 
strategic alliance in terms of war against terrorism and partnership at Afghan and Iraq 
wars.
766
 He also underscored great strategic importance of Turkey for the United States of 
America in terms of fight against terrorism as well highlighted the affiliations in terms of 
economic, cultural and politics with Ankara.
767
 During his historical speech which was 
followed many journalist and broadcasted live including many Arab media he underscored as 
follows:   
 
            The United States and Turkey have not always agreed on every issue, and that's 
to be expected - no two nations do. But we have stood together through many 
challenges over the last 60 years. And because of the strength of our alliance and 
the endurance of our friendship, both America and Turkey are stronger and the 
world is more secure.
768
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President Obama voiced Washington‘s support for Turkey‘s European Union membership 
referring to Turkish model saying, ―This is a country that has been often said lies at the 
crossroads between East and the West. It's a country that possesses an extraordinarily rich 
heritage, but also represents a blend of those ancient traditions with a modern nation state 
that respects democracy, respects rule of law and is striving towards a modern economy ―.769 
He added that ―It is a member of NATO and it is also a majority Muslim nation, unique in 
that position, and so, as a consequence, has insights into a whole host of regional and 
strategic challenges that we may face‖770 while encouraged Turkey to actively contribute to 
peace building process at Israel - Palestine conflict.   
In his keynote speech, Barack Obama also dwelled on the new paradigm of the U.S. 
relations with Muslim world under his rule, the new American President emphasized that 
―America's relationship with the Muslims cannot and will not be based on opposition to Al 
Qaeda‖, I'm sure that played better than ―you're either with us, or with the terrorists‖.771 As 
regard to ‗America‘s relationship with the Muslim community‘ Obama said, ―Cannot and will 
not just be based upon opposition to terrorism. We seek broader engagement based on mutual 
interest and mutual respect‖. The U.S. President added ―Let me say this as clearly as I can, 
The United States is not and will never be at war with Islam. In fact, our partnership with the 
Muslim world is critical [...] in rolling back the violent ideologies that people of all faiths 
reject.‖772 In order to indicate new approach to Muslim world and in search of reconciliation, 
Obama appraised Islamic civilizations contribution to the world saying, ―We will convey our 
deep appreciation for the Islam faith, which has done so much over the centuries to shape the 
world, including in my own country‖.773 Ultimately, as refer to developments arose in terms 
of Iran‘s nuclear enrichment program and Turkey‘s engagement to the issue the U.S. 
President highlighted that ―the peace of the region will also be advanced if Iran forgoes any 
nuclear weapons ambitions‖, he added,  ―Iran's leaders must choose whether they will build a 
weapon or build a better future for their people‖.774 
Following his historical speech at Turkish Grand National Assembly, the U.S. 
President met with President Gül and Prime Minister.775 Upon a question directed by press 
members during the press conference with Abdullah Gül reminding his election promises, 
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Obama replied he is supporting his words referring to records but he particularly evade from 
using the word of ―genocide‖.776 On the other hand, Obama in his speech to Parliament said, 
―He called for the opening of Turkey - Armenian border and suggested that each country 
should work through its past.
777
 The best way forward for the Turkish and Armenian people is 
a process that works through the past in a way that is honest, open and constructive‖.778 
Moreover, under the frame of the second part of his visit in Istanbul, USA President met the 
Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers to discuss further developments in the Turkish - 
Armenian rapprochement‖.779 Barack Obama's historical visit to Turkey shows that the United 
States of America appreciates Turkey as a pivotal country and strategic partner in its vision to 
re-establish Washington‘s associations with the Islam world. As Emrullah Uslu underscores 
―Obama wants Turkey to take further initiatives towards its democratization, believing that a 
fully democratic Turkey would help USA build diplomatic bridges between East and the 
West. Turkey might become a crucial part of Washington's efforts to implement the parallel 
policies of reaching out to the wider Islamic World while serving U.S. foreign policy interests 
in the Middle East‖.780  
Ensuite President Obama‘s visit, Turkey - U.S. relations highly tensed owning to ―the 
approval of the Armenian ―genocide‖ resolution that labels 1915 ethnic clashes between 
Armenians and Turkish communities as ―genocide‖ by the U.S. House Foreign Relations 
Committee‖.781 The so-called Armenian genocide claims bill that has constituted an obstacle 
for USA - Turkey relation for a long time was positively voted at the U.S. House of Foreign 
Relations Committee despite President Obama‘s call to drop the bill.782 State Secretary Hilary 
Clinton‘s attempts to persuade senators that pass of bill may endanger the rapprochement 
process developing between Turkey and Armenia.
783
 Ankara as a reaction recalled its 
ambassador to Washington for consultation shortly after the voting.
784
 Turkish President 
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called the resolution ―an injustice to history and to the science of history‖,785 while Prime 
Minister notified that ―his country had been accused of a crime it did not commit, adding that 
the resolution would hamper efforts by Turkey and Armenia to end a century of hostility‖.786 
FM, Ahmet Davutoğlu soon after the genocide voting ―underlined once again that Turkey is 
determined to continue efforts to normalize ties with Armenia‖.787  
USA - Turkey relations, following the bill crisis, one more time tensed due to so-
called Armenian genocide, issue due to 94
th
 anniversary of alleged Armenian genocide. The 
U.S. President Obama on contrary to his election promises did not evaluated the 1915 events 
as genocide but used Armenian term ―Meds Yeghern‖788 which translates as great tragedy 
during the Armenian Remembrance Day Speech 24 of April 2009.
789
 Justice and 
Development Party government headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appreciated 
Obama‘s rhetoric positive, as he reckoned that ―our sensitivities were taken into 
consideration‖.790 Davutoğlu evaluated the U.S. Presidents speech as ―one sided‖ and 
―reading the history trough a single perspective‖.791 In addition to that, Turkey‘s Washington 
ambassador commented on Obama‘s speech as the ―incorrect, and one sided evaluation of the 
history‖792 reflecting his regret. On the other hand, upon the statements of Obama that did not 
content neither Turkish nor Armenian side and as regard to harsh criticism of Armenian lobby 
in the U.S., President Obama declared that his personal opinion did not change toward the 
events. 
Aftermaths, ―On September 9th, the United States announced that it was planning a 
multi -billion dollar sale of 3 Patriot fire units, 72 PAC -3 missiles and a range of related 
hardware for ground based air defense‖.793 It was perceived that Turkey would be an 
alternative for the U.S. new Missile Defense System base that was planned to be launched in 
Central Europe (in Poland and Czech Republic).
794
 Ankara as a request of so-called model 
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partnership under Justice and Development Party government rule approached to deal 
positively. On the other hand, ―Turkish officials were careful in their comments to avoid 
identifying Iran as the specific threat motivating their decision to join NATO‘s American-
designed missile shield‖.795 Ankara tried to protect its long term zero principle policy rhetoric 
and good neighborhood relations developed with Iran, Syria and Russia. Nonetheless, it 
deeply spoiled constructive relations particularly with Tehran and Moscow that established in 
the course of AKP government periods. Parallel to issue, Tehran warned Ankara that ―that 
deploying the radar at the military installation will escalate regional tensions‖796 tough 
Turkish side insisted that the shield does not target a specific country, and the ministry 
statement did not mention Iran. However, despite of Turkey‘s warranty a prominent Iranian 
MP ―Hossein Ebrahimi, Vice-Chairman of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and 
Foreign Policy Commission, said in an interview with the Iranian Sharq newspaper that an 
Iranian strike on NATO targets in Turkey is a ―natural right‖.797 
Upon the ―release of thousands of sensitive diplomatic cables‖,798 in whistle blowing 
website of Wikileaks, Turkish - U.S. relations encountered a serious challenge at Barack 
Obama‘s period. Among revealed cast cables -constitute the largest block of cables- that the 
U.S. diplomats sent to Washington, the most controversial alleged claims sent via cable were 
as follows: Turkish PM has several secret accounts in Switzerland,
799
 Turkey under Islamist 
AKP is no more a reliable ally of United States,
800
 and Turkey helped Al-Qaida in Iraq.
801
 
Apart from that, many cables summarizing personal characters as regard to Prime Minister 
Erdoğan, AK Party as well as many speculations in domestic Turkish politics scale revealed, 
along with internal reports calling Davutoğlu as a ―Neo Ottomanist‖. Regarding the scandal, 
the U.S. secretary Hilary Clinton apologized. The so-called claims of American diplomat 
occupied Turkish media as well as the claimed cable found its reflection in world media. 
Though it was not announced publicly, the former U.S. embassy Eric Edelman was on the 
target of fervent critics of Justice and Development Party administration.
802
 Nevertheless, on 
contrary to expectations, at the initial period of wiki scandal, Turkish - USA relations did not 
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harm that much as Turkey‘s Foreign Ministry workers and Justice and Development Party 
administrators called the cables as subjective, personal perception of diplomats that do not 
reflect official position of Washington.   
 
3. The European Union and Cyprus Issue 
 
As it has been mentioned previously, traces of Westernization in Turkish case date back to 
19
th
 century, which is clear due to series of defeats against Europe that found its reflection in 
military, economic and social aspect at Ottoman Empire. After gaining its independence 
struggle and proclaiming the Republic, the founder of modern Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
selected the West as the sole model of development for modern Turkey.
803
 Kemal highlighted 
that ―our aim is to overcome contemporary civilization‖.804 He took into consideration Europe 
as the contemporary civilization that modern Turkey should integrate.
805
 The founder of the 
Republic, realizing radical reforms like abolishment of monarchy and caliphate, while 
adopting European borrowed constitution with civil law practiced his upper mentioned 
rhetoric.
806
 
After the Second World War, as parallel to foreign policy aim of modern Turkey, it 
took part with Western alliance; hence, in 1949 it signed full membership agreement with the 
Council of Europe. In 1951 Turkey joined to North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in the 
course of time Turkey became member to Organization for Economic Cooperation, and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
807
 1959 is the beginning of modern 
―Turkish - EU‖808 relations when Turkey along with Greece applied for membership to 
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former European Economic Community.
809
 After the negotiations, which prolonged due to 
military coup of 1960 Turkey signed an association agreement, that is known as the Ankara 
Agreement, with the European Economic Community,
810
 henceforth Republic of Turkey 
became an associate member for European Economic Community.
811
 The agreement signed 
between the parts shortly based on three pillars: customs union, free movement of labor and 
financial issues,
812
 besides Turkey‘s accession to the community was planned to time in three 
periods like preparatory, transitory and decision to access period.
813
 Since 1963, European 
Union has constantly occupied a main theme in both domestic and foreign policy agenda of 
Ankara, hence the European Union membership of Turkey was perceived as the modernity 
and Westernization process of Turkey.
814
 In 1987, Ankara applied for membership to 
European Community while the Community accepted application with reservations due to 
political (human right violations, minority rights, low democracy standards)
815
 and economic 
(inflation, social security etc.) reasons.
816
  
Following the collapse of Soviet Union,
817
 the relations between Turkey and the 
European Union entered to a new period due to changing status quo and increasing strategic 
importance of Turkey for Europe.
818
 As a consequence of acceleration of mutual relations and 
after series of talks, in 1995, Ankara and Brussels agreed to sign a Customs Union 
establishment agreement which realized economic integration of Ankara with the European 
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Union.
819
 The 1997, Luxemburg summit was bearing highly significant clues for the future 
enlargement perspectives of the European Union as it was proposing the post Soviet 
development of the Union opening the doors for Central and Eastern Europe overlapping:
820
 
Wojciech Sadurski asserts that, the Central and Eastern Europe were supported in terms of 
democratic consolidation and human rights issue for the future EU membership.
821
  
On the other hand, Turkey that applied for the union in 1963 was warned to develop 
human rights and minority problems categorized to entirely different place in contrast to 
future candidate states formerly depend to communist bloc.
822
 The decision of the European 
Union caused a deep reaction in Turkey,
823
 Turkish politics blamed EU for biased behavior 
against Turkey while in public level future of Turkey - EU relations caused harsh discussion 
between pros and cons.
824
 In 1998, the European Union officially announced that it would 
launch a process to enlarge the Union stating that ―Enlargement is one of the most important 
opportunities for the European Union at the beginning of the 21
st
 century. It is a unique, 
historic task to further the integration of the continent by peaceful means, extending a zone of 
stability and prosperity to new members‖.825 Therefore it took into agenda further 
negotiations with the following applicant countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
and Turkey.
826
 Yet, as a consequence of Cyprus issue Turkey‘s relations with the European 
Union was highly intertwined. In spite of the Union‘s previous decision on the Island stating 
―The Community considers Cyprus as eligible for membership as soon as the prospect of a 
settlement is surer‖,827 in following years the Union put Cyprus on the list for the following 
enlargement on condition that ―Cyprus problem that would bring territorial unity and integrity 
of the country in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions‖.828 What made the situation 
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completely complicated in terms of enlargement was, in 1997 Luxemburg summit Cyprus 
was given a date for begin the accession negotiations whereas it was denied to obtain a 
candidate state status.
829
 
Following that, Turkish - European Union relations in terms of enlargement came 
almost to a deadlock. Yet at Helsinki summit, mutual relations between Turkey and EU 
entered to an entire new direction, thus Helsinki summit became a milestone for Turkish - 
European Union relations and for the future perspectives of EU‘s enlargement.830 Ankara 
gained a candidate status, and this very status was recognized as equal with other candidate 
member countries although it was not given a date for the opening of negotiations and the 
meeting of Copenhagen criteria was the sole condition in order to initiate membership 
negotiations.
831
 Although it may be proposed that there was a pragmatic and conciliatory 
attitude toward Turkey in Helsinki Summit, as it was argued by Jan Zielonka ―there was no 
unanimous attitude on Turkey, bargaining on the EU table among the member states could 
result in contradictory even controversial foreign policy decisions‖.832  
As for the future enlargement prospects regarding the Cyprus issue it was noted by the 
Union that ―If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, 
the Council‘s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition‖.833  
Eralp and Beriker appreciate EU enlargement issue regarding the Cyprus issue and Turkey‘s 
position as follows: 
 
While the Republic of Cyprus had been making rapid progress in the accession negotiations, 
the conflict-settlement efforts were not moving forward. The European Union responded 
negatively to Turkish-Cypriot demands and requests, such as recognition by the 
international community and the removal of the trade embargo on the TRNC. The European 
Union promised to respond with incentives, including a small amount of annual financial 
aid, in return for a settlement that was favorable to the European Union‘s enlargement 
project. In the UN-sponsored process, Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash twice walked 
away from the negotiations. On November 2001, Turkey threatened to annex the TRNC if 
the RoC joined the member states of the EU.
834
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Due to Islamist background of Justice and Development Party, and regarding the 
negative tendency of National Vision Movement toward the European Union, after the 2002 
general elections both in Turkey and international level it was commenced to be worried that 
Ankara under the JDP government would slow down Turkey‘s relations with the European 
Union. On contrary to general assumptions, AK Party before the elections in different 
platforms declared that if elected it would support Turkey‘s full European Union 
membership.
835
 As opposed to National Vision Movement, Justice and Development Party 
―reassured Turkish elites and their Western partners that the AKP remained committed to 
Turkey‘s Euro - Atlantic ties‖.836 In this sense it is notified in the party program of AKP that 
―Turkey, is a part of European value system‖837 to indicate Party‘s approach toward relations 
with EU.  
In spite of the fact that, the 2001 party program of Justice and Development Party did 
not contain a specific chapter for the relations with the European Union, it had some 
characteristics to help the relations. Subchapters called as fundamental rights and freedoms, or 
economy, public policy, social and foreign policy chapters included many policy views 
compatible to the European Union and explicitly gave clues for the future policy 
understanding of Party in terms of relations with Brussels.
838
 For instance, the statements like 
―Turkey is a part of civil world‖ or ―freedoms constitute the basic of democracy‖ in 
fundamental rights and freedoms subchapter,
839
 reflects democratic orientation of the party. 
Other statements like ―It is believed that our relations with the European Union, World Bank, 
IMF and other international institutions must be maintained along the lines of the 
requirements of our economy and our national interest‖ statement in economy chapter or the 
statement depicts the Turkish desire to be the part of global society. On contrary to party 
program, there appeared more explicit expresses in 59
th 
government program of Justice and 
Development Party related to EU. The expressions in the government program of AK Party 
related to foreign affairs in terms of relations with the European Union like:  
 
               Turkey‘s full European Union membership is among main objectives of our government. 
For this purpose, guarantying Turkey‘s candidacy as an attribute irrevocable in the course 
of enlargement propose, it will be served to open accession negotiations. Our government 
is determined to fulfill Copenhagen criteria completely. In addition to acquisitions that 
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will bring to both sides due to Turkey‘s taking place in European Union family, Turkey‘s 
membership will bring positive aspects like peace, security and stability.
840
 
 
 
Justice and Development Party, shortly after coming to rule initiated to practice party and 
government program regarding the European Union,
841
 plus it continued to practice huge 
reform program that was launched by 57
th
 coalition government. Parallel to that, In January 
2002, the newly amended Turkish Civil law came into force realizing fundamental changes in 
terms of freedom of thought and expression, prevention of torture, personal liberty, security 
accommodation and travel freedom as well as gender equality.
842
 The adjustment packages 
initiated through the 57
th
 coalition government as well continued by Justice and Development 
Party, thus in 13
th
 of January put into effect 3
rd    
adjustment package to the European Union. 
The package contained changes like Political Parties Law, the Press Law, the Law of 
Association and Law of petition. In addition to that, the new package introduced changes in 
terms non-Muslim and minority community foundations‘ laws -which has been a 
controversial theme since the establishment of the Republic. It also was a theme of discussion 
during EU full accession negotiations- enabling them to obtain immovable and move freely in 
accordance with their properties in order to meet their religious, sociable, charitable cultural 
field related needs.
843
 The package as well eased the activities of foreign association in 
Turkey on condition that they should get permission of Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry.
844
   
  Shortly after coming into affect of 3
rd
 adjustment package, Justice and Development 
Party worked on the 4
th
 adjustment package and Fourth of February, 2002 enacted the 
following package in order to realize required changes envisaged in Copenhagen criteria 
proposing fundamental changes in Turkish Law system.
845
 Justice and Development Party 
kept the reform process stable and from 13 January 2002 to 14 July 2004 enacted Five-
adjustment package including remarkable reforms as regard to fight against terror, adopting 
changes in accordance with the demands of European Court of Human Rights, appointment a 
civic member to National Security Council of Turkey and laws obstructing political party 
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closing.
846
 In the Meantime, in order to strengthen Turkey‘s accession strategy to the 
European Union, in June of 2003, the European Union commission prepared and accepted the 
Revised ―Accession Partnership Document‖.847 The revised Accession Partnership Document 
advised Turkey to contribute Annan Peace Plan in order to solve Cyprus problem, and 
proposed political dialogue with Turkish neighborhood hinting relations with Armenia. It also 
suggested the adaptation of the position of Turkish army in politics to a similar level as in 
other EU countries and subject to minorities, removal of legal barriers in order to broadcast 
and publications except for official language, press independence, cultural rights, 
development of religious and faith freedom etc.
848
 Thanks to similar adjustment reforms, 
Turkey approached to Copenhagen criteria while majority of Turkish society supported the 
reforms in a consensus mode.
849
 
AK Party government, taking into consideration recommendations and reservations of 
the European Union commissions, issued Revised Accession Partnership Document, reviewed 
the Second National Program (Turkey‘s National Program for the Adoption of the Acquisition 
of the European Union and the Adaptation of Acquisition of Turkey‘s National Program 
Implementation, Coordination and Decision on the Surveillance) and put the priorities of 
Turkey parallel to the Revised Accession Partnership Document, dividing them to short, 
middle and long term accepting it at Council of Minister was enacted.
850
 AKP, on contrary to 
rest of other Turkish governments, first time in the history,
851
 admitted explicitly the presence 
of ―Cyprus Questions‖852 and supported UN General Secretary Annan Plan in accordance 
with Helsinki Summit decisions.
853
 Cyprus Island after gaining its independence from Britain 
in 1960 set up a joint republic with Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which was guaranteed by 
Britain, Turkey and Greece. In the year of 1963, when Greek Cypriots commenced to isolate 
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Turkish community, the joint republic collapsed, following that as Greek junta regime attempt 
to annex Cyprus to Greece. Turkey, in 1974, referring to its guarantor right to protect Turkish 
Cypriots in the island realized a military operation. The operation is referred as a peace 
operation by Turkish side while it is called as an invasion by Greeks, henceforth Cyprus 
question became a crucial topic for Turkey‘s foreign policy affecting relations between 
Greece, the United States of America and the European Union.
 854
 The so-called Annan Plan 
was a  ―basis for agreement on a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem‖855 
developed by United Nations devised by Kofi Annan as the General Secretary of United 
Nations in order to resolve Cyprus question.
856
 The plan, after five times of editions and 
revisions, shortly was proposing to unify the Cyprus Island under a roof but as a federal state 
and then to be a full European Union member.
857
 Parallel to that, the plan was proposing the 
abolishment of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, reducing Turkish Army entity in the 
Island, while Turkey would preserve its guarantor right in the island, a presidential system 
allowing both parties to run in equal terms.
858
 Thanks to plan, Ankara was going to change 
her Cyprus policy applied since 1974 and paling to open negotiation talks ending the occupier 
state status.  
Thus, Justice and Development Party parallel to the European Union‘s demands fully 
supported the plan; while additionally participate to process in both Turkey and Northern 
Cyprus in order to persuade Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to accept the plan and to 
create a public opinion.
859
 In 2002, both representatives of Greek and Turkish site sat to start 
negotiations.
860
 After many repeats of refusal of further talks, ultimately in 2004, Annan Plan 
as a chance proposing the reunification of Island put into referendum in both parts of 
Cyprus.
861
 Greek Cypriots voted negatively against the plan with a 75.83 %, while Turkish 
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Cypriots voted in favor of plan with 64.90 % support of the residences. Therefore, the 
unification suggestion of the Island did not realize.
862
 
In spite of Turkish Cypriots‘ major support for the Plan, shortly after Southern 
Cypriots entrance to the European Union, it blocked direct trade regulation which was 
promised in the course of negotiations to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. The European 
Union‘s acceptance of Greek Cypriots to the European Union as the sole representative to the 
Union and unsuccessful performance to remove embargoes against Turkish Cypriots along 
with violation of Union‘s principle of giving membership to the countries having conflicts 
with neighborhood caused Justice and Development Party lose its hand in the public view. 
Opposition parties blamed AK Party to threat against Cyprus question, while increased the 
Euro-skeptic tendencies in Turkish public view as well associate it as a Christian club, besides 
the decision negatively affected JDP‘s future performance and the grass roots supporting the 
membership process.
863
 On the other hand, AKP was heavily criticized for adopting foreign 
policy issues like Cyprus to gain more advantage to consolidate its domestic power and not to 
realize required further steps to contribute resolution of the problem. Carol Migdalovitz 
reckons as follows: 
 
Since their laudatory and proactive support for the unsuccessful 2004 Annan Plan for a 
settlement on Cyprus, AKP officials have abandoned the issue – even though the EU considers 
the lack of a solution to the Cyprus issue to be a major obstacle to Turkey‘s accession and the 
AKP claims not to have abandoned Turkey‘s ambition to join the EU. The Foreign Minister and 
his ministerial cohort express pro forma support for a settlement, but appear unengaged in the 
ongoing UN negotiations. Cyprus has long been viewed as a Turkish national issue and the AKP 
refuses to compromise on opening Turkish ports and airports for Cypriot transport, on Turkey‘s 
troop presence on the island, on the prerogatives accorded Turkey in the 1960 Treaty of 
Guarantee, or on support for the Turkish Cypriots that now equates to support for Turkish 
Cypriot President Derviş Eroğlu‘s hard line positions. Given that the political right would 
exploit any AKP initiative that might facilitate a settlement in order to weaken AKP 
domestically, AKP has chosen to pursue its short term domestic interests rather than longer term 
EU ones.
864
 
 
Nonetheless, Justice and Development Party governments positive attitude during the 
negotiations and full support for the EU supported Annan Plan played a highly positive role in 
2004 Brussels summit. 
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 2004 Brussels Summit 
―The latest enlargement, from 15 to 25, is the biggest in Union history. It has its roots 
in the collapse of communism, symbolized in the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which 
offered an unexpected and unprecedented opportunity to extend European integration into 
Central and Eastern Europe‖.865 The 2004 enlargement was also highly significant for Turkey 
since Greek part of Cyprus became a full member, hence the enlargement impacted Turkey‘s 
foreign policy attitude toward Cyprus conflict.
866
 
 
 
Immediately after the collapse of communism around 1990, the European Union supported 
the democratization process in the former communist countries and provided technical and 
financial assistance as they introduced market economies. By the mid-1990s, trade 
agreements were in place, giving central and Eastern Europeans preferential access to EU 
markets for most of their exports. Similar agreements with Cyprus and Malta date from the 
1970s. The actual entry negotiations to agree the terms whereby the new EU countries 
assume the rights and responsibilities of membership took place between 1998 and 2002. 
The entry date was set for 1 May 2004.
867
 
 
Prior to the European Union summit in Brussels which was going to take place in 17
th
 
of December 2004, the progress report of European Council was highly crucial for Turkey‘s 
prospects for the EU accession. The progress report as a record of candidate states status 
toward the accession evaluates the progress level on annual basis, declaring advices and 
attitude of the Union for the candidate states. Thus, the 2004 progress report was highly 
significant as it was hinting clues for Turkey regarding upcoming Brussels summit as it would 
shape future direction of accession negotiations. Moreover, the decision that was taken in 
Copenhagen summit, the Union encouraged Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. 
If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation 
from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the 
European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay‖868 was an 
additional stimulus for Ankara. 
Turkish Prime Minister, as he did often between 2002 and 2004 settled to Strasbourg 
in order to follow actualities and explain Turkey‘s position from the highest level. The first 
impression related to coming progress reports leaked to media organs and it seemed highly 
positive, however there were some expressions regarding disturbed Turkish diplomacy like 
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the indefinite expression of the aim of negotiations, or the expressions like ―open ended‖ and 
―if during the negotiation process the promised commitments is not realized, the membership 
will not provided‖.869 Turkish Prime Minister initiated a shuttle diplomacy in order to soften 
similar vague expressions, which in future might harden Turkey‘s full membership and 
contacted Italian, Belgium and German Presidents via telephone.
870
 In 6 October 2004, 
European Commission commissary publicized three documents related to Turkey in order to 
be voted in Brussels summit among member states. The documents were Progress Report, 
Recommendation Report and Effect Report to be finalized in 17 December 2004 at Brussels 
Summit of the Union. In the 18
th
 page of recommendation report, the reform progress in 
Turkey was highlighted and the intention to commence accession talk was declared. But it 
strictly mentioned that violation in democracy and human right affairs might cause the 
suspension of talks and on contrary to all attempts of diplomats. And Turkish PM could not 
remove the expressions like ―it is an open ended progress and the result is not guaranteed‖.871 
Turkish side settled to historic Brussels meeting with a big delegation constituted by 
Ministers and deputies headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan along with former 
Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Gül. The clues of Brussels meeting were released at the 
report, and it was hinted that the full membership negotiations seems to start in 2005. 
However, Turkish diplomats and Justice and Development Party foreign policy decision 
makers, before coming to summit defined indispensable policy principles of Turkey as 
bellow, estimated the fact that the summit will be tougher on contrary to positive ambiance 
present at Brussels before the meeting: 
 
 - An exact date should be given for the negotiations and this date should not be open-ended.  
- Before the start of the negotiations, Turkey cannot take any more steps in Cyprus Issue. 
- The aim of the negotiations should be full membership. The alternatives, which will distort 
the full membership, such as, ―privileged partnership‖ or ‗B Plan‘ can never, be accepted.  
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- Permanent derogations (limitations) can never be accepted by Turkey.
872
 
 At the first day of the summit, the European Union decided to start full membership 
negotiations in 3 October 2005, nevertheless the decision proposing to start of full 
membership negotiations with Turkey due to the rejection of Greek Cypriot administration 
and support of Greece, France and Austria was not accepted. Greek Cypriots proposed to 
connect start of full membership negotiations with Turkey on the condition that Ankara 
should sign the extension of Custom Union agreement with the new ten member states of the 
European Union in accordance with the additional protocol of Ankara agreement. In addition 
to that, Turkey was asked to sign the protocol prior to the end of summit.
873
 The signing of 
additional protocol of Ankara agreement in order to expand it for new ten member states 
would mean that Ankara would officially recognize South Cyprus part and accept Nicosia as 
the sole representative of Cyprus Island at international arena. Justice and Development Party 
decision makers harshly rejected the signing of the additional protocol, which brought the 
summit to a deadlock. The situation gained a more dramatic character when Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdoğan attempted to walk out of the summit as a reaction to Union‘s last minute 
precondition for the start of full membership negotiations with Turkey.
874
   
  European leaders including Blair, Schroder, and Berlusconi in order to persuade 
Turkey not to leave summit, came together to a mini non-official meeting and urged JDP 
decision makers headed by Erdoğan to continue talks with Union and sign the protocols in 
order to start negotiations removing Turkey‘s concern on Cyprus.875 Thus, after stressful 
hours, it was agreed that Turkey will not sign the additional protocols to the end of summit, 
while promise to sign it before the start of full membership negotiations at 3 October 2005 in 
the framework of the paragraph 23 of the Presidency Conclusion and Ankara‘s undertaking 
reflected at the conclusion statement of the summit.
876
      
 The previous red lines proposed before the summit were mostly not recognized as it 
was stated by the European Union that it is an open ended which means that the negotiations 
between the parts may continue forever. And opposed to the statement ‗the sole aim of the 
talks is full membership‘, it was stated that if Turkey would not assume the obligations of 
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talks it may continue tight relations with union and German - French proposed privileged 
partnership offer left current for Ankara.
877
 Worst of all, on contrary to all attempts of Ankara 
under AK Party government, Greek Cyprus joined to the European Union, while Turkey was 
pledge to open its customs for the new member states, besides the derogation limitations 
issues did not concluded as regard to Turkey‘s previous desires.878 On the other side, the 
Greek - Southern Cyprus site harshly criticized the acceptance of full membership 
negotiations with Turkey.       
 Notwithstanding to all these negative features, relations between Turkey and the 
European Union entered totally to a different path after the Brussels summit which took place 
at 17
th
 of December, 2004 as it was decided by the EU to start full membership negotiations 
with Turkey.
879
 As a consequence of attempts, endeavors, positive and negative emotions 
between Turkey and Union for 42 years and along with the reform process accelerated during 
the Justice and Development Party‘s determined the EU policies since its rise to power. In the 
Brussels summit of the European Union it was decided that the full membership negotiations 
would start at 2005.
880
 Turkish delegation was met by a huge crowd calling Turkish Prime 
Minister as ―conqueror of the Europe‖.881 In spite of the all negative features of the conditions 
restricting Turkish policies, the Brussels summit was positively met in Turkish public view, 
while AK Party government was harshly criticized trough central right and left opposition to 
compromise crucial foreign affair strategies of traditional foreign policies of Republic of 
Turkey‘s.            
 As it was decided at Brussels summit, on October 3
rd
 of 2005, accession negotiations 
with Turkey has been started.
882
 In July, the controversial additional protocol extending the 
Ankara Agreement to the new members of the European Union was agreed thanks to explicit 
statement put into declaration that Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus. 
Although, initially  it was claimed by the Union that it was not possible to put a similar 
expression Turkish diplomats reminded Greek reservation during the EU agreements stating 
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―The subjected country is not recognized as Macedonia‖ referring to Greek - Macedonian 
name crisis thus; the European Union had to accept Turkey‘s reservation and put the 
statement parallel to Ankara‘s demand. On 20 October 2005, the first phase of the accession 
negotiations called as ―scan process‖ commenced under the topic of ―introductory scan‖ 
meeting and the 2005 progress report of the Union which was highly similar to previous 
issues released at 2003 and 2004        
 As a consequence of lessons drawn from the EU‘s 2004 enlargement, the implications 
and consequences of post-compliance of the new members have caused vital shifts in the 
course of the further enlargement prospects.
883
 Consequently, the European Union preferred 
to follow a stricter and complicated procedure as new mechanisms introduced towards new 
candidate states.
884
 Thus, following 2005, Turkey - EU relations hit the lowest.
885
  
Particularly, following the election of Angela Merkel in Germany and Nicolas Sarkozy in 
France,
886
 relations prospects between Ankara and Brussels deteriorated completely. New 
chancellor of Germany stated that a next EU enlargement will be possible after strict 
fulfillment by candidates states all membership criteria and must be accepted by EU 
citizens.
887
 Besides, Her French colleague initiated the establishment of Union for 
Mediterranean, which was perceived in Europe as an alternative to Turkey‘s membership in 
the EU. 
 Many observers commenced to assume that, Justice and Development Party after 
2005 gave a lower priority to the European Union issues at foreign policy agenda and the 
reform process that hit its top has lost its momentum at this period while the debates over 
―axis shift‖ commenced to be voiced following similar developments.888 It may be suggested 
that ―The policy environment for the EU political conditionality has become less enthusiastic 
for further enlargement and more complicated over accession and its decision making 
process‖. Besides, ―The enlargement fatigue and the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, which is 
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to succeed the failed Constitutional Treaty, in Ireland referendum in June 2008 has made the 
policy environment in the EU much less-friendly‖.889 
 Parallel to that, Turkey‘s accession to the European Union constituted the most 
challenging case in this period in terms of further enlargement of the Union. Many 
problematic issues not excluding the Cyprus issue ―always threatens to ‗flare up‘ and 
religious and cultural concerns in the member states to the Turkish accession to the EU‖.890 In 
this sense, the borders of Europe continent, European identity of Turkey became a vivid 
debate, moreover Ankara was suggested a privileged partnership instead of a full 
membership. The further enlargement of the European Union due to institutional problems, 
retrograding economic situation in Euro zone along with the fears on Turkey‘s full 
membership found its reflection in Ireland when the majority of people voiced negative 
response towards the Lisbon treaty. In addition to that, upon the debates in this period 
asserting that Turkey and Europe are belong to different civilizations with so-called arising 
Islamization of Turkey under AKP rule.
891
 Furthermore, the continues discussions suggesting 
that Turkey and the West are entirely different the cultural and religious values are considered 
and the historical and religious identity problems between the EU and Turkey constitutes an 
obstacle in front of Turkey for its full EU membership. AKP regarding similar debates hold 
the point that the EU must accept Turkey‘s full membership to prove how pointless similar 
claims are.
892
 
In 2006, under the shadow of fierce debates, United Nations suggested the new 
resolution plan of Cyprus question and Turkey was asked to abolish embargo against Cyprus 
opening its ports to Nicosia. Although at the inter government conference the Science and 
Research chapter opened and closed contemporarily, in the 2006 Progress report, Turkey was 
asked to open ports and airspace toward Cyprus Republic but against to demand of Union as 
Ankara did not confirm, thus the European Union declared that the Eight chapter of accession 
negotiations will not open and were contemporarily closed.
893
 In 2007, the Industrial and 
Entrepreneurship Policy chapter provisionally opened and Turkey declared its adjustment 
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program with the European Union 2007 - 2013 on 17 April 2007 and the program was 
appraised by the EU for the close of rest of 33 chapters. In addition to that, the Trans 
European Network and Consumer and Health Protections as well opened in 2007. In 2008, the 
Company and Intellectual Property Law chapter along with Free Movement chapters were 
opened.
894
  
Among the 35 chapters of the EU laws and regulations, Turkey during Justice and 
Development Party government achieved to open 13 acquis communautaire (body of the EU 
laws and regulations).
895
 Due to Ankara‘s refusal to open its ports toward the EU member 
Cyprus, Brussels, suspended eight chapters. Aside from that, Cyprus put a hold on five 
additional chapters,
896
 while France as well put a hold on five chapters blocking full 
membership of Turkey. Apart from Cyprus issue, the European Union asks Turkey to make 
reforms in justice, freedom of speech as well as minority rights.
897
 In addition to that, the 
European Union put heavy pressure on Ankara to vitalize essential reforms as regard to 
realize constitutional changes restricting independent law, freedom of speech, rights of ethnic 
and religious minorities. Justice and Development Party, mostly was criticized after 2005 
period to slow down relations with the European Union,
898
 as a reaction in order to accelerate 
the European Union accession negotiations and to coordinate the process properly deploy 
Egemen Bağış as the chief negotiator in the course of negotiations. Aside from that, AKP 
amended Turkish constitution that prepared by junta regime at 12 September, 2010 which was 
highly welcomed by the European Union that opened civic monitoring on military which was 
praised but not found sufficient by Brussels.  
 
4. Balkans 
 
Owing to the fact that five percentage of Turkish territory situates at Balkan Peninsula,
899
 
since its establishment Republic of Turkey preferred to stress its Balkan and Mediterranean 
identity, henceforth Balkan Peninsula has been an important strategic, geopolitical and 
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cultural region for Turkey‘s foreign policy priorities.900 Ottoman Empire, being a Balkan 
state, initiated the relations with Balkan Peninsula in 14
th
 century and since the collapse of 
Empire, it became a power momentum in Balkans geography as ―500 years of Ottoman 
sovereignty have undoubtedly left significant imprints on the Balkans‖.901 The Ottoman 
system and inheritance that called as ―Pax Ottomanica‖902 in Balkans have bequeathed many 
deterministic influences in religious, ethnic,
903
 cultural life of the region the affects of which 
continue since present times.
904
  
Owning to the fact that many Balkan states -similar to Middle East- had their 
independence struggle against Ottoman Empire the image of Turkey and Turks in terms of 
politics, economics and religious issues negatively influenced relation prospects with Balkan 
nations.
905
 The emergence of the first national liberation movements among the Christian 
subjects
906
 was commenced against Ottomans, and it too had some impacts on this negative 
perspectives. Due to Ottoman heritage as well as ethno-religious minorities in Balkan 
Peninsula, Ankara has tight relations with Balkan states. Apart from that, another issue highly 
deterministic in terms of Turkish - Balkan relation is the Balkan origin population that dwells 
on Turkey who immigrated in the course of the Balkan Wars. The number of people hits 5-7 
million who have active contacts with their relatives residing in the region.
907
 As a natural 
consequence of Western connection of Turkey‘s foreign policy, Balkans is the opening door 
of Turkey to the West. Taking into the fact that, the Republic realizes half of its foreign trade 
activities with Western Europe, the stability and security of region is an essential issue for 
Turkey.
908
 During the Cold War, Turkey and most Balkan states situated in opposite poles, 
yet particularly after the collapse of Yugoslavia the mutual perspectives between Turkey and 
Balkans gained a positive acceleration.
909
 Ankara at the initial moments of crack downs 
emerging in Yugoslavia advocated policy initiatives supporting the territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia Federation, however after the United States of Americas along with many 
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European countries recognized Slovenia and Croatia, it shifted previous policy concept, 
regardless of national, ethnic or religious identity recognized all newly independent former 
Yugoslavian Balkan states. 
910
 
Because of the newly emerged international parameters arose after the Cold War, 
Turkey developed compatible foreign policy perspectives with its Western allies and took part 
in NATO interventions during Bosnia and Kosovo crisis,
911
 while tried to protect ―Muslim‖912 
and Turkish minority rights in the course of ethnic based conflicts.
913
 At the power vacuum 
arose, tough Turkey‘s foreign policy decision makers explored a heavy pressure in domestic 
scale particularly during the Bosnia War not to intervene situation, Ankara preferred to follow 
a cautious policy line parallel to its allies.
914
 Henceforth, Turkey actively participate to stop 
ethnic conflicts between the Balkan nations took part at Kosovo Force NATO led peace 
keeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina as regard to Dayton Peace Agreement.
915
 According 
to Ahmet Davutoğlu Balkan region constituted an indispensible part of Turkey‘s close land 
basin, therefore he appreciates Balkans as a region that has a strategic depth for Turkey‘s 
foreign policy.
916
 Besides, According to the Program of the 58
th
 Government,
917
 Justice and 
Development Party made the following commitments concerning foreign policy issues 
regarding relations with Balkan regions: ―Policy on Balkans to be developed and reshaped if 
necessary in the light of historical, cultural and economic relations. Developing economy 
based projects for decreasing tensions and sustaining peace in the region‖,918 and following 
―Leaving Cold War paradigms behind, making efforts to contribute to the link of Caucasia 
with Middle East and Balkans in economic terms‖.919 Therefore, relations with Balkan region 
states continued to be a top-level agenda for Justice and Development Party foreign policy 
decision makers as it used to be previous Turkish governments. After coming into power, 
AKP continued Turkey‘s traditional policies toward Balkan Peninsula, while as regard to 
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active diplomacy approach endeavored to develop economic and political connection between 
Balkan states in order to prevent future conflicts as it was referred in the government 
programs.
920
  
Turkey‘s foreign policy under AKP rule preserved traditional Turkish position toward 
the Balkan region proposing maximum international cooperation to protect regional stability 
of the Region.
921
 Parallel to that, AK Party also advocated region states accession to the 
European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership. What is more, to 
achieve an economic balance among the Balkan states to access a long-term regional stability, 
JDP governments also supported initiatives like ―Southeast European Cooperation Process‖ 
922
 in the region. To highlight importance of similar initiatives for the peace perspectives of 
the region, it is indicated in the official website of Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry. It reads 
as, ―South East European Cooperation Process is a symbol of common will of countries of the 
region to improve among them and to bring lasting stability in South East Europe‖.923 Within 
the government period of Justice and Development Party, bilateral visits at all levels not 
excluding politics, business people, NGOs‘ remarkably increased.924 In addition to that, high 
level visit including Turkish President, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister took 
place in this period along with participation of crowded business delegations to gain a 
momentum economic development of reciprocal relations.
925
  
In terms of international politics, Ankara in this period initiated tripartite consultation 
mechanisms with Serbia - Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia - Bosnia Herzegovina to 
contribute regional peace.
926
 Turkey, under the frame of tripartite consultation mechanism 
gathered Foreign Affair Ministers of Serbia - Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia several times, 
what is more in 24
th
 of April, 2010 it brought first time Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina 
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Presidents around the same table since the war declaring Istanbul declaration.
927
 Following 
that, similar tripartite consultation mechanism meetings at Foreign Affairs Ministry level took 
place en suite.  
 
4.1. Greece 
Relations with Greece commenced after Athens gained independence from Ottoman 
Empire in 1821.
928
 With the eruption of the First World War, Greece and Ottoman Empire 
took part at opposite sides though in the course of war there appeared almost no direct 
fights.
929
 At the end of the War, in accordance with the Sevres Treaty, Greece occupied some 
parts of Western Anatolia including Izmir.
930
 As a result of Turkish War of Independence 
commenced by Mustafa Kemal defeated Greek armies and pushed Athens to sign Lausanne 
treaty in Switzerland.
931
 In the signature period of Lausanne treaty, the theme of population 
exchange became a hot theme between parts containing social, political, juridical and 
economic aspects.
932
 As it was agreed between Athens and Ankara, half million Greek 
population residing in Turkey and vice versa was decided to change their residence with the 
exception of Greek residing in Istanbul and Turks in Thrace.
933
 The Ecumenical 
Patriarchate,
934
 the assets of Greek Orthodox minorities and religious freedom of Turkish 
Muslims in ―Western Thrace‖935 among the issues waiting resolution between the parts.936 
Moreover, ―Greek lobby in the United States of America‖937 and its anti Turkey activities and 
tension as regard to similar issue cause a multi - dimensional questions between N.A.TO, U.S. 
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Turkey and Greece.
938
         
 In spite of the fact that Greece and Turkey were situated in the same camps during the 
Cold War, mutual relations did not experience a radical change in this period.
939
 In 1955, due 
to false news spreading in Istanbul with claim that Greek terrorist burnt Mustafa Kemal‘s 
house in Salonika huge Turkish crowds lynched, arson and mob Greek minority ending with 
16 Greeks death at the consequence of which many Greeks left Istanbul while worsening the 
relations in international relations and social meaning.
940
 
Apart from all above-mentioned conflicts, Cyprus question since 1950s constituted the 
main problematic issue between Ankara and Athens.
941
 After Cyprus gain of independence, 
some Greek Cypriots nationalists claimed Cyprus to union with Greece and the idea was as 
well supported by some Greek politicians. After the collapse of federative state that built with 
consensus between Turks and Greeks residing in the Cyprus Island, relations worsened and 
clashes between the parts increased gradually. In 1974, members of junta advocating enosis
942
 
idea took the control in Greece and Turkey referring the guarantor right released a military 
operation to Cyprus Island.
943
 Thus, Turkish community of the Island gathered under an 
organized state with heavy mechanical Turkish troops in under the pretext protecting Turkish 
Cypriots, since then Cyprus issue occupied the top agenda between Greece and Turkey.
944
  
Another hot theme causing harsh disputes between the neighbors is Aegean Sea question.
945
 
The Aegean Islands controversial issues related to theme occupied a busy agenda  following 
this period, as the status of Aegean sea in terms of delimitation of air space and sea water, 
economic zones and continental shelf and status of Imia / Kardak island negatively affected 
Turkish - Greece relations.
946
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 In 1999, when the head of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan detained 
by Turkish Special Forces in Kenya, with Cyprus passport mutual relations one more time 
experienced tough times.
947
 Greece was continuously blamed by Turkish authorities to 
support separatist Kurdistan Workers Party militants‘ activities and Kenya case constituted an 
abstract proof for the similar accusations. As a reaction to the case, Foreign Affairs, Interior 
Minister and Public Order Ministers of Greece government resigned due to charge to attempt 
hide and seek asylum of terrorist leader in Greek diplomatic missions in Nairobi.
948
 The 
highly tensed mutual relations between Athens and Ankara experienced a détente period in 
1999 due to earthquake hit western Turkey with heavy causalities.
949
 The support provided 
through Greece in very hot moments of earthquake caused a close rapprochement, which was 
then called ―Disaster diplomacy‖950 as a date stressing the initial of good relations that even 
reached to a level as Greece dropped its opposition against Turkey‘s EU candidacy.951   
  Justice and Development Party, under the frames of its new rhetoric of foreign policy 
understating, aimed to bring an end to long-lasting disputes
952
 as well as to reach minimum 
problem and maximum cooperation with Turkish neighborhood put a special emphasis to the 
relations with Greece and Cyprus. Erdoğan during his historic balcony speech at the night of 
2002 elections as the leader of wining party gave the future signals of his party‘s future 
European Union political orientation declaring his support on Kofi Annan plan and readiness 
of his party to talk with Greece in order to find a mutual solution at Cyprus question.
953
 Yet, 
Athens approached toward AKP‘s landslide victory cautiously due to Justice and 
Development Party‘s Islamist roots. Former Foreign Minister Papandreou stated, ―Greece 
sees the new Turkish government, with its Islamist roots, as a possible prototype for 
emulation in the wider Islamic world‖.954 
AK Party, shortly after coming to power, in order to practice its rhetoric, related to 
relations with the European Union started an active agenda concreting it with Greece and 
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Cyprus.
955
 Thus, two weeks after the general elections, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid his first 
visit in 2002 -although it was an unofficial visit due to his political ban- to Greece as the 
leader of ruling party in Turkey.
956
 During his visit, Erdoğan as the head of Justice and 
Development Party met with former Greek Prime Minister Kostas Smitis.
957
 During the press 
conference held after the meeting between leaders, Greek Prime Minister stressed the 
necessity of continuation of good relations following a positive line in recent years. Kostas 
Smitis declared his pleasure related to the activities of common commission studying on 
Aegean question, while underlined the presence of dissidence between parts related to the 
Aegean issue. He also mentioned the Cyprus question as a theme continuously affecting 
Turkish - Greece relations and necessity of resolving problem in accordance with 
international law. In addition to that, Greek Prime Minister underlined Greece support for 
Turkey during the European Union process on condition that solving continental problem 
with Turkey and implementation of Copenhagen criteria trough Turkey. As for Erdoğan, he 
declared his gratitude to be invited and asked Greek part to be a strategic part leaving historic 
problems away.  
One additional important feature of the meeting was the wish of putting a way of 
Cyprus question in the course of Turkey‘s accession to negotiations with the European Union 
and full membership period, however in spite of public rhetoric Cyprus issue constituted the 
main agenda during the EU talks between Athens and Ankara. On his row, Erdoğan explained 
his party‘s program related to Greek community residing in Turkey, easing the activities of 
religious foundations, providing religious minorities to acquiring property, and promised 
more freedom for Greek minority in Turkey.
958
 The meeting was highly important in order to 
indicate Justice and Development Party‘s intention of accelerating relations with the 
European Union and Greek parts positive attitude supporting the reconciliation process with 
Turkey.
959
 Another point reflecting improvement in relations between the parties at this 
period is the unsuccessful attempt to co-host EURO 2008 which was won by Austria and 
Switzerland.   
In 2003, former Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Gül paid an official visit to Athens 
under the frame of which both parties discussed the details of previous meeting that took 
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place in 2002.
960
 Apart from that, the hot themes like ―Greco - Turkish relations, Turkey - EU 
rapprochement, the Cyprus issue, and the problem of violations of Greek national airspace by 
Turkish Air Forces jets‖ came to agenda.961 Under the frame of Turkish FM‘s visit, Turkish 
Finance Minister, the governor of Turkey's Central Bank, and the Presidents of the Greek and 
Turkish Chambers of Commerce met with Greek Foreign Affairs Minister, National Economy 
and Finance Minister, Central Bank governor to review economic situation in both countries 
and to discuss new ways for growth and cooperation on both sides of the Aegean‖.962 
Next high-level visit took place between Turkey and Greece when Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan paid his official visit as the Prime Minister of Turkey on 6-8 May 2004 due to 
invitation from his counterpart Karamanis. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the first Turkish 
Prime Minister for 16 years to visit Greece. Thus, though symbolically, it was a crucial 
meeting at least so as to indicate new JDP government‘s intent to reach a consensus at 
problems with Greece and Cyprus on Turkey‘s way to the European Union, plus before 
upcoming Cyprus referendum where sites would vote the future of the Island. At Prime 
Minister‘s visit, he met with Greek Prime Minister and both Prime Minister talked about the 
future of Greece - Turkish dialogue process aiming the solution of many historic questions 
between the parts, along with Balkan issue, Cyprus, and Turkey‘s EU candidate. At the 
second part of his visit, Turkish Prime Minister moved to Western Thrace coming together 
Turkish local authorities residing at the region.
963
 
High-level contacts in the course of the following years continued regularly between 
the neighbors. As mutual visits in different occasions took place between the parts, for 
instance former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan paid an official visit in 2007 to 
Greece where latest issues came to agenda between the parts. Under the frames of the visit, 
Turkish FM Babacan also visited Komini where Turkish Muslim minority resides in Greece, 
that recently became a tradition in official visit on contrary to past.
964
 In addition to political 
relations catching a positive acceleration in this period, Turkish - Greek - Italian Gas Pipeline 
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Project (ITGI), which was started in 2005, was completed in 19
th
 of November 2007 thanks to 
intergovernmental agreement among Turkey, Greece and Italy.
965
 The project that is known as 
The Southern Europe Gas Ring Project ―transport natural gas supplied from sources located in 
the Caspian Basin, Russian Federation, the Middle East, Southern Mediterranean countries, 
and other international sources through Turkey and Greece within scope of the European 
Union‖.966 The 178 km pipeline project was highly crucial as it was planned in future terms to 
bring more quantity of natural resource to the European Union. The construction of $300 
million pipeline project also deeply contributed to solidify ―improved ties between Greece 
and Turkey, linking the longtime Aegean rivals through a project that will give Caspian gas 
its first direct Western outlet and help ease Russia‘s energy dominance as oil and gas prices 
soar‖.967 The inauguration ceremony of Karacabey - Komtini natural gas hosted all high-level 
representatives like Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers along with Azerbaijan President 
Ilham Aliyev and Ministers responsible for energy issues.
968
  
Another unexpected development was evidenced between old rivals in terms of 
finance sector as ―in 2006, the National Bank of Greece purchased Turkey‘s fifth-largest bank 
for $2 billion‖,969 as a signal indicating future affiliations in terms of politics,970 on the other 
hand AKP government exposed critics through nationalist wing to sell Turkey‘s strategic 
institutions to enemies. In 2008, Kostas Karamanlis became the first Prime Minister in 49 
years to visit Turkey. Greece and Turkish Prime Minister met tête-à-tête during a meeting 
initially planned to last 30 minutes but endured 95 minutes and between the delegations 
discussing economic, trade and cultural issues along with the status of Aegean Sea, Cyprus, 
Greek minorities and Turkey‘s European Union process.971 During the press conference, 
Turkish Prime Minister underlined the importance of historic visit expressing his gratitude 
and referred to Atatürk - Venizelos talks that regulated the historical background of Turkish - 
Greece relations after the First World War. Erdoğan, touching to the historic antagonism 
between the states stressed his good will converting the Aegean Sea to a peace sea hinting his 
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government‘s intention to seek good relations with Greece. He also added that during their 
government period Turkish and Greek parts met 38 times in order to solve continental shelf 
problem present in Aegean Sea.
972
  
The Heybeliada Theological School was closed by Turkey due to unification of 
education law put into effect at early period of the Republic. The school run by Greek 
minorities provided their religious functionaries along with the ecumenism question related to 
status of Greek Patriarch and Greek Orthodox Church, which used to be a controversial issue 
between Turkish and Greece since Lausanne. This along with other issues related with Greek 
minorities came to agenda during the meeting and at the press conference of Prime Ministers. 
Responding the question of press members upon above mentioned issues Erdoğan evaluated 
the ecumenism question as a problem related to Christian world, while underlined the 
existence of a  general consensus in terms of Christian minorities and Patriarchate issue 
without touching details calling them as technical issues. In the course of his speech, Turkish 
PM stressed the acceleration of positive relations with Greece during his government, while 
thanked Greek Prime Minister for their support for Turkey during the accession of 
negotiations for full membership to the European Union. To a respond of a question, Turkish 
PM declared his government‘s expectations on Cyprus after the form of government in order 
to continue peace talks between the parts.
973
   
Another unorthodox development of the meeting was Greek Prime Minister‘s historic 
visit to memorial tomb of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who is accepted as the main leader of 
Greek defeat in Anatolia, which called in Greek tradition as Small Asia Catastrophe referring 
to Greco - Turkish war after the First World War and turned a taboo between Greek - Turkish 
relations.
974
. In 2009, after the general elections, newly elected Prime Minister Jeorios 
Andreas Papandreu paid his first abroad visit to Istanbul in order to attend South East 
European Cooperation Meeting and following that incumbent Foreign Affairs Minister of 
Greece Dimitris Droutsas paid an official visit meeting to his counterpart Davutoğlu in order 
to talk various actual themes between Turkey and Greece. 
Thanks to acceleration process between the parts since 1999, the gradual 
rapprochement process turned to partnership. Thus, Ankara and Athens in order to coordinate 
mutual relations more fruitfully created a High Level Cooperation Council under the guidance 
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and observation by Prime Ministers and Foreign Affairs Ministers of the states.
975
 The aim of 
the HLCC model was to gather Greek and Turkish ministers together in yearly meetings once 
a year alternatively in Turkey and Greece in order to talk on the highest level under the 
frames of an institutional council.
976
 During Turkish Prime Minister‘s visit to Athens which 
took place in 14-15 May 2010, the first meeting of High Level Cooperation Council took 
place between the parts where the various documents agreed and signed including many hot 
topics lately became a theme of discussion between neighbors.
977
 Another important feature 
of the Turkish Prime Minister‘s visit was the delegation accompanying him during his visit, 
which was constituted of 10 minister and 300 business as the visit coincided to a period when 
Greece was struggling with the heaviest economic crisis of its history.
978
   
 Shortly after the official meeting that took place in May, Prime Minister Erdoğan one 
more time settled to Greek capital on 21
st
 of October 2010 in order to attend ―Mediterranean 
Climate Change Initiative‖ conference.979 Before his scheduled visit to Athens, Turkish Prime 
Minister evaluated Turkey - Greek relations under the frames of current issues on a Greece 
Skai TV. Replying a question on Turkey‘s gas and oil exploration in Mediterranean, which 
has been interpreted in Greek side as a provocative action, PM Erdoğan said that on the 
contrary to be provocative it might be a joint project between Greece and Turkey, which may 
develop relations.
980
 Turkish Prime Minister touched the military fights issue as a theme 
tensing the relations in spite of developing relations between parts, underlying that because of 
recovering relations the jet flights of Turkey and Greece decreased, nevertheless he notified 
that he wishes to both sites end the flights under NATO observation.
981
 The 12 miles problem 
related to continental shelf question Erdoğan stressed that due to dialogue undertaken between 
the parts reconciliation is close and underlined the necessity of mutual understanding and 
leaving part previous problematic issues.
982
 Ultimately, Turkey under the rule of AKP Ankara 
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revised its defense philosophy parallel to zero problem principle with Turkish neighborhood 
in National Defense Document and exclused Greece as an external threat, furthermore Ankara 
redefined Greece as a cooperative partner played a crucial role in mutual relations.
983
 Still, 
Greece continued to define Turkey as the biggest threat directed from East against its 
sovereignty.
984
  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Republic of Turkey‘s foreign relation prospects with the West constitutes an irrevocable part 
of its external policy concept. The Western connection of Turkey‘s foreign policy continued 
to be the highest agenda of Justice and Development Party governments in 2002 – 2011 
periods as well. As similar to all other previous Turkish governments, relations with the 
United States of America and the European Union constituted the spine of Turkey‘s foreign 
policy agenda at this period. Aside from the mutual relations with Washington and the EU 
capitals, relations with Turkish neighborhood, as well as regional and global issues as regard 
to foreign policy determined parallel to USA - EU interests, thus during foreign policy 
decision making processes, Washington and Brussels views taken into consideration as many 
issues counseled reciprocally. 
Due to the occupation of Iraq, Turkey - USA relations experienced the toughest 
challenge of its history and both countries lived a conflict of interests particularly due to 
Ankara‘s security perceptions and anxieties on destiny of Northern Iraq. Aftermath harsh 
critics and hood event that brought reciprocal relations to a deadlock soon healed as USA - 
Turkey relations turned to its traditional line where states signed agreements against 
terrorism. The election of Barack Obama as the 44
th
 President of the United States of America 
helped healing of Turkey - U.S. relation to gain a more positive direction, as Obama paid an 
important visit to Turkey shortly after his election to office. On contrary to pessimistic 
expectations and hard endeavors of Armenian lobby, President Obama did not mentioned so-
called Armenian genocide during his speeches though Armenian issue constituted an obstacle 
for reciprocal relations at this period. 
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As for relations with the European Union, Cyprus and Greece, particularly shortly 
after AKP‘s coming to power, the party prioritized Turkey‘s EU agenda and continued radical 
reforms that initialized previously. Under the Justice and Development Party government, 
Turkey obtained a candidate status with harsh expressions like ‗it may continue forever‘. 
Turkey, under AK Party rule portrayed its good will in the resolution of Cyprus question. In 
addition to that, historical Turkish - Greek antagonism experienced some healing at this 
period though Cyprus question acted as an obstacle in both Turkey - Greece and Turkey - EU 
relations. Due to internal problems and emerging economic crisis in the EU zone, Turkey‘s 
full membership became a domestic theme particularly in France and Germany under the 
Sarkozy and Merkel Presidency on contrary to positive acceleration experienced in Shröder - 
Chriac Presidency. What is more, the negative result of Lisbon Treaty as an obstacle for the 
future of the Union and Turkey‘s controversial position in the issue highly agitated the 
situation. Additionally, Turkey‘s disappointment in Cyprus issue and close affiliation with its 
Eastern periphery pushed away relations with the EU with a bare slow down in the EU 
reforms. Yet, Turkey‘s full EU membership continued to be the top level agenda of Turkey‘s 
foreign policy decision makers under the AKP rule in 2002-2011 periods. In brief, as a 
continuation of its Westernization principle, Turkey‘s foreign policy in AKP rule kept its 
fundamental character regarding the relations with the West. Regardless of the fact that, 
Turkey experienced some road accidents with USA; or especially following the second term 
of AKP in the office, Turkey - EU relations undertook a recession it may not be interpreted as 
an axis shift. Moreover, in the course of reciprocal relations Turkey‘s foreign policy makers 
in different occasions confronted similar challenges still similar incidents did not influence 
Turkey‘s Western oriented foreign policy concept.    
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Chapter V 
The Northern Direction 
 
The chapter analyzes Turkey‘s connection with its Northern direction during Justice and 
Development Party‘s government tenure between 2002 and 2011. The main objective of the 
chapter is to examine bilateral relations between Turkey and its northern neighbors. The 
scopes under the frame of this chapter are Turkey‘s relation with Russian Federation, 
Southern Caucasus as well as the newly independent Republics in Central Asian in terms of 
political, economical, military and diplomatic sectors. The contents are studied 
chronologically in order to figure out foreign policy practice of Turkey during Justice and 
Development Party‘s regime.  
The chapter seeks answers whether Turkey‘s foreign policy in the course of Justice 
and Development Party government periods experienced an unorthodox affiliation with 
Russia, South Caucasus and Central Asian States that might be interpreted as an alternative 
model for Turkey‘s Western alliance or Justice and Development Party continued the 
traditional Turkish foreign policy orientation toward regional countries. The first section of 
the chapter analyzes Turkey - Russia relations, while the second section analyzes Turkey‘s 
relations with Southern Caucasus states. The third section of the chapter analyzes Turkey‘s 
relations with Central Asian Republics in Justice and Development Party‘s tenure. As for the 
final section it dwells on conclusions of the chapter. 
 
1. Russian Federation 
 
According to mainstream foreign policy analysts like Oral Sander
985
 and Faik 
Armağanoğlu,986 Turkey - Russia (in terms of Russian Empire, Soviet Union as well as 
Russian Federation) relations bear a contradictory nature that is based on mutual rivalry. Due 
to the lack of trust between the countries from security and military perspectives along with 
the legacies of the past, the nature of mutual relations have many disagreements that are hard 
to recover. Historical background of the mutual relations between Turks and Russians carry 
many evidences proving similar arguments. Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire many times 
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encountered each other due to the struggle to hold power in Balkans, Caucasus, Black Sea 
region, and Crimea since 16
th
 century.
987
 In spite of the fact that the bilateral relations had 
indicated a positive development after the First World War,
988
 the end of the Second World 
War, and the emerge of the Cold War caused both countries to face one another again.
989
 
Russia‘s continuous imperialist desires and territorial demands at the Eastern part of Turkey 
as well as historical aim to capture Turkish Straits always agitated Turkey's foreign policy 
decision makers that caused a security threat perception and feeling of danger from the north 
of Turkey.
990
 Thus, Republic of Turkey to convert this very negative situation searched 
alternative alliances or blocks against Russian threat. Russian Federation perceived Turkey as 
an agent or tool of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and West that locates aside.
991
 
Nonetheless, according to Suat Bilge the establishment of good will relations between 
Ankara and Moscow would be beneficial for the national interest of Ankara.
992
 Particularly, 
after the collapse of Soviet Union, though the nature of mutual relations did not radically 
change, cooperation prospects in terms of energy, tourism, trade and commerce issues 
positively influenced the Russian - Turkish relations. Although, Russian Federation continued 
to be the biggest opponent of Turkey in Central Asia, Caucasus, Black Sea and Balkans the 
conflictual nature of relations diverted; thanks to collaborations in terms of energy, economics 
and commerce issues. 
The diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia (their predecessor states) date 
back to 15
th
 century.
993
 Between Ottoman and Russian Empires, there were both peaceful 
times, collaborations as well historic wars.
994
 Turkish - Russian Wars accelerated the collapse 
process of Ottoman Empire,
995
 while it also negatively influenced Russian Empire. The core 
point of Russian - Ottoman relations was Russia‘s endeavors to reach warm waters and 
control Turkish straits in order to be a global empire as Ottomans resisted to Russia using 
                                                 
987
 Dmitri Trenin, ―Russia and Turkey: A Cure from Schizophrenia‖, Perceptions, Vol. II (2), June - 
August 1997, p. 60. 
988
 Vitali Alexandrov, ―Soviet - Turkish Cooperation‖, International Affairs (Moscow), No. 12, 
December 1986, p. 33. 
989
 Alvin Z Rubeinstein, Oles M Smolansky, Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, 
Turkey and Iran, M.E.S. Sharpe Inc, New York 1995, p. 5. 
990
 Vadim Markushin, ―Russia - Turkey: Doomed to Eternal Neighbourhood‖, Perceptions, Vol. II (1), 
March - May 1997, p. 95. 
991
 Kamuran Gürün, Türk - Rus  İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1491-1992, (500 Years in Russo - Turkish 
Relations, 1491-1992), TTK Yayınları, Ankara 1999, p.117. 
992
 Suat Bilge, Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye - Sovyetler Birliği Ilişkileri 1920 - 1964 (Hard Neighbourhood: 
Turkish - Soviet Union Relations 1920 - 1964), Ofset Repromat, Ankara 1991, p. 355. 
993
 D. Quataret, op. cit., p. 84. 
994
 Virginia H Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700 - 1870: An Empire Besieged, Pearson, Harlow 2007, p. 5. 
995
 Alexander Lebedev, ―Russia and Turkey at 21st Century:  What is behind Us and What is ahead?‖, 
Insight Turkey, April - June 2002, Vol. IV, No. 2, p.5. 
 188 
different alliance and taking advantage of power balance system of the international 
environment in order to keep its territorial integrity.
996
 In addition to that, both Empires many 
times confronted in order to establish dominance in Balkans, Caucasus and Crimea.
997
  
While Russia was emerging as an empire and experiencing a radical reform period 
adopting European technologies in order to expand Russian empire under the rule of Peter the 
Great,
998
 Ottoman foreign policy decision makers did underestimate the Russian 
expansionism and were deadly mistaken not to consider Russia as a threat against the 
Empire.
999
 During the reign of Catharine II, it was barely understood that Ottoman Empire 
was not superior to Russia but Ottomans were the great enemy of Russian empire.
1000
 Russian 
expansion continued on expanse of Ottoman at this period while at 1774,
1001
 because of 
Küçük Kaynarca agreement Ottoman Empire lost Crimea, which opened gates of Black Sea to 
Russian Empire.
1002
 In the nineteenth century, in spite of the hostilities between Ottoman and 
Russian Empires in some periods both sites realized alliances against third states that 
endangered their interests. During Ottoman Empires‘ adoption of constitutional system, it 
applied for the alliance of England and other European forces in order to take an 
advantageous position against Russia. Towards the end of 19
th
 century, Ottomans and Russian 
fought over Balkans that resulted in absolute Ottoman defeat and opened independence gate 
for many Balkan states.  
20
th
 century weakened both Russian and Ottoman Empires, therefore both empires 
collapsed as a consequence of the First World War. Relations between old enemies 
experienced a very positive trend in post First World War period. Moscow appreciated 
Turkish Independence War as a struggle against Western imperialism and aimed to impose 
Communist ideology on Turkey to evade it from entering to Western block.
1003
 Parallel to this 
approach, USSR became the first great power recognizing Ankara government, and supported 
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the Turkish Independence War financially.
1004
 Ankara government under the administration 
of Mustafa Kemal favored material and logistic support from Soviet Union, thus both 
countries signed ―Soviet - Turkish Friendship Agreement‖.1005  
Booming relations between Soviet Russia and Turkey faded after the Second World 
War.
1006
 On the eve of the Cold War, Soviet Union‘s demand on Turkish straits and Stalin‘s 
reservations on Moscow agreement cooled the relations; as a result, Ankara and Moscow one 
more time were situated in different fronts.
1007
 After the end of the Cold War, Turkish - 
Russian relations experienced a positive change. Ankara recognized Russian Federation as the 
successor of USSR and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister visited Moscow in 1992; Russian 
Foreign Affairs Minister visited Turkey the same year.
1008
 From the initial level of mutual 
relations, the terrorism issue
1009
 (The Chechen war in Russia and Kurdish separatists in 
Turkey) occupied the political agenda of both countries in the course of high-level meetings 
of official representatives.
1010
 Besides, the peripheries of both countries like Caucasus, 
Balkans and Central Asia issues in some cases intensified mutual relations at post Cold War 
Period;
1011
 Moscow was afraid of Islamist and Pan-Turanist policies of Turkey,
1012
 as Ankara 
searched economic and cultural influence at these  regions referring its religious and ethnic 
relations.. Under the frame of Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel‘s official visit to 
Moscow, Turkey and Russia signed a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement at 25 May 
1992.
1013
 The signed treaty between the countries proposed the future mutual relation 
prospective based on respect to sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of states.  
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As a respond to Turkish PM‘s visit, Russian Prime Minister visited Ankara in 1997 as 
Turkish Bülent Ecevit paid a visit back to Russian capital. In 2001, Turkey and Russia signed 
understanding of ―Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia‖. 1014 The aim of the 
agreement was to shape mutual relations in accordance with the demands of multi-polar 
international relations system, respect for territorial integrity and noninterference in internal 
affairs. Within the framework of the Joint Action Plan, the principles like intention of 
development economic dialogue, creating solutions toward regional problems too were well 
stressed.
1015
 The economic relations between these countries became the driving force of 
multi dimensional relations. After the collapse of Soviet Union, in order to augment regional 
cooperation, Turkey initialized Black sea Economic Cooperation and along with most other 
post-Soviet region states, Russian Federation as well signed the declaration of Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation.
1016
  
 Turkey‘s revision of its strait regime toward Russia also highly contributed a lot to the 
development of close relations within this period. The shuttle trade between Russia and 
Turkey, tourism, Turkish companies‘ activities in building sector in Russia constituted the 
core of economic relations between Moscow and Ankara. Within 2000, mutual relation was 
enriched with energy aspect because of signed Blue Stream Pipeline Project. Turkey fulfilled 
its natural resources demand via Russia, and it turned out to be a strategic energy transit for 
transfer of Russian gas to Europe. By 2010, the trade volume between Turkey and Russia 
exceed 25 billion United States Dollars, hence Russian Federation became the second largest 
trade partner of Turkey after Germany.
1017
 
After Justice and Development Party took power after the 2002 general elections, first 
time high-level visit between Ankara and Moscow took place when former Turkish Foreign 
Affair‘s Minister Abdullah Gül paid an official visit to Russian Federation between 23 and 26 
February 2004.
1018
 The visit was very important, as it was the first official visit since 1996 
between Russia and Turkey at the level of Foreign Affairs Ministry. Under the frames of 
official visit, Turkey and Russian Federation undertook consultations on the issues like 
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economical cooperation, security issues, terrorism, along with regional problems.
1019
 The 
economic and commerce based aspects of the visit was highly remarkable as the business 
people of both sites met in Russian - Turkish Business Council aiming to develop commercial 
relations between the countries.
1020
 In addition to that, both parties signed 2004 - 2005 
Consultation Programs in order to advance future consultation prospects between parties
1021
. 
Former Turkish FM Abdullah Gül met with his counterpart Igor Ivanov and former Russian 
President Vlademir Putin, and invited President Putin to Turkey on the name of Turkish 
President Sezer. During the visit, Visa issue between the countries came to agenda as Moscow 
restricted visa requirements for Turkish nationals under the pretext of Chechen war.
1022
 
Ankara‘s refusal of 1 March bill under the Justice and Development Party government 
rule highly contributed advancement of bilateral relations at this period,
1023
 hence it gave birth 
to a mutual trust atmosphere between partners. Furthermore, Turkey‘s open critical attitude 
toward Iraqi occupation was also appreciated by Moscow, while Russian policy makers 
changed their outlook toward Turkey as a neighbor applying more independent foreign 
policies from West in comparison to past. The affiliation between Moscow and Ankara in 
terms of politics gave it fruitful results in economical and energy fields. Therefore, Russian 
Gasprom and Turkish state owned petroleum company Botaş met in order to discuss latest 
disagreements present between the states, at the end of meeting, both parties officially 
declared that they agreed on price and export amounts. Besides, it was also announced that 
the tax issues too were resolved during the meeting.
1024
 
Shortly after Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister‘s visit, Russian Federation President 
Vladimir Putin paid an official visit to Turkey between 5 and 6 December 2004.
1025
 The fact 
that, apart from Russian President, Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov, Defense Minister, 
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Chief of General Staff, President of Tatarstan and high-level officials form Gasprom 
attendance to the program indicated the importance of visit in terms of economic, commerce, 
and energy based issues.
1026
 In fact, it was a postponed visit as Russian leaders were 
scheduled to visit Turkey in August, however due to terror acts in Northern Ossetia; Vladimir 
Putin had to postpone all his abroad journeys.
1027
 President Putin‘s historic visit to Ankara 
was highly significant, as he was the first Russian President to visit Turkey since the initiation 
of Russian - Turkish diplomatic relations. During the visit, Vladimir Putin met with Turkish 
former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and Turkish Foreign 
Affairs Minister in Ankara. After the meetings, Erdoğan and Putin moved to Izmir in order to 
attend Izmir International Fair and both leader met with Turkish - Russian businessmen. 
During the visit, Russian and Turkish Presidents signed a ―Joint Declaration of 
Multidimensional Partnership and Friendship Intensification‖ at the press conference after 
which both Presidents expressed their satisfaction over the agreement and present level of 
relations between the countries.
1028
       
Yet, the signed declaration was not the sole document agreed between the parts during 
the historical visit of Russian President, both parties agreed to sign military deals, educational 
cooperation and energy issues. The improvement between Moscow and Ankara was notable 
for conceptualization of the present level of mutual relations in comparison to past that used 
to engage terror, security and rivalry on Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. After the 
Russian Presidents historical visit to Turkey, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
visited Russian Federation officially on 10 - 12 January 2005, to attend the inauguration 
ceremony of Turkish Trade Center in Russian capital.
1029
 Apart from Turkish PM, a crowded 
delegation consisting of business people, politicians and bureaucrats participated in 
delegation, which barely indicated the commercial aspect of the visit. In spite of the fact that, 
the main goal of Turkish PM‘s visit was to increase commercial relations with Turkey‘s 
Northern neighbor, Russia and Turkey discussed energy issues. At the press conference held 
after the inauguration ceremony, where both chief of states took the center stage, Vladimir 
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Putin announced Russian Federation‘s support for the Annan Plan in Cyprus issue,1030 the 
result of which caused a relative acceleration between mutual relations of Russian and Turkey 
in terms of regional and international relations. 
 Apart from the Cyprus issue, the Turkish - Armenian relations was also discussed 
during the meetings of commissions. Russian President one more time digressing traditional 
Russian foreign policy stated that Russia would support the normalization process between 
Turkey and Armenia. He continued his words as ―we know that, there are heavy historical 
problems between both countries, we are aware of Turkey‘s attitude and we also know that 
Armenia is look for solution, thus Russia is ready to play a peacemaker‘s role and undertake 
guarantor task in the relations‖.1031 On respond to Putin‘s explanations, Erdoğan reminded 
Turkish efforts for the resolution of conflict stressing the zero problem principle of Turkey 
during Justice and Development Party government.
1032
 
The opening ceremony of Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipeline brought high rank 
officials of both countries on 17 November 2005. Thanks to complication of Blue Stream 
Pipeline, Republic of Turkey became the second largest gas partner of Russian Federation 
after Germany.
1033
 In spite of the critics that Turkey became highly dependent to Russia in 
terms of energy the pipeline project, contribute to Russian - Turkish relations in many other 
spheres. On 25 June 2005, in order to attend 15
th
 anniversary summit of Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation, President Putin and an official delegation came to Turkey. Russia and Turkey, 
during the meetings under the frame of Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Balkan Energy 
summit, signed agreements related to energy themes related to issues between Turkey and 
Russia. Besides, the members of Black Sea Cooperation made decision to adopt summit a 
strong mechanism in international arena.
1034
 Henceforth ―from a bilateral political 
perspective, 2005 was an annus mirabilis as President Putin and Prime Minister Erdogan met 
four times, including a seven-hour private meeting on the Black Sea. Putin‘s visit in 
December 2004 marked a monumental event in itself as he was the first Russian head of state 
to visit Turkey in 32 years‖.1035 
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Mutual relations continued at a stable line in the course of years. In 2008, former 
Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Babacan visited Moscow in order to discuss political 
and economic issues. Along with bilateral issues, at this meeting Russia and Turkey initiated 
multidimensional cooperation prospects both in regional and global affairs. Under the frames 
of talks on energy issues, Turkish FM underlined the importance of energy cooperation 
between Russia and Turkey; while he stated that Turkey‘s quest for alternative energy does 
not bear rivalry character. In this period, the ties between Moscow and Ankara gained a 
multidimensional character in terms of culture as the events held in 2007 when the ―Year of 
Russian Culture‖ was celebrated in Turkey and in 2008 ―Year of Turkish Culture‖ was 
celebrated in Russia.
1036
 In the July of 2008, Russian FM Sergei Lavrov visited Ankara to 
discuss latest developments between the neighbors.
1037
 Under the frame of his visit the themes 
like ―wide spectrum of the Russian-Turkish cooperation, regional and international issues 
including Iraqi and Middle East settlement, the situation around the Iranian nuclear issue, the 
situation in Kosovo, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, the state of affairs in Cyprus 
settlement, interaction in the Black SeaEconomic Cooperation (BSEC) and Operation Black 
Sea Harmony‖1038 were discussed between the parts. On contrary to all similar constructive 
developments between Moscow and Ankara, Turkey‘s relations with Russia experienced a 
serious fluctuation because of erupted war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. Igor 
Torbakov‘s statement regarding the negative implications of the war is as follows: 
 
         The war put the Turkish-Russian relationship under additional strain. It also revealed a number of 
key factors and trends that are likely to affect the interaction between   Russia and Turkey in the 
short to medium term. Among these trends are Moscow‘s growing assertiveness in what it chooses 
to call the areas of ―privileged interests,‖ including in the region where Russia‘s and Turkey‘s 
strategic neighborhoods effectively overlap; the vulnerability of Turkey‘s geopolitical position 
following the collapse of the Caucasus status quo; Moscow‘s increased leverage with Ankara due 
to Russia‘s hefty surplus in bilateral trade; and Turkey‘s growing energy dependence on 
Russia.
1039
 
 
Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan flew to Moscow so as to assess latest actualities that arose 
after the war. Prime Minister Erdoğan and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister came together 
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with Russian President Dmitri Medvediev in a meeting closed to press.
1040
 After the Moscow 
visit, Turkish Prime Minister went to Tbilisi to evaluate situation in Northern Caucasus with 
Georgian President Michail Saakashvili.
1041
 As it has been urged by Nona Mikhelidze, ―The 
Georgia - Russia crisis placed Turkey in a difficult position, not only between neighboring 
partner-countries but also in the wider confrontation between the US and Russia‖.1042 She 
described sensitive structure of Russo - Turkish relations under the latest war as below: 
 
         Ankara stayed out of the conflict, neither defending its regional partner Georgia nor making 
official statements on the matter. Erdogan admitted that it would not be right for Turkey to be 
pushed towards any side. Certain circles want to push Turkey into a corner either with the United 
States or Russia after the Georgian incident. One of the sides is our closest ally, the United States. 
The other side is Russia, with which we have an important trade volume. We would act in line 
with what Turkey‘s national interests require.1043 Despite Turkey‘s participation in BTC, two-
thirds of its gas comes from Russia. Hence, Ankara‘s careful juggling between Moscow and the 
US and its Caucasian partners.
1044
 
 
In the aftermath of Russia - Georgia War, Ankara under the rule of AKP declared its intention 
of launching a conflict resolution initiative in South Caucasus called as Caucasus Stability 
and Cooperation Platform (CSCP).
1045
 Turkey barely indicated the necessity that Russian 
Federation as well should attend to the future planned Platform. Another high-level visit 
between Ankara and Moscow was held in June 2009, as newly assigned Turkish Foreign 
Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu paid an official visit to Russian Federation.1046 At the press 
conference held after the meeting of delegations Turkish FM declared due to a question 
related to current situation of relations between Russia and Turkey as follows: 
 
         We do not recognize any obstacle to cooperation between Turkey and Russia does 
not recognize any border. Various projects related to energy alternatives, including 
the handling of each issue in a spirit of full cooperation and are determined to 
continue. Therefore, the southern corridor and all the other alternatives very clearly 
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with the Russian side of the interview and any co-operation in making available a 
common understanding.
1047
 
 
 
Turkish FM appraised Russian initiatives in the course of resolution process of Azeri - 
Armenian conflict and noticed that the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform project 
was maturating gradually. At his row, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister appreciated the 
current level of Russia -Turkey relations and stressed affinity of both countries in UN, Middle 
East, Iran and Iraq along with Southern Caucasus issues. In addition to that, along with 
diplomatic and economic issues, the theme of problems arose toward Turkish goods in 
Russian customs and Turkish trucks‘ issue occupied the agenda of both ministers. Due to a 
question directed to Lavrov related to custom issue, he replied that it is a technical problem 
however the Foreign Affairs of both sites endeavors to resolve it as soon as possible.
1048
 
Additionally, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister invited Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
to Turkey on behalf of Turkish Prime Minister. 
Due to Turkish PM‘s invitation Vladimir Putin, this time visited Turkey as Russian 
Prime Minister. Under the frames of the official visit, along with Russian President, Italian 
Berlusconi took part in the meetings. The top agenda of visit was energy issues between the 
countries, while many other cooperation issues as well negotiated in the course of sessions 
held between Joint Economic Commissions. Russia, in order to create alternative energy 
routes to West Europe provided permit for Turkey so as to initiate feasibility works in Black 
Sea for so called South Stream Project. Besides, it has been decided that Italian Energy 
Company ―Eni‖ would also participate to the project, therefore Italian President Berlusconi 
also put signature to the protocols signed between Turkey and Russia.
1049
 In addition to that, it 
was also decided that Russia would provide additional oil supply to Samsun - Ceyhan 
pipeline, which would decrease oil transit in Turkish straits. Among all other twenty protocols 
signed between the parties, the last important agreement was Turkish - Russian protocol 
proposing nuclear energy cooperation, however due to high costs this protocol did not vitalize 
subsequently. Furthermore, Turkey prolonged its gas agreement with Russia that would 
expire in 2011 during Russian Prime Ministers visit.
1050
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Another additional peculiarity of the meeting was Putin‘s respond to a question stating 
that Turkey‘s projects of turning an energy hub does not disturb Russia, he added that 
Nabucco project, which aims to carry Caspian oil to West is not the competitor of South 
Stream Project as there exist plenty of sources for both projects.
1051
 The statement of Russian 
Prime Minister indicated that Turkish site clearly explained its position in terms of energy 
transit issues and it was understood by Russia. The next high-level meeting between Russia 
and Turkey during Justice and Development government took place when Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Russian Federation on 12 - 13 January 2010.1052 
During his visit, Turkish PM met with Russian President Medvedev and his counterpart Putin. 
Among the top-level issues that came to agenda, the most important was nuclear energy 
project with Russia. In fact, Russia gained the Nuclear power plant from auction of the 
planned plant in Southern Turkey (Akkuyu). Nevertheless, Turkish justice objected the 
auction and decision was approved by state council, thus Turkish Prime Minister searched 
methods to atone Russia and tried to give nuclear plant project to Russia by state agreement 
without putting the deal to an open auction as it used to be experience in some cases with 
former Soviet Union.
1053
  
Another issue negotiated during the meeting was to buy or pay clause that existed in 
natural gas agreements signed with Russian Federation. Due to abrupt price raises and 
economic crisis Turkish consumers were using lesser gas than foreseen previously which 
caused Turkey to buy lesser gas than pledged in gas agreements signed. However, according 
to buy or pay clause even tough Turkey does not demand gas trough Russia, she should pay 
for the gas amount pledged in the agreement. Turkish and Russian officials in all levels 
undertook talks in order to soften this clause, which was processed against Turkey, but all in 
all, the sides did not reach an agreement at the end of talks, thus Prime Minister brought to 
agenda this issue during the following meetings as well.
1054
 In addition to that, the Nagorno 
Karabagh topic as well came to agenda during the meetings. As Moscow appraised the 
Turkey‘s initiatives to relief its relations with Armenia it clearly declared that Karabagh 
conflict and Turkish - Armenian relations should be hand separately, which did not meet 
Ankara‘s expectance entirely, nonetheless Russia‘s constructive attitude indulged Turkey and 
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the healing of Turkish - Russian relations in future prospect positively contributed for the 
resolution of conflicts in Caucasus region.
1055
 On the other hand, the Caucasus Stability and 
Cooperation Platform were well situated in the agenda. However, an abstract development did 
not take place during the meetings of Turkish Prime Minister.
1056    
 
Following Turkish Prime Ministers visit, Dmitri Medvedev, paid his first official visit 
to Turkey as the President of Russian Federation with a crowded delegation, constituted of 
business people and high rank bureaucrats. During the visit Turkey - Russia relations recorded 
abstract advancements and many issues were discussed in previous meetings. Both states 
signed the ―Agreement on Cooperation in Field of Nuclear Power Plant facility and operation 
in Akkuyu‖.1057 The signed agreement in terms of nuclear cooperation found its deep 
reflection not only in Turkish and Russian mass media organs but also in world press, plus 
world public view as well followed Russian Presidents historical visit with a deep interest. 
Besides, parties agreed on ―Mutual Trip Agreement Procedure of the Republic of Turkey and 
the Russian Federation Citizens ―proposing visa exemptions for the citizens of both 
countries.
1058
 The initialized documents proposing a visa free regime for Russian and Turkish 
citizens was highly crucial in order to understand present level of mutual relations, it is vital 
to add that at this moment the fact that Russia‘s initialization of visa free regime coincided to 
a tense period when Russia experienced a terror attack in Moscow causing heavy 
causalities.
1059
 
High-level relations between Turkish and Russian officials continued in the year of 
2011 as similar to 2010. Prime Minister of Turkish Republic paid a visit to Russian capital in 
the spring of 2011, in order to attend High-level Joint Commission held between the parts at 
Kremlin.
1060
 The theme of removing visa requirement came into agenda and the parts agreed 
on removal of visa requirements on April of 2011.
1061
 Another important feature of Prime 
Minister was his visit to Tatarstan autonomous Republic; hence Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
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became the first Turkish Prime Minister who visited Tatarstan in the history of Turkish - 
Russian relations. Tatars, as a Turkic nation, in the course of history always had close 
relations with Turks and the economic relations between Tatarstan Autonomous Republic and 
Turkey, particularly after the initial of goodwill relations with Russian Federation gained a 
positive acceleration.
1062 
Finally, under the frames of the visit steps that are more abstract 
were taken in terms of Turkey‘s participation to South Stream Pipeline Projects and Russia‘s 
support to Baku - Ceyhan pipeline.
 1063
 In addition to that, Ankara in order to influence Israel - 
Palestinian conflict tried to develop more cooperative politics with Moscow and in some 
meetings both parts initialized talks on Middle East conflict though an abstract development 
did not take place at this period in terms of Turkish - Russian initiative in Middle East.
1064
 
 
2. Southern Caucasus States 
 
Southern Caucasus region from geopolitical point of view lies at the very heart of main 
energy and transport corridors of Eurasia.
1065
 The Transcaucasia region is currently divided 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In the course of the history, the Southern Caucasus was 
ruled by Persians, Ottomans and within the 18
th
 century by Russians, since the dissolution of 
Soviet Union.
1066
 After the end of the Cold War and dissolution of Soviet Union, Southern 
Caucasus experienced both tough challenges and opportunities in the course of time.
1067
 The 
region experiencing a power vacuum after USSR, turned to be a struggle square of outside 
powers searching intervention possibilities, additionally the local actors along with 
international system were not ready for a similar dissolution which agitated the situation in 
Southern Caucasus at all.
1068
 The transition period to democracy, difficulties met during the 
adaptation to market economy, ethnic diversity of the region, the hardship of nation building 
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process for local identities, religious differences, threat of fundamentalist groups,
1069
 
economic inequalities and corruption caused deep instabilities for South Caucasus states that 
resulted in conflicts menacing stability of the region.
1070
  
The Caucasus became a transit route for Turkic people during their migrations form 
Central Asia to Anatolia. While some Turkic tribes passed via Caucasus to Anatolia some 
others stayed in North and East Caucasus.
1071
 In the year of 1475, Ottoman Empire became 
influential in Caucasus region, and till 1783, when Ottomans lost their sovereignty both in 
Crimea and Caucasus, although not totally, continued its effect in Caucasus.
1072
  Following 
the collapse of Ottoman Empire, Soviet Union and Republic of Turkey shared common 
borders through the Southern Caucasus states, plus the emergence of the Cold War increased 
the strategic position of region for both states as a natural border separating states. In the 
course of the Cold War, Turkey played the Southern flank role of the West as an ally of 
United States of America in the region.
1073
 With the end of the Cold War, Turkish foreign 
policy decision makers were challenged with the risks and opportunities that emerged with 
breakdown of its Northern rival. Turkey, now that it was  breathing a sign relief for not 
sharing a common border with Soviet Russia or its predecessor Russian Federation,  applied 
all possible methods in order to prevent Russia‘s predomination of region. Ankara from the 
very beginning supported the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty of newly 
emerged Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and recognized their independence quickly,
1074
 
and established diplomatic missions -except for Armenia -. 
Shortly after the fall of Soviet Union, Turkey as a bridge between West and East and 
was appreciated as a determinant actor and a ―regional power‖1075 in South Caucasus. Not 
only Turkish decision makers but also Western alliances of Ankara underlined Turkey‘s role 
in the region referring to religious, historic, linguistic, cultural and ethnic liaisons. 
Furthermore it was proposed in the West that, the so-called Turkish model reconciling Islam 
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with democracy under the secularity principle might prevent radical Islamic streams in the 
region, plus it was as well stressed that Turkish Islam concept might prevent Iranian 
influences and create a power balance against Russia in Southern Caucasus.
1076
 On the other 
hand, Turkey was eager to participate joint policy-making process in accordance with its 
alliances toward Southern Caucasus and Central Asia due to the fact that its role as a strategic 
partner to West was relatively diminished since the collapse of Soviet Union. Therefore, 
Ankara at this period was always underlining Turkey‘s strategic role in the region and 
evaluated all possible opportunities so as to take initiatives in regional policies.
1077
 On the 
other hand, Ankara, following the collapse of Iron Curtain, put a special emphasis on energy 
resources of Caspian that could be transferred via the South Caucasus - Turkey to Western 
Europe to strength its energy hub role increasing its influence in the region.
1078
 In spite of the 
fact, Ankara did not directly intervene regional conflicts arose among  South Caucasus states 
and tried to support stability of the region, due to fact that many Turkish citizens were 
ancestry of South Caucasus or due to kinship relations in Nagorno Karabagh - Armenia 
conflict,
 1079
  it engaged to regional conflicts among Southern Caucasus states.
1080
 
 
2.1 Georgia 
Republic of Turkey and Georgia share 114 km long border.
1081
 Georgia constitutes a 
gateway for Turkey to Caucasus and Central Asia.
1082
 Diplomatic relations between Turkish 
Republic and Georgia commenced shortly after the Georgia‘s gain of independence in 
1991,
1083
 and both states initialized diplomatic relations and following that bilateral relations 
developed under the frames of good neighborhood principles.
1084
 Yet, in some sporadic cases 
                                                 
1076
 Iver B Neumann, ―The Caucasus between Russia, Turkey and Iran‖, NUPI Working Papers, No. 
495, June 1993, p. 12. 
1077
 Gareth Winrow, Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns, Royal 
Institute for International Affairs, London 2000, pp. 60-67.  
1078
 William Hale, „Turkey, the Black Sea and Transcaucasia‖ in Wright et al (eds.), Transcaucasian 
Boundaries, UCL Press, London 1996, pp. 54-71. 
1079
 Bülent Aras, ―Turkey‘s Policy in the Former Soviet South‖, Turkish Studies, Spring 2000, pp. 36-
58. 
1080
 Philip Robins, ―Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy toward Azerbaijan and the 
Central Asian States‖, Middle East Journal, 1993, Vol. XLVII, No. 4, pp.593-610. 
1081
 Mithat Çelikpala, ―Türkiye ve Kafkasya: Reaksiyoner Dış Politikadan Proaktif Ritmik Diplomasiye 
Geçiş‖ (―Turkey and Caucasus: From Reactionary Foreign Policy to Proactive Rhythmic Diplomacy‖), 
Uluslararası İlişkiler, Vol.VII, No. 25, Spring 2010, p. 94.   
1082
 Mithat Çelikpala, ―From a Failed State to a Weak One? Georgia and Turkish - Georgian Relations‖, 
The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 2005, Vol. XXXVI, pp.159-199. 
1083
 ―Relations with Turkey and Georgia‖, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: 
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-georgia.en.mfa>,) March, 2012). 
1084
 Mustafa Aydın, New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus; Causes of İnstability and 
Predicament, Center for Strategic Research (SAM), Ankara 2000, pp. 81-84. 
 202 
like Meskhetian Turks come back to their homelands issue, crisis in Adjaria region and 
confiscation of Turkish ships caused tense periods. Ankara and Tbilisi have common oil and 
gas-pipeline transit project with the encouragement of European Union and United States by 
passing through Russia and Iran. Both states explicitly underlined their respect to territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, Ankara supported the Velvet Revolution in Georgia and helped its 
neighbor in the course of adaptation to NATO, supporting Georgia‘s membership and 
providing technical support in terms of modernization of Georgian army.  
Apart from that, amid political relations existing between Georgia and Turkey, the 
economic relations as well played a deterministic role for the advancement of mutual 
relations. Particularly in 2003, the economic and commercial relations between two states 
highly increased reaching to 427 million United States Dollars. At the present, trade volume 
between Turkey and Georgia has hit 830 million dollars.
1085
 Business activities of Turkish 
companies focused on telecommunication, manufacturing and build sectors contributed highly 
positively to the accessed number.
1086
 Before the government of Justice and Development 
Party, Georgia commenced to turn out to be the next battlefield for global powers struggling 
for the influence in Caucasus. However due to economic crisis exhausting Turkey‘s whole 
energy and fluctuating political crisis, foreign policy decision making process pushed Turkey 
away from the regional politics and since the reign of AK Party, Ankara was obliged to 
follow a reaction based foreign policy towards Georgia.
1087
 At the initial periods of Justice 
and Development Party government, international and local observes stated their concerns 
that Islamic agenda of AK Party might distort Turkish interest in Southern Caucasus, 
particularly with Georgia. However, on contrary to all fears Justice and Development Party 
succeed to launch economic oriented mutual relation perspective with Georgia enforcing it 
through strategic projects supported by Western alliance of Turkey as well. Besides, Justice 
and Development Party‘s foreign  policy administration staff put a special stress on Turkey‘s 
historical background and the responsibilities related to this very historical relations in 
Turkish periphery, thus AK Party introduced its new rhetoric to relations with zero problem 
principle with Turkish neighbors , win - win, regional politics and regional integration under 
the frames of  ―rhythmic diplomacy ―.1088 Consequently, Ankara put a special emphasis for 
the development of economic and trade relations with Tbilisi instead of developing culture 
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based politics. From the government period of Justice and Development Party, the trade 
volume between the states developed highly in comparison to pre 2003 period. Besides, as 
AK Party decision makers practiced in other neighbor countries, they also promulgated Free 
Trade Agreement with Georgia on 21 November 2007, in order to develop economic relations 
and facilitate import - export procedures.
 1089
   
Ankara and Tbilisi recorded a highly positive advancement, initially at 2006, when 
former Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer paid an official visit to Georgian capital where 
he met with his counterpart Michael Saakashvili.
1090
 At this meeting, Turkish and Georgian 
official agreed to realize a common usage project of international airport situated in 
autonomous Adjara capital Batumi. Under the frame of the agreement, Turkish and Georgian 
citizens could use Batumi airport during their local and international flights without the 
obligation of bearing a passport or a visa. Besides, the agreement would give possibility for 
planes belong to both states to use Batumi airplanes for flights. Turkish companies undertook 
the renovation tasks at both Batumi and Tbilisi international project with the budget of hitting 
to 15 million US Dollars. In addition to that the officials of both states reached to an 
agreement proposing a ―single counter‖1091 application for road transports at Turkish – 
Georgian customs. 
Another affiliation realized during the meeting was the signed memorandum of the 
principles of equality and mutual non - interference in domestic affairs, along with a visa free 
travel agreement for Georgian and Turkish citizens permitting both nationalities to stay up to 
90 days. The timing of signature was highly staking as it coincided to period when Russian 
Federation declared that it would apply visa to Georgian citizens.
1092
 Ankara encouraged with 
the realization of ―Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan‖1093 pipeline brought back to agenda, which was 
postponed at 1993 due to the funding problems proposing a railroad connecting South 
Caucasus with Turkey to connect Caspian basin energy resources to the West. In the 
inauguration ceremony of Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan pipeline project, the presidents of Turkey, 
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Azerbaijan and Georgia voiced the possibility of a railroad project connecting three countries 
to each other.
1094
 The project was called as Baku - Tbilisi - Kars railroad, and it was launched 
in 2007, shortly after the meeting of the Presidents and was planned to be finished in 2011. 
The railroad project with a planned 876 KM length was expected to transport, in initial stages, 
1 million people and 15 Millions of freight.
1095
 
Foreign policy attitude of Justice and Development Party government towards Georgia 
experienced the utmost challenge, when Russian - Georgia war erupted. Turkish foreign 
policy proposing zero problem principles with Turkish in the course of war was congested 
between Western alliances -Russia and Turkey‘s domestic dynamics- due to Caucasus origin 
of Turkish citizens who mostly inhabited in the west of Turkey. Ankara was pressed between 
its strategic partner Georgia and economical partner Russia, along with US - NATO. As 
Bülent Aliriza underlines ―One of the sides is our closest ally, the United States. The other 
side is Russia, with which we have an important trade volume. We would act according to 
what Turkey‘s national interests require‖.1096 In addition to tune power balance between 
Russia - West and the position of Turkey, Ankara was obliged to take into consideration 
Turkish - Georgian relations as Georgia is Turkey‘s sole gateway to Azerbaijan and other 
Turkic origin Republics along with energy cooperation prospects of Georgia, which makes 
Turkey to became an energy hub. Hence, the territorial integrity was highly crucial for Turkey 
along with good condition of mutual relations with Tbilisi as Professor Mithat Çelikpala 
emphasizes, ―Georgia‘s instability and civil war is more of a threat to Turkey than a Georgia 
without territorial integrity‖.1097 
Thus, at the initial period of crisis, Turkish foreign policy administration preferred to 
stay silent in order to keep current sensitive balances, besides the Justice and Development 
Party ―1098 had received criticism for failure to pursue an active policy since the crisis 
erupted‖,1099 however later on Turkey gained a relative wide maneuver as a side proposing 
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Within the following days after the emerge of 
crisis between Russia and Georgia, Recep Tayyip Erdogan headed to Russia and Georgia in 
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order to intervene to the crisis and to play a more active role in the course of resolution 
process. He proposed the ‗Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform‘ while he was in 
Moscow in order to provide security and stability in South Caucasus. Actually, Turkish Prime 
Minister‘s idea of creating a platform aiming to provide stability in Caucasus was not a new 
idea, former Turkish President Süleyman Demirel in 2000 suggested establishing ―Stability 
Pact for Caucasus‖ but it was not implemented due to the second Chechen war1100. In fact, 
Ankara, since the collapse of iron curtain worried about stability that directly influenced 
Turkey and after the Russian - Georgian war the necessity of stability understood due to 
power vacuum arose aftermath the conflict that constitutes a serious treat against the stability 
of region.
1101
 Eleni Fotiou notes Turkish perspectives toward Caucasus stability as follows: 
 
In parallel, economic and energy interdependence and existing cooperation in bilateral or trilateral 
schemes, made the quest for crisis management even more urgent: Turkey‘s aspiration to become 
an energy hub largely depends on Russian gas imports and on sustainable Azeri-Georgian-Turkish 
cooperation for the transportation of energy resources from Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea to 
Turkey and then to Europe. Tourism, investments and trade relations are another parameter; 
Turkish direct investments in Georgia and Russia, the number of Russian tourists in Turkey, and 
the level of trade between Georgia and Turkey and between Russia and Turkey show that Turkey 
afford to lose any of its partners in the region.
1102
 
 
 
When it comes to Georgia; As Tbilisi administration‘s utmost priority to develop relations 
with European Union and become a NATO member in order to decrease its dependence to 
Russia and feel secure against it, they supported Turkey‘s project appreciating it as a gateway 
toward Western integration, and gave positive engagement signals to the similar initiatives. 
All sort of initiatives proposing to prevent ethnic or religious tensions treating Georgia‘s 
territorial integrity interested foreign policy priorities of Tbilisi, but it approached to the 
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform cautiously as attributed a conflict resolution role 
to platform. Tbilisi, particularly after the war applied all methods in order to discard Russian 
press, but it also felt disturbed due to power struggle game on Caucasus while did not want to 
jeopardize positive military, strategic and economic relations with Ankara as a state playing 
bridge role for Georgia. 
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2.2. Azerbaijan 
Owing to the common cultural, religious and linguistic affinity, Republic of 
Azerbaijan has an exceptional place in terms of foreign affairs not only in Southern Caucasus 
region, but also in all other international relations prospects for Turkey‘s foreign policy 
decision makers. Former president of Azerbaijan Abulfayz Elchibey
1103
 described this very 
specific nature of mutual relation between sister countries as ―one nation, two states‖1104 and 
this statement of ex - president became a popular slogan for Turkish - Azeri relations, which 
bears a complicated nature that interfered with emotions and a plane of realpolitik.
1105
 
Before its participation to Soviet Union, young Turkish Republic as well developed 
positive relations with Azerbaijan, though mutual relations experienced a recession in the 
course of Soviet regime,
1106
 after the fall of USSR, Turkey became the first country to 
recognize the independence of Azerbaijan Republic, thus it established high-level diplomatic 
relations with Baku.
1107
 Ankara supported the position of Baku, during ―Nagorno - 
Karabagh‖1108 conflict arose between Armenia and Azerbaijan,1109 and imposed economic 
embargo against Armenia closing Turkish border between Armenia.
1110
 Economic relations 
between the states bloomed gradually in the course of years after Azerbaijan‘s independence 
and hit 1.2 billion USD in 2007 making Azerbaijan Turkey‘s biggest partner in terms of 
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trade.
1111
 Relationship in the energy sphere is a foundation stone of the economic cooperation 
between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Common projects implemented by the countries with joining 
Georgia - Baku - Tbilisi- Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku - Tbilisi - Erzurum gas pipeline ensure 
present day energy security of both as well as other European countries.  
Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan project was the first pipeline bypassing the territory of Russia. 
With the starting of exploitation, it greatly changed the geopolitical alignment of forces in the 
vast region, enveloping the Central Asia, Caucasus and basin of the Caspian Sea. 
Transportation of sizeable oil volume that could be realized by the territory of Russia with the 
using of existing pipeline Baku-Novorossiysk bypasses the Russia that caused long-expected 
decreasing of its influence in the region. Next huge project was Nabucco - South Caucasus 
natural gas pipeline with the length of 3, 3 thousand km that has to deliver Caspian natural gas 
(Turkmen and Azerbaijani) to the EU markets.
1112
 The partners of this project have started to 
build the pipeline in 2011, finish it in 2014. Estimated cost of the project is € 7, 9 billion. On 
4 March 2010, Turkey has ratified its participation in the Nabucco project and approved 
construction of natural gas pipeline by its territory. Another common important project is 
Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway project, which is under its realization and bypasses Armenia as 
well.
1113
  
Since, the beginning of war around the Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia, Turkey supported the Azerbaijan side, advocating Azeri thesis in the international 
arena. After the occupation of Kelbajar district belong to Azerbaijan by the Armenian Armed 
Forces, Turkey called an extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council on 6 April 1993. 
However, the UN Security Council rejected formulation ―aggression of the Armenia against 
sovereign Azerbaijani Republic‖1114 presented by Ankara. In adopted resolution was only 
expressed grave concern on the subject of escalation of the hostile actions in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict‖, and was told not about the aggression of the Armenia. Following the 
United Nations Security Council resolution from April 6, 1993, calling for the immediate 
withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories, Turkey applied an 
embargo against Armenia, and the border between the two states was closed.
1115
 The border 
subsequently remained closed as Turkey demanded Armenia to withdraw from Nagorno-
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Karabakh and seven surrounding districts of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia. Ankara as well 
set this demand as a precondition for establishing diplomatic relations with its neighbor 
Armenia. 
Military relations between Baku and Ankara emerged shortly after Azerbaijan‘s 
independence and since that day both countries have a close military cooperation as under the 
frames of NATO, Turkish officers educate Azerbaijan military forces and Ankara assisted 
Azerbaijani Military Force‘s modernization. Apart from political, economic and military 
relations, Turkey and Azerbaijan have deep affiliations in cultural and educational fields. 
Under the frames of signed agreements between two states, Turkish and Azeri students may 
receive university education in both states. Ankara supported Baku during transformation 
from Cyril alphabet to Latin providing all require technical support as Turkish is the mean of 
medium between nations. Turkey has middle and high schools and private universities in 
different places of Azerbaijan opened by the contribution of Turkish investment.
1116
 In 
addition to that, Turkish TV channels play an important role in terms of cultural affiliation of 
people.  
Justice and Development Party was in search of ameliorating relations with Baku and 
other capitals through interstate and inter- regional projects providing economic integration of 
region states in Turkish neighborhood. Henceforth, from AK Party‘s formation the 57th 
government at 2001 to the Russia - Georgia war, Turkish - Azeri relations along with other 
Southern Caucasus states continued in accordance with the frames of above-mentioned 
understanding, while traditional line of orthodox Turkish foreign policy toward region as well 
observed. Efegil summaries AK Party‘s policy objectives to Azerbaijan and other Central 
Asian sister states as follows: 
 
• Developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the fields of energy, economy,  
   commerce, culture, society, politics, etc.   
• Assisting them to find a peaceful solution to the frozen regional conflicts.  
• Serving as an energy terminal.   
• Providing assistance to the regional states in their nation- and state-building processes.   
• Helping them develop and maintain close relations with the other countries.1117 
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 On the other hand, due to the busy schedule of Turkish foreign policy mainly preoccupied to 
European Union and Middle East affairs until the Russia - Georgia war, Azerbaijan theme did 
not occupy a top-level agenda for Turkish foreign policy during the government period of 
Justice and Development Party. Ahmet Davutoğlu, as an academician and strategist was 
highly aware of strategic importance of Azerbaijan for Turkey, thus along with former 
Turkish Foreign Policy Ministers and in accordance with Turkey‘s traditional approaches 
toward Caucasus, he also contributed an exceptional mark to Southern Caucasus region 
countries calling it as Turkey‘s ―gate door to Asia‖ handling the region in frames of Black 
Sea, relations with Russia and other Turkic states and policy balance between West and 
Russia.
1118
 Davutoğlu qualified Caucasus as Turkey‘s ―Close land basin‖ while appreciated 
Azerbaijan as ―the backbone of Eurasian politics‖1119 poses Azerbaijan to a particular primary 
category. To highlight strategic position of Azerbaijan for Turkish foreign policy he notifies 
that ―until Azerbaijan in Caucasus and Albania in Balkans would not gain a powerful regional 
position, it is impossible for Turkey to develop a cross border influence in Caspian and 
Adriatic region‖.1120 
The Southern Caucasus issue came to agenda of Turkish foreign policy with the 
eruption of Russian - Georgian war, AK Party decision makers faced with the fact that the 
situation in Caucasus is highly fragile and Turkey should take more engagements in order to 
realize its zero problem principle with Turkish neighborhood. It was practically understood 
the difficulty of constructing amid relation with countries at odds. As Ankara accelerate this 
engagement and proposed the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, this fact one 
more time realized in terms of Turkish - Azerbaijan relations. From Azerbaijan‘s point of 
view, Baku was ready to participate in all initiatives or project in order to free its occupied 
territories by Armenia, besides Azeri officials in all platforms was repeatedly stating that they 
were ready to apply all options to free Nagorno - Karabagh not excluding military options. 
The sole reservation of Azerbaijan toward a similar project was not to loose her negotiation 
cards against Armenia that was approved by United Nation Security Council.
1121
 In addition 
to Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform proposing cooperation with region states 
aiming to resolve frozen conflicts among Caucasus nations, Ankara commenced to melt ices 
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with Erevan due to everlasting Armenian claims accusing Turkey committing genocide 
against Armenians referring to events in 1915. The potential presidency of Barack Obama and 
his previous election promises signalizing USA‘s recognition of so - called Armenian 
genocide also played a determinant role in Ankara‘s decision. In addition to that, the so - 
called Armenian claims as an obstacle blocking Turkey‘s EU membership under the frames of 
zero problem rhetoric of Justice and Development Party played an essential role at Ankara‘s 
approach. Besides, AKP‘s new attitude toward Armenia was supported by Western alliance of 
Turkey;
1122
 however AK Party decision makers faced with unexpected opposition of Aliyev 
administration along with severe critics of Turkish nationalists blaming Justice and 
Development Party for betraying Azerbaijan. Thus, in the course of history of Turkey - 
Azerbaijan relations experienced worst period at the eve of healing diplomatic relations with 
Armenia.
1123
 
At the initial period of Turkish - Armenia thawing period, Baku did not indicate a 
negative attitude regarding the initiatives of Ankara, Justice and Development Party stressed 
explicitly that it would not damage the position of Azerbaijan in Karabagh conflict. Indeed, 
on 6 September 2008, when Turkish President Abdullah Gül attended Turkish - Armenia 
national football game and the affiliation process commenced to accelerate between Armenia 
and Turkey.
1124
 Baku attentively followed AK Party‘s opening policies toward Erevan, and 
did not oppose the historic visit of Turkish President, thus de facto agreed with Ankara‘s 
approaches from this respect.
1125
 In this period Justice and Development Party was highly 
cautious taking into consideration delicate structure of Caucasus and multi - dimensional 
perspective of Armenian - Azeri conflict. It is here vital to underline that Justice and 
Development Party owing to decided group decision of party,  did not attend to match and 
AK Party was not represented in Erevan at political party level. Besides, Four days after the 
match, Turkish President paid an official visit to Azeri capital in order to meet Ilham 
Aliyev.
1126
 Behind the close doors, Turkey from the very highest level explained its approach 
to relations with Armenia, trying to remove concerns of Azerbaijan. During the meeting, 
Abdullah Gül evaluated his visit to Erevan and shared his impression acquired in Armenia 
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causing him to hope that Armenia may voluntarily agree to leave all occupied Azeri 
territories; furthermore, Turkish President repeated that Turkey searches resolution methods 
in the so-called Armenian opening policy abiding to territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
1127
 On 
his back way to Ankara, President Gül answered questions of journalists related to meeting 
enduring 8 hours; Gül stated that Azeri part does not disturbed due to Turkey‘s initiatives; 
moreover, he added that resolution of the conflict would contribute to stability of Caucasus. 
President‘s visit was also appreciated positively in Turkish and Azerbaijani public view. 1128 
Following that, Armenian and Azeri representatives came together in Moscow at the 
beginning of November and signed a common Karabagh declaration, which has been the first 
official paper signed by the parties since 1992. Hence, Justice and Development Party 
perceived these developments as the supporting development of Turkey‘s initiatives toward 
Armenia as a pushing factor Erevan to undertake talks with Baku, thus after this period 
Ankara accelerate diplomatic contacts with Erivan. Turkey and Armenia commenced to 
realize open and close talks in Switzerland in order to access an agreement in order to resolve 
current problems existing between the states and to draw a road map determining the future 
steps to normalize relations. On the other hand, Ankara was as well informing all new 
developments to Baku trying to engage Azerbaijan to the process as well.
1129
  
Yet, Turkish - Azerbaijani diplomatic relations commenced to tense before the Barack 
Obama‘s historic visit to Turkey as the rumors increased claiming that either Turkey will 
open Armenian border symbolically or permanently, in order to show Turkish side‘s good 
intention, it was even claimed that both states (Turkey and Armenia) would launch diplomatic 
missions soon.
1130
 As for Baku, initially Azeri administration staff was highly careful and the 
statements of Azeri Foreign Ministry officials in the direction of evaluating the process as it 
was still early to state conclusive messages evaluating developments. Nevertheless, all of 
sudden Azeri President boycotted the United Alliance of Civilizations summit as a reaction to 
Turkey‘s negotiations with Armenia, owing to the possibility of Turkey opening Armenian 
borders and realized a surprise visit to Moscow in order to evaluate current situation with 
Russian President Medvedev. At the period coinciding the same time frame, some Non 
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Governmental Organization delegations from Azerbaijan came to Ankara to demolish 
misunderstandings between countries. Their appointment demands were rejected by Foreign 
Ministry and Justice and Development Party officials under the pretext that they were on 
purpose sent by Aliyev in order to influence AK Party policies. Nevertheless, Left and Right 
wing opposition parties accepted delegation and criticized Justice and Development Party for 
losing control in Foreign policy toward Caucasus,
1131
 accusing AK Party one more time for 
harming historic Turkey - Azerbaijan relations.
1132
  
Ankara on the eve of 24 April, which is celebrated as the anniversary of so - called 
Armenian genocide, was afraid that Obama would mention the incident as genocide in 
accordance with his promises in the course of his election campaign, thus accelerated the 
healing procedure with Armenia. The Foreign Affairs Ministers of both sides signed a 
memorandum of understanding in Switzerland, which gained a historic dimension to Turkish 
- Armenian relations since 1923. At this point, President Abdullah Gül was engaged in the 
convergence process between Armenia and Turkey. He called Ilham Aliyev in order to inform 
about the details and repeated Turkey‘s position related to the Nagorno Karabagh and 
occupied Azerbaijani lands adding that opening of the borders between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia depend on the condition that Armenia should withdraw from occupied lands belong 
to Azerbaijan. After Armenia and Turkey declared that, they agreed on a framework towards 
the normalization of relations Baku one more time repeated its concerns underlying that the 
opening of the Turkish - Armenian border without progress in the Nagorno - Karabagh 
conflict might destroy regional stability in Caucasus.
1133
  
On the other side, Azerbaijan administration as a reaction to Turkey‘s initiatives in 
domestic scale commenced to put pressure on Turkish companies existing in Azerbaijan, 
furthermore Baku closed the Turkish mosque under the pretext of restoration in Baku, though 
mosque officials stated that they were not informed about it, opened by Turkish Religious 
Affairs in 1995. Baku shortly after the signature publicly declared that the gas deal signed 
between Turkey and Azerbaijan was outdated implying an increase at oil and gas prices that 
Turkey buys, while Justice and Development Party Energy Minister called Azerbaijani move 
on prices as provocative. In addition to that, Azerbaijan aims to indicate their displeasure with 
Turkey dropped off Turkish flags hanged on Turkish martyrdom situated in Baku and 
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Azerbaijan officially announced that Baku abrogated visa application for Turkish citizens 
upon arrival or at the borders.
1134
 
After the signature of memorandum between Turkey and Armenia, first time high-
level talks realized between Ankara and Baku in Prague during the OSCE Minsk Summit. 
Turkish President after his meeting with Sargsyan came together with Ilham Aliyev in order 
to evaluate latest development and future road map in Caucasus. Following the meetings of 
Presidents, Turkish Prime Minister paid an official visit to Azerbaijan on 13 May 2010, in 
order to calm down tense Turkish - Azerbaijani relations that was experiencing the worst time 
in the course of diplomatic history present between the sister states. A high rank minister 
delegation including Turkish FM Ahmet Davutoğlu and Natural Resources Minister Taner 
Yıldız accompanied the visit. The main agenda of the visit was border issue, where both head 
of states discussed téte a téte in details along with current economic and energy issues. During 
the joint press conference held after the officials meeting Erdoğan respond to a question 
asking current situation ―The Azerbaijan - Turkey fraternal relations have never been subject 
of discussions. The Turkey - Armenia border has been closed due to Nagorno - Karabagh's 
occupation and will not be solved until it will be liberated‖.1135 
 In the same press conference, Turkish newspaper asked to Ilham Aliyev, Baku‘s 
demand on price rise to which Azerbaijani President related with oil prices and abstaining to 
connect it emerging crisis in Turkey, as for Azerbaijan‘s close relations with Russia, Azeri 
President contented with reminding historical relations with Russia and called Moscow as an 
important ally of Azerbaijan.
1136
 The following day of the visit, Turkish Prime Minister made 
a speech in Azerbaijan Parliament notifying that Turkey will not act against Azeri interest, 
while called Armenian origin news as a sabotage claiming Turkey will open doors with 
Armenia without precondition.
1137
 Shortly after Turkish PM‘s visit to Baku, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Davutoğlu paid the following visit in order to normalize relations with Azerbaijan 
meeting with his colleague Elmar Mammadyarov. During the visit, Davutoğlu tried to remove 
Azerbajcan‘s concerns and explained the principles and objectives of Justice and 
Development Party government‘s foreign policy attitude toward Caucasus. To indicate 
Turkey‘s position with Azerbaijan, Turkish FM in a joint press conference noted that ―Our 
Azerbaijani brothers and sisters should know that, just as in the past, Turkey will be on the 
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side of Azerbaijan in the future‖,1138 adding ―Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are 
excellent. Turkey and Azerbaijan are not merely friends and neighbors. They are also 
strategic partners‖.1139 
Ultimately, after series of misunderstanding, speculations, that commenced with 
Turkey‘s political rapprochement with Armenia and Baku‘s harsh opposition against it, 
Turkey - Azerbaijan relations re-normalized in the 2010. Ankara and Baku signed a Strategic 
Partnership and Mutual Assistance agreement, which were presented to National Assemblies 
of both states in order to be ratified.
1140
 Ankara and Baku additionally signed a memorandum 
of understanding planning transfer Shah Deniz gas resources to Europe via Turkish territory, 
the signed memorandum of understanding also secured gas demand for Nabucco pipeline. 
Under the frames of achieved understanding Turkish and Azerbaijani sites agreed on the gas 
prices that previously became a theme of discussion as well, while Turkey guaranteed as well 
to buy ―11 billion cubic meters natural gas from Azerbaijan‖.1141 Finally, both states signed an 
agreement on the establishment of Turkey - Azerbaijan High-level Strategic Cooperation 
Council,
1142
 which explicitly proved the healed relation between sister countries.
1143
 
 
2.3. Armenia 
First contacts between Turks and Armenians were held in 10
th
 century, when Turkic 
tribes migrated to Anatolian peninsula in masses. In battle of Manzikert (1071),
1144
 
Armenians struggled in the rows of Seljuk Turks against despot Byzantine Imperium
1145
 In 
the course of time, Turks and Armenians lived together in Anatolia peacefully, besides 
Armenians were called by Ottomans as ―loyal nation‖ in order to indicate their fidelity to 
Ottoman authority.
1146
 Until the decade period of Ottoman Empire, Armenians along with 
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other nationalities enjoyed religious tolerance of Ottoman Empire rising high ranks both in 
military and civil, while Armenian artisans and businessmen played a crucial role in Ottoman 
socio economic life.
1147
 
Towards to the collapse of Ottoman Empire, likewise other ethnic nationalities, 
Armenians as well start to ask for their independency, and due to religious and politic reasons 
Armenian demands were used as a political pressure method against Istanbul through Russian 
Empire, Great Britain and France, thus Armenian problem gradually became an international 
question. In fact, in comparison to Greeks or other Balkan nations Armenians were not 
settling in majority, which made their independence claim harder for them. Particularly, at the 
end of 19
th
 century Ottoman Armenians and Russia developed tight relations and local 
Armenian revolts supported by Russian Empire aiming to create a Caucasus Armenian state 
in order to prevent Ottomans contact with Caucasus and Central Asian Turkic and Muslim 
nations. From this perspective, some radical Armenian groups due to nationalistic ambitions 
in order to create big Armenia participated in Russian Armies invading Eastern part of 
Anatolia. As a reaction to upcoming danger and due to increasing conflicts in the region 
Ottoman Administration in 1915, decided to relocate local Armenian population residing 
close to war zone in masses to the other Ottoman regions in order to prevent future Armenian 
supports toward Russian army. However, the mass relocation process of Armenians brought 
many troubles like epidemics, looting actions against Armenians, famines etc and as a 
consequence of disorder that worsening due to the war atmosphere and antagonism between 
Muslim population and Armenians many Armenians severely died in the process of relocation 
period headed by Ottoman Government.
1148
  
It is an undeniable fact that as similar to many other great empires, the collapse period 
of Ottomans as well brought many tragedies to the people of the empire including the 
Armenians. In the following years, after the break down of Ottoman Empire, the relocation 
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issue of Armenia became a hot topic for the foreign relations prospect for Turkey as 1915 
incidents commenced to come agenda particularly after the World War II when the 
international community recognized the atrocities Nazis inhuman actions against European 
Jews. The Armenian Diaspora inspired by Holocaust, initialized genocide claims as refer to 
1915 events. Respectively, Diaspora brought the 1915 events to the international agenda 
while in many countries where Armenians live in masses, the 1915 events due to supports of 
Armenia and domestic political concerns recognized in local and national levels as genocide. 
The so- called genocide claims constituted a problematic issue with United States of America 
and Turkey as Armenian Diaspora continuously brought genocide bills to House of 
Representatives. Besides, Diaspora achieved to celebration of 24 April as the date of genocide 
memorial day, during which American Presidents undertake public speeches, the content of 
American President‘s speech has been a theme of discussion between Washington and 
Ankara. But, since that day none of USA President has used the word of genocide referring to 
1915 incidents while they preferred to call it as the big tragedy. In addition to that, the 
negative relations between Turkey and Armenia constitutes a big obstacle for Turkey‘s full 
membership prospects toward European Union, furthermore the EU countries recognizing 
1915 incidents as genocide like France injured bilateral relations, thus since France‘s 
recognize the so - called genocide that affected the relations highly negative.
1149
 
On the other hand, from 1975 until the end of 1980‘s, Leftist - Nationalist Armenian 
groups living in Diaspora, established an illegal terrorist organization called as the Armenian 
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) in order to compel Turkey to recognize 
1915 events as a genocide initialized terror acts particularly against Turkish Foreign Ministry 
members on duty abroad. Aftermaths many bloody terror acts ending in 46 death and 299 
injuries, due to counterattacks of Turkish inelegancy and changing international conjecture, 
the ASALA terrorist organization was dissolved.
1150
 Another issue, directing the mutual 
relations towards the deadlock, is Armenian territory claiming and harsh attitude performed 
by Armenian governments was not to recognize territorial integrity of Turkish Republic. 
From this perspective Turkey along with Armenia‘s withdraw from Nagorno - Karabagh and 
other occupied Azeri territories demands from Yerevan to recognize its territorial integrity 
and to abandon genocide claims as well stop anti - Turkish activities. After the collapse of 
Soviet Union, Turkish Republic recognized independence of Armenia, though it did not 
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establish diplomatic relations with Armenia.
1151
 As a reaction of Armenia‘s aggressive 
position in the course of Karabagh conflict, Turkey to support Azerbaijan closed its land 
border with Erivan, which influenced Armenia very negatively in terms of economics while 
isolated it in total.
1152
 On the other hand, there is a huge amount of illicit trade volume 
between Turkey and Armenia through Iranian and Georgian borders of both countries,
1153
 and 
it has been claimed that 40.000 Armenian citizens are working in Turkey illegally while there 
are direct flights between Turkish cities and Armenian capital.   
The first contact between Armenian and Turkish officials was made when Turkish 
Prime Minister addressed to his counterpart Kocharian to establish a joint independent history 
commission to investigate 1915 events that Armenian part prefer to call persistently as 
genocide. However, both Yerevan and Diaspora vehemently refused Ankara‘s proposal under 
the pretext that it might cause doubts and debates about the genocide.
1154
 In 2007, when a 
Turkish nationalist assassinated an Armenian descent Turkish journalist Hrant Dink, Turkish - 
Armenian relations came into view of Turkish public view one more time. The funeral of 
Dink caused an indignation in Turkey and thousands of Turks attended his funeral to protest 
assassination, however the most stroking feature of the funeral was placards hold by Turks 
―We are all Hrants, We are all Armenians‖1155 to indicate solidarity with Armenian minority 
residing in Turkey.
1156
 The funeral of Armenian journalist caused public debates while 
signaling thawing Turkish - Armenian diplomatic relations. ―A positive spirit in high-level 
political relations between Armenia and Turkey became perceptible in the beginning of 2008, 
when Turkish President Abdullah Gül congratulated warmly his newly elected Armenian 
counterpart Serzh Sargsyan on his victory. Serzh Sargsyan invited Turkish President to 
football game that would take place between Armenia and Turkey in Yerevan under the frame 
of World Cup qualifications; additionally he added that Armenia would apply a visa free 
regime to Turkish fans who want to watch the game in Yerevan. The international Crisis 
Group reported the developments between Ankara and Yerevan as: 
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Armenian-Turkish reconciliation is not only an elite driven process; public opinion in both countries 
is also ready for it. Two thirds of Turks supported President Gül‘s Yerevan visit. According to a 
think tank director in Ankara, ―there is a lot about the visit on opposition websites; it is a domestic 
political football, but public opinion is ready. They‘re saying, open it [the border] and be done with 
it. It is a question of timing, not preparation.‖ In Armenia support for a border opening even without 
Turkish recognition of an Armenian genocide has grown to more than half of the population. Even 
the once fiercely anti-Turkish Armenian Diaspora now has a more nuanced approach.
1157
 
 
In the aftermath of Russian - Georgian war, Turkey invited Armenia as well to take part in 
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform which was highly welcomed by Yerevan,
1158
 
however Azerbaijan put strict reservation toward Turkey‘s invitation notifying that it would 
not take part any organization with Armenia till it would leave occupied territories.
1159
  
Due to the invitation of Armenian side, Turkish President attended to soccer game held in 
Yerevan.
1160
 Turkish President was met trough his counterpart in the course of his historical 
visit to Armenia, the visit of Turkish President found a wide reflection as well on world press. 
After the visit, the term ―football diplomacy‖1161 as well found its place in the literature of 
diplomacy history and international relations. Following that, both sides issued a notification 
stating that they agreed on a ―comprehensive framework for the normalization of their 
bilateral relations.‖1162 Nevertheless, Baku stated its concern as regard to affiliation between 
Ankara and Yerevan with a threatening tone that it might cause unrecoverable damages in 
terms of Turkish - Azeri relations if the Turkey would open Armenian border before Armenia 
stops occupation in Nagorno Karabagh. Turkey‘s foreign policy at this period highly 
snookered between Armenia and Azerbaijan, on one hand Ankara was trying to continue 
negotiation with Yerevan while on the other hand keep its positive relations with sister state 
Azerbaijan. However, Turkey and Armenia went further and foreign ministries of both 
countries under the meditation of Switzerland signed the ―Protocol on Development of 
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Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia‖1163 on the level of 
Foreign Affairs Ministries along with the attendance of Hillary Clinton, Sergey Lavrov, 
Foreign Affairs Minister of Switzerland and high-level EU represents.
1164
 Both sides under 
the so-called Zurich protocols agreed to: 
 
Conduct regular political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two 
countries; implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual 
confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical 
records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations;  make the best 
possible use of existing transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks 
between the two countries, and to undertake measures in this regard; develop the bilateral legal 
framework in order to foster cooperation between the two countries; cooperate in the fields of 
science and education by encouraging relations between the appropriate institutions as well as 
promoting the exchange of specialists and students, and act with the aim of preserving the cultural 
heritage of both sides and launching common cultural projects;  establish consular cooperation in 
accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 in order to provide 
necessary assistance and protection to the citizens of the two countries;  take concrete measures in 
order to develop trade, tourism and economic cooperation between the two countries; engage in a 
dialogue and reinforce their cooperation on environmental issues.  Agree on the establishment of 
an intergovernmental bilateral commission which shall comprise separate sub-commissions for the 
prompt implementation of the commitments mentioned in operational paragraph 2 above in this 
Protocol. To prepare the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-
commissions, a working group headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be created 2 
months after the day following the entry into force of this Protocol. Within 3 months after the 
entry into force of this Protocol, these modalities shall be approved at ministerial level. The 
intergovernmental commission shall meet for the first time immediately after the adoption of the 
said modalities. The sub-commissions shall start their work at the latest 1 month thereafter and 
they shall work continuously until the completion of their mandates.
1165
  
 
 
Shortly after the signature of protocols, Armenian President attended second leg of world cup 
qualifying match this time held in Turkey.
1166
 He was met by Turkish President upon his 
arrival to Turkey and along with Presidents, Foreign Ministers of both countries organized a 
closed meeting where they discussed current situation of bilateral relations.
1167
 On the other 
hand, there appeared a huge opposition wage against Justice and Development Party due to its 
policies towards Azerbaijan. Opposition parties, particularly Nationalist Action Party 
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(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) gave a parliamentary question to ask AK Party whether it 
would permit Azerbaijan flags to enter to match or not,  and the general secretary of party 
realized a fierce speech at Turkish Great National Assembly criticizing Armenian President‘s 
planned visit to Turkey.
1168
   
The visit of Armenian President caused fervent discussions in Turkish public view as 
well, though the majority of Turks (65.6 %) regarded Governments policies positive.
1169
 
Turkish nationalists who wanted to protest Armenia tried to enter football match with Azeri 
flags, however, due to decision of FIFA, Turkish officials had to ban Azeri flags from 
entering the match. When Turkish police used force to scatter crowds holding Azeri flags and 
threw Azeri flags to garbage bin not to permit them to enter stadium. In order to soften tensed 
relations and to remove Azeri sides concerns, Foreign Minister Davutolğu notified that 
―Turkey does not differentiate between Azeri and Turkish flags‖1170 calling the case as a 
provocation. However, Azeri side vehemently reacted against Turkey where it as reprisal 
banned foreign flags in Azerbaijan and dropped down Turkish flags at Turkish martyrdom in 
Baku. Nonetheless, on contrary to all gained progress in terms of Turkish - Armenian talks, 
Armenian side declared that the singed protocols with Turkey could not be commented to 
question genocide issue while Turkish Prime Minister notified that without the halting the 
Armenian occupation in Azeri territories the signed protocols would not be send Turkish 
Parliament to be ratified. Henceforth, in this period the efforts to normalize reciprocal 
relations between the Republic of Turkey and Armenia failed.
1171
  
 
3. Central Asian Republics 
 
Due to ethnic, kinship, cultural, linguistic and religious ties, the Central Asian republics
1172
  
have been an important agenda for Turkish foreign policy since the breakdown of Soviet 
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Union.
1173
 After the dismantlement of USSR in 1991,
1174
 the newly emerged sister states issue 
occupied an important agenda for Turkish foreign policy decision makers. Ankara fearing to 
lose its strategic position (being a buffer zone against Soviet Union during the Cold War 
period) with the end of Cold War put a special stress on Central Asia politics adopting a big 
brother role.
1175
 It opened an alternative foreign policy dimension as regard to spoiled 
European Union relations, Cyprus Question, pressures of international community due to 
human right abuses and extension of Kurdish problem to the international arena.
1176
 
Initially, the bilateral relations between Turkey and Central Asian republics mostly 
developed on an emotion base perspective in accordance with the popular quote, ―Turkish 
world from Adriatic sea to Great Wall of China‖1177 of Turkish foreign policy of that time, 
which gave birth severe trust crisis between Russia as regard to Moscow‘s concerns over 
Ankara‘s nationalistic interest in Central Asia.1178 On the other hand, Turkey‘s initiatives have 
been supported by United States of America and West European countries
1179
 in order to 
compensate power vacuum emerged in the region emerged after the collapse of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. Moreover, Turkey was promoted as a role model for newly 
independent states during the transition period.
1180
 Plus, influence of Iran aimed to be 
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balanced suggesting ―Turkish model‖ as a unique country reconciling Islam with democracy 
under the roof of a secular state structure.
1181
 
Turkey became the first country recognizing the newly independent Central States like 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and established diplomatic 
relations with Central Asian republics. Shortly after the reorganizations, high-level visits 
between the states started.
1182
 President of Kazakhstan visited Ankara in September, while 
former President of Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan and Islam Kerimov of Uzbekistan were in 
Ankara in December of 1991.
1183
 Ankara in order to enforce its relations with newly emerged 
independent states in Central Asia initialized the First Turkic Summit in 1992. In addition to 
that, shortly after the dissolution of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Turkey initialized 
close economic ties with new sister states and signed commerce and trade agreements. In 
order to promote private enterprise in the region Ankara established Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency, (TIKA).
1184
 
Turkey developed a highly motivated cultural policies toward Central Asian sister 
republics as well. Turkey launched both state supported and private schools in the region in to 
spread Turkish language and culture. Due to bilateral agreements, university attracted 
students and in return, universities gave opportunities for Turks to study in Central Asia. In 
addition to that, Turkey established public universities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan while 
Turkish businessmen established private universities in Bishkek, Alma-Ata and Ashgabat. 
Another initiative of Turkish Republic was to realize transition to Latin alphabet and 
constitute a common Turkish language with new sister states tough in the course of time the 
difficulties related to dialect differences appeared. In this period, Turkish TV channels as well 
played a crucial role in the course of disseminating influence of Turkish language and 
culture.
1185
 
Because of ethnic, cultural and religious ties among Turkey and region states in the 
initial period of the collapse of USSR, Turkish foreign policy makers assumed that Turkey 
would be the leading player in Central Asia in the power vacuum emerged due to Russia‘s 
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weakening at region politics.
1186
 Yet, due to the international conjecture emerged in bipolar 
world, particularly after mid 1990‘s Turkey deserted emotional foreign policy approaches 
toward regional states stopped appreciating regional powers like China, Iran and Russia as 
rivals,
1187
 besides she searched for partnership and cooperation prospect in the region with 
these states. Turkey staying an important player in the region launched a soft power policy 
based on the mutual benefits of both region states and regional actors and avoided to drive a 
‗zero sum game policy‘ in the region.1188 
Turkey‘s foreign policy relations with Central Asian republics did not experience a 
radical change in the course of Justice and Development Party governments. During the 
government periods of AK Party, the high-level visit continued as it used to be in previous 
governments to the region states. As parallel to Justice and Development Party‘s ―zero 
problem principle‖ Ankara at this period supported a policy in order to reinforce security and 
cooperation with her neighborhood and periphery, thus in this respect regarding Central Asia, 
Justice and Development Party promote democracy, human rights and peaceful resolution 
methods of conflict resolution among region countries.
1189
 In the party program of Justice and 
Development Party in terms of relations with Central Asian republics, it is stated that, in spite 
of our (Turkey‘s) close ties with Central Asia due to historic, cultural and social reasons, it is 
an undeniable fact that the current level of bilateral relations is far a way meeting mutual 
expectations. In this respective, Justice and Development Party strive in order to convert 
current relations into a wide cooperation platform. In the programs of Turkish Republic 
governments established by Justice and Development Party under the similar texts were used 
in terms of party‘s relation prospects with Central Asian Turkic republics.1190   
 
3.1. Kazakhstan  
Turkish Republic recognized independence of Kazakhstan Republic on the same day 
(after two hours) of decision in 1991, thence established  diplomatic relations with 
Kazakhstan in 1992, since then  between both states due to different means many high-level 
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visits took place.
1191
 Turkish - Kazakhstan relations in general terms continued its traditional 
path during the Justice and Development Party government. In 2003, between 21 and 23 May 
President of Kazakhstan Republic Nursultan Nazarbayev visited Turkey where he attended 
high-level talks with Turkish officials including President and Prime Minister.
1192
 Under the 
framework of NATO summit which was held in Istanbul, high-level contacts between the 
head of states one more time realized. Turkey, in order to provide closer relations and to 
concrete these relations with a strategic partnership agreement accelerate her relations with 
friend and brother state Kazakhstan and Turkish Prime Minister in order to hold talks in 
details with Kazakh officials headed to Astana in the May of 2005.  
 Following that, former Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer attended Conference 
on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which was inspired by 
Kazakh President Nazarbayev in order to gather Asian states under a roof. In the course of 
time, personal initiative of Kazakh President became a regional forum where region states 
discuss security, stability and peace related issues. Turkey participated actively at CICA 
organization and support toward the forum in all platforms has been highly appreciated at 
Kazakh site, plus Turkey‘s getting the periodical presidency of CICA in 2010 put an 
additional dynamic to bilateral relations.
1193
 In 2008, Turkey moved her embassy to new 
capital Astana, and opened a new consulate in Aktau. At the following visit of President 
Nazarbayev, which took place in 2009 to Turkey, as a consequence of long time endeavors, 
both states agreed to sign a strategic partnership treaty, thus Kazakhstan became the first 
Central Asian Turkic state with whom Turkish Republic signed such agreement.
1194
 Turkey 
supported Kazakhstan‘s presidency at OSCE, while Kazakhstan supported Turkish temporary 
membership at United Nations. Turkish President visited Kazakhstan in order to attend OSCE 
summit and in 2011 to attend Kazakh President‘s 70th birthday ceremony.1195 Both states 
continued high-level relations under the framework of Turkic Speaking Countries Summit, 
Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking Countries and Parliamentarian Assembly of Turkic 
Speaking Countries.
1196
 Turkey‘s relations during Justice and Development Party 
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governments in terms of economic and commerce as well increased as the trade volume 
between the states hit 2.3 Million United States Dollars in the year of 2007.
1197
 As Turkish 
companies were engaged various projects in Kazakhstan and vice versa, Turkey at this period 
tried to increase tourist number from Kazakhstan. 
 
3.2. Turkmenistan 
  Turkish Republic recognized Turkmenistan‘s independence shortly after Ashgabat 
declaration of independence and established diplomatic relations in 1992.
1198
 During the 
Presidency of former President Turgut Özal, Turkey and Turkmenistan developed close 
relations due to Özal‘s personal initiatives and personal efforts. However, Turkey – 
Turkmenistan reciprocal relations gaining a dynamic with Özal lost the velocity after the 
death of Özal. In the mid 1990‘s, Turkey‘s critical preference of Russia in terms of gas 
purchase instead of Turkmenistan caused a serious disappointment in Turkmenistan, what 
made the situation worse was Turkish diplomacy‘s insufficiency while explaining the 
situation to Turkmen colleagues with a diplomatic manner. Following this, bilateral 
agreements between the states though not declared experienced chilling as Turkmenistan 
converted a firm visa regime including business visas, which caused serious problems for 
Turkish business people activating in Turkmenistan.   
Justice and Development Party government tried to initiate a recovery process in terms 
of relations with Turkmenistan. Former Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül took personal 
initiative to contribute to the healing relation between the sister states.
1199
 Shortly after JDP‘s 
coming to power Tayyip Erdoğan paid a visit to Ashgabat in 2003 as the general secretary of 
AK Party.
1200
 Turkey‘s relation with Turkmenistan experienced a healing after the death of 
former Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov. In spite of the retrograded relation with Turkey 
under his presidency, Ankara at top level took part at his funeral with Prime Minister 
Erdoğan‘s presence.1201 Justice and Development Party, in order to indicate importance 
attributed to Turkmenistan as well took part at presidency ceremony of second President of 
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Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov in 2007. Following the election of new 
President, acceleration at mutual relations experienced in terms of Turkish - Turkmenistan 
relations. Turkish President Abdullah Gül paid an official visit to Turkmenistan and came 
together with the fresh President. At the visit of Turkish President Turkey and Turkmenistan 
signed a ―common vision document‖ in order to provide the initials of Strategic Partnership 
between the states. 
New President of Turkmenistan Berdimuhamedov paid an official visit to Turkey in 
2008 as regard to invitation of his counterpart. Under the frames of his visit, both states 
signed a visa easement agreement in order to accelerate affiliation between the states as 
regard to economic and cultural relations. Shortly after the visit of Turkmen President, 
Turkish Prime Minister paid a two-day official visit to Turkmenistan between 4 and 6 October 
2008. Erdogan attended to meeting of Turkish - Turkmenistan Business Council and met with 
Turkish businesspersons living in Turkmenistan,
1202
 while he came together with 
Berdimuhamedov in order to undertake talks on Turkmenistan - Turkey related matters along 
with regional and international issues.
1203
 After the spoiled relations with Turkmenistan due to 
Turkey‘s signature Blue Stream Gas deal with Russia, the energy cooperation one more time 
came to agenda after 2007 period. As it has been in other meetings Erdogan visited 
Turkmenistan with a crowded delegation including Minister of Energy and Natural Resources 
in order to participate state heads talk about energy related issues. Turkey and Turkmenistan 
realized high-level talks in terms of transferring Turkmen gas trough an underground pipeline 
project via Caspian Sea (Trans-Caspian) connecting it with Nabucco. Turkey‘s foreign 
diplomacy attacks during Justice and Development Party governments turn Turkey an energy 
hub and to reinforce her role being a global and regional strategic energy base resource 
coincided with the Turkmenistan‘s interest that was looking for export diversities. 
Turkish - Turkmenistan relations during Justice and Development Party increased 
slowly but steadily. The bilateral relations gained a relative acceleration particularly after the 
Presidency of Berdimuhamedov as in the course of his 18-month rule Turkish investment to 
Turkmenistan increased hit $ 2.7 million,
1204
 while aftermath his Presidency the frequency of 
high-level visits increased including the visit of President and Foreign Ministers. The Trans - 
Caspian pipeline project that has been promoted by Turkish Republic at this period planning 
to carry Turkmen gas to Western markets through Turkey attributed a positive dynamic to 
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mutual relations. In addition to energy cooperation, Turkmenistan‘s newly initialized tourism 
expansion project planning to open Caspian shores to international market and investment 
prospect emerged due to project as well contributed to relation prospects remarkably positive.    
 
3.3. Kyrgyzstan  
Turkey‘s diplomatic relations as similar to other sister Turkic Central Asian countries 
started in 1991 and both sides established their diplomatic missions in 1992.
1205
 Former 
President of Kirgizstan Republic, Askar Akayev paid his first official foreign trip to Turkey in 
order to indicate his countries relation toward Turkey.
1206
 Both states shortly after Bishkek‘s 
acquiring independence signed an ―Economy and Trade Cooperation Agreement‖ thus further 
trade and commerce relation between the states developed on the basis of this agreement. In 
the same ―Turkish - Kirgiz Business Council‖ as well vitalized and Turkish International 
Cooperation Agency as well launched its activities in the terrain of Kirgizstan. Since the 
establishment of bilateral relations, Kirgizstan has been an attractive market for middle size 
Turkish entrepreneurships.   
Shortly after the Justice and Development Party‘s coming to power, Turkey‘s foreign 
policy related to Kirgizstan challenged with the turmoil causing a social and economic 
disorder in Kyrgyzstan. After the so-called ―Tulip Revolution‖ took place in the country, 
incumbent President obliged to leave his post and fled to Russia. Ankara at this period did not 
take a visible initiative preferring not to highly engage quickly changing conjecture; in 
addition to that, Ankara at the very hot moments of incidents did not contact with the leaders 
of opponent groups who downed former President Akayev. Turkey‘s taciturn attitude toward 
Bishkek incident caused adamant critiques-, particularly from the rows of opponent 
nationalist party and institutions and columnists close to ideology of Nationalist Action Party- 
accused the Government not for not having a definite policy foreseeing future Turkish foreign 
policy prospects with Bishkek.
1207
 After the Tulip Revolution, Ankara recognized the 
authority of new President Kumanbek Bakiyev and the incumbent President of Kyrgyzstan 
paid an official visit to Ankara after his acceding to power in 2006. Following the visit of 
Kyrgyz President, former Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan visited Kyrgyzstan together 
with Bakiyev and attended other high-level meetings in order to evaluate current situation of 
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bilateral relations during the period after the revolution. Under the frame of his visit, Turkish 
FM came together in a breakfast program with the Turkish businessperson investing in 
Kyrgyzstan who suffered severely -in the course of disorder of Bishkek incidents many 
Turkish work places were looted by protesters - during the Tulip revolution unrests.  
Following the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister, President Abdullah Gül paid his first 
official visit to Kyrgyzstan Republic as the President of Turkish Republic. During his visit, 
Abdullah Gül met his counterpart and discussed current situation in Turkish – Kyrgyz 
relations and methods to improve mutual relations prospects along with regional issues, along 
with upcoming Kyrgyzstan elections.
1208
 After 5 years of Presidency, due to discontent 
directed to Kumanbek Bakiyev administration, Kyrgyzstan one more time evidenced 
uprisings, riots and clashes along with violent crashes between the crowds protesting Second 
President of Kyrgyzstan Republic and police, which resulted in death and heavy causalities of 
many Kyrgyz in 2010. Due to incidents, Kumanbek Bakiyev announced his resignation and 
left his country for asylum in Belarus. As it was in Tulip Revolution causing resignation of 
Akayev, Ankara preferred not to actively engage uprising incidents causing the end of 
Bakiyev administration.   
Following the overthrow of Bakiyev regime as a consequence of 2010 April uprisings, 
Turkish Republic in order to contribute to the stabilization process of Kyrgyzstan, initialized 
high-level contacts with the representatives of new administration, hence Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu attended inauguration ceremony of 3rd Kyrgyz President Roza 
Otunbeyova.
1209
 During his visit to Bishkek, Turkish FM signed two agreements with 
Kyrgyzstan proposing  21 Million U.S. Dollars financial aid 10 Million U.S. Dollars as 
donation,
1210
 while another project to be realized by Turkish International Cooperation 
Agency. Turkish Prime Minister paid an official visit to Bishkek in 2011. In comparison with 
previous diplomatic visits between the states -including other Central Asian Turkic states- the 
sincere dialogues between Erdoğan and his counterpart Almazbek Atambayev  publicly was 
interpreted as an opening of a new term as regard to Turkish - Kyrgyz relations. Prime 
Minister of Kyrgyz Republic‘s method of welcoming his Turkish colleague was very 
unconventional in terms of diplomatic tradition. Referring Tayyip Erdoğan ―ağbi‖ -a Turkish 
word, which means elder brother often used in order to express respect or an addressing style 
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preferred in close acquaintances-, Atambeyev has tight business connections in Turkey and 
speaks fluent Turkish said that he could not sleep upon arrival of Turkish Prime Minister due 
to his excitement.
1211
 Turkish Prime Minister‘s visit to Kyrgyzstan and usage of elder brother 
in diplomatic circles appreciated as Turkey‘s approach to newly independent Turkic states 
after the dissolution of Soviet Union as Turkey assumed elder brother role and tried to play 
leader country in Central Asia in economic and political respect. However, the 2011 approach 
of Erdoğan appraised more realistic and far a way being emotional as new policy attitudes of 
Turkey toward Central Asia does not appreciated the other big brother Russia as a rival but a 
partner with whom Turkey launched region based policies in coordination.
1212
 During his 
high-level contacts, Turkish Prime Minister stressed Turkey‘s good will in order to support 
Kyrgyzstan on the path of democracy, stability and economic welfare. In the course of his 
speech, Prime Minister mentioned the future cooperation prospects with a strong Eurasia tone, 
underlining the necessity of maximum free movement and mobility necessity among the 
Turkic nations referring to historic and kinship relations between two states,  as it had been 
done trough Turkish politics at the preliminary periods of relations between Central Asian 
newly independent states, however, in terms of economic and political relations , he applied 
more rationalist approaches trying to engage Russia between Turkish - Kyrgyz relations 
aiming to establish  a triple structure in order to conserve delicate balances present in the 
region.
 1213
 One additional issue coming into agenda was the visa free regime for Turkish and 
Kyrgyz citizens and in the course of meeting it was announced that the bilateral talks 
continues in order to remove visa requirements between the states.
1214
 
Shortly after Turkish Prime Minister‘s significant visit to Kyrgyzstan, his counterpart 
Almazbek Atambeyev came to Turkey and was met with official ceremony. The close 
atmosphere commenced in Bishkek continued between Erdoğan and Atambey as they called 
each other brother and elder brother in public. Turkish and Kyrgyz officials organized several 
meetings in order to discuss actual themes between the states along with regional and global 
affairs. After the meeting, Kyrgyz Prime Minister voiced his satisfaction related to his visit 
and expressed his gratitude to Turkey for donations provided to Kyrgyzstan whose economy 
seriously damaged  due to uprising and global economic crisis. 
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3.4. Uzbekistan 
Along with other Central Asian Turkic newly independent states, Turkey after the 
collapse of iron curtain initialized close relations with Uzbekistan and recognized the 
independence while established diplomatic mission with Tashkent shortly after the 
independence.
1215
 In the course of time, high-level visits including Turkish Presidents, Prime 
Ministers and incumbent President of Uzbekistan Republic took place. After the death of 
former President, relations with Uzbekistan evidenced a recession, and after the bomb attack 
aiming to kill incumbent Uzbek President, due to alleged attacker‘s connection with Turkey, 
the relations between Ankara and Tashkent experienced a relative freeze, however due to 
initiatives of Turkish sites the political and economical relations continued. In addition to that, 
mutual relations with Uzbekistan were deteriorated due to political asylums provided by 
Turkey to the opposition leaders activating in Uzbekistan against Islamov regime.
1216
    
The low-level relations of Turkey with Uzbekistan during the government period of 
Justice and Development Party did not experience a radical change and Uzbekistan among 
Central Asian Turkic speaking countries continued to stay weak ring of Turkey‘s in terms of 
Turkic world. Prime Minister Erdogan paid an official visit to Uzbekistan in 2003 in order to 
gain a new dimension to mutual relations; the Meskhetian Turks issue along with the 
problems of Turkish businessmen residing in Uzbekistan came into agenda of Turkish Prime 
Minister under the frames of official visit.
1217
 Turkey‘s critical approach toward bloody 
Andijan events and positive vote of denounce incumbent government in United Nations 
caused the de facto cut of mutual relations between Uzbekistan. Tashkent as a reaction to 
Turkey‘s positive vote at United Nations did not send its official representative to attend 
summit of Turkish Speaking Nations as since the death of former President Özal, Uzbekistan 
was represented at the lowest level. On the other hand, the trade volume between Turkey and 
Uzbekistan had increased during the Justice and Development Party government.  
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3.5. Tajikistan 
Along with other Central Asian republics, Ankara following the collapse of Soviet 
Union recognized the independence of Tajikistan in 1991
1218
 Aftermaths, the diplomatic 
relations settled between Dushanbe and Ankara, meanwhile high level visits among the high 
rank officials of the states commenced. Ankara in the post-Cold War period in order to 
complete its integral policies toward the Central Asia region did not exclude Tajikistan while 
paid a special attention to the country due its strategic location. In spite of the fact that unlike 
to other Turkic Central Asian republics Turks and Tajiks are not belong to the same ethnic 
group, there exists a common cultural and religious heritage between the nations due to 
secular affilation. 
Under the rule of AKP governments in 2002-2011 periods the main character of 
Turkey - Tajikistan relations followed its traditional path. Turkish President Abdullah Gül 
paid a highly important visit to Dushanbe in 30 - 31 May 2009 to boost poltical and economic 
relations between the states.
1219
  Under the frame of his visit, Turkish President met with his 
collegue where both Presidents talked about the future prospects of bilateral relations. Similar 
to previous visit took place between the states; the main agenda was the development of 
economic relations while regional themes also came to agenda. 
Following the visit of Abdullah Gül, Tajik President Emamoli Rahman visited Istanbul 
where he attended the summit of Economic Cooperation Organization in 2010. Within the 
frames of the visit, Turkish - Tajik Joint 
1220
Business Forum was held where representatives 
of both sides shared their views on the development of mutual commerce and trade relations 
of states. Finally in this period, to attend 37
th
 meeting of Islamic Conference that took place in 
Tajik capital, a high rank Turkish delation consist of Ministers paid a visit to Tajikistan. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Turkish - Russian relations in the course of government period of Justice and Development 
Party continued its positive line that determined after 90‘s, which aims the maximum 
collaboration instead of rivalry with Russian Federation both in bilateral relations and 
regional politics not excluding Balkans, Black Sea region, Caucasus as well as Central Asia. 
Thus, AK Party continued the traditional Turkish foreign policy outlook at this period while it 
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was enriched thanks to mutual relations with bilateral agreements, energy cooperation. 
Eventually the visa free regimes between the countries strengthen reciprocal relations 
increasingly. The high-level visits realized at Presidents and Prime Ministers level as well as 
the level of trade volume level that reached to its peak level at this period also constitutes an 
affirmative argument for the positive constructive structure of Turkish - Russian reciprocal 
relations during Justice and Development Party Government periods. 
On the other hand, the historical problems that existed between the countries 
continued to keep its problematic nature while both countries keep on being perpetual 
opponents in regional politics. Notwithstanding to that fact, the attempts of JDP foreign 
policy decision maker‘s to build a constructive relation prospect with Moscow was interpreted 
as an alternative alliance model against West along with Chine and Muslim states, Russian 
Federation and Turkey are far a way of being strategic partners as refer to nature of bilateral 
relations. On contrary to Turkey‘s Northern connection, Justice and Development Party 
attempted to change Caucasus paradigm of Turkey. Ankara at this period due to official and 
unofficial advices of EU and USA as well as to take an advantageous position both in 
European Union negotiations and toward Armenia initialized a softening process with Erivan. 
Nevertheless, the sides could not agree on a common base that satisfying their interests as 
well as public views, besides the unexpected reaction of Azerbaijan caused AK Party to 
withdraw all its initiatives as it jeopardized strategic energy agreements along with Turkey‘s 
role of being an energy hub. 
The following deadlock of JDP foreign policy appeared at Caucasus due to the sudden 
eruption of Russian - Georgian War. Ankara leaving between two strategically important 
neighbors one more time experienced the fragile nature of Caucasus region politics. 
Following the flaming atmosphere of the war, AK Party came up with Caucasus Stability and 
Cooperation Platform project, due to current conjecture tough the project has not completely 
canceled; it has lost its actuality. As for the Turkish foreign policy orientation toward Central 
Asian Turkic Republics, Justice and Development Party foreign policy decision makers 
continued the traditional foreign policy at the period of their rule. On contrary to previous 
governments, AK Party, as regard to its constructive positive relations with Russian 
Federation elaborately hesitated to use a nationalist - Islamist rhetoric. AK Party at this period 
instead of stressing to strategic, military or political engagements with region countries 
preferred to continue economy, trade, commerce and culture based affiliations with Central 
Asian Turkic republics.  
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Chapter VI 
Relations with Emerging Global Powers 
 
The chapter analyzes Turkey‘s foreign policy connection with emerging powers of the world 
in Justice and Development Party government periods between 2002 and 2011. The main 
objective of the chapter is to examine bilateral relations between Turkey and emerging global 
actors. Within the frame of the chapter Turkey‘s relation with People‘s Republic of China, 
India and Brazil from political, economic, military and diplomatic relations are studied 
chronologically in order to figure out foreign policy practice of Turkey in Justice and 
Development Party governments.  
The chapter seeks answers to questions such as whether Turkey‘s foreign policy in the 
course of Justice and Development Party government periods experienced a change in 
comparison to traditional Turkey‘s foreign policy orientation or Justice and Development 
Party continued the traditional Turkish foreign policy line toward BRICS group states. The 
first section of the chapter analyzes Turkish - Chinese relations, while the second section 
analyzes Turkey‘s relations with India. The third section of the chapter analyzes Turkey‘s 
relations with Brazil troughout Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002 - 
2011 periods under the light of historical background. The final section of the chapter consists 
of the conclusion. 
As a consequence of changing conjecture of the world politics and globalization 
process, the bipolar structure of global politics arose after the end of the Cold War 
commenced to change gradually particularly with the start of the new millennium. The 
indisputable place of United States of America as the gendarme of the world order along with 
its enormous economic dominance commenced to be shaked with the emerge of new global 
actors. China,
1221
 India,
1222
 and Brazil
1223
 due to their dynamic young demographics, 
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economic developments and their success in technology, communication along with other 
related issues came out to be the new power centers in international relations sphere creating 
new power momentums around their regions, thus they have started to shape international 
politics gradually.  
 As regard to newly emerged global powers issue, Global Economics Paper issued by 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. the term BRIC was first time used ―to describe the four large 
developing countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China that will overtake the G6 (US, Japan, 
UK, Germany, France, and Italy) in terms of GDP (in US$) by 2050‖.1224 The main thesis of 
BRIC forecast theory, ―Dreaming with BRICS: The Path to 2050‖,1225 posits on the argument 
that China and India would be the main suppliers of world in terms of good and service while 
Brazil an Russia would be the dominant suppliers of raw materials.
1226
 Following that, the 
BRIC group member states initialized regular meetings at Foreign Ministry Level, taking 
various decisions and turned out to be an international political organization thanks to their 
developing industries and blooming economies with an economic and political influence both 
in regional and global politics.
1227
 In addition to Brazil, Russia, India, and China, in 2010, 
South Africa was included to BRIC group where the acronym was changed to BRICS.
1228
 
Republic of Turkey, as a regional power with global ambitions mostly based its 
foreign policy perspectives to close relations with West as regard to political heritage 
objectives of its founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Nonetheless, particularly within mid 90‘s in 
accordance with the changing paradigms, Turkey initialized an affiliation process with the 
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emerging actors of the world. Turkey‘s foreign policy adminstrators, while focusing their 
attentions to Turkey‘s European Union membership and accelerating convergence prospects 
with United States of America in terms of strategic relations, commenced to develop mostly 
economy and commerce based associations with China and India. As for Brazil, due to the 
distance and weak links in the past, it was difficult to start a strategic relation.  
Throughout its government periods, Justice and Development Party, as regard to its 
new foreign policy discourse aimed to bring a versatile character to foreign policy concept by 
putting a special stress to economic and political relations of Turkey‘s with emerging global 
actors. Doing so, it aimed to enforce multi-dimensional structure of Turkey‘s foreign policy 
and to find wider policy maneuver areas mostly tighten to relations with European Union and 
United States as refer to changing dynamics of the world politics. 
 
1. China  
 
Being a Central Asia nation, the genealogy of Turks relations with China goes back to Han 
Dynasty of China and Hun Empire of Turks.
1229
 The relationship between two countries 
continued during the Tang Dynasty and Göktürk state in Central Asia.1230 Despite of the fact 
that, Ottoman Empire used to be a Balkan - Mediterranean located empire, due to its global 
vision and claims, Ottomans advanced close relevancies with Far East Asian Muslims 
including Muslims
1231
 in China.
1232
 Throughout the reign period, Sultan Abdulhamid II, in 
order to find equilibrium to European politics put a unique focus to Far East and South Asian 
Muslim nations, plus he used his Caliphate authority in order to create deep moves at 
international politics. For instance, Sultan Abdulhamid assigned his special agents to 
encourage Chinese Boxer rebellion,
1233
 which heavily jeopardized English colonies in Far 
East. 
Republic of Turkey officially recognized Peoples Republic of China in 1971, thus 
diplomatic relations between the states established.
1234
 During the Korea war, Turkey and 
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China located at hostile parts and both states throughout the Cold war too were situated at 
adverse sides. In 1984, the preliminary high-level visit took place between Beijing and 
Ankara when Chinese President Li Xiannian settled to Turkey,
1235
 on reply former Turkish 
Prime Minister Turgut Özal settled to China in 1985, in order to pay an official visit.1236 
Succeeding the end of Cold War,
1237
 Turkey‘s head of state Süleyman Demirel strengthened 
relation with China aligning with a deeper dimension to two - sided relations in order to boost 
the collaboration outlooks at information exchange and cultural issues along with to council at 
regional matters. Ankara at this period tried to prevent political actions so as not disturb 
Beijing, on the other hand, at the initial emotional atmosphere raised after many Central Asian 
Turkic states gained sovereignty with the breakdown of Soviet Union. The populist nationalist 
oratory ―Turkish World from Adriatic to China Wall‖1238 pushed Turkey to follow a pro 
Uighur policy supporting Uighur Turks independency and Diaspora‘s activities in Turkey. For 
instance, in a meeting with previous Uighur politicians and activities, former President Turgut 
Özal noted that after the dismantlement of USSR, 1239  it is high time for Uighur Turks to gain 
independency.
1240
 In the thick of the changing general conjecture in the world, former Turkish 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit‘s official visit to Peking has an exceptional place. It was a 
crucial visit as the economic aspect of relations and ―Uighur Turks‖ issue came to into agenda 
of leaders under the framework of this visit. In accordance to talks with China, Turkey 
continued a friendly policy observing Chinese's sensibilities in terms of Chinese integrity and 
acceptance of Beijing as the sole representative of Chine (as regard to China - Taiwan  
conflict).
1241
 
The liaisons between China and Turkey accelerated with the year of 1997,  as Ankara 
intended to enter Chinese market in order to enjoy trade and commerce prospects in Asia 
Pacific market as well as to  asset alternatives at foreign policy and to collect support in 
Cyprus question, therefore  two-sided relations evidenced a blossom at this period. Coalition 
government put a special accent on relations with Chine and in the coalition protocol a 
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phrase caring the relations with China and providing a versatile dynamic to Turkish foreign 
policy.
1242
 Through a secret notice, Turkish government banned the use of East Turkestan 
flags and restricted activities of Uighur Diaspora in Turkey. Besides, 10 members of East 
Turkistan Independence Organization were detained and former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit 
overtly announced that the Uighur issue may not lay as an obstacle throughout the Turkish – 
Chinese relations hinting Turkey‘s new policy approximations toward People‘s Republic of 
China. Thus, Turkish - Chinese relationship speeded up with an aligning bloomed in 1999 - 
2002 periods.
1243
 
In 2000, under the framework of Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Ankara and Beijing 
consented to sign a Joint Communiqué and Energy Cooperation Protocol, and Memorandum 
of Understanding on Economic issues. In addition to that, both sides released a common 
declaration on terrorism as well Turkish Republic rewarded Chinese President with a golden 
medal due to his inputs to bilateral relations.
1244
  As with many other developing countries, 
there is a huge disproportion between the import and export ratio of Chinese - Turkish 
economic relations. Turkey's exportation amount to Chine is roughly 693 million United 
States Dollars, while the import amount is striking 9.6 billion United States Dollars. In order 
to balance detrimental composure versus it, Turkey focuses on tourist flow from China, as 
well appeal to direct investments from China and develop joint ventures with Beijing.
1245
 
It is stated in the party program of AK Party that ―Dynamic economies in Chine and 
South East Asia will be handled on a multiple base and Turkey will work to tighten its 
relations with these countries‖1246 referring to relations with China with a special emphasis on 
economic dimension of bilateral relations. In the 59
th
 Turkish Republic party program 
constituted by AK Party, it was affirmed that ―relations with China will be developed under 
the basement of mutual respect and will be forwarded parallel to this principle‖.1247 However, 
at the 60
th
 government program, which was prepared during the second term of Justice and 
Development Party government, contains the expression ―The developing relations with 
Russia, India, China and Japan, as the key actors of Eurasia are not an alternative for Turkey‘s 
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institutionalized relations with European Union and United States of America‖1248. This 
statement is highly remarkable in order to conceptualize the Justice and Development Party‘s 
approach to relations with East - West balance. 
Shortly after Justice and Development Party‘s accession to rule, first time high-level 
touch took place between the countries, when Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji paid a two-
day official visit to Ankara in 2002. It was, as usual, an economy focused visit and both sites 
signed memorandum of understandings in agriculture, import taxes and information issues
1249
. 
On respond to Prime Minister‘s visit, former Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Gül 
paid a 5 working day official visit to China in 2005. Under the borders of his visit, former FM 
realized high-level meetings with Chinese officials, principally in economic and business 
oriented issues. The imbalance commerce relations between the states and Turkey‘s trade 
tariffs against China came into an agenda as a warm topic during the meetings. 2009 became 
a historic year for Turkish - Chinese relations. After 14 years of the break, Turkish Chief of 
state paid an official visit to China between 24 and 29 June of 2009. It was also immensely 
influential as it was the first highest-level visit undertook during Justice and Development 
Party Government in terms of relations with China. Visiting Beijing as the President of 
Turkey, Abdullah Gül noticed on an interview with Turkish state channel Turkey‘s 
involvement in distant regions of the globe in terms of political and economic relations, while 
highlighted that it does not suggest that Turkey's engagements in South East Asia is an 
alternative preference for Turkey‘s  liaison with EU and USA.1250  
Throughout his visit in Beijing, Turkish President came together with his counterpart 
Hu Jintao, where both states put endorsements on several accords. During his executive visit, 
head of state attended a business council meeting with Turkish business people and Abdullah 
Gül one more time took into the agenda the instable situation of Turkish - China relations in 
terms of commerce and noticed that China has investments worth billions of dollars across the 
world. It made investments worth 90 billion U.S. dollars abroad last year. The country's 
investments in Turkey amount to only 60 million U.S. dollars. Turkey has more investments 
in China‖.1251 He repeatedly dwelled the demand of Chinese direct invest to Turkey and the 
need to boost the number of Chinese tourists to Turkey.  
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On the final leg of Turkish President‘s trip, he visited the Urumqi, the capital of 
Xinjiang - Uighur autonomous region. Abdullah Gül became the first Turkish President who 
visited the Xinjiang autonomous region in history of Turkish - Chinese relations where he met 
with regional authorities and addressed to students of Xinjiang University.
1252
 In an open 
public speech, Turkish President notified, ―Xinjiang constitutes one of the most important 
bonds between the two countries, and that the Uighur people in Xinjiang forms a bridge of 
friendship between China and Turkey‖.1253 
 
2009 July Urumqi Riots  
The Uighur people with a population approximately 9 Million, are ethnic Muslim - 
Turkic group who live in the northwestern part of China chiefly inhabited in Xinjiang - 
Uighur autonomous region.
1254
 The Uighur issue has been a theme of discussion since the 
initial of Turkish - Chinese diplomatic relations. The heavy human right violations, 
assimilation policies of Beijing government against Uighur Turks, demographic changes 
applied to the region, the ethnic tensions between Han Chinese and Uighur Turks, economic 
underdevelopment of the territory, integration problems are the main issues causing the raise 
of tension in the region.
1255
 
Along with Tibet issue, the human right violation concerns in East Turkistan came into 
the agenda of United Nations a couple of times. Regardless of that, Beijing did not accept the 
allegations appreciating it as the internal problem of China as well blamed foreign states to 
agitate the situation and interfering internal affairs of People‘s Republic of China. The Uighur 
question entered to a complete different path after 9/11 terror attacks and gained a more 
international character as China's government issued reports retaining Al Qaida – East 
Turkistan Islamic Movement connection.
1256
 United States of America initially warned 
Beijing not to put press ethnic minorities under the pretext of struggle against terror 
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throughout the military operations held in Afghanistan.
1257
 US forces obtained East Turkistan 
Islamic Movement - Al Qaida connection while arrested Taliban militants with Uighur 
origins, therefore Washington declared many East Turkistan political organizations in 
Diaspora as illegal as well as added them into terrorist organizations list. Moreover, United 
Nation as well applied the similar policy of United States of America the result of which 
narrowed Uighur Turks struggle against Chine.
1258
 
Along with other world countries, Uighur issue as well caused concerns of Turkey due 
to its ethnic and religious affinity to Uighur Turks. The Uighur community residing in Turkey 
and nationalist - Islamist fractions ceaselessly became a press factor for Turkish governments. 
Yet, Ankara as regard to fragile construction of the issue, favored to advent to East Turkistan 
question as an internal matter of Peoples‘ Republic of China. On the other hand, Turkish 
Republic, constantly hesitated to engage with Uighur problem due to its Kurdish separatist 
problem, as well as owing to the fact that China being a constant United Nations member and 
Peking‘s support for Turkish thesis in Cyprus issue. These factors always stimulated Ankara 
to approach Uighur Turks question delicately in order not to deteriorate the sensitive relations 
with China. 
 Due to ethnic tension raising in the course of history of the region between Han 
Chinese and Uighur Turks (% 45 Uighur Turks and % 40 Han Chinese) the East Turkistan 
gradually draw to a chaos atmosphere.
1259
 In 2009, first flame of ethnic conflict – though 
there existed similar cases previously - of ethnic conflict fired in the violence incident in 
Shaougan city at Guangdong region. A group of Uighur Turks who went to work to the region 
was alleged for raping a Han woman and due to raised rumors in the city Han Chinese 
attacked to Uighur killing 2 men in the incidents between 25 and 26 June. As respond to 
incidents, at the capital of Xinjiang region Urumqi, ethnic Uighur Turks commenced to 
organize protest against the killings and oppressive politics of Chinese government. The 
Uighur Turks hitting number of 1000 initially gathered to protest the incident, however at the 
following phases of protest, the action turned out to be a riot where the angry crowds targeted 
Han Chinese watching the protests. The crowd attacked Han Chinese to beat to death and 
burn cars, shops and houses of Han Chinese. When the incident was heard in the Han discreet, 
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in respond to Uighurs they as well started to attack Uighur Turks, therefore the incidents 
turned out to be the most bloody ethnic conflict in the history of region.
1260
  
As a reaction to riot Chinese police intervened in order to take control and the incident 
ended with the toll of 197 dead and 1.721 injured. The severe attitude of Beijing government 
against the protesters was harshly criticized by Human Rights Watchdogs and Uighur 
Diaspora at abroad. The Chinese armed force deployed to region was criticized for practicing 
disproportional violence against the Uighur protester and aftermath searches realized in 
Uighur districts, while regional authorities blamed them for reacting slow deliberately in 
order to prevent Han Chinese attacks against Uighur regions.
1261
 Beijing and Ankara, 
achieved a positive economic and political affinity in recent years with Justice and 
Development Party and this accelerations yielded with Turkish Presidents historical visit to 
China. Thus, the most important and attracting part of 2009 June riot was the Turkish 
Presidents historical visit to China and Xinjiang region. The 2009 Urumqi incidents from the 
very first stages reflected widely in Turkish media, particularly the nationalist wing of mass 
media, which put a special emphasis on East Turkistan (Uighur Turks) issue. On the other 
hand, the opposition parties criticized JDP government to keep motionless against Urumqi 
massacres while mass protests in various Turkish cities supported by conservatives, 
nationalist and Islamist put a heavy pressure on AK Party government.  
Ankara, in the course of history with China had kept silence many times when similar 
cases occurred, when China violated human rights of Uighur Turks severely. Previous 
Turkish governments preferred to call Xinjiang as an integral part of China and put a stance 
toward the related issues, nevertheless this time; Ankara followed a totally unorthodox path 
and from the top level of government criticized Beijing. Turkish Prime Minister along with 
President Hu Jintao (due to unrest Chinese President returned to Beijing leaving the summit 
suddenly) was attending the G - 8 summit in Italy and there called the events as ―almost 
genocide‖ and asked China to stop assimilation against Uighur minority, while President Gül 
called the events as ―massacre‖ 1262. Turkish PM asked Chinese government not to remain as 
a spectator to the incidents. He continued his critics saying, ―No state, no society that attacks 
the lives and rights of innocent civilians can guarantee its security and prosperity. Whether 
they are Turkic Uighurs or Chinese, we cannot tolerate such atrocities. The suffering of the 
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Uighurs is ours‖1263. He noticed that Turkey, as a non-permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council, was determined to bring the issue of the Chinese crackdown onto 
the council's agenda.
1264
 Erdoğan, upon return to home, during an interview on a private TV 
channel comment the incident as ―the incidents in China are, simply but, genocide. There‘s no 
point in interpreting this otherwise‖.1265 
The unexpected attitude of Turkish President supported by the high rank members of 
Justice and Development Party as some AK Party members of Turkish – China Friendship 
Group as some ministers suggested boycotting goods made in China. One additional reaction 
of Turkish government as respond to the incidents was Rebiya Kadeer. Rebiya Kadeer is an 
influential figure in Uighur issue living in political exile in United States. Being a millionaire 
businesswoman as well the advocate of Uighur question, Kadeer is also the President of 
World Uighur Congress. In 2009 riot events, the name of Kadeer came into public view often 
as Chinese government accused her to mastermind and provoke the ethnic separatism. Rebiya 
Kadeer applied two times for a Turkish visa but Ankara in order not to influence her relations 
with China refused her visa demands, but Justice and Development Party from the highest 
level (Prime Minister) told that if she wants to visit Turkey again a visa should be issued 
signaling an invitation to Turkey, which did not take place. 
 The official respond to Turkish government‘s sour criticism came trough diplomatic 
channels from China demanding withdrawal Erdoğan‘s words blaming Peking administration 
to undertake genocide.
1266
 The state owned China Daily evaluated Turkish Prime Minister‘s 
words ―irresponsible and groundless‖1267 hinting that majority victim of incidents were Han 
Chinese. The most interesting part of the article was the suggestion for China as a respond to 
Turkish Prime Minister Outcry to support Kurdish separatism and accept so called Armenian 
Genocide proposal. The Foreign Affairs Minister of China called Ahmet Davutoğlu in order 
to convey his sorrow related with Turkish Prime Minister‘s words and asked to retract these 
harsh comments. Beijing, to restore spoiled relations with Turkey sent a high-level diplomat 
to Ankara. Qin Gang, the spokesman of Chinese Foreign Ministry underlined the fact that in 
the incident more Han Chinese dead than Uighurs and it could not be called as genocide.  In 
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addition to that, China dismissed Turkish Prime Minister‘s proposal in order to discuss 
Urumqi events in United Nations Security Council.
1268
 
On contrary to bitter critics of Turkish Prime Minister, Turkish Foreign Affair 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu approached the case cold bloodedly and diplomatically. In the 
turmoil of tense moments of crisis, Turkish diplomacy conveyed concerns of Turkey via 
diplomatic channels and through a telephone conversation lasted 1 hour and 15 minutes 
affirmed his counterpart that Turkey did not want to interfere with internal issues  of China, 
Turkish FM also stressed Turkey‘s high respect toward territorial integrity of China. He added 
that the Uighur Turks constitutes a bridge for dialogue and close relations with China, while 
affirmed that Turkey hands the issue from human rights perspective, plus conveyed his wishes 
to investigate the issue quickly. As for the indignation in Turkish media and public, Minister 
connected it to Turkey‘s affinities with Uighur Turks and appreciated it as the sensitiveness of 
Turkish society. Both Ministers as well agreed to send a Turkish journalist delegation in order 
to visit places where incidents took place.
1269
 
Following the strained period of relations due to 2009 Urumqi riots, Turkish - Chinese 
relations soon reconciled and high-level visits along with bilateral agreements signature 
restarted. In October 2010, Chinese Prime Minister Ven Ciabao visited Ankara. Under the 
frames of visit, both sides signed agreements in trade and technology issues. Chinese PM met 
with his Turkish counterpart where both Prime Ministers pledged to realize high speed rail 
way project which will connect Turkish capital to Istanbul. Besides, the historical Silk Road 
connecting both countries in terms of mercantile relations initialized to revitalize due to Silk 
Road Railway, which aims to connect China with Turkey. After the tensions of last year for 
many observers and political analysts, the visit of Chinese Prime Minister accepted as the 
initial of Turkish - Chinese strategic partnership.  
In October 2010, Turkey invited Chinese jets to take part in Anatolian Eagle military 
exercise which held in Turkish territory, what made the issue more controversial was Chinese 
air forces used air space of Iran. In October again, the Interior Minister of Turkish Republic 
visited Peoples‘ Republic of China in order to develop bilateral relations between security 
forces of countries in the struggle against illegal narcotic trafficking. In the November of 
2010, Chinese and Turkish armies underwent a joint training, which was recorded to history 
                                                 
1268
 ―China Dismiss Turkish PM‘s Genocide Remarks‖, Hürriyet Daily News, 14 July 2009.   
1269
 ―Turkish Foriegn Minister Davutoglu Talk to His Chinese Counterpart on the Phone‖, 
 (source:www.aa.com.tr,<http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkish-foreign-minister-davutoglu-talks-to-his-chinese-
counterpart-on-the.html>, April 2011). 
 244 
as China deploying armies to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member state territory for 
the first time.
1270
 
Following that, Turkish Minister of Trade Zafer Cağlayan settled to China in order to 
soften tensed relations due to Urumqi riots, though the mutual critics of statesmen, the trade 
and commerce relations did not severely harmed, which signified Turkey‘s intention to 
continue good will relations with Beijing that worsen due to public remarks of Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan. Cağlayan visit caused different commentaries in Turkish and Chinese media. 
Chinese evaluated Trade Minister‘s visit as Turkey‘s initiatives to ameliorate relations while 
Turkish media approached it as the high-level conveyer to pass Turkish concerns on the 
Uighur issue.
1271
 Shortly after the visit of Ven Ciabao, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu paid a six-day long visit to China in 20101272. Turkish Minister visited Beijing, 
Shanghai along with Urumqi and Kashgar. The visit was highly important as Davutoğlu 
started his visit from Urumqi and Kasghar, which was symbolically important in order to 
indicate China‘s good will, trust and intention to develop close relations with Turkey as 
Beijing previously permit Turkish parliamentarian delegation, Turkish journalists and state 
minister for Foreign Trade. The visit of Davutoğlu evidenced many first time events; for 
instance during Ahmet Davutoğlu‘s first leg of visit in Urumqi, he attended a Friday prayer in 
central mosque of Urumqi along with Uighur Muslims though Chinese officials passed their 
security concerns. The Kashgar visit was meaningful in order to understand new level of 
relations as Kashgar was a symbolic city in Turkish - Islam tradition which hosts many 
historic personalities important for Turkey, moreover Ahmet Davutoğlu visited the tombs of 
Mahmud al Kashgari the prominent Turkish scholar and lexicographer of Turkish language 
and Yusuf Balasaghun an important Turkish writer and philosopher.
1273
 Though symbolically, 
the visits to historic places were important as coincided with the Urumqi riots, hence the 
Uighur question commenced to be a secondary issue between Turkish - Chinese relations. The 
visit of Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister played a crucial role in the process of reconciliation 
of relations with China as Turkey publicly declared its idea to open a consulate in Urumqi, 
which was a political taboo till the current level of relations. 
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2. India  
 
As a nation, Turks‘ relations with India go back to the medieval era as many Turkish 
originated tribes established various state in different scales in today‘s India. Among these 
states, Ghaznavids and Babur states played an important role in the history of India, while 
Turkic people contributed a lot to Indian culture, literature, language civilization, art, 
architecture and cuisine of India.
1274
 During the Ottoman Empire bilateral relations continued 
and first diplomatic relations took place in 15
th
 century, because Ottoman Empire was holding 
Caliphate institution, there appeared a constant relation between Indian Muslims and Ottoman 
Empire. Toward the collapse period of Ottoman Empire, the level of relations experienced a 
decrease, however, Indian Muslims supported materially (providing huge amounts of gold 
and cash) Ottoman Empire during the very heavy moments of Balkan and Turkish 
Independence War periods thanks to which Turks favored in the course of independence war. 
The diplomatic relations between Turkish Republic and Republic of India was established 
shortly after India gained of independence in 1947.
1275
 Since then, mutual relations between 
both states developed gradually. Both India and Turkey being democratic and secular states 
and part of G-20 reinforced bilateral relations thanks to high-level visits of head of states.  
Mutual relations gained a positive momentum with 1990‘s and from each side high-
level visits including that of Prime Ministers and Presidents took place. Due to strategic 
location of India, Turkey and India cooperated in Central Asia, Afghanistan, naval issues and 
war against terrorism. Besides there exist many dialogue mechanism between Turkey and 
India in order to coordinate political and economic relations. As for commerce and economic 
relations, on contrary to the close relations between the states the economic relations followed 
a low profile. Within 1990‘s due to developed relations there was a mobility parallel to 
political affiliation.
 1276
 Turkey - India relations in the course of history highly influenced 
India - Pakistan conflict on Kashmir, because Pakistan was a close of alliance and supporter 
of Turkey in many international issues like Cyprus, Turkey always attentively observed 
Pakistan‘s priorities and shaped her relations in accordance with these sensibilities. Sarah 
Akram regarding Turkish - Indian reciprocal relations notifies: 
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           Both the countries have expanding economies, growing industrial infrastructures and the attention 
of global powers trying to make important investments in their potential. Previously, the Cold War 
strategic calculus kept both the countries at a significant distance, along with the Pakistan factor, 
as Pakistan and Turkey have enjoyed strong ties and Turkey‘s historic support of Pakistan in its 
stance on the Kashmir issue has also been an irritant in Indo-Turkish cooperation. Similarly, 
Turkey‘s military ties with Pakistan have also been a stumbling block and prevented the two 
countries from coming closer to each other in the past.
1277
 
 
However, after the new conjecture emerged after the Cold War, India commenced to occupy a 
central place in Asian politics, becoming second crowded world country and increasing 
economic power turned to be a global actor with an increasing influence. Thus, with 1990‘s 
Turkey gradually shifted her traditional distinctive towards India, while continued to held her 
tight relations with Pakistan with whom Turkey has many cooperation in terms of struggle 
against terror, Central Asia politics and Afghanistan. 
` With Justice and Development Party‘s coming to power in Turkey, new political 
attitude of Ankara towards New Delhi continued in the same line in comparison to previous 
Turkish governments. The level of economic and commerce relations initialized to be 
compensated, furthermore parallel to Justice and Development Party‘s new foreign policy 
alternatives Ankara prioritized Turkish - Indian relations to increase trade volume, while 
developing political affiliations. It is an undeniable fact that, since AK Party, there were high-
level visits between Ankara and New Delhi but Justice and Development Party‘s new rhetoric 
and attempts to practice this new foreign policy discourse brought outcomes that are more 
fruitful at this period. At this perspective, AK Party‘s policies toward South Asian countries 
including India brought a new dynamic to Turkish foreign policy at this period. 
Parallel to this, Justice and Development Party in order to accelerate economic 
relations with India and other South Asian countries launched ―The Trade and Economic 
Relation Development Strategy with Asia Pacific Countries‖,1278 and put a special stress on 
trade issues with India. Since Justice and Development Party‘s constituting the government 
2002 high-level visits from Indian side gradually increased in comparison to past. However, 
neither at Indian Prime Minister nor President visited Turkey. Turkish Prime Minister paid a 
Three day visit to India in 2008 and Turkish President went to India in 2010. Since 2002, 
Turkey hosted various Indian Minister mostly economy, trade and commerce related issues 
like the visits of; Culture and Tourism Minister‘s (2002), Commerce and Industry Minister‘s 
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(2009) or Minister of Textiles in 2009.
1279
 As respond previous visits, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Ali Babacan and State Minister responsible for Foreign Trade visited India. Between 
21 and 24 November 2008, Erdoğan paid an official visit to India, 8 years after former Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit. During Prime Minister‘s visit, State Minister, Minister of Commerce 
and Industry, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources took place at the official delegation 
of Turkey, along with a huge number of business people – which turned out to be a tradition 
during the Justice and Development Party government- seeking business opportunities in 
Indian market.    
Turkish Prime Minister met with Indian President Prathiba Patil and his counterpart 
Manmohan Sing along with Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherje. As it was uttered by 
Turkish Prime Minister, the top agenda of the visit was developing economic and trade 
relations between Turkey and India. Erdoğan during the press conference held after his 
meeting mentioned the historical affinity between the states and stressed the fact that there is 
no present political conflict between two countries. He appreciated India as a global actor 
highly determinative both in regional and global politics and suggested to increase 
cooperation prospect with Turkey due to strategic importance of Turkey that deepened during 
their government.
1280
 He invited Indian Businessmen to invest to Turkey, reminding Turkey‘s 
role as a civilization bridge and geopolitical location situating at a strategic point linking 
energy resources between East and West. Under the frame of his visit, Turkish Prime Minister 
attended the Turkish - Indian Forum. He underlined Turkey‘s eagerness to increase trade 
volume between India and informed journalist about the works in order to create a free trade 
zone between the states. Among one of attracting points of the visit was New Delhi‘s wish to 
take part at Turkish - Israeli Med Stream Project. Hilmi Güler, Minister of Energy and 
Natural Resources stated that Turkey Israel and India initialized talks on joint project planned 
to accomplish in 2011 proposing to connect Red Sea to Turkish Ceyhan Port. In addition to 
that, Turkish and Indian sides conducted executive talks on nuclear issue due to India‘s 
experience in nuclear energy in accordance to Turkey‘s nuclear program in order to produce 
alternative energy supplies for domestic market. 
Following the Prime Minister‘s visit, second high-level visit to India was paid by 
Turkish President two years after, in 2010. Under the frame of his South Asia visit program - 
parallel to Turkey‘s new South Asia openings - President Gül as the first stop of his visit went 
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to India. As it was expected, the main agenda of Turkish President was economy and trade 
issues, additionally the cultural issues as well came to agenda as at the Turkish delegation 
were present famous Turkish director seeking cooperation with Indian movie sector.
1281
 The 
timing of Turkish President‘s was significant as it was coinciding India‘s ignorance of 
invitation to Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia held in Istanbul due to 
Pakistan‘s suggestions. Turkish President coming together with his counterpart expressed 
Turkey‘s attitudes and invited India to upcoming events, while on the other hand Turkish 
Foreign Affairs informed Turkey‘s stance in order to keep the delicate balance momentum in 
the region. Following his meeting with Indian President, Abdullah Gül came together with 
opposition leaders and continued his visit in Bombay where he realized economy and trade 
weighted meetings. 
President Abdullah Gül, throughout his stay in India came together with Turkish 
business people who have different investments in the region. Referring to India‘s growing 
economy and huge population potential and increasing power of India in world politics as a 
global actor Gül promised to solve all trade and economy related problems of Turkish 
businesspersons in Turkey like visa easement, and free trade agreement with India.
1282
 
Following his meetings, Turkish President went to Bangladesh. The trade volume between 
India and Turkey increased relatively during Justice and Development Party government. In 
2010, Turkish export to India has increased 47 % in comparison to 2009 hitting 606 Million 
US Dollars, as import percentage as well increased 79 % hitting 3.4 Billion US Dollars. In 
spite of the developing relations in terms of trade and economy, Turkey now has a 
disadvantageous shortcoming in import - export balance with India.
1283
 Therefore, Justice and 
Development Party government launched different mechanisms in order to turn current trade 
volume toward Turkey‘s advantage; like Turkish - Indian Business Forum which held in  
Istanbul (2009) or Turkish - Indian Joint Economic Commission took place in Ankara and 
Indian - Turkish Cooperation Platform held in New Delhi.
1284
 In addition to that, opening a 
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Turkish consulate in Bombay as the heart of business in India was an indicator of Turkey‘s 
endeavors in order to create maximum cooperation with India in economic meaning.    
On the other hand, Turkey seeking advantageous opportunities for Turkish companies 
at transport sector in Indian market as India is the second most crowded country in the world, 
which has a very low rate of communication and transport possibilities. Another attempt of 
Turkey during this period was to promote tourism and recreation opportunities in Indian 
market, thus there will be a stable increase at Indian tourist quantity visiting Turkey as it 
reached 63. 000 people in 2011.
1285
 Justice and Development Party throughout its reign paid 
an exceptional attention to Turkey‘s relations with third states and emerging global actors of 
the world along with other regions that Turkey used to have poor relations. From this 
perspective, South East Asian and Far East Asian, countries like China and India settled top-
level agenda of Ankara between 2002 and 2011 period. 
In spite of the fact that, in the course of reciprocal relations between China, the Uighur 
Turks issue did not come to the agenda and Turkish statesmen called China‘s attitude as a 
massacre, the trade and commerce side of Turkish- China's relations did not experience  
negative impact on contrary to expectations. Turkish foreign policy under AK Party 
administration developed high-level economic relations between Beijing and signed strategic 
agreements in terms of communication, transport, energy issues. One attracting feature of 
developing mutual relations and trust between the countries was the high-level of Turkish 
officials visit to East Turkistan, which was accepted as a political taboo in the framework of 
Turkish - China's relations previously. 
Turkey - Brazil relations, which did not indicate a sign of healing since mid 90‘s hit its 
top level during Justice and Development Party government and Brazil, became Turkish most 
close ally not only in regional politics but also in global issue. Thanks to the latest 
achievements that took place in terms of relations with Brazil. Turkey entered to South 
America market slowly while both countries displayed a good performance in Iranian nuclear 
crisis engaging to a long lasted problem and gained an advantageous position. Additionally, 
Turkey and Brazil agreed on much energy related issues along with starting joint venture 
projects in third-world countries. Turkish policies toward India since AK Party mostly 
engaged to Pakistani reserves gained an independent feature at this term as JDP foreign policy 
makers succeed to explain Turkey‘s position diplomatically to Pakistani colleagues. Ankara 
interested in realizing investments in the India's market effort to turn negative balance 
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equilibrium, sought transport based investments in India while promoted Turkish tourism and 
recreation opportunities in Indian market. 
 
3. Brazil  
 
Turkey‘s relations with Brazil date back to Ottoman Empire, when both states signed a 
friendship, trade and maritime agreement in 1888 in London. Due to Brazil‘s immigration 
policies toward the latest period of Ottoman Empire, many Ottoman citizens particularly from 
Syria and Lebanon immigrated to Brazil, which gained a deeper dimension to relations. After 
the collapse of Ottoman Empire, Turkish Republic and Brazil singed a friendship in Rome 
and both states opened their diplomatic missions in capitals in the following years. 
As a consequence of the distance and rare contacts like many other Latin American 
countries, Turkey could not develop tense frequency economic, political and diplomatic 
relations with Brazil. Furthermore, because of low-level associations, the basic trade 
agreements easing the trade opportunities between the countries did not overcame, therefore 
the trade volume between the Brazil and Turkey remained a relatively low level far below 
from real potential of countries. Being a prominent political and economic actor in Latin 
America and a global power in world politics particularly after the 1990, Brazil entered 
Turkish Foreign policy agenda in recent years. The low-level relations relatively accelerated 
thanks to historical visit of former Turkish President Süleyman Demirel, who became the first 
Turkish President visiting Brazil in 1995, he also visited other Latin American countries like 
Chile and Argentina. Following the visit of Turkish President, in 1998 former Turkish 
Foreign Minister Ismail Cem too paid an official visit to Brazil.
1286
  
With the Justice and Development Party‘s taking the power, the relations between 
Turkey and Brazil gained a more dynamic feature, first of all the direction of  reciprocal 
relations focused on economy and trade, secondly though gradually it gave more 
opportunities in terms of political cooperation‘s and partnership prospects. Similar openings 
of AK Party‘s foreign policy decision makers were parallel to multi dimensional foreign 
policy concept and in order to favor Latin American markets, plus to develop tighter 
economic and trade oriented relations with Latin America region.  
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In 2003, Defense Minister of Justice and Development paid an official visit to Brazil 
where both states signed a common defense agreement.
1287
 Thanks to goodwill based 
relations between the parliamentary friendship commissions of Turkey and Brazil a Joint 
Economic Commission Mechanism was built, hence first meeting of the Joint Economic 
Commission Mechanism met in October of 2004, to the first meeting of joint commission, 
Finance Minister of Justice and Development Party attended. On respond, Development, 
Industry and Foreign Trade Minister of Brazil visited Ankara in order to talk with Turkish 
counterparts in terms of economic and trade relations.  
In 2006, former Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül paid an official visit to 
Federative Republic of Brazil due to the invitation of Brazilian Foreign Minister along with a 
crowded delegation constituted of Ministers responsible foreign trade and business people 
seeking business opportunities in Brazil. Under the frames of his official visit, he met with 
Brazilian officials including Industry and Foreign Trade Minister, his counterpart Celso 
Amorim and former President Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva in capital Brasilia. After the former 
Foreign Minister Gül‘s meeting with Celso Amorim, both states signed a memorandum of 
understanding on creating a ―High Level Cooperation Commission‖ and ―Cooperation 
between the Diplomacy Academies of Foreign Ministries‖.1288Additionally, Abdullah Gül in 
order to accelerate Turkey‘s relations with South American countries organized a 
coordination meeting with incumbent Turkish embassies on duty in Latin American countries. 
During the second step of his visit, Foreign Affairs Minister, Gül visited Sao Paolo where he 
attended opening ceremony of Turkish Consulate in Sao Paolo and attended the first meeting 
of Turkish - Brazil Joint Business Council. Turkish FM as well visited Brazil‘s world famous 
airplane factory Empraer in order to seek alternatives for Turkey in terms of airplane tenders. 
Justice and Development Party, starting in 2006 reactivated the Action Plan for Latin 
America, which was initialized in 1998 after the series of meeting held in Foreign Affairs 
ministry analyzing the region from all aspects thanks to brainstorming of high-level 
bureaucrats, honorary consulates, academicians and specialist in order to develop fruitful 
relations with South American region countries. During his visit Abdullah Gül reminded this 
Action for Latin America plan aiming to focus political, economic, commerce, trade relations 
with South American countries. 
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On May 20 - 23, 2009, President of Federative Republic of Brazil visited Turkey with 
a delegation of Economy ministers and businessmen; it was the first time visit in the course of 
bilateral relations on head of state level. Economic issues between the states was occupying 
top level agenda of President Lula da Silva, hence his official visit commenced in Istanbul 
where he met with Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges, Minister of Finance, and 
attended the special session of Business Partnership Seminary organized by Foreign 
Economic Relations Council. Brazilian President also met with Turkish Prime Minister and 
attended Turkish - Brazilian Business Council meeting in accordance with his program in 
Istanbul.
1289
  
 Turkish President and his Brazilian counterpart met in Ankara in order to realize talks 
in bilateral and international issues along with economy and trade. Both Presidents announced 
that Turkish and Brazilian state owned energy companies agreed to sign an agreement for oil 
and natural exploration in Black Sea. President Gül as well conveyed his concerns on the 
necessity of a free trade agreement in order to eliminate trade barriers between the states 
blocking the development of larger trade volumes. Apart from the cooperation, prospects held 
in energy sector, an affiliation as well provided in aviation sector.
1290
 A high-level director 
taking part in Brazilian delegation realized talks with the officers of Turkish state owned 
Aviation Company Turkish Airlines and the director undertook talks for future projects like 
producing jets through cooperation projects. Furthermore, high-level talks took place between 
the officials of both states in order to realize joint projects in third states. Shortly after the 
historic visit of Brazilian President, in July 2009, Foreign Trade Minister of Turkey paid a 6 
day visit to Brazil and Chile along with Turkish businesspersons seeking business 
opportunities in South America. On respond, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim visited Ankara. 
 With the emergence of Iran‘s nuclear program crisis the current relations line between 
Turkey and Brazil gained an entire different character. As it has been mentioned previously, 
the Iranian nuclear program became a hot debate since Geneva talks. A reasonable solution 
template was achieved as Tehran accepted to enrich its uranium in France and Russia at these 
countries after realizing the required procedure send back it to Iran. Nonetheless, due to 
conservative press directed to government in domestic politics and distrust to international 
community in Iran the conversion and stocking of uranium issue entered to a deadlock. As a 
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result, due to mutual trust shortcomings Tehran tried different methods like proposing to 
barter uranium in the territories of Iran, or to barter it in different amounts, to realize barter in 
third countries like Turkey, Brazil or Japan.
1291
 Hence, Turkey and Brazil commenced to 
engage to Iran‘s nuclear program issue gradually as Turkey did not want a following military 
intervention like Iraq which potentially threatens its political and economic stability.    
Turkey and Brazil at the very critical moment of deadlocked talks engaged to process 
and initialized a tight diplomacy attempt, on contrary to United States and international 
community pressures insisting putting heavy sanctions or economic enforcements against 
Iran. Both states stood on the idea to hold further talks with Iran instead of isolating it from 
international community. The initiatives commenced by Brazil and Turkey appraised by some 
states while others approached it suspiciously appreciating it as Iran‘s time gain tactics. 
Turkey and Brazil coexisting under the roof of United Nations with veto right a controversial 
process in order to provide a dialogue ground with Iran. In April, shortly after Turkish Prime 
Minister paid a visit to Brazil to evaluate current situation regarding Iranian issue along with 
other related issue, FM paid a visit. After the meeting with his counterpart Amorim, Turkish 
FM Davutoğlu announced that Turkey and Brazil had common intention in terms of Iran‘s 
nuclear plan though did not share the details with public. He also added that, Turkey and 
Brazil in Foreign Affairs level organized mini summits with President Obama conveying their 
attitudes related to the issue. As regard to matter, Turkish Foreign Minister underlined the fact 
that it was not a newly initiated attempt to overcome trust problem existing Iran and among 
third countries, plus stressed the necessity of diplomatic solution of the question.
1292
  
Following the talks held among Iran, Brazil and Turkey, officials from Tehran 
declared that they could discuss the details with Brazil and Turkey in a triple meeting. Shortly 
after the declaration the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Iran and Brazil came together in Tehran 
in order to discuss uranium barter issue in details. In order to find a common solution, the 
ministers undertook talks lasting in 2,5 hours after which continued by high-level special 
technocrats of three countries. One more time in order to resolute Iran‘s nuclear program 
crisis, Foreign Affairs Ministers of Iran, Turkey and Brazil came together in Tehran and 
discussed the solution proposals. After 18 hours of talks, the sites agreed on an understanding 
framework. After long hours of talks, Turkey and Iran urged Iran to accept International 
Atomic Energy Association‘s barter plan with five constant members of United Nation plus 
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Germany. (5 +1). Following active hours and meetings at Turkish Foreign Ministry parallel to 
Tehran, Turkish Prime Minister postponed his visit to Azerbaijan and fled to Iran in order to 
take part at the signature ceremony of Iran‘s nuclear resolution along with Brazilian President 
Da Silva.  
The so-called fuel swap deal was proposing a great amount of uranium which was 
enriched in Iran firstly to Turkey and then to Russia or France. Iran would give 1200 kg 
uranium as deposit to Turkey on condition that Tehran might get all these uranium at one 
time, which was put on agreement text as ―In case the provisions of this Declaration are not 
respected Turkey, upon the request of Iran, will return swiftly and unconditionally Iran's LEU 
to Iran‖.1293 While all similar barters would take place in Turkey. Turkish side announced her 
pleasure related to sign of agreement stressing the success of diplomacy, while Davutoğlu 
called it as a historic event as there will be no need for United Nations sanctions against 
Iran.
1294
  
The agreement held thanks to endeavors of Turkey and Brazil surprised United States 
of America and those parties who supported the United Nation sanctions against Iran, while 
Russia and China approached the deal attentively. State Secretary Hilary Clinton appreciated 
the deal as Iranian tactics in order to evade upcoming United Nations sanctions and softly 
criticized Turkey‘s and Brazil‘s engagement to the Iran case, though both states well aware of 
the fact that unless meeting requirements of US it is very difficult to achieve a constant deal 
in Iran‘s nuclear program -. Notwithstanding to the fact that the resolution model United 
States of America was quite similar to deal agreed now with Iran  - Turkey and Brazil but 
could not achieved due to trust shortcoming between Iran and international community. What 
made the agreement highly crucial was the fact that, Iran accept 1200 kg uranium be kept in 
Turkey, it would not have changed to create a bomb as it does not have Low Enriched 
Uranium, thus the deal was quite crucial against the claims and fears of Iran‘s possibility to 
use low enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb. Another, important feature of the 
agreement was the affiliation between Turkey and Brazil as emerging global actors 
undertaking cooperative indispensable projects in Middle East, and the fact that after five 
years of talks on Iran‘s nuclear program the resolution axis shifted from Transatlantic - 
European to Turkish - Brazilian side.  
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Turkish - Brazilian affiliation strengthening with the signature of Iranian nuclear 
program resolution brought the Turkish and Brazil issues to world agenda as the new 
indispensable global actors who achieved to take initiatives in third issues indirectly to 
bilateral relations. The developing relations gained a deeper dimension with the historic visit 
of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‘s to Brazil. Erdoğan in order to attend 
Third session of Civilization‘s Alliance meeting, which held in Brazil between 28 and 29 May 
2010  went to Brazil along with ministers of Foreign Affairs, Culture and Tourism, Transport, 
Energy and Natural Resources, Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Trade Minister which was 
openly indicating the importance of visit for Turkish  Brazilian bilateral relations. 
 Under the frames of the visit, both sites agreed to sign a memorandum of 
understanding preventing double taxation, which was the most important trade barrier 
between Brazil and Turkey. Thanks to personal initiatives of Former President Da Silva 
Turkey and Brazil had signed a Free Trade Agreement. Turkey also signed trade treaty with 
other South American countries like Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina. Erdoğan being the 
first Prime Minister, who visited Brazil, came together with former Brazilian President under 
the frame of Civilization Alliance meeting. Turkish Prime Minister, in order to seek 
alternative business opportunities came together with Brazilian businesspersons and visited 
Brazilian aircraft factory. Following that, he attended the inauguration ceremony of Turkish 
consulate in Sao Paolo along with Turkey Export Goods Fair that held first time by Istanbul 
Chamber of Commerce in order to promote Turkish products in Mercosur region. During the 
meeting of Turkish - Brazilian Business forum, Turkish Prime Minister, for the first time 
mentioned that Turkey and Brazil are improving their relations and the aim of the bilateral 
relations is to constitute a strategic partnership.
1295
 At the same session Turkish Minister was 
responsible for foreign trade stressed the business possibilities between the states while 
underline that Turkey and Brazil are not opponents in terms of trade.
1296
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Republic of Turkey as a natural consequence of the new demands that emerged at global 
politics level adopted its foreign policy priorities to be compatible with the new conjecture. 
Turkey‘s foreign policy decision makers who used to be highly engaged with West in terms 
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of foreign policy relations (European Union and United States) particularly with the start of 
1990 initialized to seek close affiliations with the new actors of the world emerging as global 
actors both influential in regional and global politics. The main motivation of Turkey‘s 
foreign policy makers was to gain alternative options for Turkey‘s foreign policy that solely 
engaged to one dimension as well as to enrich negotiations with EU and to find alternative 
economic and trade opportunities as regard to changing dynamics. 
  Justice and Development Party, similarly to traditional line of Turkey‘s foreign policy 
line during its government periods followed a resembling foreign policy towards the emerging 
global actors. Yet, in this period Turkish - Chinese relations dissimilar to past experienced a 
tough challenge due to Uighur Turks in the course of Urumqi riots. AK Party, unlike to 
previous Turkish governments explicitly expressed its position as regard to issue and publicly 
criticized Peking administration. Following the incidents, bilateral agreements tensed due to 
Urumqi riots healed due to initiatives of Turkish Foreign Ministry and high-level visits 
realized by Turkish authorities including the Uighur region. Apart from that, Justice and 
Development Party tried to balance trade deficit against Turkey tough an abstract progress 
was not recorded. 
Turkey - Brazil relations that followed a low profile due to the distance between 
countries, during Justice and Development Party experienced a remarkable advancement. 
Thanks to engagement took place between the states regarding Iran nuclear crisis both 
countries took the initiative during the talks that was drawn to deadlock. Ankara and Brasilia 
gained an advantageous position in international arena sideling both EU and Russia in the 
course of talks. Besides, thanks to liaisons realized with Brazil, Turkey during Justice and 
Development Party government period entered South American markets gradually. 
When it comes to relations with India, in the course of government period between 
2002 and 2011, Turkish - Indian relations did not experienced a radical shift in comparison to 
past. Yet, at this period, Ankara initialized to develop more policies independent of Pakistani 
reservations as regard to relations with India.  
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Chapter VII 
Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy of the 
Justice and Development Party Governments in 2002-2011 
 
 
The chapter analyzes Turkey‘s foreign policy relations with its Eastern, Western and Northern 
connections along with emerging global actors in the course of Justice and Development 
Party governments in 2002–2011 periods. The main objective of the chapter is to evaluate 
general character of Turkey‘s foreign policy in a comparative manner regarding the traditional 
line of foreign policy concept of Turkey. The first section of the chapter analyzes Turkey‘s 
relations with the East. The second section dissects relations with the West, while the third 
section examines Turkey‘s relations with its Northern direction. The fourth and final section 
of the chapter analyzes Republic of Turkey‘s relations with the emerged global actors like 
China, India and Brazil in Justice and Development Party rule in 2002-2011. 
 
1. Relations with the East 
 
Due to the Islamist roots of ruling AKP, the controversies regarding the axis shift of Turkey‘s 
foreign policy occupied a huge volume of agenda in this period. Therefore, the Eastern 
connection of Turkey‘s foreign policy as similar to relations with the West became a theme of 
debate in the course of AK Party‘s office period in 2002-2011. Regarding Turkey‘s increasing 
affiliation with Middle East, AK Party foreign policy decision makers permanently advocated 
the point that, initiatives of Republic of Turkey aim to gain a deeper dimension to Turkey‘s 
foreign policy in order to reinforce its European Union negotiation as the EU would prefer a 
Turkey with a minimum problem with is vicinity. Besides, high rank AKP foreign policy 
makers repeatedly underlined that a similar foreign policy engagement of Turkey in this 
period should not be appreciated as an attempt of alternative model search to replace the EU 
nor it is a sort of Neo-Ottomanist, Pan-Islamist foreign policy approach.  
Turkish - Iraqi relations during Justice and Development Party governments in 2002- 
2011continued its traditional path, as reciprocal relations between Turkey and Iraq did not 
experience any radical change. Justice and Development Party in terms of direct relations 
with Iraq did not encounter a high level diplomatic crisis or conflict under its rule. The 
integrity of Iraq, PKK camps in Northern Iraq and attacks directed against Turkey, Iraqi 
Turkmens and their status in Iraq, Kirkuk issue, Iraqi oil as well as relations with Northern 
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Iraq continued to be the top level agendas of reciprocal relations. Though, Justice and 
Development Party in the course of its rule period preferred to continue and protect the status 
quo as regard to relations with Iraq; it introduced some alternative approaches in comparison 
to previous Turkish governments.  
Ankara instead of focusing its attention to solely on PKK terror or Turkmen issue 
developed more integrating policies toward the whole of Iraq including all religious, sectarian 
and ethnic units of Iraq. On one hand, Ankara became a mediator among Iraqi Sunnis and 
Shiites; while on the other hand, it took regional initiatives where tried to mediate Syria and 
Iraq. AKP foreign policy makers also initialized summit of countries neighboring Iraq in 
order to contribute to peace prospects of the region. Apart from that, AK Party foreign policy 
decision makers developed highly positive relations with Northern Iraqi Kurdish 
administration. Opposed to previous Turkish governments, Justice and Development Party 
government enriched reciprocal relations with Iraqi Kurdish administration thanks to 
economic and commerce oriented relations that used to singularly engage to terror and 
security issues. Turkish companies in this time period gained big tenders in Northern Iraq, 
while Turkish State Oil Company obtained a license to search petroleum in the North of Iraq. 
The disputes regarding PKK entity in Northern Iraq to some degree caused harsh disputes, yet 
AK Party‘s new approached appreciated by Northern Iraq Kurdish administration more 
constructive. Besides, Justice and Development Party thanks to its increasing power 
developed more abstract collaborations with the United States of America in terms of terror 
directed to Turkey which caused a relative reduce of attacks.  
Thus, it may be presumed that Turkish - Iraqi relations at the office period of Justice 
and Development Party government continued its traditional path. AK Party instead of 
degrading mutual relations to security issues developed a more containing policy orientation 
putting alternative dimensions to relation perspectives. Nevertheless, the referendum in 
Kirkuk, Iraqi constitution, future of Iraq after the United States of America, integrity of Iraq, 
potential of a Kurdish state as well as PKK camps in Northern Iraq continued to be 
problematic issues between Iraq and Turkey. 
Turkish - Syrian relations in the course of government periods of Justice and 
Development Party in 2002-2011 gained a constructive change initially. A country that a 
decade ago Turkey came to the edge of war, Syria, in the course of Justice and Development 
Party government period turned out to be Turkey‘s best allies in the Middle East. Damascus 
and Ankara in this period realized such an affiliation that in the history of the Republic of 
Turkey, Syria became the first country which Council of Minister organized joint meetings. 
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Still, particularly toward the end of AK Party‘s second government period due to the Arab 
Spring inspired protests demanding democracy and Assad regimes measureless interventions 
Turkish - Syrian relations were heavily wounded. In fact, the affiliation period that started 
with Ankara and Damascus carried a pure pragmatic feature instead of being ideological or 
pro-Islamist due to security languor that menaced both countries as a consequence of Iraqi 
occupation. The American intervention to Iraq, changing ethnic and sectarian dynamics as 
well highly contributed to the warming of mutual relations. When Turkey and Syria obtained 
a consensus in chronic Hatay problem, the nature of mutual relations radically changed. The 
affiliation process that started with Turkish Presidents historical visit to father Assad‘s funeral 
against all recommends of the West, in the course of time gave it fruitful consequences in 
terms of reciprocal relations. 
Following that both countries initialized free custom regime as well enabling 
commerce activities freely that highly demised the increase of trade volume. By the same 
token, in terms of diplomacy both countries opened consulates in border cities to ease similar 
facilities; eventually the initial of a free visa regime for the citizens of both countries 
extremely accelerated the reciprocal relations between Syria and Turkey. Damascus and 
Ankara apart from peregrinating a long distance in terms of mutual relations as well engaged 
to regional politics as regard to Middle East. In addition to that, AK Party foreign decision 
makers searched further methods of influences via Syria through mediator role in historical 
conflicts as well in the region.  
All in all, the positive acquisitions obtained in this period as a consequence of zero 
problem principle with the popular motto of Turkish FM lost its momentum in the course of 
the Arab Spring. When Syrian army commenced to suppress opposition protests 
disproportionally and it caused a mass migration wave toward Turkish borders. Ankara asked 
Damascus to realize democratic reforms as respond to demands of opposition and stop 
violence against civilians. On contrary to  harsh press of Ankara and international community, 
Assad regime blamed Turkey and other countries to intervene internal affairs of Syria that 
caused to spoil relations that experienced its golden era. Turkey, along with the pressure of its 
Western allies applied all methods against Syria to stop violence, besides when Ankara 
allowed opposition activities in Turkish territory mutual relations with Assad regime 
wounded heavily.   
In comparison to previous Turkish governments, Turkey - Israel relations also 
evidenced unorthodox developments in comparison to previous Turkish governments under 
AKP rule that ended with Turkey‘s decision of putting diplomatic relations to minimum level. 
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Turkey - Israel relation that hit its top level with 90‘s experienced a graduate recession 
process during the previous governments; however when Israel army killed 9 Turkish activists 
in international waters reciprocal relations between the countries hit the bottom. It is an 
incontrovertible reality that Turkish - Israeli relations till Israel‘s attack against Gaza 
performed a highly positive line. Ankara was developing constructive relations both with 
Israel and Syria as it engaged to peace talks that would change the destiny of the Middle East. 
Apart from that, Ankara parallel to support of European and United States also tried to 
continue its peacemaking role in Palestine - Israel conflict.
1297
 Nevertheless, the gradual 
tension between the allies started when Khalid Meashal paid a visit to Ankara in 2006. 
Following that, the Cast Lead Operation reasoned a deep feeling of deceive of Turkish side 
directed towards Israel. AK Party criticized Israel due to the unbalanced violence used against 
Palestine in the course of the Gaza operations, while political tension in this period found its 
reflection in public as anti-Israel sentiments raised against Israel attacks to Gaza district.  
Respectively, the diplomatic relations agitated through the highest level when Turkish 
Prime Minister burst into anger in Davos due to Gaza blockade. Thereupon, the lower chair 
crisis one more time tensed the mutual relations, after Turkey‘s menace to pull diplomatic 
relations to a lower level; Israel Foreign Ministry expressed its apology. The diplomatic 
relations recovered back but the Gaza issue continued to be a theme of discussion between the 
parts in this period. Israeli - Turkish relations experienced its worst time not only in the 
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course of Justice and Development Party but also all the times due to Israel‘s attack against 
Gaza Flotilla where Israeli armed forces killed 9 Turkish activists. Following the case, Ankara 
blamed Israel regarding the violence to be a pirate state where it denounced the act from the 
highest level of the state. Foreign Ministry of Turkey asked Israel to apologize for the act and 
pay compensation to families of victims. Yet, Tel Aviv advocated its action appreciating it as 
a natural motion as a right of self protection. Ankara explained that it will apply a pack of 
sanctions toward Tel Aviv as regard to attacks.
1298
 In the course of reciprocal relations tough 
both states experienced diplomatic crisis the economic, military and strategic have never 
pushed a lower level as similar to crisis experienced following the Flotilla crisis. 
Relations with Iran in this period also kept its characteristic feature. In the course of 
AKP rule, Ankara engaged with Brazil to Iran‘s nuclear swap deal. In 2010, when Ankara 
urged Tehran in Nuclear barter issue Turkey‘s increasing regional came to agenda in Western 
public view. Similar initiatives of Ankara though followed with cautiousness as well were 
supported by the West regarding Turkey‘s contribution to diplomatic resolution of the crisis. 
AKP‘s close engagement with Middle East under the ―rhythmic diplomacy‖ and ―zero 
problem principle‖ in its rule period, on one hand gave to birth to question ―is Turkey‘s 
leaving of the West?‖1299 On the other hand, some other observers appreciated a similar 
engagement in Middle East politics not a political preference of AKP as it was initialized by 
Turgut Özal following the end of the Cold War upon the newly emerged regional and 
international conjecture as a result of Gulf War.
1300
  
Apart from that, during the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Ismail Cem Ankara gradually 
left aside security based foreign policy interactions with Middle East as a versatile intercourse 
between Turkey and region states commenced. What is more, especially when the leader of 
PKK, Abdullah Öcalan was deported thanks signed Adana Protocols with Damascus; 
Ankara‘s security based skeptic approach toward the Middle East has changed entirely. 
Before AKP came to power in 2002, Ankara settled significant problems with its Eastern 
neighborhood apart from the PKK settlements in Northern Iraq. To analyze Justice and 
Development Party‘s foreign policy orientation properly, it is vital to take into consideration 
international and regional dynamics emerged prior to AKP rule. The 9/11 terror attacks, along 
with occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq aftermaths played a crucial role in the very 
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conjectural change. Hereafter, foreign policy makers of Turkey parallel to these very 
developments developed compatible policies regarding the newly emerged conjecture. 
Thereby, out of similar explanations it may be concluded that Turkey‘s foreign policy practice 
toward the Middle East is not emerged in AKP rule, but AK Party foreign policy decision 
makers under the administration of Davutoğlu regarding the changing international and 
regional conjecture diversified relation prospects with Middle East states. The new conjecture 
coincides the AK Party‘s taking the office in this period made Turkey to develop versatile and 
multi dimensional foreign policy practices. Turkey‘s close affiliations with Middle East in 
this period may not be concluded as an axis shift or a leaving of Turkey‘s Westernization 
principle as similar policy initiatives were highly supported by Ankara‘s Western allies.  
Chiefly, in the course of Arab Spring, so as to tempt newly established regimes to 
democracy Turkey‘s role as a Muslim predominant states that coincides Islam with 
democracy promoted by the West as Turkey‘s relations toward Tunis, Egypt and Libya after 
the coups highly encouraged. Furthermore, AKP as a new political entity constituted of 
former Islamists became a role model that promoted also by West and USA for the Islamist of 
the Middle East that reconciles democracy with Islam.  
 
2. Relations with the West 
 
Republic of Turkey‘s relation with the West, in this term, relations with the United States of 
America, the European Union, and the Balkans continued to be the highest level agendas of 
Turkey‘s foreign policy in the government period of Justice and Development Party. In spite 
of the fact that Turkey‘s relations with the West became to be a highly controversial theme 
regarding the Islamist roots of AK Party. Quite contrary to the all negative predictions, AK 
Party shortly after its office period continued the reform process that initialized through 
previous governments. Furthermore, the radical reform process ended with Turkey‘s gain of 
official membership status for full European Union membership. Relation perspectives with 
the United States of America, especially in the rule period of George W. Bush experienced 
serious troubles due to 1 March bill crisis and hood event, however the reciprocal relations 
kept its traditional orientation and regained its natural character following the election of 
President Obama.  
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as the founder and the general secretary of AKP, developed 
highly constructive relations with the U.S. when he used to be the head of Welfare Party in 
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Beyoğlu district of Istanbul.1301 His initial contacts with the U.S. officials commenced when 
he was visited by the former U.S. ambassador Abramowitz many times, besides similar visits 
took place following Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‘s election for mayor of Istanbul.1302 
Notwithstanding to the fact that ultra-nationalist wing interpreted similar contacts as a U.S. 
conspiracy to imply that Erdoğan would be the follower of mild Islamist policies of 
Washington in the Middle East,
1303
 it is a non contentious fact that, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as 
a requirement of the current conjecture put a special stress on relations with the United States 
of America before and after AKP‘s coming to rule in Turkey. Additionally, in 2001, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan visited the United States of America where he came together with the 
members of Jewish Congress and Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs to find 
support.
1304
 
 Following the establishment of AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Washington as 
the general secretary of the Party, where he realized a speech in Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. In his speech, he explicitly highlighted that his party is not against USA 
and would support the development of Turkey - U.S. relations if elected.
1305
 Notwithstanding 
to the fact that foreign policy decision makers of Turkey, prior to AKP government supported 
U.S. during its occupation of Afghanistan so as to contribute international and regional 
stability.
1306
 When the scope of the U.S. war directed t against Iraq, Justice and Development 
faced a tough dilemma in the course of Iraqi occupation as regard to relations with the United 
States of America. On one hand, the grassroots and at parliamentary level Justice and 
Development Party was not that eager to engage to occupation of Iraq, while the realpolitik 
and the requirements of strategic partnership was highly dominant. Moreover, the future of 
the Northern Iraq, PKK terror, economical factors were the other factors influencing the 
decision making process of AK Party foreign policy makers. As the permission letting USA 
army to use Turkish land, port and air space was not accepted at grand assembly, Turkish - 
USA relations experienced a historical crisis that caused a deep disappointment at 
neoconservative politicians of Pentagon and Washington.  
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Tough the rejection of bill was appreciated as an anti-American act of ruling AKP, 
Turkey‘s former Minister of Defense notified that ―tough we did not accept the bill we did 
permit 4300 sorties‖.1307 What is more, Turkish Prime Minister in his article published in 
Wall Street Journal implied that the rejection of bill was not entirely depending on AKP 
where he called Turkey as the loyal friend and ally of the United States.
1308
 In his article 
Turkish PM stressed that as refer to Gulf War experience of Turkey, the economic and social 
factors played a determinant role in the rejection of bill hinting that the action was not bearing 
an anti- American character, besides he also underlined that Turkey following the rejection of 
bill opened its air space to coalition forces during their operations in Iraq.
1309
 The worsening 
relations between Ankara and Washington found its deep reflection in terms of Turkey‘s 
struggle against PKK terror. Besides, Turkey lost its strategic acquisitions gained since the 
Gulf War. Following the negative decision of Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkish 
Special Forces realizing anti-terror activities in Northern Iraq was detained through U.S. 
forces in a sardonic manner which agitated the reciprocal relations entirely. Justice and 
Development Party at the very heart of crisis atmosphere, on one hand tried to satisfy public 
view while on the other hand tried to keep constructive relations with the United States of 
America in terms of Iraq issue which highly managed the national security of Turkey. 
Additionally, this period coincided to a time sequence where Turkish military 
headquarters became the open target of PKK militants who leaked to Turkish border through 
Northern Iraq. AK Party at this period was on the target of public view and opposition to 
realize cross border operation against PKK camps situated in Northern Iraq, while the United 
States of America warned Ankara not realize any land or air operation so as not to harm 
stability of Iraq. (Actually, the Iraqi Kurds who turned out to be the best allies of USA in Iraq 
highly press United States not to permit Turkey to realize operation toward Northern Iraq) 
Nevertheless, tough the fact that Turkey - USA relations highly tensed since 2003 particularly 
regarding the cooperation in terms of Northern Iraq, under AKP rule, it is not possible to 
conclude that reciprocal relations between Ankara and Washington had cut. Thanks to Bush - 
Erdoğan meeting that took place in 2007, relations between Ankara and Washington had 
highly relieved. The meeting was highly essential as both sides agreed on intelligence share 
against Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK) leakages versus Turkey as the United States of 
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America guaranteed Turkey to collaborate its struggle with Terror. Hence, USA - Turkish 
Relations experienced a positive direction in terms of softening afterward the 1 March 
permission crisis. 
Reciprocal relations between Republic of Turkey and the United States of America 
entered to a new phase following the election of Barack Obama as the President of USA. In 
spite of the Obama‘s election promises regarding the so-called Armenian genocide issue, 
Turkish - USA relations experienced highly positive developments as the countries agreed on 
signature of partnership agreements in terms of strategic partnership. On the other hand, USA 
supported Turkey more efficiently in terms of Ankara‘s fight against separatist Kurdish terror 
in this period. 
Henceforth, Turkey - U.S. relations under AKP rule may be appreciated as a reflection 
of Westernization principle of Turkey‘s foreign policy was kept. Turkey - USA relations 
continued its traditional characteristic feature that mostly based on regional cooperation in 
terms of strategic and military relations. The United States of America continued to be the 
most powerful ally of Republic of Turkey, while Ankara supported the U.S. military 
operations in Afghanistan under the umbrella of NATO. In spite of the fact that, in the course 
of Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011, Turkey and the United 
States of America came across in terms of Iraqi occupation as regard to 1 March permit crisis 
and the hood event, the principal nature of the bilateral relations did not undertake a radical 
change. Prior to AK Party government, Ankara and Washington experienced many political, 
diplomatic and military challenges like Johnson letter, USA embargo against Turkey due to 
Cyprus or Opium crisis, the strategic partnership in terms of economic, military, political and 
diplomatic spheres kept its essential character.  Although many Western analysts and 
journalist suggested the hidden Islamist agenda of JDP aims Turkey to shift from its Western 
axis as regard to AK Party‘s new foreign policy concept aiming maximum collaboration in 
Turkish neighborhood, Turkey‘s rhythmic diplomacy with Syria, Iran and with many other 
geographies were de facto approved and supported through Washington. Besides, when 
Ankara and Tel Aviv came across due to tensing relations at this period, The United States of 
America as the best allies of continuously pushed its closest allies to recover relations.  
Parallel to relations with the United States of America, the European Union became to 
be the utmost foreign policy agenda of Justice and Development Party in the course of its rule 
period in 2002-2011. In this period, Turkey‘s accession to full membership to the EU 
continued to be the highest priority for Turkey‘s foreign policy. Chiefly, during the first 
government period of AKP in 2002-2007., on contrary to all expectations highly engaged to 
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relations with the European Union where Turkey finally achieved the official candidate status 
for full European Union membership. The EU reform processes initialized by Ecevit 
government continued by AKP that is highly crucial to understand importance of the EU 
agenda for JDP,
1310
 as two adaptation packages were enacted quickly. In this time period, 
high level visits of high rank Turkish officials not excluding Turkish Prime Minister and 
Foreign Affairs Minister frequently appeared in Brussels and other EU capitals. To add, when 
Turkey was given an official candidate status for full membership, Turkish delegation was 
met by crowds celebrating the decision.  
Nonetheless, mainly following the 2007 general elections, relations with the European 
Union entered to a recession as the EU theme gradually swept out of AK Party‘s foreign 
policy agenda. It is an obvious fact that, Turkey‘s full membership status was an exceptional 
case in comparison to other candidate states as it was bearing an expression that the 
consequence of negotiations may not end with full membership, which made Turkish case in 
total different. AK Party foreign policy decision makers harshly criticized the EU to apply 
different standard for Turkey while called the European Union to proof it not to be a Christian 
Club.
1311
 Furthermore, regardless of all positive attempts of AKP and political risks peculiarly 
in domestic politics, proposing a new paradigm toward Cyprus issue since 1974, its feeling of 
deceive as regard to Greek side‘s acceptance to the European Union tough its rejection of 
Annan Plan gradually froze the relations between the European Union and Turkey. Moreover, 
the election of Sarkozy and Merkel agitated the situation entirely, as both Presidents fiercely 
opposed Turkey‘s future EU membership. 
Turkish - EU relations indicated a serious breaking particularly during the period 
following the second land slide of AK Party in 2007 general elections. Turkish - EU relations 
that were driven to a deadlock due to blockades, opening chapters and Turkey‘s reluctance to 
open its port toward Greek Cypriots brought the situation to a more complex structure than 
ever. Parallel to this period, Justice and Development Party put a special stress on relations 
wit Middle East countries which gave birth to popular fears of Turkey‘s axis shift that found 
deep reflection in periodical progress reports of the EU, while JDP foreign policy decision 
makers were blamed to create an alternative formation against the European Union. 
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Turkish - EU relations during the government period of Justice and Development 
Party may be shared into two periods, the 2002-2007 and 2007-2011 period.  The 2002-2007 
period coincided to initial period of JDP government evidenced an intensive interaction 
between the parts while the 2007 - 2011 periods were a time of recession. AK Party has been 
blamed to utilize the European Union process as an instrument in order to gain power against 
Turkish military under the pretext of democratic reforms; besides it was accused when 
eliminated the Turkish Army Forces along with the % 50 percentage of population with 2007 
general election, to put aside the EU reforms and accession process and initialized its Islamic 
agenda highly engaging to Middle East direction. Justice and Development Party regarding 
the claims repeatedly proposed that better relation prospects with Turkish vicinity would 
enforce Turkey‘s hand as a Turkey with minimum problem with its neighborhood would be a 
more attractive candidate for the EU. Additionally, Turkey‘s tight engagement with Iraq, 
Syria and Iran would be to the benefits of the EU that seek further influence in the Middle 
East region.  
Moreover, due to economic crisis in Euro zone as well as the decrease of public 
support along with the Turkey‘s increasing gravity among Arab nations, the European Union 
issue lost its public support in this period. Even through the rows of Justice and Development 
Party discourses stating that Turkey is not in need of the European Union voiced. 
Nonetheless, Justice and Development Party so as to indicate its position toward the EU 
assigned Egemen Bağış as Minister for the European Union affairs and chief negotiator to 
coordinate the EU accession from a unique center. Notwithstanding to all controversies, 
accession to the European Union with a full membership target continued to be the main 
objective of Turkey‘s foreign policy during the Justice and Development Party government 
period in 2002-2011. Regardless of the fact that within the second term of AKP, Turkish - EU 
relations have experienced a recession, it cannot be interpreted as a cut. Henceforth, taking 
into account the current situation of reciprocal relations one may not interpret it as Turkey‘s 
shift from its Western axis. In spite of all alignments accusing AKP to seek alternative 
alliance models in replacement of the European Union, Turkey‘s political and economic 
engagement with Middle East as well was supported by the European Union. The so-called 
Turkish model with the AK Party model as a successful example coinciding Islam and 
democracy has been promoted and supported by Turkey‘s, particularly AK Party model 
inspired Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab Spring as Islamist sought ways to reconcile with 
international community referring to AK Party example in Turkey.  
 268 
In terms of relations with Balkans, Republic of Turkey‘s foreign policy attitude that 
mostly shaped following the 90s also kept its traditional line under the rule of AKP. High 
level visits of Turkish officials continued,
1312
 plus Ankara to contribute regional peace 
supported initials like Southern Europe Cooperation Process and Regional Cooperation 
Council. Additionally, to provide a long term security in Balkans, Ankara under its rule 
period brought Serbia - Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia thanks to triple council meetings. 
In epitome, Republic of Turkey‘s foreign policy concept toward the West regarding 
the frames of Westernization and Status Quo principles -as the fundamental principles of 
Turkey‘s foreign policy concept- kept its main character under the rule of AKP in 2002-2011. 
In addition to that, like in relations prospects in Balkans, Cyprus and Greek examples, thanks 
to newly introduced foreign policy rhetoric of AKP, Turkey applied good will and dialogue 
based tools toward its interlocutors. In this respect through the main goals of foreign policy 
making process did not change the methods of reaching to the goals experienced a change.  
 
3. Relations with the North 
 
Turkish - Russian relations in the course of Justice and Development Party government 
periods in 2002-2011 experienced a golden age both politically, economically as well as in 
terms of energy, trade and tourism issues. All the same, it is obligatory to emphasize that the 
fundamentals of positive relations with Russian Federations mostly established particularly 
toward 2000s when both countries instead of developing rivalry based politics commenced to 
concentrate on regional cooperation prospects. Hence, AKP principally followed Turkey‘s 
traditional foreign policy orientation toward Russia that constituted with the new millennium. 
In spite of all positive developments and affiliation took place in this period many 
problematic issues between the countries kept its nature as the historical Turkish - Russian 
competition in region politics did not experience a radical shift.
1313
 The joint energy projects 
like Blue Stream Pipeline Project highly contributed to the affiliation between neighbors, 
thanks to Blue Stream mutual relations mostly engaged on political issues gained a diverse 
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character. Nonetheless, the similar cooperation prospects within the new millennium did not 
achieve an entire consensus in Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia.
1314
 
Justice and Development Party without any radical shift continued the positive relation 
prospects with Russian Federation during its rule period. High rank officials of both countries 
during this time period many times visited each other where they signed significant 
agreements highly influential in the determination of mutual relations both in economic and 
political meaning. As it used to be in the past, the energy dimension continued to be the spine 
and main dynamic of mutual relations during Justice and Development Party government 
periods. In this time period, on one hand Turkey due to signed energy agreements with 
Russian Federation became the biggest energy purchaser, while on the hand Russia enjoyed 
strategic position of Turkey that give energy access to South European and North African 
countries. Additionally, the Akkuyu nuclear energy plant constituted an important liaison in 
this period for bilateral relations between Ankara and Moscow.
1315
 
Commercial and Economical relations between Moscow constituted another engine 
for the development of mutual relations in this period as well. The humble trade facilities 
commenced with shuttle trade opened gate for Turkish companies particularly in construction 
sector. During Justice and Development Party governments‘ period the trade volume between 
the states reached a significant level as Russian Federation turned Turkey‘s second biggest 
trade partner following Germany. Apart from the tight cooperation initiatives in energy sector 
and trade traditional good relations in tourism as well kept its characteristic features between 
Russia and Turkey under the rule of Justice and Development Party governments. Besides, 
the positive relations gained a dynamic after the enactment of visa free regime for Russian 
and Turkish citizens. 
Yet, in spite of all positive developments that were mentioned above, the traditional 
rivalry in many other fields continued to keep its problematic characteristic feature. In 2004, 
shortly before the referendum of so-called Annan Plan, Moscow‘s veto had highly negative 
influenced Turkey‘s position as the veto highly favored Greek Cypriots, besides Russia 
continued to veto General Secretary‘s report on post-referendum period in Cyprus. In 2005, 
Russian Duma recognized the allegedly Armenian genocide claims which constituted a 
serious barrier for the future prospect of bilateral relation. Furthermore, Russia‘s ban of 
Turkish poultry at the same year as well severely harmed commerce based relations. In 
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addition to that, Moscow still has not put Kurdish separatist terrorist organization PKK to 
terrorist list which concerns Ankara. The traditional character of Turkish - Russian relations 
that mostly based on regional rivalry and mistrust with historical traces continued its nature in 
the course of Justice and Development Party government in 2002-2011. The affiliation period 
that hit its peak at this period is a continuation of policy that applied toward the end of 90‘s, 
besides the post 9/11 period as well pushed the countries develop joint projects in order to 
continue regional power balance system. In spite of the fact that, there existed many positive 
developments in terms of energy, trade, commerce, politics as well as diplomacy and tourism 
both countries have still have diverse military paradigms and Russia and Turkey are the 
biggest regional rivals in Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and Balkans. Tough strategic 
partnership rhetoric has commenced to be used even at the highest level, both strategically 
and militarily Russia and Turkey are belonging to different poles. The energy politics of the 
countries as well bear a competitive character regardless of present bilateral energy 
agreements signed between the states.   
The foreign policy orientation of the Republic of Turkey in the Justice and 
Development Party government periods toward Southern Caucasus experienced a tough 
challenge. In Southern Caucasus case, opposite to other foreign orientations of classical 
Turkish Republic foreign policy, Justice and Development Party tried to adjust against to 
status quo but regardless of all attempts AK Party could not bring a new dynamism. As it has 
been mentioned previously, the zero problem principle of JDP faced a tough complication as 
a result of Russian - Georgian war. Justice and Development due to sudden eruption of war 
stayed between Russia and Georgia. On the one hand, Ankara was initializing highly positive 
relations in many respects with Russian Federation; on the other hand it supported territorial 
integrity of Georgia. Ankara at the early period of war preferred to take any reaction long 
afterwards proposed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform which did not bring an 
abstract result in long term. 
Apart from Russia - Georgia war, regardless of all endeavors of AK Party foreign 
policy decision makers to create a positive dynamism at Southern Caucasus region. And to 
create a new paradigm breaking the status quo character in Southern Caucasus politics of 
traditional foreign policy line of Turkey, it brought the Ankara to the versus of breaking all 
positive relation gains with Azerbaijan. Justice and Development Party, particularly as a result 
of non official demands of the European Union as well as the United States of America 
initialized a peace making process with Armenia, however as a consequence of sensitive and 
fragile structure of Southern Caucasus it met with unexpected and strong resistance of Baku. 
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Consequently, in the government periods of Justice and Development Party, the Southern 
Caucasus policy orientation of Republic of Turkey did not experience a radical shift in spite 
of all attempts of AK Party. Ankara as a result of sudden war erupted between Tbilisi and 
Moscow evidenced the fragile structure of Southern Caucasus.  
Though, Ankara searched methods to reconcile with Armenia on a common ground in 
this period, the power balance parameters which was miscalculated almost cause the 
cancelation of energy politics of Turkey that planned Turkey to turn an energy hub within last 
decade. The regional power balance and status quo in Southern Caucasus determined among 
Russia, Iran and Turkey did not shift at this time period as the limits of Ankara‘s regional 
politics proofed. As a consequence of all unsuccessful attempts AKP reproached its 
traditional position where it advocated Baku‘s thesis against Armenia regarding Nagorno 
Karabagh. As for Georgia, Turkey continued to support the NATO membership of Tbilisi 
both to secure its national security against Russia and to guarantee energy routes. Although in 
the course of all tension Turkey and Russia did not face each other the problematic nature of 
Turkish - Russian relations as regard to Southern Caucasus evidenced one more time in spite 
of all good will political rhetoric. 
When it comes to Central Asia Turkic states, it may be claimed that traditional foreign 
policy orientation of Turkey toward the region did not experience a radical change. Justice 
and Development Party during its government periods in 2002-2011, as similar to previous 
Turkish governments followed the routine Central Asian policy that Turkey formulated with 
the end of 90‘s. Justice and Development Party in order not to spoil sensitive balances with 
Russian Federation and Chine on purpose hesitated to use a nationalist or Islamist rhetoric in 
the course of its government period, while it put a stress on economy and culture based soft 
policy appliances. High rank official visits between sister states and Ankara continued at this 
period while close energy cooperation between Turkey and Turkmenistan as well as 
Kazakhstan occupied the  foreign policy agenda as it would enforce Turkey‘s traditional 
energy strategy that aim to turn it to an energy hub without any alternative. In addition to that, 
the traditional Turkic speaker countries summits as well continued while Turkey also 
supported all similar initiatives inspired by Central Asian states. 
  Ankara did not highly engaged to political clashes in Kyrgyzstan tough it recognized 
the newly elected Prime Minister without reservation with whom Prime Minister Erdoğan 
than developed close personal contacts. Relation levels did not accelerate with Uzbekistan 
due to legacies of the past. As for Turkmenistan, an abstract acceleration did not provided, but 
Turkey thanks to its Western support engaged energy diplomacy so as to urge Ashgabat to 
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take part in Nabucco project aiming to connect Turkmen gas via Caspian. As for the 
Kazakhstan, due to its more democratic structure became the engine state with which Ankara 
developed its relations. 
 
4. Relations with Emerging Global Powers 
 
Justice and Development Party under its government period between the years of 2002 -201, 
put a special emphasis on Turkey‘s foreign policy priorities between the distant countries that 
Turkey did not achieve to develop required contacts in terms of economic, diplomatic and 
political relations. The main motivation of Turkey‘s foreign policy at this period ruled by 
Justice and Development Party decision makers was to bring a more dynamic approach to 
Turkey‘s foreign policies as regard to changing demands of the current world conjecture. 
From this perspective, the global actors gradually becoming the new powerhouses in 
international arena thanks to their economic and political might entered to the foreign policy 
agenda of Justice and Development Party. Yet, it is an incontrovertible fact that, Turkey‘s 
openings toward the new global actors did not start during the AK Party governments. The 
initials of Turkey‘s relations at this meaning, for instance toward China, with a high 
frequency coincides the end of the Cold War period as a mandatory obligation for Turkey 
after the dissolution of Soviet Union and independence of Turkic nations of Central Asia. In 
general terms, it may be argued that Turkey‘s foreign policy attitude toward China, Brazil and 
India did not shift from its general path. Yet, Sino - Turkic relations due to Uyghur question 
Ankara and Peking experienced tough challenges, besides Turkey and Brazil performed an 
unorthodox affiliation in terms of Iran nuclear crisis. As for relations with India, though 
gradually, Turkey‘s foreign policy gained a more independent feature that used to mostly 
depend on priorities of Pakistan. 
Turkey‘s relations with China, in the course of Justice and Development Party in 
accordance with Turkey‘s traditional attitude to Peoples‘ Republic of China kept its 
traditional line, which is mostly, depend on economic and commerce based relation prospects. 
The mutual high level visits between top level representative of states realized between 2002 
and 2011 as Turkish President, Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister along with other 
Ministers visited People‘s Republic of China and vice versa. Both parties in the course of 
mutual meetings signed various bilateral agreements in technology, communication, 
commerce issues. Beijing searched to increase the volume of export proportion toward 
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Turkey, while Ankara endeavored to balance negative trade deficit against itself concentrating 
to attract direct investment to Turkey, realizing joint projects in third countries and attracting 
tourist number to Turkey. Sino - Turkic relations in the course of bilateral associations at this 
period encountered the most serious crack during 2009 Urumqi riots. Justice and 
Development Party, on contrary to previous Turkish governments reacted Urumqi incidents in 
a harsh manner and blamed Chinese government to perform massacre and genocide against 
Uyghur Turks from the highest level of state, while some AK Party government ministers 
called to boycott Chinese goods.
1316
 The crisis emerged between Turkey and Chine due to 
Urumqi riots amended due to rational and diplomatic oriented approaches of Turkey‘s 
Foreign Ministry and shortly after the incident bilateral relations between Ankara and Beijing 
normalized. China sent various delegations to Turkish capital in order to express Beijing‘s 
approach to the issue while invited Turkish official and journalist delegations in order to 
realize visits in Xingjian region. 
What made the Turkish - Chinese relations interesting following the Urumqi riot was 
the strategic and military affiliation between the countries. Turkey and Chine realized a 
common military exercise which it was highly criticized by the United States of America and 
Israel. Afterwards, Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu settled to China starting from 
Urumqi and visited many historical regions important for Turkish - Islam history. Attitude of 
Beijing, tough symbolically was highly significant in order to present its outlook toward 
Turkey afterward the Urumqi riots. 
Brazil as a power turning out to be a global actor influencing global politics, occupied 
a high level  agenda for Turkey‘s foreign policy especially due to emerge of Iranian nuclear 
crisis. Bilateral relations with Brazil experienced a boom during the government periods of 
Justice and Development Party. Turkey - Brazil relations initially performed an affiliation 
period in terms of economic and commerce based issues, Turkey at this period mostly focused 
to eliminate double taxation barrier in order to ease Turkish business based engagements in 
Brazil and searched methods to disseminate Turkey‘s economic activities in South America. 
On the other hand, as similar to policy approach toward China, Turkey looked for joint 
initiatives in third countries with Brazil while seek methods to attract direct Brazilian 
investment to Turkey.  
Turkey‘s relations with Brazil that commenced at this period through economical 
relations entered to an entire different course due to raised Iran nuclear crisis. On contrary to 
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international community pressing Iran in terms of its nuclear program and pushing to apply 
additional embargo and sanctions, Turkish and Brazilian Foreign Ministers took a surprising 
initiative in Iran case and agreed on a deal matching the demands of both sites. Thanks to 
proposed agreement, Iran continued its nuclear program compatible to the demands of 
National Atomic Agency, while the concerns of international community headed by the 
United States of America and Israel were removed as in accordance with the compromised 
agreement Iran‘s conversion its enriched uranium to a nuclear bomb eliminated. Turkey and 
Brazil at this period in accordance to converged political attitudes toward Iran, rejected 
United Nation decision proposing additional sanctions against Iran related to Tehran‘s 
uranium enrichment policy, still Justice and Development Party at this perspective explored 
intensive critics by Turkey‘s Western alliance (mostly by Israel and the United States of 
America) and domestic opposition centers blaming Justice and Development Party‘s foreign 
policy to follow an Islamist character seeking allies with Islamic Republic of Iran. In addition 
to convergence in Iran‘s nuclear program, both countries agreed to initialize close relations in 
commerce and trade relations, moreover Turkish and Brazilian stated owned oil companies 
started to oil seeking facilities in Black Sea.  
When it comes to Turkey‘s relations with India due its strategic location and 
increasing impacts both in Eurasian and global politics, New Delhi as well constituted a top 
priority country in foreign policy agenda of Justice and Development Party, thus during the 
government periods, AK Party endeavored to accelerate Turkish - Indian relations. Turkey‘s 
foreign policy mostly shaped due to Pakistani sensitiveness, as a country supporting all sort of 
Turkish thesis in international arena, constituting a barrier for Turkey‘s foreign policy 
initiatives toward India in this period indicated a more independent character. Ankara since 
the very beginning of the conflict supporting Pakistani site in Kashmir conflict, with the 
Justice and Development Party government performed a more enthusiastic behavior in order 
to engage resolution of Indian - Pakistani conflict in Kashmir.  
   In conclusion, in spite of the fact that Turkey‘s foreign policy developed close ties 
with the emerging global actors that are highly influential both in regional and global scale, 
traditional line of Turkey‘s foreign policy did not experience a radical shift from the 
traditional path mostly established by the end of the Cold War. Justice and Development 
Party aiming to gain a multi dimensional and versatile character to Turkey‘s political 
approaches in the course of its power period, constantly continued consultations with 
Washington and Brussels in order to express Turkey‘s position while in different platforms 
many Justice and Development Party  high rank officials including Prime Minister and 
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President publicly declared that Turkey‘s openings in Far East and South America does not 
propose an alternative for Turkey‘s institutional relations with the West.  
Additionally, although in some cases like common military exercise with China 
Ankara drew the reaction of the West, foreign policy of Turkey under JDP administration 
watched out the red lines of the United States of America as did not permit Turkish jets to 
participate military exercise due to Pentagons reservations. On contrary to alleged claims 
charging Justice and Development Party a pro Iran policy along with Brazil, as it has been 
mentioned above Turkish and Brazilian Foreign Ministers came together with President 
Obama in order to council Turkish - Brazilian joint initiative regarding the issue. Republic of 
Turkey‘s foreign policy orientation toward new global actors of the world developed as a state 
reflection due to strengthen its foreign policy perspectives and peculiarly as a reaction to 
degrading relation traffic with the European Union. What is more, Turkey‘s isolation in 
Cyprus and increasing security concerns as a result of rising PKK terror that was tolerated in 
most European countries also highly contributed to this process. The public view along with 
Turkey‘s foreign policy elites mostly influenced by Leftist and Nationalist ideologies at this 
period initialized to build an alternative foreign paradigm for Turkey proposing new allies 
with Eurasian countries keeping in mind China - Iran and Russia. (this fraction called as 
Ulusalcılar continuously propagated to Turkey‘s leave for NATO and to be a member state of 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and became highly influential in Turkish public view in a 
definite period). 
Therefore, the traditional foreign policy line of Republic of Turkey toward emerging 
global actors like China, India and Brazil continued in the course of Justice and Development 
Party governments the essentials of which shaped after the Cold War period due to the new 
demands and challenges of the world conjecture. 
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Findings and Conclusions 
3 November 2002 general elections became a milestone for Turkish democracy; the 
unexpected result and absolute victory of AKP was articulated as a ―political earthquake‖ 
both in public and scholar level.
1317
 Following the landslide victory of Justice and 
Development Party, due to the Islamist identity and possible performance of JDP in the 
government, AKP phenomenon has been a subject of fierce debates both in Turkey and 
abroad. Therefore, Turkey and its position in international relations have turned out to be a 
more prominent theme than ever.
1318
       
 Regardless of the fact that Justice and Development Party was preferred to be 
identified as an Islamist Party, high rank JDP leaders consistently refused to utilize a similar 
articulation while labeled the new party as the follower of conservative democracy.  Thus, 
from the very beginning of its government term, JDP‘s performance in terms of foreign policy 
choices, particularly the EU stance of the Party and its relations with USA as well as Israel 
were discussed profoundly. The main concern of the dissertation was to analyze Turkey‘s 
foreign policy under Justice and Development Party governments in 2001-2011 periods. More 
precisely, it intended to present political, economic, diplomatic and military aspects of 
relation prospects between Turkey and its surrounding both in close and far meaning as well 
as along with the international actors not excluding emerging global powers, so as to 
implement a proposed understanding of Turkey‘s foreign policy in this period in a 
comparative manner by examining traditional patterns and practices of Turkey‘s foreign 
policy to the period during in which AKP was in rule. Out of similar explanations, the 
dissertation aimed to suggest responds toward research question of the emerges as such 
―whether or to what extent changed Turkey‘s foreign policy during Justice and Development 
Party government periods in 2002-2011 and if Turkey‘s foreign policy experienced an axis 
shift under AKP rule.          
 Thence, as a consequence of realized objective scientific research under the 
framework theory and guidance of methodological approaches, the dissertation acquired 
bellow mentioned findings: 
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1- As it is suggested trough the hypothesis of the dissertation, the study rest upon the 
assumption that there was not a foreign policy change in Turkey‘s foreign policy 
paradigm under the rule of Justice and Development Party governments in 2002-2011. 
Contrary to mainstream literature blaming AKP to shift Turkey‘s traditional Western 
oriented foreign policy, although Turkey experienced some tune changes in terms of 
foreign policy in comparison to past practices, referring the Charles Hermann
1319
 a 
similar quantity change may not be interpreted as an axis shift that caused a radical 
shift of Turkey‘s traditional foreign policy orientation in accordance with the ―change 
within continuity‖1320 theory formulated by Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul.  
2- The dissertation concludes that Justice and Development Party in the course of its rule 
period in 2002-2011 followed a similar foreign policy objective in terms of Western 
connection of Turkey‘s foreign policy similar to traditional foreign policy paradigm of 
Republic of Turkey.   
3- AKP under its rule applied principles of Strategic Depth doctrine that shaped Turkey‘s 
foreign policy orientation to a large extent.
1321
      
4- As a continuation of reform process commenced with 57th Turkish government, AK 
Party undertook many significant legislative reforms to access full EU membership. 
The fact that full membership negotiations with the European Union commenced 
under the rule of AKP in 2005 explicitly indicates AKP‘s foreign policy decision 
makers‘ intention to gain a full membership at the end of negotiations. In this period, 
following acquisition of candidate status, Ankara‘s accession to full European Union 
membership followed a steady line parallel to its Westernization principle that 
constituted the fundamental principle of Turkey‘s foreign policy concept. When it 
comes to Cyprus tough it constituted the weak ring of Turkey‘s foreign policy, as a 
reflection of status quo principle Ankara deliberately hesitated to develop revisionist 
policies regarding the Cyprus issue. Notwithstanding to the fact that AKP‘s popular 
foreign policy rhetoric regarding the Cyprus issue ―deadlock is not a solution‖ may be 
appreciated as a shift trough Turkey's traditional line, nevertheless in particular foreign 
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policy configurations toward Cyprus issue under the rule of Özal as well indicated 
similar tendencies. To ease Turkey‘s accession to European Community, Turgut Özal 
as well tried to bypass status quo in Cyprus as an issue constituting a huge obstacle in 
front of Turkey‘s full membership to European Community.   
5- In terms of Turkey‘s reciprocal relations with the United States of America, it may be 
concluded that Justice and Development continued Turkey‘s foreign policy tradition 
with Washington that restructured at the post Cold War following the conjecture 
radically shifted after 11 September 2001. Although bilateral relations highly tensed 
under Presidency of Bush as it was highly harden to unilateralist approaches of White 
House. It is highly essential to note that as a consequence of Turkish Parliament‘s 
rejection of motion opening of Northern Front for the U.S. caused a considerable 
tension between Ankara and Washington. Additionally, as a consequence of Iraq‘s 
occupation and the process aftermaths also tensed reciprocal relations. Yet, peculiarly 
within the Presidency of Obama Turkey - U.S. reciprocal relations launched back to 
its historical path, moreover as refer to Iraq crisis in terms of relations between Ankara 
- Washington, both sides since the establishment of reciprocal relations opposed 
seriously tough similar conflicts did not harm the nature of mutual relations. The fact 
that President Obama‘s first time oversea visit took place in Turkey and new level of 
relations called as ―model partnership‖ is an explicit indicator of Turkey‘s foreign 
relations toward the U.S. under the rule of AKP.  
6- It is an incontrovertible reality that Justice and Development Party for the time of its 
government terms in 2002-2011 caught on an unorthodox amalgamation practice with 
Middle East states adverse to traditional Turkey‘s foreign policy that favored to advent 
the region merely through a national-security standpoint. Yet, Turkey‘s foreign policy 
attitude toward the Middle East in this period mostly shaped under the rule of Turgut 
Özal parallel to Gulf War. Towards the initial of the new millennium Turkey‘s 
engagement with Middle East in terms of political and economic relations highly 
increased. Softening relations with Syria aftermath of Adana Protocols, natural gas 
agreements with Iran and close affiliation with Israel in this period are good samples 
to figure out Ankara‘s engagement with the Middle East in this period as a 
consequence of newly emerged regional and international conjecture. Collapse of 
Soviet Union also deeply influenced Turkey‘s foreign policy attitude toward Russia, 
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Southern Caucasus and Central Asian states following the end of the Cold War. Turkic 
states in Central Asia and South Caucasus as well highly contributed Turkey to 
develop a multidimensional foreign policy orientation in the region upon a balance 
policy among Russia - China and Iran triangle not excluding Western interests in the 
region. Taken into consideration Turkey‘s foreign policy engagement in post 2002 
period under the AKP rule, Turkey‘s foreign policy affiliation with diverse regions 
including the Middle East may not be considered as an axis shift.    
7- AKP‘s relation prospects with Russian Federation as well is a continuation of 
Turkey‘s traditional foreign policy concept that most shaped following the end of the 
Cold War. The melting relations with Moscow that initially bore a rivalry character 
soon diversified with economic and trade based relations, besides thanks to 
cooperation prospects in energy issues reciprocal relations highly reinforced. Similar 
to this very line towards Russia, AKP continued Turkey‘s traditional foreign policy 
towards Russia. In spite of all affiliations the traditional character of mutual relation 
that based on a strict rivalry on Balkans, Caucasus, Black Sea and Central Asia did not 
change in the course of rule period of AKP in 2002-2011.      
8- AKP under its rule period tried to keep traditional foreign policy concept of Ankara 
towards Southern Caucasus as a region highly essential for Turkey‘s national security 
perceptions regarding Russian expansion. Although, converse to post-Cold War 
paradigm of Turkey‘s foreign policy, AKP decision makers proved to change status 
quo in terms of relation with Armenia, however a similar shift did not realize due to 
fragile structure of Southern Caucasus. It is vital to highlight that a similar foreign 
policy engagement of AKP was highly encouraged by European Union and United 
States of America. Additionally, regarding the foreign policy relations with Central 
Asian Republics, Justice and Development Party under its office terms kept Republic 
of Turkey‘s foreign policy line that shaped following the end of the Cold War. It may 
be argued that as a part of continuity of the current status quo, AKP in this period 
evaded experiencing conflicts with Russia, while preferred to apply trade, business, 
and culture based policies toward Central Asia. 
9- As a requirement of changing conjecture Ankara aimed to gain diversity to its foreign 
policy particularly in terms of economics developing constructive relations with the 
emerging global actors like Chine, India and Brazil that are known as BRICS. Yet, it 
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is mandatory to state that Turkey‘s close engagement with BRICS is not a political 
preference specific solely to Justice and Development Party as similar engagement as 
well commenced with the end of the Cold War as a demand of new world order.  
10- The dissertation holds the point that regarding traditional continuity principle of 
foreign policy under the rule of AKP, the ―westernization‖ as an essential principle of 
Turkey‘s foreign policy was kept. What is more, the ―status quo‖ principle of 
Turkey‘s foreign policy was highly observed as Turkey under AKP government in 
2001-2011 did not follow a revisionist foreign policy concept.    
  
11-  Another remarkable finding of the dissertation regarding the AKP rule is Turkey‘s 
preference of using soft power applications and its increasing role as a mediator 
towards conflicts arose its vicinity.  
12-  The dissertation argues that, though, under the rule of AKP, Ankara developed 
alternative paradigms in foreign policy sphere with the ―zero problem principle‖ or 
―rhythmic diplomacy‖ rhetoric, Turkey‘s constructive engagement in foreign policy 
had initialized by previous governments. Many new foreign policy application 
dynamics that seemed to be introduced by Ahmet Davutoğlu as an example of active 
foreign policy, rhythmic diplomacy, regionalism, trade and commerce based relations, 
energy policies and encouragement of direct foreign investment essentially have its 
roots in Özal period where Turkey restructured its foreign policy concept upon the 
demands of newly emerged international and regional dynamics arose following the 
end of the Cold War.   
Henceforth, based on similar findings and following all similar foreign policy analysis within 
the scope of the dissertation, it may be concluded that under the rule of Justice and 
Development Party government in 2002-2011, on contrary to all mainstream critics accusing 
Justice and Development Party to follow an Islamist - Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy which 
resulted in an axis shift of Turkey‘s Western oriented foreign policy line, Turkey‘s foreign 
policy did not lead towards any major changes. Justice and Development Party, similar to 
previous Turkish governments followed a rationalist, pragmatic; initiative based proactive 
foreign policy supported by rhythmic diplomacy toward Turkey‘s natural periphery. It is an 
undeniable fact that, a similar rhythmic diplomacy seem to be an unaccustomed foreign policy 
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reflex for traditional foreign policy paradigm of Ankara, however as regard to changing 
internal and external dynamics that emerged following the end of the Cold War, a similar 
practice is visible in Turkey‘s foreign policy practices. Turkey‘s soft power based peaceful 
endeavors and engagements in Turkish periphery and in its vicinity as well as its role model 
was de facto supported through its Western alliance‘s -the United States of America and the 
European Union- in this period.        
 A similar foreign policy orientation of Justice and Development Party was appreciated 
as an axis shift of Turkey‘s Western orientation while AK Party foreign policy decision 
makers called it as a special political maneuver to create a balance against spoiling relations 
with the European Union. Though, in all means high rank AK Party officials highlighted that 
Turkey is not in search of a alternative alliance model instead of its Western direction, 
particularly Turkey‘s Foreign Minister Davutoğlu through its academic writings indicated that 
Middle East is Turkey‘s natural periphery the importance of which should not be 
underestimated. On the other hand, the regional and international dynamics following the 9/11 
attacks and Afghanistan and Iraq war pushed Turkey‘s foreign policy decision makers to 
follow a similar policy. Additionally, the ―neighborhood forum‖ initialized by 57th 
government prior to AK Party initialized an active diplomacy process with the Middle East 
neighbors of Turkey to repair spoiled relations.       
 In spite of the recessing relations with the EU converse to highly blooming 
associations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine as well as other Arabic countries of the Middle 
East, it may not be argued that Turkey‘s foreign policy had shifted to East under Justice and 
Development Party government. Although, along with AK Party government‘s, in particular, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan‘s harsh critics against Israel that resulted with the minimizing 
relations with Tel Aviv as well as Turkey‘s open rejection against the United States of 
America in terms of opening its territories the nature of Turkey‘s foreign policy‘s Eastern 
direction did not change radically. Turkey‘s foreign policy decision makers, as it was 
experienced in AK Party example, previously many times realized similar attempts so as to 
strengthen its hand and to imply alternative options for Turkey‘s foreign policy. On the other 
hand, regardless of all positive and constructive affiliations with Syria, for instance, where 
both countries turned out to be strategic allies, following the Arab Spring mutual relations 
turned back to 90‘s level as both countries came to edge of war due to strained relations. 
Presently, as a consequence of 2011 uprisings all positive gains of the affiliations obtained in 
the course of Justice and Development Party came back to zero point. Syria closed its 
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consulate as well as border customs while suspended all trade and commerce agreements as 
regard to Turkey‘s initiatives to apply sanctions against Assad regime through Arab League.  
 The blooming relations with Iran that initialized due to Iranian Uranium enrichment 
crisis as well came to a deadlock as a result of Tehran‘s reluctance to propose abstract 
resolution models. Besides, when Turkish government accepted NATO missile shield radars 
in its territories that appreciated as an act against Iran, thus from the highest level Iran 
authorities menaced Turkey in case of a potential attack the radars would be primary targets. 
Furthermore, religious authorities of Iran Islam Republic criticized Turkey to promote 
secularist policies following the Arab Spring as well as Ankara‘s policies against Syria and 
closed its air space to Turkish Air Forces against operation that Turkey used against its 
struggle with PKK terror.         
 On contrary to severe criticism accusing AK Party to follow an Islamist or Neo 
Ottomanist foreign policy agenda toward Middle East, Turkey‘s foreign policy behaviors in 
the course of Arab Spring as well constituted disproving arguments. Ankara at Libya 
example, for instance, instead of following a religious brotherhood policy in solidarity with 
Muslim Libya, applied a rational foreign policy along with international community. Republic 
of Turkey strongly backed opponents of Gaddafi at this period while advocated the role of 
NATO as well joined operations to consolidate embargo against the ports held by the 
supporters of Colonel Muhammer Ghaddafi.       
 In general terms, the dissertation concludes the idea that Justice and Development 
Party made a successful analysis of the new international context that emerged at post 9/11 
conjecture. AK Party decision makers pragmatically perceived the major chances took place 
both in international and regional scale and posed Turkey‘s foreign policy parallel to this very 
situation. It can be argued that JDP‘s new foreign policy discourse and active diplomacy is a 
continuation of Turkey‘s foreign policy that arose following the end of the Cold War, besides 
it may be appreciated as a  product of  post 9/11 international system that bears heavy traces 
of Afghanistan and Iraq occupation.    
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